Pas au pénal Responsable en raison de troubles mentaux
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Principes généraux
La défense de troubles mentaux est codifiée à l’article 16 du Code criminel canadien, qui stipule notamment :
- Troubles mentaux
16 (1) La responsabilité criminelle d’une personne n’est pas engagée à l’égard d’un acte ou d’une omission de sa part survenu alors qu’elle était atteinte de troubles mentaux qui la rendaient incapable de juger de la nature et de la qualité de l’acte ou de l’omission, ou de savoir que l’acte ou l’omission était mauvais.
[omis (2) and (3)]
L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 16; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 185(F); 1991, ch. 43, art. 2
Cet article reconnaît le principe de droit selon lequel une personne qui souffre d'un trouble mental la rendant incapable de faire des choix rationnels ou autonomes ne devrait « pas » être tenue pénalement responsable.[1]
Cette disposition ne s'applique que lorsque l'individu fait l'objet d'un verdict de culpabilité. L'article 16 aura pour effet d'éviter qu'une déclaration de culpabilité soit prononcée et qu'une pénalité soit imposée.
Il existe deux formes de cette défense. Pour établir une allégation de troubles mentaux, la partie qui soulève la question doit d'abord démontrer, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, que la personne a commis l'acte, que la personne qui a commis l'acte était :
- il souffrant d'un trouble mental; et,
- il incapable d'apprécier la « nature et la qualité » de l'acte, ou
- il ne savais pas que c'était « injuste ».[2]
Glanville Williams in Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd Ed.), au p. 644 characterized the questions as 1) whether the accused "know that he was, for instance, sticking a knife in someone?"; 2) whether the accused know he was killing someone?"
The inquiry under s. 16(1) is whether "the accused lacks the capacity to rationally decide whether the act is right or wrong and hence to make rational choice about whether to do it or not."[3]
Delusions that "make the accused perceive an act which is wrong as right or justifiable" can remove the ability to make rational choices and engage s. 16(1).[4] However, not all offences committed while in a state of delusion will trigger s. 16(1).[5]
The test to be applied is found in s.672.34:
- Verdict de non- responsabilité criminelle
672.34 Le jury ou, en l’absence de jury, le juge ou le juge de la cour provinciale, qui détermine que l’accusé a commis l’acte ou l’omission qui a donné lieu à l’accusation mais était atteint, à ce moment, de troubles mentaux dégageant sa responsabilité criminelle par application du paragraphe 16(1) [défense des troubles mentaux] est tenu de rendre un verdict de non-responsabilité criminelle pour cause de troubles mentaux.
1991, ch. 43, art. 4.
[annotation(s) ajoutée(s)]
- ↑
R c Ejigu, 2016 BCSC 2278 (CanLII), par Davies J, au para 333 (“The provisions recognize the fundamental principles of law that a person who suffers from a mental illness which renders them incapable of making a rational and autonomous choice should not be held to be criminally responsible.“)
R c Chaulk, 1990 CanLII 34 (SCC), [1990] 3 SCR 1303, par Lamer CJ
R c Swain, 1991 CanLII 104 (SCC), [1991] 1 SCR 933, par Lamer CJ
R c Oommen, 1994 CanLII 101 (SCC), [1994] 2 SCR 507, par McLachlin J
- ↑ R c Borsch, 2007 MBCA 111 (CanLII), 53 CR (6th) 76, par Freedman JA
- ↑
Oommen, supra, au p. 518
- ↑
Oommen, supra, au p. 520
- ↑
R c Ratti, 1991 CanLII 112 (SCC), [1991] 1 SCR 68, par Lamer CJ, au p. 113
R c Richmond, 2016 ONCA 134 (CanLII), 334 CCC (3d) 315, par Cronk JA, au para 54 (“ Not every mental disorder, even those that are delusion-driven, will trigger a s. 16 defence. The concept of “wrong” embodied in s. 16(1) contemplates knowledge that an act was morally – not legally – wrong in the circumstances, according to the ordinary moral standard of reasonable members of the community.“)
Mental Disorder and "Disease of the Mind"
Section 2 of the Code defines Mental Disorder as a "disease of the mind".
