Consent Search and Failure to Stop or Remain at Scene of Accident (Repealed Offence): Difference between pages

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{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderWarrantless}}
{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderOffences}}
==General Principles==
<!-- -->
A search by consent is one form of [[Warrantless Searches|warrantless search]].
A search conducted with valid consent is lawful.<ref>''R v Chang'', [http://canlii.ca/t/4s1h 2003 ABCA 293] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}}{{at|28}}</ref>


Valid consent exists where the following is present:<ref>  
{{OffenceBox |OffenceTitle=Failure to Stop or Remain at Scene of Accident|OffencePage=Failure to Stop or Remain at Scene of Accident|Section=252(1.1) and (1.2)|Act={{OBCCC}} |CrownElection= {{OBHybridIndictableElection}} |Jurisdiction={{OBJurisdictionAll}}  |Bail= {{OBBailVar}} |SummaryDisp= {{OBDispAll}} |SummaryMin= {{OBMinNone}} |SummaryMax= {{OBSConviction}} |IndictableDisp= {{OBDisp14orLifeVar}} |IndictableMin= {{OBMinNone}} |IndictableMax={{OBTime|5 years}}<Br>{{OBTime|10 years}} (harm) or<Br> {{OBMaxLife}} (death)}}
''R v Wills'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1npnl 1992 CanLII 2780] (ON CA), (1992), 70 CCC (3d) 529{{perONCA|Doherty JA}} at 69<br>
 
''R v Cooper'', [http://canlii.ca/t/2f7rc 2011 ABQB 17] (CanLII){{perABQB|Kenny J}} at paras 35-41<br>
==Overview==
''R v Borden'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1frrd 1994 CanLII 63], [1994] 3 SCR 145{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}}<br>
{{OverviewVIII|failure to stop or remain at scene of accident}}
''R v Rutten'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1mldp 2006 SKCA 17] (CanLII){{perSKCA|Smith JA}}{{at|35}}<br>
 
</ref>
; Pleadings
#There was a consent, either express or implied;
{{PleadingsHeader}}
#The consenting party has the authority to give the consent;
{{PleadingsHybridList|s. 252(1.1) [failure to stop] | Yes | {{YesIfCrown}} }}
#Consent was voluntary and not the product of police oppression, coercion or other external conduct negating freedom to choose not to consent;
{{PleadingsIndictableList|s. 252(1.2) [with bodily harm] and<br>s. 252(1.3) [with death] | {{NA}} | Yes }}
#The consenting party knew of the nature of the police conduct to which he or she was being asked to consent;
{{PleadingsEnd}}
#The consenting party knew they had the ability to refuse the search;
 
#The consenting party was aware of the potential consequences of giving the consent, including a general understanding of the jeopardy resulting from the police conduct about which the consent was being sought.
{{PleadingsHybridElection|s. 252(1.1) [failure to stop]}}
 
{{PleadingsIndictElection|s. 252(1.2) [with bodily harm] and 252(1.3) [with death]}}
 
; Release
{{ReleaseHeader}}
|s. 252(1.1) || {{ReleaseProfileAll}}  
|-
|s. 252(1.2) or (1.3) || {{ReleaseProfileOnlyBail}}
|-
{{ReleaseEnd}}
 
{{ReleaseAllOptions|s. 252(1.1)}}
 
{{ReleaseOnlyBail|s. 252(1.2) or (1.3)}}
 
{{ReverseOnusCirc}}
 
{{IDCriminalAct|s. 252}}


; Voluntary
; Publication Bans
For consent to be valid it must be voluntary and informed. Voluntary search requires that the consent to be given without coercion.<ref>
{{GeneralPubBan}}
''R v Bergauer-Free'', [http://canlii.ca/t/253pd 2009 ONCA 610] (CanLII){{perONCA|Moldaver JA}}{{at|57}}<br>
See also ''R v Goldman'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1tx9c 1979 CanLII 60] (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 976{{perSCC|Mclntyre J}} at p. 1005
</ref>


; Informed consent
; Offence Designations
Informed consent to a search requires the accused to be aware of the right to refuse the search and the consequences of consenting to the search.<ref>
{{DesignationHeader}}  
{{supra1|Wills}} <br>
|-
''R v Borden'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1frrd 1994 CanLII 63] (SCC), (1994), 33 C.R. (4th) 147{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}} at 158 <br>
|s. 252 || {{XMark}} <!--wire--> || {{XMark}} <!--DO-->||{{XMark}} <!--SPIO--> || {{XMark}} <!--consent-->  
''R v SS'', [http://canlii.ca/t/205d8 2008 ONCA 578] (CanLII){{perONCA|Doherty JA}} at paras 48, 52<br>
{{DesignationEnd}}
cf. ''R v Lupien'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1nmsf 1995 CanLII 5211] (QC CA), (1995) 68 QAC 253 (CA){{perQCCA|Rothman JA}}<br>
''R v Blackstock'', [http://canlii.ca/t/232ch 1997 CanLII 14495] (ON CA), (1997) 10 CR 5th 385 (ONCA){{TheCourtONCA}}<br>
''US v Drayton'' 536 US 194 (2002) - police need not inform of right as long as there was no coercion, intimidation, or confrontation<br>
</ref>The party expressing "consent must be possessed of the requisite informational foundation for a true relinquishment of the right.  A right to choose requires not only the volition to prefer one option over another, but also sufficient available information to make the preference meaningful.”<ref>''R v Borden'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1frrd 1994 CanLII 63] (SCC), [1994] 3 SCR 145{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}}</ref>


; Notice of Right to Refuse
{{SeeBelowForAncillary}}
The cases are divided on whether the police need to give clear instructions on the right to refuse. <ref>
''R v Rutten'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1mldp 2006 SKCA 17] (CanLII){{perSKCA|Smith JA}} at paras 39 to 44, the court stated that permission to enter to search a dwelling must include information on the person's right to refuse<br></ref>
Courts opposed to the requirement state that the standard of informed consent is less than the informational component of s. 10(b). The police need not tell the accused of the right to refuse consent. However, a failure to do so may result in a lack of informed consent.<ref>
''R v Lewis'' (1998) 122 CCC (3d) 481 (ONCA), [http://canlii.ca/t/4q25 1998 CanLII 7116] (ON CA){{perONCA|Doherty JA}}<br>
</ref>


