« Neutralité judiciaire et partialité » : différence entre les versions

Dernière version du 5 novembre 2024 à 12:36

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< Procés

< Procédure et pratique
< Pré-procès et procès

Principes généraux

Obligation de neutralité

Le juge doit être neutre. Cela implique qu'il doit [TRADUCTION] « se limiter autant que possible à ses propres responsabilités et laisser aux avocats et aux membres du jury leurs fonctions respectives. »^[1]

Apparence d'impartialité

Il ne suffit pas que les tribunaux soient simplement impartiaux, il faut aussi qu'ils paraissent impartiaux.^[2]

L'apparence de neutralité est [TRADUCTION] « d'une importance fondamentale pour que justice soit non seulement rendue, mais qu'elle soit manifestement et indubitablement perçue comme telle ».^[3]

Degré de participation du juge

On n'attend pas des juges qu'ils soient des [TRADUCTION] « observateurs silencieux » dans un procès.^[4]

Un juge peut [TRADUCTION] « entrer dans l'arène » dans le but [TRADUCTION] « d'insister pour que l'avocat fasse avancer l'affaire ».^[5]

Un juge peut participer à un débat juridique, contester la position de l'avocat et exprimer des opinions préliminaires sans créer une perception de partialité.^[6]

Les comportements qui impliquent des [TRADUCTION] « réprimandes injustifiées de l'avocat, des remarques insultantes et inappropriées à l'égard des plaideurs et des témoins, des déclarations témoignant d'un jugement préjudiciable et un comportement immodéré et impatient peuvent détruire l'apparence d'impartialité. »^[7]

Objectif de la neutralité

Le système judiciaire ne fonctionne que s'il jouit du [TRADUCTION] « respect et de la confiance de la société ». Cela nécessite des [TRADUCTION] « procès équitables » qui semblent équitables aux yeux de [TRADUCTION] « l'observateur informé et raisonnable ».^[8]

Récusation des juges

Le simple fait qu'un juge ait précédemment statué contre un plaideur ne le disqualifie pas automatiquement des affaires futures.^[9] Une telle histoire ne permet pas de craindre une quelconque partialité.^[10] Les juges sont présumés capables de se défaire des antécédents de l'accusé dans leur jugement futur.^[11]

L'évaluation des préjugés dépend fortement des faits.^[12]

↑ R c Torbiak and Campbell, 1974 CanLII 1623 (ON CA), , 18 CCC (2d) 229, par Kelly JA, aux pp. 230-231
↑ Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2003 CSC 45 (CanLII), [2003] 2 RCS 259, par curiam, au para 66 ( [TRADUCTION] « the manifestation of a broader preoccupation about the image of justice [because] there is an overriding public interest that there should be confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice » )
↑ R v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy , [1924] 1 K.B. 256 (UK), au p. 259
↑ R c Potter; R v Colpitts, 2020 NSCA 9 (CanLII), par curiam, au para 743
↑ R c Clarke, 2014 NSSC 431 (CanLII), par Coady J, au para 34
↑ R c Baccari, 2011 ABCA 205 (CanLII), 527 WAC 301, par curiam
↑ Clarke, supra, au para 20 citing Canadian Judicial Council, "Ethical Principles for Judges", au p. 33
↑ R c RDS, 1997 CanLII 324 (CSC), [1997] 3 RCS 484, par Cory J
↑ Broda v Broda, 2001 ABCA 151 (CanLII), 286 AR 120, par curiam, au para 16
R c Collins, 2011 FCA 171 (CanLII), 202 ACWS (3d) 820 per Mainville JA , au para 11 ("[t]he simple fact that judges render a judgment which is unfavourable to a party cannot in itself result in a conclusion of bias. Were it otherwise, no judgment could ever be issued. A reasonable apprehension of bias must be shown to exist either in the judgment itself, in the comportment of the judge or by some other means. » )
R c JNS, 2019 ABQB 557 (CanLII), par Mandziuk J
R c Heisinger, 2007 NWTTC 11 (CanLII) per Schmaltz J, au para 6 ( [TRADUCTION] « The case law is clear: an accused having appeared previously before a judge will not require that the judge cannot preside on subsequent matters involving that accused. This applies whether or not an accused appeared as an accused, a party, or a witness, and whether or not credibility findings were made. » )
↑ Alberta Health Services v Wang, 2018 ABCA 104 (CanLII), par Slatter JA, au para 9 ( [TRADUCTION] « ... Making decisions is the essence of the judicial function, and a reasonable person, properly informed, would not conclude that a judge would have a bias towards any one party just because that party was unsuccessful on one particular application. » )
↑ R c Bolt, 1995 ABCA 22 (CanLII), 26 WCB (2d) 18, par Russell JA, au para 2 ("… It is inevitable that there will be occasions when an experienced trial judge will have had some prior judicial contact with an accused. We are confident that trial judges are capable of disabusing their minds of that fact in considering the guilt or innocence of the accused in relation to the specific charge before them… » )
↑ R c Potter; R v Colpitts, 2020 NSCA 9 (CanLII), au para 742
Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 CSC 25 (CanLII), [2015] 2 RCS 282, par Abella J