"Mental disorder" and "disease of the mind" are both legal terms, not medical terms.[1]
Disease of the mind encompasses mental illnesses, disorders and mental impairments, both naturally occurring and those resulting from injury or consumption of materials.[2] It is a legal construct, regardless of its medical dimension. It is then a determination of the judge and not medical experts.[3] A finding of a disease of the mind is a question of law based on the evidence before the court.[4]
Disease of the mind "embraces any illness, disorder or abnormal condition which impairs the human mind and its functioning, excluding however, self-induced states caused by alcohol or drugs, as well as transitory mental states such as hysteria or concussion."[5]
If there is a disease of the mind, it must be shown to be connected with the accused state of mind at the time of the offence. Specifically, that the disease of the mind caused the accused to be impaired. It must be a sufficiently serious disorder.[6]
Central to the inquiry is the effect of the mental disorder upon the accused's capacity.[7]
The applicant should present expert evidence about "the cause, nature and symptoms of the abnormal condition" and how that condition is viewed and characterized medically.[8]
The judge should take into account "the internal cause factor, the continuing danger factor and other policy considerations."[9] Internal causes refers to malfunctioning mind due to the accused's psychological and emotional make-up.[10]
Expert medical opinion on whether a condition constitutes a "mental disorder" is largely irrelevant to whether the "condition should be classified legally as a disease of the mind."[11]
- Sleep Walking
Somnambulism cannot be categorically rejected from being a "disease of the mind". The determination will depend on the evidence.[12]
- Examples
Disease of the mind has been found to include:
- some types of psychopathy [13]
- retardation[14]
- sleep walking[15]
- anxiety[16]
- toxic psychosis[17]
- delirium tremens[18]
However, some conditions that do not cause cognitive impairment have been considered insufficient, such as being concurrently mute and deaf.[19]
A mental disorder does not include a person who is deaf or unable to speak.[20]
- ↑
R c Stone, 1999 CanLII 688 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 290, par Bastarache J, au para 195
R c SH, 2014 ONCA 303 (CanLII), 310 CCC (3d) 455, par Watt JA, aux paras 75, 76 - ↑
R c Rabey, 1980 CanLII 44 (SCC), [1980] 2 SCR 513, par Ritchie J
Stone, supra, au p. 197
R c Cooper, 1979 CanLII 63 (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 1149, par Dickson J - ↑
, ibid.
Stone, supra, au para 195
R c Parks, 1992 CanLII 78 (SCC), [1992] 2 SCR 871, par La Forest J, aux pp. 898 to 899
R c Rabey, 1977 CanLII 48 (ON CA), 17 OR (2d) 673 (CA), par Martin JA, aux pp. 12-13
R c Simpson, 1977 CanLII 1142 (ON CA), O.R. (2d) 129, par Martin JA ("The term “disease of the mind” is a legal concept, although it includes a medical component, and what is meant by the term is a question of law for the Judge") - ↑ R c Charest, 1990 CanLII 3425 (QC CA), 57 CCC (3d) 312, par curiam
- ↑
Cooper, supra, au p. 1159
- ↑ R c Sullivan, 1995 CanLII 8931 (BC CA), 96 CCC (3d) 135, par Hinds JA
- ↑ SH, supra, aux paras 78{{{3}}}
- ↑ SH, supra, au para 79
- ↑
SH, supra, au para 80
Stone, supra, au para 203 - ↑
SH, supra, au para 80
Rabey, supra, au para 59 - ↑ R c Luedecke, 2008 ONCA 716 (CanLII), 236 CCC (3d) 317, par Doherty JA
- ↑ , ibid.