; Waiver
==Offence Wording==
The Crown must establish that the accused right to be searched was waived clearly and unequivocally.<ref>
{{quotation|
''R v Collins'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftnd 1987 CanLII 84] (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 265{{perSCC|Lamer J}}</ref> 
; Failure to stop at scene of accident
However, where the accused is given access to counsel there is a presumption of informed consent unless the accused shows otherwise.<ref>
252. (1) Every person commits an offence who has the care, charge or control of a vehicle, vessel or aircraft that is involved in an accident with
''R v Williams'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1dgtn 1992 CanLII 295] (BC SC), (1992) 76 CCC 385 (BCSC){{perBCSC|Melnick J}}<br>
:(a) another person,
''R v Deprez'' (1994) 95 CCC 29 (MBCA), [http://canlii.ca/t/gbrwh 1994 CanLII 16612] (MB CA){{perMBCA|Scott CJ}}<br>
:(b) a vehicle, vessel or aircraft, or
</ref>
:(c) in the case of a vehicle, cattle in the charge of another person,<br>


; Effect of Consent
and with intent to escape civil or criminal liability fails to stop the vehicle, vessel or, if possible, the aircraft, give his or her name and address and, where any person has been injured or appears to require assistance, offer assistance.
Once consent is given there is no future expectation of privacy.<ref>''R v Arp'', [1998] 3 SCR 339, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqq7 1998 CanLII 769] (SCC){{perSCC|Cory J}} at 90</ref>
<br>
; Punishment
(1.1) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) in a case not referred to in subsection (1.2) or (1.3) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
<br>
; Offence involving bodily harm
(1.2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) knowing that bodily harm has been caused to another person involved in the accident is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.
<br>
; Offence involving bodily harm or death
(1.3) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life if
:(a) the person knows that another person involved in the accident is dead; or
:(b) the person knows that bodily harm has been caused to another person involved in the accident and is reckless as to whether the death of the other person results from that bodily harm, and the death of that other person so results.<br>


; invalidating consent
<br>...
A threat to get a warrant when the officer knows there is no grounds to do so can invalidate consent to search.<ref>
<br>
''R v O’Connor'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1cgld 2002 CanLII 3540] (ON CA){{perONCA|O'Connor ACJ}} at paras 74, 75<br>
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 252; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 36; 1994, c. 44, s. 12; 1999, c. 32, s. 1(Preamble).
</ref> However, it is not necessary the police ever let the accused know that there is no grounds to search the item for which consent is sought.<ref>
|[http://canlii.ca/t/7vf2#sec252 CCC]
{{ibid1|O’Connor}}{{at|75}}</ref>
}}


; Coercion
==Proof of the Offence==
Coercion will exist where there are threats made should the accused refuse to give consent.<ref>
{{ElementHeader}}
''R v Bergauer-Free'', [http://canlii.ca/t/253pd 2009 ONCA 610] (CanLII){{perONCA|Moldaver JA}} - police threaten to bring in the canine unit should consent be refused. This was found to be "colorably lawful coercion"<br>
{{ElementLeft}}
</ref>


; Honest But Mistaken Belief in Consent
{{Proving|Failure to Stop or Remain at Scene of Accident|252(1), (1.1)}}
Police are not permitted to justify a warrantless search on the basis that they had a mistaken belief in consent.<ref>
{{InitialElements}}
{{supra1|Wills}} (“where the Crown relies on the consent of an individual as authorization for a seizure and fails to establish the validity of that consent, then the seizure cannot be brought within s. 8 based upon the police officer’s perception of the validity of the consent”)<br>
# {{Box}} the accused must be the operator of one of the vehicles
''R v Reeves'', [http://canlii.ca/t/hphzk 2017 ONCA 365] (CanLII){{perONCA|LaForme JA}}{{at|71}}<br>
# {{Box}} the make and model of the vehicle driven by accused
</ref>
# {{Box}} there must be an accident with a person, vehicle, or cattle
# {{Box}} the condition of the objects before and after a collision
# {{Box}} the culprit must be aware of the accident
# {{Box}} the accused did not stop, give his name/address or offer assistance to any injured persons
# {{Box}} the accused must flee for the purpose of escaping criminal or civil liability in relation to the accident (presumed under s. 252(2))


; Burden
{{ElementRight}}
The burden is upon the Crown to prove consent on a balance of probabilities.<ref>
{{supra1|Wills}} at p. 353<br>
''R v Colson'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1vdtv 2008 ONCA 21] (CanLII), 88 O.R. (3d) 752{{perONCA|Blair JA}}, at para 23 leave denied [2008] SCCA No 101<br>
''R v Simon'', [http://canlii.ca/t/205d8 2008 ONCA 578] (CanLII){{perONCA|Doherty JA}}{{at|49}}<br>
{{supra1|Rutten}}{{at|36}}<br>
</ref>
{{reflist|2}}


===Consent to Enter Residence to Arrest===
{{Proving|Failure to Stop or Remain at Scene of Accident|252(1.2)}}
# {{Box}} underlying elements of s. 252(1), (1.1)
# {{Box}} the culprit knew that "bodily harm has been caused to another person involved in the accident"


Consent entry for the purpose of arrest is an exception to the rule from ''R v Feeney'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1fr1w 1997 CanLII 342] (SCC){{perSCC|Sopinka J}} requiring a "Feeney warrant" to enter a residence for arrest.<ref>
{{Proving|Failure to Stop or Remain at Scene of Accident|252(1.3)}}
''Tymkin v Ewatski et al''., [http://canlii.ca/t/g2mxs 2014 MBCA 4] (CanLII){{perMBCA|Monnin JA}}
# {{Box}} underlying elements of s. 252(1), (1.1)
</ref>
# {{Box}} the culprit "knows that another person involved in the accident is dead" or "knows that bodily harm has been caused to another person involved in the accident and is reckless as to whether the death of the other person results from that bodily harm, and the death of that other person so results".


