Témoins adverses et hostiles
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Principes généraux
Lorsqu'un témoin est cité à comparaître, il est présumé qu'il doit être cru. En common law, un témoin ne peut pas être interrogé sur sa mauvaise moralité pour attaquer sa crédibilité par la partie qui l'a cité à comparaître.[1]
- Défaut d'application du par. 9(2)
Lorsque la Couronne est en mesure de mettre en doute la crédibilité de son témoin d'une manière similaire au contre-interrogatoire sans appliquer le par. 9(2), cela peut créer une erreur réversible.[2]
- ↑
Hanes v Wawanesa Mutual Insurance, 1961 CanLII 28 (ON CA), [1961] OR 495 at 499 (ONCA), par Porter CJ
G.&J. Sales v Basil MacDonald (1956), 3 DLR (2d) 442 at 450 (NSCA)(*pas de liens CanLII)
See also CEA s. 9(1)
R c CEN, 1998 ABCA 290 (CanLII), 129 CCC (3d) 198, par curiam
R c Situ, 2005 ABCA 275 (CanLII), 200 CCC (3d) 9, par curiam
R c Paquette, 2008 ABCA 49 (CanLII), 425 AR 4, par curiam
David M. Paciocco and Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 5th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at 503-509
- ↑ R c Fairbarn, 2020 ONCA 784 (CanLII), par curiam
Principes de la common law
En common law, un témoin défavorable et hostile peut être contre-interrogé sur une déclaration antérieure de tout type. [1]
Un témoin « défavorable » est celui qui donne un témoignage contraire au fait qu'il a été appelé à prouver. La partie qui cite peut présenter des éléments de preuve pour contredire ces éléments de preuve tout en continuant de s'appuyer sur les autres éléments de preuve qui n'ont pas été contredits.
Un témoin « hostile » en common law est celui qui « ne désire pas dire la vérité ». Un tel témoin peut être contre-interrogé dans la mesure où le juge le juge nécessaire pour rendre justice, ce qui peut inclure un large éventail de sujets tels que tous les faits en cause, la fiabilité et la crédibilité des témoins quant aux circonstances de l'affaire.
Une déclaration d'hostilité en common law peut être disponible uniquement sur la base de la manière dont le témoin a témoigné et de son comportement.[2]
Les principes de common law sont en grande partie tombés en désuétude et les questions de rétractation ou de changement défavorable de preuve sont traitées aux art. 9(1) et 9(2).
- ↑ R v Prefas , (1988), 86 Cr. App. R. 111, (CA) (UK)
- ↑ R c McAllister, 2008 NSCA 103 (CanLII), 865 APR 237, par Oland JA
Témoin défavorable vs hostile
Un témoin « défavorable » est « quelqu'un qui s'oppose à un intérêt ou qui est défavorable au sens d'une position opposée à celle de la partie qui le cite à comparaître. »[1]
Un témoin « hostile » est « quelqu'un qui fait preuve d'une attitude antagoniste ou d'un esprit hostile envers la partie qui le cite à comparaître » ou quelqu'un « qui ne donne pas son témoignage de manière équitable et avec le désir de dire la vérité en raison d'une animosité hostile envers la poursuite. »[2]
- ↑
R c Figliola, 2011 ONCA 457 (CanLII), 272 CCC (3d) 518, par curiam, au para 50
- ↑
, ibid., au para 50
Section 9(2)/Milgaard Demande de contre-interrogatoire sur une déclaration
s.9
[omis (1)]
- Previous statements by witness not proved adverse
(2) Where the party producing a witness alleges that the witness made at other times a statement in writing, reduced to writing, or recorded on audio tape or video tape or otherwise, inconsistent with the witness’ present testimony, the court may, without proof that the witness is adverse, grant leave to that party to cross-examine the witness as to the statement and the court may consider the cross-examination in determining whether in the opinion of the court the witness is adverse.
R.S., 1985, c. C-5, s. 9; 1994, c. 44, s. 85.