- ↑
R c Cooper, 1979 CanLII 63 (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 1149, par Dickson J
See also Simpson, supra
R c Kjeldsen, 1980 ABCA 49 (CanLII), 53 CCC (2d) 55, par Harradence JA appealed to 1981 CanLII 218 (SCC), [1981] 2 SCR 617 - ↑ R c MSR, 1996 CanLII 8294 (ON SC), 112 CCC (3d) 406, par Lofchik J
- ↑ R c Parks, 1992 CanLII 78 (SCC), [1992] 2 SCR 871, par La Forest J
- ↑ eg. R c McLeod, 1980 CanLII 313 (BC CA), 52 CCC (2d) 193, par Craig JA
- ↑ eg. R c Mailloux, 1985 CanLII 3580 (ON CA), 25 CCC (3d) 171, par Lacourciere JA
- ↑ eg. R c Malcolm, 1989 CanLII 214 (MB CA), 50 CCC (3d) 172, par O'Sullivan JA
- ↑ R c Isaac, 2009 ONCJ 662 (CanLII), 250 CCC (3d) 565, par Schneider J
- ↑ R c Isaac, 2009 ONCJ 662 (CanLII), 250 CCC (3d) 565, par Schneider J
Self-Induced State
A state of psychosis that is entirely due to self-induced consumption of alcohol cannot form the basis of a NCRMD defence.[1] The defence can only apply where the mental disorder is the "source" of the incapacity, "in spite of the intoxication."[2]
Self-Induce states are presumed to be exempted from the rule of s. 16.[3]
To determine whether self-induced states can still avail to s. 16, the courts should consider (a) internal cause factors and (b) continuing danger theory.[4]
Where a state of psychosis is induced by drug, there may be application of s. 16.[5]
- ↑
R c Turcotte, 2013 QCCA 1916 (CanLII), RJQ 1743, par curiam, au para 118 (“ To summarize, self-induced intoxication does not, in and of itself, rule out the defence of mental disorder, except when, as in Bouchard-Lebrun, it is the single cause of the psychosis. The defence of mental disorder must not, however, turn into another form of self-induced intoxication.“)
R c Bouchard-Lebrun, 2010 QCCA 402 (CanLII), 260 CCC (3d) 548, par curiam appealed to SCC - ↑
, ibid., au para 118
- ↑
Cooper, supra, au p. 1159
- ↑ R c Bouchard-Lebrun, 2011 SCC 58 (CanLII), [2011] 3 SCR 575, par LeBel J
- ↑ e.g. R c Patel, 2019 ONCJ 833 (CanLII), par Konyer J
"Appreciating" vs "Knowing"
The verb "appreciating" in section 16 is distinguished from "knowing" in that the appreciation requires a degree of mental analysis on the part of the accused while knowing connotes a bare awareness but not necessarily an understanding or analysis of knowledge or experience.[1]
The act of "appreciating" means "a second stage in a mental process requiring the analysis of knowledge or experience in one manner or another."[2]
The act of "knowing" means a "base awareness, the act of receiving information without more."[3] Appreciation of the "nature and quality" of the act does not require that the "act be accompanied by appropriate feeling about the effect of the act on other people" or that the accused "lacks appropriate feelings for the victim or lacks feelings of remorse or guilt for what he has done". The absence of such feelings is often common among certain people who commit repeated serious offences.[4]
The act of appreciating means appreciating the "physical character" and "physical consequences" of your actions.[5]
- ↑
R c Kjeldsen, 1981 CanLII 218 (SCC), [1981] 2 SCR 617, par McIntyre J
R c Barnier, 1980 CanLII 184 (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 1124, par Estey J - ↑ , ibid., au p. 11
- ↑
, ibid., au p. 11
- ↑ R c Simpson, 1977 CanLII 1142 (ON CA), 35 CCC (2d) 337, par Martin JA
- ↑ Kneldsen, supra
Nature and Quality of Act
The "nature and quality" refers to the "physical character of the act."[1] The accused is not responsible where the offence was "really not his act."[2]
This requirement does not extend to include a mere lack of the "appropriate feelings of remorse or guilt for what she has done."[3]
- ↑ R c Schwartz, 1976 CanLII 165 (SCC), [1977] 1 SCR 673, par Martland J
- ↑ , ibid.