When executing a warrant, police may enter premises by consent where there exists:<ref>
{{ElementEnd}}
''R v RMJT'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g6px4 2014 MBCA 36] (CanLII){{perMBCA|Cameron JA}}{{at|46}}<br>
{{supra1|Tymkin v Ewatski}}{{at|89}}<br>
</ref>
# it must be given by someone who has a privacy interest in the premises
# the consent must be an informed one


{{Reflist|2}}
==Interpretation of the Offence==


===Consent to Enter Residence to Search===
; Duty
Consent to search a residence is guided by the "reasonable expectation of privacy".<ref>
The offence imposes a duty upon all people to stop their vehicles, provide their name and address, and offer assistance to injured persons. A failure to do any of these duties will make out the ''mens rea'' of the offence.<ref>
''R v RMJT'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g6px4 2014 MBCA 36] (CanLII){{perMBCA|Cameron JA}}{{at|48}}
''R v Parks'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fp5g1 1979 ABCA 242] (CanLII){{perABCA|Harradence JA}} at paras 7, 8<br>
</ref> A person who does not possess an expectation of privacy may not consent to a search.<ref>
''R v Steere'', (1972) 6 CCC (2d) 403 (BCCA), [http://canlii.ca/t/gd6xk 1972 CanLII 1256] (BC CA){{perBCCA|MacFarlane JA}}<br>
{{ibid1|RMJT}} at para 48
</ref>
</ref>


The relationship between the consenter and the suspect is not determinative.<ref>
; ''Mens Rea''
{{ibid1|RMJT}}{{at|48}}<br>
Actual subjective knowledge of the accident is necessary.<ref>
''R v Slessor'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g16np 1969 CanLII 248] (ON CA), [1970] 2 CCC 247 (Ont. C.A.){{perONCA|Laskin JA}} at pp. 260-61<br>
''R v Faulkner (No. 2)'' (1977), 37 CCC (2d) 217 (N.S. Co. Ct.), [http://canlii.ca/t/htz2d 1977 CanLII 1976] (NS SC){{perNSSC|McLellan J}}<br>
''R v MacDonald'' (1972), 8 CCC (2d) 16 (B.C.S.C.), [http://canlii.ca/t/gclts 1972 CanLII 1286] (BC SC){{perBCSC|Berger J}} at p. 18 - ("The test therefore is a subjective one.  Did the accused know he had been involved in an accident?")<br>
see also ''R v Bartlett'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1nm51 1994 CanLII 4427] (NL SCTD){{perNLSC|Barry J}}
</ref>
 
; Circumstances of the Offence
It is not necessary for the Crown to prove that there was any damage or injury.<ref>
''R v Chase'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1nh0z 2006 BCCA 275] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Rowles JA}}{{At|40}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


A parent can consent to a search of a child's portion of a residence as long as there were no restrictions on the parent's access to the zone of privacy.<ref>
Section 252(1)(a) can include a single vehicle accident where "another person" refers to the passenger of the vehicle.<ref>
{{ibid1|RMJT}}{{at|48}}<br>
''R v McColl'', [http://canlii.ca/t/209rp 2008 ABCA 287] (CanLII){{perABCA|Hunt JA}}{{at|28}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}
===Definitions===
[[Criminal Code and Related Definitions|Section 214]] defines "aircraft" and "vessel".


==Implied Licence==
'''"Liability"'''<br>
The "occupier of a dwelling gives implied licence to any member of the public, including a police officer, on legitimate business to come on to the property” <ref>
"Liability" refers to liability that flows from the accident, not simply any liability that may arise from unrelated acts.<ref>
''R v Evans'', [1996] 1 SCR 8, [http://canlii.ca/t/1frf4 1996 CanLII 248] (SCC){{perSCC|Sopinka J}}{{at|13}} , citing ''R v Tricker'', [http://canlii.ca/t/6jqj 1995 CanLII 1268] (ON CA), (1995), 21 O.R. (3d) 575{{perONCA|Galligan JA}}{{atp|579}}<br>
R v Hofer, [http://canlii.ca/t/g7m35 1982 CanLII 2378] (SK CA), (1982), 2 CCC (3d) 236 (Sask. C.A.){{perSKCA|Hall JA}} - judge found sole reason for failing to stop was to avoid arrest due to outstanding warrants<br>
See also [[Plain View Search and Seizure#Officer Trespassing and Perimeter Searches|Plain View Search and Seizure]]<br>
</ref>
</ref>
The licence "ends at the door of the dwelling."<ref>
{{ibid1|Tricker}}{{at|12}}</ref>
Privacy rights are waived unless there is a clear expression of intent rebutting this.<ref>Evans at 13</ref>


This consent extends only insofar as it permits a person to conveniently communicate with the occupant and the activities reasonably associated with this purpose.<ref>
{{reflist|2}}
{{supra1|Evans}}{{at|15}}</ref>
===Section 252 Presumption of ''Mens Rea''===
It does not extend to police approaching and knocking at the door for the purpose of collecting evidence against the occupant.<ref>
Section 252(2) creates a presumption where there is evidence of the accused failing to stop that is proof of intent to escape criminal or civil liability. This presumption can be negated by evidence of intoxication.<ref>R v Nolet (1980), OJ No. 3027 (ONCA){{NOCANLII}}</ref> The presumption is rebutted by presenting evidence that raises a doubt.<ref>
{{supra1|Evans}} at para 16, 18, 20, 21</ref>
R v Kleberc, [http://canlii.ca/t/1tdgd 2007 YKTC 61] (CanLII){{perYKTC|Luther J}}{{at|11}}<br>
 
Entering on a person's driveway, where in plainview of the public will be included in the licence.<ref>
''R v Lotozky'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1nnqj 2006 CanLII 21041] (ON CA), (2006), 210 CCC (3d) 509{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}} - police observed impaired driver exiting his car in the driveway</ref> But this was found impermissible for an attached garage.<ref>
''R v Noerenberg'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1w6kg 1997 CanLII 12354] (ON SC), [1997] OJ No 4628 (Ont. Gen. Div.){{perONSC|Lally J}}<br>
''R v Maciel'', [http://canlii.ca/t/51nk 2003 CanLII 32396] (ON CA), (2003), 33 M.V.R. (4th) 152{{TheCourtONCA}} - attached garage different from driveway<br>
''R v Clements'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1sxsz 2007 ABPC 220] (CanLII), [2007] AJ No 1024 (ABPC){{perABPC|Fraser J}}<br>
See also ''R v Belnavis'', [1997] 3 SCR 341, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqzw 1997 CanLII 320] (SCC){{perSCC|Cory J}} - stating attached garage including in privacy of home
</ref>
</ref>