Ceci a été considéré comme une forme distincte de mise en accusation d'un témoin au sens de 9(1).[1]
- Objectif
L'article 9(2) a été ajouté pour permettre une plus grande capacité de mettre en doute la crédibilité d'un témoin par le biais d'un contre-interrogatoire sur des déclarations écrites sans déclaration défavorable.[2] Il s'agit également d'un outil disponible pour aider à établir une conclusion d'adversité.[3]
- ↑
R c Milgaard, 1971 CanLII 792 (SK CA), 2 CCC (2d) 206 (SKCA), par Culliton CJ
R c Rouse; McInroy, 1978 CanLII 175 (SCC), [1979] 1 SCR 588, par Martland J
- ↑ Rouse; McInroy, supra - aucune conclusion d'adversité nécessaire
- ↑
R c Dayes, 2013 ONCA 614 (CanLII), 301 CCC (3d) 337, par LaForme JA (3:0), au para 30
Demande discrétionnaire
La décision d'autoriser ou non l'avocat à contre-interroger le témoin qu'il appelle en vertu du par. 9(2) de la « Loi sur la preuve » est à sa discrétion.[1] The application should only be granted where it "meets the ends of justice."[2]
This can often be treated as a consideration of probative value vs prejudicial effect analysis.[3] Factors to consider when exercising the discretion include:[4]
- The extent and materiality of the conflicts in the statement;
- Sound indicators about whether cross-examination is apt to produce a change in testimony, including an adoption of the statement as true;
- Whether the statement was secured fairly or by trickery, abuse, inducements, oppression or Charter violations;
- Whether the statement contains information prejudicial to the accused that will be disclosed if cross-examination and proof is permitted;
- The risk the procedure will create distracting side issues.
The reliability of the prior statement is a factor but not "essential" in the same way as it would be in a hearsay exception application.[5]
Where it is unlikely or implausible that the witness will change their testimony under cross-examination, that may be the basis to reject a request to cross.[6]
Consideration should include whether permitting cross-examination would potentially bring the administration of justice into disrepute.[7]
- Burden of Proof
The question of whether the examination meets the ends of justice is on the standard of a balance of probabilities.[8]
The refusal to cross-examine on a prior inconsistent statement should be "relatively rare."[9]
- ↑
R c Carpenter (No 2), 1982 CanLII 3308 (ON CA), 1 CCC (3d) 149, par Grange JA, au p. 13 ("I do not, of course, mean that cross-examination should automatically have been permitted. The subsection is clearly permissive and the trial judge might well have refused permission in view of the circumstances of the taking of the statements and his opinion of its reliability. The test as put by Porter C.J.O. in [citation omitted] is whether “the ends of justice would be best attained by admitting it. The section does not contemplate the indiscriminate admission of statements of this kind”.")
R c Salmon and Foster, 2020 ONSC 786 (CanLII), par Henderson J, au para 15
- ↑
R c Boyce, 2014 ONCA 150 (CanLII), 316 OAC 310, par Rosenberg JA, au para 20
R c Taylor, 2015 ONCA 448 (CanLII), 325 CCC (3d) 413, par Rosenberg JA, au para 47 ("the judge should determine whether to grant leave to cross-examine by asking whether the ends of justice are best attained by permitting it") R c South, 2018 ONSC 604 (CanLII), par Baltman J, au para 98 ("Permitting cross-examination under s. 9(2) is discretionary. The test to be applied in determining whether to grant cross-examination is “clearly permissive”, depending on “whether the ends of justice would be best attained”: [citations omitted]") - ↑ R c Neville, 2013 CanLII 9090 (NL SC), par Thompson J, au para 2("Overall, it is most helpful to treat the s. 9(2) discretion as an exercise in weighing probative value against prejudicial impact. The trial judge should assess the probative value of cross-examination as a means to persuade the witness to change his or her testimony and adopt the earlier version of events in whole or part and/or to impeach the credibility of any testimony that remains inconsistent.")