Crainte raisonnable de partialité

Crainte raisonnable de partialité

Voir également

[1] R c Torbiak and Campbell, 1974 CanLII 1623 (ON CA), , 18 CCC (2d) 229, par Kelly JA, aux pp. 230-231

[2] Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2003 CSC 45 (CanLII), [2003] 2 RCS 259, par curiam, au para 66 ( [TRADUCTION] « the manifestation of a broader preoccupation about the image of justice [because] there is an overriding public interest that there should be confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice » )

[3] R v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy , [1924] 1 K.B. 256 (UK), au p. 259

[4] R c Potter; R v Colpitts, 2020 NSCA 9 (CanLII), par curiam, au para 743

[5] R c Clarke, 2014 NSSC 431 (CanLII), par Coady J, au para 34

[6] R c Baccari, 2011 ABCA 205 (CanLII), 527 WAC 301, par curiam

[7] Clarke, supra, au para 20 citing Canadian Judicial Council, "Ethical Principles for Judges", au p. 33

[8] R c RDS, 1997 CanLII 324 (CSC), [1997] 3 RCS 484, par Cory J

[9] Broda v Broda, 2001 ABCA 151 (CanLII), 286 AR 120, par curiam, au para 16
R c Collins, 2011 FCA 171 (CanLII), 202 ACWS (3d) 820 per Mainville JA , au para 11 ("[t]he simple fact that judges render a judgment which is unfavourable to a party cannot in itself result in a conclusion of bias. Were it otherwise, no judgment could ever be issued. A reasonable apprehension of bias must be shown to exist either in the judgment itself, in the comportment of the judge or by some other means. » )
R c JNS, 2019 ABQB 557 (CanLII), par Mandziuk J
R c Heisinger, 2007 NWTTC 11 (CanLII) per Schmaltz J, au para 6 ( [TRADUCTION] « The case law is clear: an accused having appeared previously before a judge will not require that the judge cannot preside on subsequent matters involving that accused. This applies whether or not an accused appeared as an accused, a party, or a witness, and whether or not credibility findings were made. » )

[10] Alberta Health Services v Wang, 2018 ABCA 104 (CanLII), par Slatter JA, au para 9 ( [TRADUCTION] « ... Making decisions is the essence of the judicial function, and a reasonable person, properly informed, would not conclude that a judge would have a bias towards any one party just because that party was unsuccessful on one particular application. » )

[11] R c Bolt, 1995 ABCA 22 (CanLII), 26 WCB (2d) 18, par Russell JA, au para 2 ("… It is inevitable that there will be occasions when an experienced trial judge will have had some prior judicial contact with an accused. We are confident that trial judges are capable of disabusing their minds of that fact in considering the guilt or innocence of the accused in relation to the specific charge before them… » )

[12] R c Potter; R v Colpitts, 2020 NSCA 9 (CanLII), au para 742
Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 CSC 25 (CanLII), [2015] 2 RCS 282, par Abella J