A business open to the public will also provide a similar licence for police to enter.<ref>
The effect of s. 252(2) is that once the full ''actus reus'' is proven then the ''mens rea'' is presumed until there is evidence to the contrary.<REf>
''R v Fitt'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1mqf2 1995 CanLII 4342] (NS CA){{perNSCA|Hallett JA}} aff'd [1996] 1 SCR 70, [http://canlii.ca/t/1frfb 1996 CanLII 251] (SCC){{perSCC|Lamer CJ}}<br>
R v Roche, [http://canlii.ca/t/1xv6l 1983 CanLII 130] (SCC), [1983] 1 SCR 491{{perSCC|Lamer J}}<br>
''R v Spindloe'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1fjk0 2001 SKCA 58] (CanLII){{perSKCA|Jackson JA}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Consent to enter a home does not include a blanket right to search the whole house including the basement.<ref>''R v Smith'', [http://canlii.ca/t/5scs 1998 ABCA 418] (CanLII), (1998), 128 CCC (3d) 62 (ABCA){{perABCA|Conrad JA}}</ref>
{{quotation|
252<Br>...<Br>
; Evidence
(2) In proceedings under subsection (1), evidence that an accused failed to stop his vehicle, vessel or, where possible, his aircraft, as the case may be, offer assistance where any person has been injured or appears to require assistance and give his name and address is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof of an intent to escape civil or criminal liability.
<br>
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 252; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 36; 1994, c. 44, s. 12; 1999, c. 32, s. 1(Preamble).
|[http://canlii.ca/t/7vf2#sec252 CCC]
}}


What constitutes implied licence "must be analyzed in [its] context".<ref>
Section 252(2) requires an accused who is involved in an accident to:<Ref>''R v Seipp'', [http://canlii.ca/t/gx81v 2017 BCCA 54] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Bennett JA}}{{at|30}}<br>
{{supra1|Evans}}
</ref>
</ref>
# stop
#  give their name and address, and
# offer assistance if a person appears injured or in need of assistance.


When "an invitee’s purpose changes from lawful to unlawful while on the premises, they become a trespasser.<ref>
A failure to do any of these steps will result in engaging the presumption under s. 252(2).<ref>
''R v Nobile'' (2006), 75 W.C.B. (2d) 581 (Ont. S.C.){{NOCANLII}}{{at|53}}
{{ibid1|Seipp}}{{at|30}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
{{reflist|2}}


==Authority to Consent and Third Party Consent==
Despite anything said in s. 252(2), the burden always remains on the Crown. This presumption "does not place any onus on the accused to establish his lack of intent".<ref>
 
{{supra1|Roche}}{{At|23}} ("The presumption provision does not place any onus on the accused to establish his lack of intent.  The onus remains on the Crown to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption provision simply assists the Crown in achieving that standard of proof and is applicable only in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.")<Br>
A third party cannot consent or waive a suspect's rights under s. 8 of the Charter.<ref>
</ref>
''R v Reeves'', [http://canlii.ca/t/hwk3k 2018 SCC 56] (CanLII){{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}}<br>
It is only to be applied "only in the absence of any evidence to the contrary."<ref>
''R v Cole'', [http://canlii.ca/t/ft969  2012 SCC 53] (CanLII){{perSCC|Fish J}}
Roche{{ibid}} at para 23<br>
see also [[Presumptions#Evidence to the Contrary|Evidence to the Contrary]]<br>
</ref>
</ref>
 
The accused need only raise a reasonable doubt that he did not have the necessary intent.<Ref>
Third party consent by a wife or parent requires that the police also have diffident grounds to get a search warrant at the time.<ref>
''R v Proudlock'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1mktb  1978 CanLII 15] (SCC), [1979] 1 SCR 525{{perSCC|Pigeon J}} at 551<br>
''R v Barrett'', [1995] OJ No 920 (Ont. C.J.){{NOCANLII}}
Seipp at para 30<br>
</ref>
</ref>


; Mistaken Belief in Authority
The intent to escape liability must relate to liability arising from the accident at issue and not arising from other conduct that may result in liability.<ref>
For all searches, the police must have a subjective belief that they have consented to conduct the search and it must be an objectively reasonable belief in the circumstances. Where the police wrongly relied upon consent of a third party, the reasonableness of their belief will go to section 24(2) analysis.<ref>
''R v Fournier'', (1979), 8 C.R. (3d) 248 (Q.C.C.A), [http://canlii.ca/t/g0g7b 1979 CanLII 1619] (QC CA){{perQCCA|Dube JA}}<br>
''R v DiPalma'', [http://canlii.ca/t/20k8k 2008 BCCA 342] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Smith JA}}
</ref>
</ref>


Issues of consent seizure will most often be dealt with by way of warrantless seizure under s. 489.<ref>
Evidence establishing that the accused escaped to avoid being arrested rather than avoid liability is not evidence to the contrary.<Ref>
''R v RMJT'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g6px4 2014 MBCA 36] (CanLII){{perMBCA|Cameronn JA}} at para 29
Seipp{{supra}}<Br>
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}
===Joint Residency===
An "authorized occupant" of a residence may give consent to a search.<ref>
''R v Duarte'' (1987) 38 CCC (3d) 1 (ONCA), [http://canlii.ca/t/1p77j 1987 CanLII 175] (ON CA){{perONCA|Cory JA}}{{atp|11}}<br>
''R v Currie'', [http://canlii.ca/t/21f9l 2008 ABCA 374] (CanLII){{perABCA| Côté JA}} - resident gave consent to search house containing items of non-resident accused<br>
</ref>
This will usually include the homeowner.
<ref> ''R v Smith'', [http://canlii.ca/t/5scs 1998 ABCA 418] (CanLII){{perABCA|Conrad JA}}{{at|5}}</ref>


A parent of a suspect can usually consent to searches of the familial home where the suspect "does not expect restrictions on the access of others to those spaces".<ref>
==Participation of Third Parties==
{{ibid1|Reeves}}{{at|47}}<br>
{{seealso|Role of the Victim and Third Parties|Testimonial Aids for Young, Disabled or Vulnerable Witnesses}}
</ref>
 
; Testimonial Aids
{{3rdPTestimonyAids}}
 
; On Finding of Guilt
<!--
{{606Notice5Y|XX}}
{{606NoticeSPIO|XX}}
-->
{{RestitutionNotice}}


A landlord or neighbour does not constitute an "authorized occupant".<ref>
{{VISNotice}}
''R v Mercer'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g1390 1992 CanLII 7729] (ON CA), (1992) 70 CCC 180 (ONCA){{perONCA|Arbour JA}} - landlord<br>
''R v Blinch'' (1993) 83 CCC (3d) 158 (BCCA), [http://canlii.ca/t/1dbvq 1993 CanLII 1433] (BC CA){{perBCCA|Rowles JA}}<br>
</ref>