- ↑
, ibid., au para 99
Paciocco, “Confronting Disappointing, Hostile and Adverse Witnesses in Criminal Cases” (2012) 59 C.L.Q. - ↑
South, supra, au para 100 ("The reliability of the prior statement is not an essential component under s. 9(2) in the same way that it is when considering whether the statement is admissible as substantive evidence under the principled exception to the hearsay rule. However, it remains a factor for consideration")
, supra, au para 51
R c Tran, 2010 ONCA 471 (CanLII), 257 CCC (3d) 18, par Epstein JA, au para 38
Carpenter, supra, au para 13
R c Ranglin, 2016 ONSC 4304 (CanLII), par Ricchetti J, aux paras 39 to 41
R c Kenny, 2012 ONSC 1374 (CanLII), au para 49
- ↑
South, supra, au para 108 ("There is no plausible basis to believe that cross-examination is likely to produce a change in testimony, much less an adoption of the statement as true. This was effectively conceded by Crown counsel during submissions, when he predicted that Pearson would “likely” give the same answer at trial as he had at the preliminary hearing, namely that he did not see the shooter. As the probative value of the questioning will therefore be minimal or non-existent, there is no logical basis to grant leave")
Neville, supra, au para 2 - ↑ infra, au para 42
- ↑ R c CLS et al., 2011 MBQB 12 (CanLII), 266 CCC (3d) 360, par Beard J, au para 42
- ↑ , ibid., au para 42
Procedure
The "Milgaard procedure" required by the courts for cross-examination under 9(2) is as follows:[1]
- counsel should notify the court of the intention to make an application under s.9(2)
- where necessary the jury should retire
- counsel should notify the court of the particulars of the application and provide the court with the alleged statement;
- if the judge believes on reviewing the statement there is no contraction, then the application is over. Otherwise, the judge should call upon counsel to prove the statement.
- Counsel should prove the statement. If the witness agrees to making the statement then it will be sufficient, otherwise, additional witnesses can be called to prove it.
- if the contradictory statement is proven then opposing counsel can cross-examine on the circumstances under which the statement was made.
- the judge should decide whether to permit cross-examination
Where the matter is a judge-alone trial, there is no need to go through the 9(2) application where the intention is to make a KGB application.[2]
The judge may require the applicant to refresh the witnesses memory or review the statement before giving leave to cross examine.[3]
- ↑
R c Milgaard, 1971 CanLII 792 (SK CA), 2 CCC (2d) 206 (SKCA), par Culliton CJ, au p. 55
R c Williams, 1985 CanLII 113 (ON CA), CR (3d) 351, par Martin JA
R c South, 2018 ONSC 604 (CanLII), par Baltman J, au para 96 ("The procedure to be followed by counsel in seeking such permission from the trial judge is set out in Milgaard, at para. 55.")
- ↑
R c Glowatski, 2001 BCCA 678 (CanLII), 160 CCC (3d) 525, par Hall JA (3:0)
R c Fleet, 2001 NSCA 158 (CanLII), (2001) 48 CR 5th 28 (NSCA), par Bateman JA (3:0)
- ↑
R c Stewart, 1976 CanLII 202 (SCC), 31 CCC (2d) 497, par Spence J (dissent)
R c Le(TD), 2011 MBCA 83 (CanLII), 275 CCC (3d) 427, par Pigeon JA (6:3), au para X
Requirements
- Prior Statement
There is no need for the statement to be signed or acknowledged to be considered under s. 9(2).[1]
- "Reduced to Writing"
A transcript of a translation that is accurate and complete will be a "statement in rewriting or reduced to writing."[2]
Notes made by a police officer of a conversation does not amount to a written statement or one reduced to writing.[3] That is, unless the witness confirmed the written statement as accurate.[4]
- Claimed Lack of Memory
The testimony of a witness claiming that they have no memory of events described in a prior statement can constitute an inconsistency.[5]
- Adoption of Prior Statement
Where a witness is cross-examined on a prior statement, and denies having any memory of the answer, then it cannot become evidence and can only be used towards the witnesses credibility.[6]
Where the witness has a no memory of making the prior statement, there may be a ground to permit cross-examination.[7]
- Admissibility of Prior Statement
Is it not necessary that the prior statement be found to be admissible as substantive evidence.[8]
- ↑ R c Carpenter(No.2), 1982 CanLII 3308 (ON CA), (1982) 1 CCC (3d) 149, par Grange JA (3:0)
- ↑
Carpenter (No.2), supra
- ↑ R c Handy, 1978 CanLII 2446 (BC CA), (1978) 45 CCC (2d) 232 (BCCA), par Hinkson JA (3:0)
- ↑
, ibid.