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@@ Ligne 1 : / Ligne 1 : @@
-{{en|Judicial_Neutrality_and_Bias}}
+[[en:Judicial_Neutrality_and_Bias]]
 {{Currency2|janvier|2021}}
 {{LevelZero}}{{HeaderTrials}}
@@ Ligne 5 : / Ligne 5 : @@
 ==Principes généraux==
-; Obligation of Neutrality
+; Obligation de neutralité
-The judge must be neutral. This requires that the judge should "confine himself as much as possible to his own responsibilities and leave to counsel and members of the jury their respective functions."<ref>
+Le juge doit être neutre. Cela implique qu'il doit {{Tr}}« se limiter autant que possible à ses propres responsabilités et laisser aux avocats et aux membres du jury leurs fonctions respectives. »<ref>
 {{CanLIIRP|Torbiak and Campbell|htw5l|1974 CanLII 1623 (ON CA)| , 18 CCC (2d) 229}}{{perONCA|Kelly JA}}{{atps|230-231}}
 </ref>
-; Appearance of Impartiality
+; Apparence d'impartialité
-It is not sufficient that the courts simply be impartial, but rather they must appear to be impartial as well.<ref>
+Il ne suffit pas que les tribunaux soient simplement impartiaux, il faut aussi qu'ils paraissent impartiaux.<ref>
-{{CanLIIRPC|Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada|51pj|2003 SCC 45 (CanLII)|[2003] 2 SCR 259}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|51pj|66}} ("the manifestation of a broader preoccupation about the image of justice [because] there is an overriding public interest that there should be confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice")<br>
+{{CanLIIRPC|Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada|51pk|2003 CSC 45 (CanLII)|[2003] 2 RCS 259}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|51pk|66}} ( {{Tr}}« the manifestation of a broader preoccupation about the image of justice [because] there is an overriding public interest that there should be confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice » )<br>
 </ref>
-The appearance of neutrality is "of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done."<ref>
+L'apparence de neutralité est {{Tr}}« d'une importance fondamentale pour que justice soit non seulement rendue, mais qu'elle soit manifestement et indubitablement perçue comme telle ».<ref>
 {{UKCase|R v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy|, [1924] 1 K.B. 256}}{{atp|259}}</ref>
-; Judge's Degree of Participation
+; Degré de participation du juge
-Judge's are not expected to be "silent observers" in a trial.<ref>
+On n'attend pas des juges qu'ils soient des {{Tr}}« observateurs silencieux » dans un procès.<ref>
 {{CanLIIRx|Potter; R v Colpitts|j528d|2020 NSCA 9 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtNSCA}}{{atL|j528d|743}}<br>
 </ref>
-I judge can "enter the arena" for "the purpose of insisting the counsel move the case forward."<ref>
+Un juge peut {{Tr}}« entrer dans l'arène » dans le but {{Tr}}« d'insister pour que l'avocat fasse avancer l'affaire ».<ref>
 {{CanLIIRx|Clarke|gfl1w|2014 NSSC 431 (CanLII)}}{{perNSSC|Coady J}}{{atL|gfl1w|34}}<br>
 </ref>
-A judge can participate in legal debate, challenge counsel's position and state preliminary views without creating a perception of bias.<ref>
+Un juge peut participer à un débat juridique, contester la position de l'avocat et exprimer des opinions préliminaires sans créer une perception de partialité.<ref>
 {{CanLIIRP|Baccari|fm8bq|2011 ABCA 205 (CanLII)|527 WAC 301}}{{TheCourtABCA}}
 </ref>
-Conduct that involves the "[u]njustified reprimands of counsel, insulting and improper remarks about litigants and witnesses, statements evidencing prejudgment and intemperate and impatient behaviour may destroy the appearance of impartiality."<ref>
+Les comportements qui impliquent des {{Tr}}« réprimandes injustifiées de l'avocat, des remarques insultantes et inappropriées à l'égard des plaideurs et des témoins, des déclarations témoignant d'un jugement préjudiciable et un comportement immodéré et impatient peuvent détruire l'apparence d'impartialité. »<ref>
 {{supra1|Clarke}}{{atL|gfl1w|20}} citing Canadian Judicial Council, "Ethical Principles for Judges"{{atp|33}}<br>
 </ref>
-; Purpose of Neutrality
+; Objectif de la neutralité
-The justice system only works if it has "the respect and confidence of its society". That requires "trials that are fair" and that appear to be fair to the "informed and reasonable observer."<ref>
+Le système judiciaire ne fonctionne que s'il jouit du {{Tr}}« respect et de la confiance de la société ». Cela nécessite des {{Tr}}« procès équitables » qui semblent équitables aux yeux de {{Tr}}« l'observateur informé et raisonnable ».<ref>
-{{CanLIIRP|RDS|1fr05|1997 CanLII 324 (SCC)|[1997] 3 SCR 484}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}
+{{CanLIIRP|RDS|1fr05|1997 CanLII 324 (CSC)|[1997] 3 RCS 484}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}
 </ref>
-; Disqualification of Judges
+; Récusation des juges
-The mere fact that a judge previously ruled against a litigant does not automatically disqualify them from future cases.<ref>