Guests can have the authority to consent to a search of a home, however, the authorization can be revoked by the homeowner.<ref>''R v Thomas'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1p8vs 1991 CanLII 2736] (NL CA){{perNLCA|Goodridge CJ}} aff'd at SCC</ref>
==Sentencing Principles and Ranges==
{{seealsoSentencing}}


The seizure of property "under mistaken authority is not necessarily fatal where authority otherwise exits".<ref>
; Maximum Penalties
''R v RMJT'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g6px4 2014 MBCA 36] (CanLII){{perMBCA|Cameron JA}}{{at|64}}<br>
{{SProfileMaxHeader}}
</ref>
{{SProfileMax|s. 252(1.1) [failure to stop] | Summary Election | {{summaryconviction}} }}
{{SProfileMax|s. 252(1.1) [failure to stop] | Indictable Election | 5 years custody }}
{{SProfileMax|s. 252(1.2) [with bodily harm]  | {{NA}} | 10 years custody }}  
{{SProfileMax|s. 252(1.3) [with death] | {{NA}} | life in custody }}  
{{SProfileEnd}}


'''Consent of Accused's Parents'''<br>
{{MaxPenaltyHybrid|s. 252(1.1)|'''5 years incarceration'''| '''{{summaryconviction}}''' }}
There will not necessarily be a violation of s. 8 where a parent consented to the search of the youth's bedroom.<ref>
R v F.(D.M.), [http://canlii.ca/t/5s36 1999 ABCA 267] (CanLII), (1999), 139 CCC (3d) 144 (Alta.C.A.), <br>
R v Figuerora [2002] OJ No 3138 (Ont. S.C.J.){{NOCANLII}}<br>
''R v Scheck'', [http://canlii.ca/t/5ktf 2002 BCSC 1046] (CanLII), [2002] BCJ No. 1671 (B.C.S.C.)<br>
</ref>
Parents who exercise control over a child's room or property may remove any expectation of privacy.<ref>
F(DM){{supra}}</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{MaxPenaltyIndictment|s. 252(1.2) and (1.3)| '''10 years''' under s. 252(1.2) or '''life''' under s. 252(1.3)}}
===Computers===
Police may not seize a device without a warrant that is jointly owned by multiple people unless they have the consent of ''all'' the owners.<ref>
''R v Reeves'', [http://canlii.ca/t/hwk3k 2018 SCC 56] (CanLII){{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}}
</ref>


<!--
; Minimum Penalties
Police may seize a hard drive where a computer repair technician has been given authority to examine the contents of the hard drive and finds illegal images.<ref>
{{NoMinimumPenalties}}
''R c Piette'', [http://canlii.ca/t/27brk 2009 QCCQ 14499] (CanLII){{perQCCQ|Bonin J}}<br>
''R v Winchester'', [http://canlii.ca/t/27qm8 2010 ONSC 652] (CanLII){{perONSC|Valin J}}<br>
</ref> The computer repair technician is not an agent of the state in calling the police.<ref>
{{ibid1|Winchester}}
</ref>


Joint interest in a thing such as a computer can permit one of the joint owners to give consent to search it.<ref>
; Available Dispositions
''R v Pommer'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1x6ms 2008 BCSC 423] (CanLII){{perBCSC|D Smith J}} - wife consenting to search of husband's property
{{SProfileAvailHeader}}
</ref> However, in the case of an estranged husband, the ex-wife cannot consent to a search.<ref>
|s. 252(1.1) || any || {{SProfileAll}}
''R v Libby'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1x3vt 2008 NBQB 36] (CanLII){{perNBQB| LaVigne J}}
|-
</ref>
|s. 252(1.2) || {{NA}} || {{SProfileAll}}
-->
|-
|s. 252(1.3) || {{NA}} || {{SProfileNoDischargeOrCSO}}
|-
{{SProfileEnd}}


; Employer Consent
{{AllDispositionsAvailable1|s. 252(1.1) or (1.2)}}
An employer cannot provide consent to examine the contents of an employee's computer where they hold any reasonable expectation of privacy.<ref>
{{supra1|Cole}}, at paras 74 to 79<br>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{NoDischargeAvailable|s. 252(1.3)}}


==Mandatory Consent==
{{NoCSOAvailable|C|s. 252(1.3)}}
A court order, such as a probation order, can in certain circumstances require an offender to consent to random searches.<ref> ''R v Unruh'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fs66q 2012 SKCA 72] (CanLII){{perSKCA|Herauf JA}} </ref>
{{reflist|2}}


==Consent by Organizations Holding Personal Information==
; Consecutive Sentences
Privacy of personal information within private companies is governed by the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).
{{NoConsecutive}}


Section 7(3) permits the disclosure of personal information without the subject's knowledge or consent:
===Principles===


{{quotation|
===Ranges===
; Disclosure without knowledge or consent
{{seealsoRanges|Failure to Stop or Remain at Scene of Accident}}
(3) For the purpose of clause 4.3 of Schedule 1, and despite the note that accompanies that clause, an organization may disclose personal information without the knowledge or consent of the individual only if the disclosure is<br>
...<br>
:(c.1) made to a government institution or part of a government institution that has made a request for the information, identified its lawful authority to obtain the information and indicated that
::(i) it suspects that the information relates to national security, the defence of Canada or the conduct of international affairs,
::(ii) the disclosure is requested for the purpose of enforcing any law of Canada, a province or a foreign jurisdiction, carrying out an investigation relating to the enforcement of any such law or gathering intelligence for the purpose of enforcing any such law, or
::(iii) the disclosure is requested for the purpose of administering any law of Canada or a province;<br>
...<br>
:(d) made on the initiative of the organization to an investigative body, a government institution or a part of a government institution and the organization
::(i) has reasonable grounds to believe that the information relates to a breach of an agreement or a contravention of the laws of Canada, a province or a foreign jurisdiction that has been, is being or is about to be committed, or
::(ii) suspects that the information relates to national security, the defence of Canada or the conduct of international affairs;<br>
...<br>
:(h.2) made by an investigative body and the disclosure is reasonable for purposes related to investigating a breach of an agreement or a contravention of the laws of Canada or a province; ...
|[http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-2000-c-5/latest/sc-2000-c-5.html PIPEDA]
}}