- ↑
R c CLS, 2011 MBQB 12 (CanLII), 266 CCC (3d) 360, par Beard J, aux paras 11 to 13
R c McInroy et al., 1978 CanLII 175 (SCC), [1979] 1 SCR 588, par Martland J, aux pp. 604 ("...It was quite open to [the trial judge] to conclude that she was lying about her recollection and to form his own conclusions as to why she was refusing to testify as to her true recollection. Chief Justice Farris says in terms that “the trial judge clearly did not believe her when she said she had a lack of recall”. This being so there was evidence of an inconsistency between what she said at the trial, i.e. that she had no recollection of a conversation, and what was contained in her written statement, i.e. a detailed recollection of it.") - ↑ Rouse; McInroy, supra
- ↑ R c Aubin, 1994 CanLII 5884 (QC CA), 94 CCC (3d) 89, par LeBel JA (3:0)
- ↑ R c South, 2018 ONSC 604 (CanLII), par Baltman J, au para 95 ("Cross-examination may be appropriate even where the prior statement has been ruled inadmissible as substantive evidence pursuant to K.G.B.:") R c Tran, 2010 ONCA 471 (CanLII), 257 CCC (3d) 18, par Esptein JA, aux paras 33 to 38
Permissible Cross-Examination
- Reason to Cross-examine
Generally, cross-examination is an important tool in ascertaining the truth, and it will often be in the interests of justice to examine a witness under s. 9(2)[1]
In many instances it has been agreed that cross-examination can be permitted to establish whether the witness deviated in their evidence to protect the accused and unearth why they changed their statement.[2]
It is also recognized as a means to have the witness adopt an earlier statement.[3]
- Scope of Cross Examination
Cross-examination under s. 9(2) is limited to questioning that relates to the prior inconsistent statement and the circumstances surrounding them.[4] It is improper to conduct a broader attack on the witnesses credibility.[5]
It is permissible under s. 9(2) to question as to the motive and reasons behind the change in evidence.[6]
The trial judge has discretion on the manner in which the cross-examination may be undertaken and should be exercised to minimize the prejudice to the accused.[7]
- Use of Prior Statement
The prior statement is not rendered admissible for the truth of its contents when the application is granted. The contents of the statement is only available as a factor when considering the weight to be given to the witness's evidence.[8]
- ↑ R c Kizuik, 2001 CanLII 26048 (MB PC), par Smith J, at para 67 ("When it is established that a witness made a prior inconsistent statement with the testimony given in court, particularly on matters related to the central issues relevant to the proceeding, it will usually be in the interests of justice to permit cross-examination under Section 9(2). The ultimate objective of the trial process in which the preliminary hearing plays an important role is ascertaining the truth. Cross-examination is a technique that our system of justice accepts as a very effective tool in the pursuit of truth. It is unsettling when a witness tells one account in court and then apparently another outside court. It raises obvious concerns and questions about the veracity of the witness' testimony. These concerns are best addressed by permitting cross-examination.")
- ↑
R c Dayes, 2013 ONCA 614 (CanLII), 301 CCC (3d) 337, par LaForme JA (3:0)
R c Taylor, 2015 ONCA 448 (CanLII), 325 CCC (3d) 413, par Watt JA (3:0)
- ↑ R c South, 2018 ONSC 604 (CanLII), par Baltman J
- ↑
R c Figliola, 2011 ONCA 457 (CanLII), 272 CCC (3d) 518, par curiam, aux paras 49 to 51
Dayes, supra, aux paras 28 to 40
- ↑
Figliola, supra
- ↑ Dayes, supra, au para 31
- ↑ R c Fraser, 1990 CanLII 983 (BC CA), 55 CCC (3d) 551, par Seaton JA (3:0)
- ↑
Taylor, supra, au para 50
South, supra, au para 97 ("Even when cross-examination is permitted, the prior statement is not admissible as proof of the truth of its contents. Rather, it is available as a factor for consideration in assessing the weight to be given to the witness’ trial testimony")
Section 9(1) Adverse Witnesses
If the witness is shown to be adverse, counsel may contradict the witness with a prior statement under s. 9(1) of the CEA as long as the witness confirms whether the prior statement was made:
- Adverse witnesses
9 (1) A party producing a witness shall not be allowed to impeach his credit by general evidence of bad character, but if the witness, in the opinion of the court, proves adverse, the party may contradict him by other evidence, or, by leave of the court, may prove that the witness made at other times a statement inconsistent with his present testimony, but before the last mentioned proof can be given the circumstances of the supposed statement, sufficient to designate the particular occasion, shall be mentioned to the witness, and he shall be asked whether or not he did make the statement.