+Le simple fait qu'un juge ait précédemment statué contre un plaideur ne le disqualifie pas automatiquement des affaires futures.<ref>
 {{CanLIIRPC|Broda v Broda|5rgc|2001 ABCA 151 (CanLII)|286 AR 120}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|5rgc|16}}<br>
-{{CanLIIRP|Collins|flkjj|2011 FCA 171 (CanLII)|202 ACWS (3d) 820}} ''per'' Mainville JA {{atL|flkjj|11}} ("[t]he simple fact that judges render a judgment which is unfavourable to a party cannot in itself result in a conclusion of bias. Were it otherwise, no judgment could ever be issued. A reasonable apprehension of bias must be shown to exist either in the judgment itself, in the comportment of the judge or by some other means.")<br>
+{{CanLIIRP|Collins|flkjj|2011 FCA 171 (CanLII)|202 ACWS (3d) 820}} ''per'' Mainville JA {{atL|flkjj|11}} ("[t]he simple fact that judges render a judgment which is unfavourable to a party cannot in itself result in a conclusion of bias. Were it otherwise, no judgment could ever be issued. A reasonable apprehension of bias must be shown to exist either in the judgment itself, in the comportment of the judge or by some other means. » )<br>
 {{CanLIIRx|JNS|j1mjt|2019 ABQB 557 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Mandziuk J}}<br>
-{{CanLIIRx|Heisinger|1sr38|2007 NWTTC 11 (CanLII)}} ''per'' Schmaltz J{{atL|1sr38|6}} ("The case law is clear:  an accused having appeared previously before a judge will not require that the judge cannot preside on subsequent matters involving that accused.  This applies whether or not an accused appeared as an accused, a party, or a witness, and whether or not credibility findings were made.")
+{{CanLIIRx|Heisinger|1sr38|2007 NWTTC 11 (CanLII)}} ''per'' Schmaltz J{{atL|1sr38|6}} ( {{Tr}}« The case law is clear:  an accused having appeared previously before a judge will not require that the judge cannot preside on subsequent matters involving that accused.  This applies whether or not an accused appeared as an accused, a party, or a witness, and whether or not credibility findings were made. » )
 </ref>
-Such a history does not support an apprehension of bias.<ref>
+Une telle histoire ne permet pas de craindre une quelconque partialité.<ref>
-{{CanLIIRxC|Alberta Health Services v Wang|hr1mj|2018 ABCA 104 (CanLII)}}{{perABCA|Slatter JA}}{{atL|hr1mj|9}} ("... Making decisions is the essence of the judicial function, and a reasonable person, properly informed, would not conclude that a judge would have a bias towards any one party just because that party was unsuccessful on one particular application.")
+{{CanLIIRxC|Alberta Health Services v Wang|hr1mj|2018 ABCA 104 (CanLII)}}{{perABCA|Slatter JA}}{{atL|hr1mj|9}} ( {{Tr}}« ... Making decisions is the essence of the judicial function, and a reasonable person, properly informed, would not conclude that a judge would have a bias towards any one party just because that party was unsuccessful on one particular application. » )
 </ref>
-Judges are presumed capable of disabusing themselves of the accused's history in their future judgement.<ref>
+Les juges sont présumés capables de se défaire des antécédents de l'accusé dans leur jugement futur.<ref>
-{{CanLIIRP|Bolt|2dblj|1995 ABCA 22 (CanLII)|26 WCB (2d) 18}}{{perABCA|Russell JA}}{{atL|2dblj|2}} ("… It is inevitable that there will be occasions when an experienced trial judge will have had some prior judicial contact with an accused. We are confident that trial judges are capable of disabusing their minds of that fact in considering the guilt or innocence of the accused in relation to the specific charge before them…")
+{{CanLIIRP|Bolt|2dblj|1995 ABCA 22 (CanLII)|26 WCB (2d) 18}}{{perABCA|Russell JA}}{{atL|2dblj|2}} ("… It is inevitable that there will be occasions when an experienced trial judge will have had some prior judicial contact with an accused. We are confident that trial judges are capable of disabusing their minds of that fact in considering the guilt or innocence of the accused in relation to the specific charge before them… » )
 </ref>
-The assessment of bias is highly fact specific.<ref>
+L'évaluation des préjugés dépend fortement des faits.<ref>
 {{CanLIIRx|Potter; R v Colpitts|j528d|2020 NSCA 9 (CanLII)}}{{atL|j528d|742}}<br>
-{{CanLIIRPC|Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v Yukon (Attorney General)|ghl85|2015 SCC 25 (CanLII)|[2015] 2 SCR 282}}{{perSCC-H|Abella J}} </ref>
+{{CanLIIRPC|Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v Yukon (Attorney General)|ghl86|2015 CSC 25 (CanLII)|[2015] 2 RCS 282}}{{perSCC-H|Abella J}} </ref>
 {{reflist|2}}
-==Reasonable Apprehension of Bias==
+==Crainte raisonnable de partialité==
-* [[Reasonable Apprehension of Bias]]
+* [[Crainte raisonnable de partialité]]
 ==Voir également==
-* [[Appeals]]
+* [[Appels]]
-* [[Role of the Trial Judge]]
+* [[Rôle du juge de première instance]]
-* [[Judicial Immunity]]
+* [[Immunité judiciaire]]