Under this section a peace officer may make a Law Enforcement Request (LER) requesting particular information of an accused person without their consent. A proper LER should identify the person requesting the information, what information is being requested, the purpose of the request for the information (presumably to obtain evidence to an offence). The organization is permitted but not required to provide the information requested.
==Ancillary Sentencing Orders==
{{seealso|Ancillary Orders}}
; Offence-specific Orders
{{AOrderHeader}}
| [[DNA Orders]] ||s. 252||
* {{SecondDNA(CtoE)|s. 252}}
{{AOrderEnd}}


{{reflist|2}}
; General Sentencing Orders
{{GeneralSentencingOrders}}


Related: [[Crown Duty to Disclose|Disclosure]]
; General Forfeiture Orders
{{GeneralForfeitureOrders}}


==See Also==
==See Also==
* [[Waiver of Charter Rights]]
; References
* [[Pre-Trial and Trial Motions Checklist]]
 
{{OffencesNavBar/MotorVehicles}}
 
 
[[Category:Offences Punishable on Summary Conviction]]
 
[[Category:Offences with Maximum Penalty of 5 Years]]
[[Category:Offences with Maximum Penalty of 10 Years]]
[[Category:Offences with Maximum Penalty of Life]]

Revision as of 19:24, 9 February 2019


Failure to Stop or Remain at Scene of Accident
s. 252(1.1) and (1.2) of the Crim. Code
Election / Plea
Crown Election Hybrid / Indictable
summary proceedings must initiate within 12 months of the offence (786(2))
Jurisdiction Prov. Court

Sup. Court w/ Jury (*)
Sup. Court w/ Judge-alone (*)

* Must be indictable. Preliminary inquiry also available.
Summary Dispositions
Avail. Disp. Discharge (730)

Suspended Sentence (731(1)(a))
Fine (734)
Fine + Probation (731(1)(b))
Jail (718.3, 787)
Jail + Probation (731(1)(b))
Jail + Fine (734)

Conditional Sentence (742.1)
Minimum None
Maximum 2 years less a day jail and/or a $5,000 fine (from Sept 19, 2019)
Indictable Dispositions
Avail. Disp. Discharge (730)*

Suspended Sentence (731(1)(a))
Fine (734)
Fine + Probation (731(1)(b))
Jail (718.3, 787)
Jail + Probation (731(1)(b))
Jail + Fine (734)
Conditional Sentence (742.1)*

(* varies)
Minimum None
Maximum 5 years incarceration
10 years incarceration (harm) or
Life (death)
Reference
Offence Elements
Sentence Digests

Overview

Offences relating to failure to stop or remain at scene of accident are found in Part VIII of the Criminal Code concerning "Offences Against the Person and Reputation".

Pleadings
Template:PleadingsHybridListTemplate:PleadingsIndictableList
Offence
Section
Offence
Type
Crown Election Defence Election
s. 536(2)

Offences under s. 252(1.1) [failure to stop] are hybrid with a Crown election. If prosecuted by indictment, there is a Defence election of Court under s. 536(2).

Offences under s. 252(1.2) [with bodily harm] and 252(1.3) [with death] are straight indictable. There is a Defence election of Court under s. 536(2).

Release
Offence(s) Appearance Notice
by Peace Officer

s. 497
Summons
by Judge or Justice

s. 508(1), 512(1), or 788
Release by
Peace Officer
on Undertaking

s. 498, 499, and 501
Release By
a Judge or Justice
on a Release Order

s. 515 to 519
Direct to Attend
for Fingerprints, etc.
Identification of Criminals Act

s. 2 ID Crim. Act
s. 252(1.1) Template:ReleaseProfileAll
s. 252(1.2) or (1.3) Template:ReleaseProfileOnlyBail

When charged under s. 252(1.1), the accused can be given an appearance notice without arrest under s. 497 or a summons. If arrested, he can be released by the arresting officer under s. 498 or 499 on an undertaking with or without conditions. He can also be released by a justice under s. 515.

Template:ReleaseOnlyBail

If police decide to bring the accused before a Justice pursuant to s. 503, there will be a presumption against bail (i.e. a reverse onus) if the offence, prosecuted by indictment, was committed:

  • while at large under s. 515 [bail release], 679 or 680 [release pending appeal or review of appeal] (s. 515(6)(a)(i));
  • "for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association" with a criminal organization (s. 515(6)(a)(ii));
  • where the offence involved a weapon, being a firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, while the accused was subject to a prohibition order preventing possession of these items (s. 515(6)(a)(viii)); or
  • where the accused is not "ordinarily a resident in Canada" (s. 515(6)(b)).

And, regardless of Crown election, if the offence alleged was one:

  • where the offence was an allegation of violence against an "intimate partner" and the accused had been previously convicted of an offence of violence against an "intimate partner" (s. 515(6)(b.1));
  • where the offence alleged is a breach under s. 145(2) to (5) while (s. 515(6)(c));
  • where the offence committed (or conspired to commit) was an offence under s. 5 to 7 of the CDSA that is punishable by life imprisonment (s. 515(6)(d));

A peace officer who charges a person under s. 252 of the Code can require that person to attend for the taking of fingerprints, photographs or other similar recordings that are used to identify them under the Identification of Criminals Act.

Publication Bans

For all criminal or regulatory prosecutions, there is a discretionary general publication ban available on application of the Crown, victim or witness to prohibit the publishing of "any information that could identify the victim or witness" under s. 486.5(1) where it is "necessary" for the "proper administration of justice". Other available publication bans include prohibitions for publishing evidence or other information arising from a bail hearing (s. 517), preliminary inquiry (s. 539) or jury trial (s. 648). There is a mandatory publication ban in all youth prosecutions on information tending to identify young accused under s. 110 of the YCJA or young victims under s. 111 of the YCJA.

Offence Designations
Offence(s) Wiretap
Eligible

s. 183
Dangerous Offender
Designated Offence

s. 752
Serious Personal
Injury Offence

s. 752
AG Consent Required Serious Criminality
Offence
s. 36 IRPA
s. 252

See below in Ancillary Sentencing Orders for details on designations relating to sentencing orders.

Offence Wording

Failure to stop at scene of accident

252. (1) Every person commits an offence who has the care, charge or control of a vehicle, vessel or aircraft that is involved in an accident with

(a) another person,
(b) a vehicle, vessel or aircraft, or
(c) in the case of a vehicle, cattle in the charge of another person,

and with intent to escape civil or criminal liability fails to stop the vehicle, vessel or, if possible, the aircraft, give his or her name and address and, where any person has been injured or appears to require assistance, offer assistance.