[omis (2)]
R.S., 1985, c. C-5, s. 9; 1994, c. 44, s. 85.
Section 9(1) does not change the common law right to cross-examine the calling party's own witness.[1]
"Adverse" is taken to mean that the witness "opposed in interests."[2] This is in distinction with the traditional meaning of "adverse" requiring outward hostility, such as a witness who is belligerent argumentative and un-cooperative, rather than simply hostility in mind.[3] Adversity can be found by way of many means including demeanor or a prior contradictory statement.[4] Testifying in an unfavourable way contrary to a prior statement can be enough.[5]
Factors to be considered in finding of adversity include "possible grounds for bias and collusion between the witness and the opposing party to fashion testimony."[6]
An "hostile" witness, by contrast, is a subset of "adverse" witnesses. A hostile witness is one who is "not giving her evidence fairly and with a desire to tell the truth because of a hostile animus towards the [calling party]" [7] This will capture those witnesses who are belligerent or argumentative. A hostile witness will also engage s.9(1).
Hostility can be determined by way of observation of the witnesses' demeanour.[8]
An application under s. 9(1) is to be performed without the presence of the jury as a voir dire.[9]
Section 9(1) further provides that before counsel can attempted to contradict a witness with a previous statement, counsel has the obligation to first mention the circumstances of the statement to the witness, including the particularities of the occasion it was made, and confirm with the witness whether the statement was made by him.
Where the court gives permission to cross examination, the counsel may impeach the witness. Counsel may not use it to bolster favourable evidence from the witness.[10]
Section 9(1) does not permit counsel to cross examine at large. It is only an ability to cross examine on the circumstances of the prior statement.[11] Only a declaration of hostility permits cross examination at large.[12]
Whenever there is an application under s.9, the applicant must inform the judge what the purpose of tending the prior statement.[13]
Section 9(1) has been found to include oral statements as well as written statements. However, the judge may refuse to consider prior oral statements as evidence of adversity where the supporting evidence is too conflicting, unsatisfactory or ambiguous.[14]
- ↑
R c Figliola, 2011 ONCA 457 (CanLII), 272 CCC (3d) 518, par curiam, au para 51
- ↑
Hanes v Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co, 1961 CanLII 28 (ON CA), [1961] OR 495 (ONCA), par Porter CJ (2:1)
See also: R c Gushue (No.4) (1975) 30 CRNS 178 (Ont. Ct. J.)(*pas de liens CanLII) - ↑ eg. R c SWS, 2005 CanLII 43072 (ON SC), 67 WCB (2d) 658, par Glass J at 7
- ↑ See Delisle, "Evidence: Principles and Problems" (7th Ed.), au p. 459
Wawanesa
- ↑ eg. SWS, supra, au para 7
- ↑ R c Dayes, 2013 ONCA 614 (CanLII), 301 CCC (3d) 337, par LaForme JA (3:0)
- ↑ In Reference re R c Coffin, 1956 CanLII 94 (SCC), [1956] SCR 191, at page 213
see also R c Figliola, 2011 ONCA 457 (CanLII), 272 CCC (3d) 518, par curiam (3:0)
- ↑
Wawanesa, supra
- ↑ See Delisle, "Evidence: Principles and Problems" (7th Ed.), au p. 460
R c Cassibo, 1982 CanLII 1953 (ON CA), 70 CCC (2d) 498 (ONCA), par Martin JA (3:0) - ↑ R c C(JR), 1996 CanLII 5041 (SK CA), 110 CCC (3d) 373, par Sherstobitoff JA (3:0)
- ↑
R c Vivar, 2004 CanLII 34315 (ON SC), [2004] OJ No 9, par Dambrot J
SWS, supra, au para 14 - ↑
SWS, supra
Figliola, supra - ↑ R c U(FJ), 1994 CanLII 1085 (ON CA), 90 CCC (3d) 541, par Osborne JA (2:0) aff'd by SCC in [1995] 3 SCR 764, 1995 CanLII 74 (SCC), par Lamer CJ (7:0)
- ↑
Cassibo, supra