Punishment

(1.1) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) in a case not referred to in subsection (1.2) or (1.3) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Offence involving bodily harm

(1.2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) knowing that bodily harm has been caused to another person involved in the accident is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.

Offence involving bodily harm or death

(1.3) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life if

(a) the person knows that another person involved in the accident is dead; or
(b) the person knows that bodily harm has been caused to another person involved in the accident and is reckless as to whether the death of the other person results from that bodily harm, and the death of that other person so results.


...
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 252; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 36; 1994, c. 44, s. 12; 1999, c. 32, s. 1(Preamble).


CCC

Proof of the Offence

Proving Failure to Stop or Remain at Scene of Accident under s. 252(1), (1.1) should include:

  1. identity of accused as culprit
  2. date and time of the incident
  3. jurisdiction (incl. region and province)
  4. the accused must be the operator of one of the vehicles
  5. the make and model of the vehicle driven by accused
  6. there must be an accident with a person, vehicle, or cattle
  7. the condition of the objects before and after a collision
  8. the culprit must be aware of the accident
  9. the accused did not stop, give his name/address or offer assistance to any injured persons
  10. the accused must flee for the purpose of escaping criminal or civil liability in relation to the accident (presumed under s. 252(2))

Proving Failure to Stop or Remain at Scene of Accident under s. 252(1.2) should include:

  1. underlying elements of s. 252(1), (1.1)
  2. the culprit knew that "bodily harm has been caused to another person involved in the accident"

Proving Failure to Stop or Remain at Scene of Accident under s. 252(1.3) should include:

  1. underlying elements of s. 252(1), (1.1)
  2. the culprit "knows that another person involved in the accident is dead" or "knows that bodily harm has been caused to another person involved in the accident and is reckless as to whether the death of the other person results from that bodily harm, and the death of that other person so results".

Interpretation of the Offence

Duty

The offence imposes a duty upon all people to stop their vehicles, provide their name and address, and offer assistance to injured persons. A failure to do any of these duties will make out the mens rea of the offence.[1]

Mens Rea

Actual subjective knowledge of the accident is necessary.[2]

Circumstances of the Offence

It is not necessary for the Crown to prove that there was any damage or injury.[3]

Section 252(1)(a) can include a single vehicle accident where "another person" refers to the passenger of the vehicle.[4]

  1. R v Parks, 1979 ABCA 242 (CanLII), per Harradence JA at paras 7, 8
    R v Steere, (1972) 6 CCC (2d) 403 (BCCA), 1972 CanLII 1256 (BC CA), per MacFarlane JA
  2. R v Slessor, 1969 CanLII 248 (ON CA), [1970] 2 CCC 247 (Ont. C.A.), per Laskin JA at pp. 260-61
    R v Faulkner (No. 2) (1977), 37 CCC (2d) 217 (N.S. Co. Ct.), 1977 CanLII 1976 (NS SC), per McLellan J
    R v MacDonald (1972), 8 CCC (2d) 16 (B.C.S.C.), 1972 CanLII 1286 (BC SC), per Berger J at p. 18 - ("The test therefore is a subjective one. Did the accused know he had been involved in an accident?")
    see also R v Bartlett, 1994 CanLII 4427 (NL SCTD), per Barry J
  3. R v Chase, 2006 BCCA 275 (CanLII), per Rowles JA, at para 40
  4. R v McColl, 2008 ABCA 287 (CanLII), per Hunt JA, at para 28

Definitions

Section 214 defines "aircraft" and "vessel".

"Liability"
"Liability" refers to liability that flows from the accident, not simply any liability that may arise from unrelated acts.[1]

  1. R v Hofer, 1982 CanLII 2378 (SK CA), (1982), 2 CCC (3d) 236 (Sask. C.A.), per Hall JA - judge found sole reason for failing to stop was to avoid arrest due to outstanding warrants

Section 252 Presumption of Mens Rea

Section 252(2) creates a presumption where there is evidence of the accused failing to stop that is proof of intent to escape criminal or civil liability. This presumption can be negated by evidence of intoxication.[1] The presumption is rebutted by presenting evidence that raises a doubt.[2]

The effect of s. 252(2) is that once the full actus reus is proven then the mens rea is presumed until there is evidence to the contrary.[3]

252
...

Evidence

(2) In proceedings under subsection (1), evidence that an accused failed to stop his vehicle, vessel or, where possible, his aircraft, as the case may be, offer assistance where any person has been injured or appears to require assistance and give his name and address is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof of an intent to escape civil or criminal liability.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 252; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 36; 1994, c. 44, s. 12; 1999, c. 32, s. 1(Preamble).


CCC

Section 252(2) requires an accused who is involved in an accident to:[4]

  1. stop
  2. give their name and address, and
  3. offer assistance if a person appears injured or in need of assistance.

A failure to do any of these steps will result in engaging the presumption under s. 252(2).[5]

Despite anything said in s. 252(2), the burden always remains on the Crown. This presumption "does not place any onus on the accused to establish his lack of intent".[6] It is only to be applied "only in the absence of any evidence to the contrary."[7] The accused need only raise a reasonable doubt that he did not have the necessary intent.[8]

The intent to escape liability must relate to liability arising from the accident at issue and not arising from other conduct that may result in liability.[9]

Evidence establishing that the accused escaped to avoid being arrested rather than avoid liability is not evidence to the contrary.[10]

  1. R v Nolet (1980), OJ No. 3027 (ONCA)(*no CanLII links)
  2. R v Kleberc, 2007 YKTC 61 (CanLII), per Luther J, at para 11
  3. R v Roche, 1983 CanLII 130 (SCC), [1983] 1 SCR 491, per Lamer J
  4. R v Seipp, 2017 BCCA 54 (CanLII), per Bennett JA, at para 30
  5. Seipp, ibid., at para 30
  6. Roche, supra, at para 23 ("The presumption provision does not place any onus on the accused to establish his lack of intent. The onus remains on the Crown to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption provision simply assists the Crown in achieving that standard of proof and is applicable only in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.")
  7. Roche, ibid. at para 23
    see also Evidence to the Contrary
  8. R v Proudlock, 1978 CanLII 15 (SCC), [1979] 1 SCR 525, per Pigeon J at 551
    Seipp at para 30
  9. R v Fournier, (1979), 8 C.R. (3d) 248 (Q.C.C.A), 1979 CanLII 1619 (QC CA), per Dube JA
  10. Seipp, supra

Participation of Third Parties

See also: Role of the Victim and Third Parties and Testimonial Aids for Young, Disabled or Vulnerable Witnesses
Testimonial Aids

Certain persons who testify are entitled to make application for the use of testimonial aids: Exclusion of Public (s. 486), Use of a Testimonial Screen (s. 486), Access to Support Person While Testifying (s. 486.1), Close Proximity Video-link Testimony (s. 486.2), Self-Represented Cross-Examination Prohibition Order (s. 486.3), and Witness Security Order (s. 486.7).

A witness, victim or complainant may also request publication bans (s. 486.4, 486.5) and/or a Witness Identity Non-disclosure Order (s. 486.31). See also, Publication Bans, above.

On Finding of Guilt

Under s. 738, a judge must inquire from the Crown before sentencing whether "reasonable steps have been taken to provide the victims with an opportunity to indicate whether they are seeking restitution for their losses and damages".

Under s. 722(2), the judge must inquire "[a]s soon as feasible" before sentencing with the Crown "if reasonable steps have been taken to provide the victim with an opportunity to prepare" a victim impact statement. This will include any person "who has suffered, or is alleged to have suffered, physical or emotional harm, property damage or economic loss" as a result of the offence. Individuals representing a community impacted by the crime may file a statement under s. 722.2.

Sentencing Principles and Ranges

See also: Purpose and Principles of Sentencing, Sentencing Factors Relating to the Offender, and Sentencing Factors Relating to the Offence
Maximum Penalties
Offence(s) Crown
Election
Maximum Penalty
s. 252(1.1) [failure to stop] Summary Election 2 years less a day jail and/or a $5,000 fine (from Sept 19, 2019)
s. 252(1.1) [failure to stop] Indictable Election 5 years custody
s. 252(1.2) [with bodily harm] N/A 10 years custody
s. 252(1.3) [with death] N/A life in custody

Offences under s. 252(1.1) are hybrid. If prosecuted by indictment, the maximum penalty is 5 years incarceration. If prosecuted by summary conviction, the maximum penalty is 2 years less a day jail and/or a $5,000 fine (from Sept 19, 2019) .

Offences under s. 252(1.2) and (1.3) are straight indictable. The maximum penalty is 10 years under s. 252(1.2) or life under s. 252(1.3).

Minimum Penalties

These offences have no mandatory minimum penalties.

Available Dispositions
Offence(s) Crown
Election
Discharge
s. 730
Suspended
Sentence

s. 731(1)(a)
Stand-alone
Fine

s. 731(1)(b)
Custody
s. 718.3, 787
Custody and
Probation
s. 731(1)(b)
Custody and
Fine
s. 734
Conditional
Sentence
(CSO)
s. 742.1
s. 252(1.1) any
s. 252(1.2) N/A
s. 252(1.3) N/A

For offences under s. 252(1.1) or (1.2), all dispositions are available. The judge may order a discharge (s. 730), suspended sentence (s. 731(1)(a)), fine (s. 731(1)(b)), custody (s. 718.3, 787), custody with probation (s. 731(1)(b)), custody with a fine (s. 734), or a conditional sentence (s. 742.1).

If convicted under s. 252(1.3) a discharge is not available under s. 730(1) as it is "an offence for which a minimum punishment is prescribed by law or an offence punishable by imprisonment for fourteen years or for life".

Offences under s. 252(1.3) are ineligible for a conditional sentence order under s. 742.1(c), when prosecuted by indictment, as the maximum period of incarceration is 14 years or life.

Consecutive Sentences

There are no statutory requirements that the sentences be consecutive.

Principles

Ranges

see also: Failure to Stop or Remain at Scene of Accident (Sentencing Cases)

Ancillary Sentencing Orders

See also: Ancillary Orders
Offence-specific Orders
Order Conviction Description
DNA Orders s. 252
General Sentencing Orders
Order Conviction Description
Non-communication order while offender in custody (s. 743.21) any The judge has the discretion to order that the offender be prohibited "from communicating...with any victim, witness or other person" while in custody except where the judge "considers [it] necessary" to communicate with them.
Restitution Orders (s. 738) any A discretionary Order is available for things such as the replacement value of the property; the pecuniary damages incurred from harm, expenses fleeing a domestic partner; or certain expenses arising from the commission of an offence under s.402.2 or 403.
Victim Fine Surcharge (s. 737) any A discretionary surcharge under s. 737 of 30% of any fine order imposed, $100 per summary conviction or $200 per indictable conviction. If the offence occurs on or after October 23, 2013, the order has smaller minimum amounts (15%, $50, or $100).
General Forfeiture Orders
Forfeiture Conviction Description
Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime (s. 462.37(1) or (2.01)) any Where there is a finding of guilt for an indictable offence under the Code or the CDSA in which property is "proceeds of crime" and offence was "committed in relation to that property", the property shall be forfeited to His Majesty the King on application of the Crown. NB: does not apply to summary offences.
Fine in Lieu of Forfeiture (s. 462.37(3)) any Where a Court is satisfied an order for the forfeiture of proceeds of crime under s. 462.37(1) or (2.01) can be made, but that property cannot be "made subject to an order", then the Court "may" order a fine in "an amount equal to the value of the property". Failure to pay the fine will result in a default judgement imposing a period of incarceration.
Forfeiture of Weapons or Firearms (s. 491) any Where there is finding of guilt for an offence where a "weapon, an imitation firearm, a prohibited device, any ammunition, any prohibited ammunition or an explosive substance was used in the commission of [the] offence and that thing has been seized and detained", or "that a person has committed an offence that involves, or the subject-matter of which is, a firearm, a cross-bow, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or an explosive substance has been seized and detained, that the item be an enumerated weapon or related item be connected to the offence", then there will be a mandatory forfeiture order. However, under s. 491(2), if the lawful owner "was not a party to the offence" and the judge has "no reasonable grounds to believe that the thing would or might be used in the commission of an offence", then it should be returned to the lawful owner.
Forfeiture of Offence-related Property (s. 490.1) any Where there is a finding of guilt for an indictable offence, "any property is offence-related property" where (a) by means or in respect of which an indictable offence under this Act or the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act is committed, (b) that is used in any manner in connection with the commission of such an offence, or (c) that is intended to be used for committing such an offence". Such property is to be forfeited to Her Majesty in right of the province. NB: does not apply to summary offences.

See Also

References