- ↑
R c Ejigu, 2016 BCSC 2278 (CanLII), par Davies J, au para 345
R c Simpson, 1977 CanLII 1142 (ON CA), (1977), 16 OR (2d) 129 (CA), par Martin JA, au p. 14 ("Appreciation of the nature and quality of an act does not import a requirement that the act be accompanied by appropriate feeling about the effect of the act on other people.")
Meaning of "Wrong"
The meaning of the word "wrong" was held to be restricted to "morally wrong" and not "legally wrong."[1]
The meaning of "morally wrong" is determined from "the perspective of society or the perpective of reasonable people."[2]
A person will be unaware of the wrong-ness of an act where he is "deprived of the capacity for rational perception and hence rational choice about the rightness or wrongness of his acts."[3]
The question is whether mental disorder renders them incapable of knowing that their act is not moral on reasonable social standards.[4]
The question is not however whether the offender "was capable of knowing only that an end or objective served by his or her act was morally desirable."[5]
The lack of appreciation must be specific to the particular act that was the subject of the offence. It is not a question of "general capacity."[6]
In assessing capacity to appreciate morally wrong conduct, the focus should be upon "the thinking process of the accused, not their actual knowledge of wrongness". This requires delving into "the thought process, ... coherence, logic, rationality" of the person. Did his condition deprive him of an ability to properly appreciate his conduct?[7]
The issue is whether the accused possessed the capacity to "rationally decide" whether the acts were "right or wrong" so as to chose whether to do the acts.[8] They cannot "rationally decide" where they perceive the acts as "right or justifiable."[9]
Those who have the capacity to "capacity to know that society regards his actions as morally wrong ... cannot be said to lack the capacity to know right from wrong."[10] This is true even when "he believed that he had no choice but to act, or that his acts were justified."[11] But a person who believes the conduct is justified according to the "norms of society"--or a person not able to assess the wrongness of his conduct against "societal norms"--would be unable to know right from wrong.[12]
- ↑
R c Chaulk, 1990 CanLII 34 (SCC), [1990] 3 SCR 1303, par Lamer CJ at 1351 [SCR]
Prior to Chaulk 1990, the standard was simply "legally wrong" - ↑
R c Longridge, 2018 ABQB 145 (CanLII), par Renke J, au para 111 (““Morally wrong” means morally wrong from the perspective of society or the perspective of reasonable people. ...An accused may consider an act to be a moral act and may feel morally compelled to do the act, but because of his or her mental disorder the person may be incapable of knowing that the act is not a moral act by reasonable social standards. That is, the accused may believe that he or she is doing the morally right thing by doing an act, but because of mental disorder the accused is not capable of knowing what reasonable people consider to be right and wrong.“)
- ↑
R c Szostak, 2012 ONCA 503 (CanLII), 289 CCC (3d) 247, par Rosenberg JA, au para 57
- ↑
Longridge, supra, au para 111
- ↑
Longridge, supra, au para 111
- ↑
Longridge, supra, au para 112
R c Oommen, 1frs91994 CanLII 101 (SCC), [1994] 2 SCR 507, par McLachlin J, au p. 516
- ↑
R c Schzartz, 1976 CanLII 165 (SCC), [1977] 1 SCR 673, par Martland J
Longridge, supra, au para 113
- ↑
Oommen, supra ("The crux of the inquiry is whether the accused lacks the capacity to rationally decide whether the act is right or wrong and hence to make a rational choice about whether to do it or not. The inability to make a rational choice may result from a variety of mental disfunctions; as the following passages indicate these include at a minimum the states to which the psychiatrists testified in this case -- delusions which make the accused perceive an act which is wrong as right or justifiable, and a disordered condition of the mind which deprives the accused of the ability to rationally evaluate what he is doing.")
R c Warsing, 2000 BCSC 388 (CanLII), BCTC 166, au para 122
- ↑ , ibid. at para 122
- ↑ R c Dobson, 2018 ONCA 589 (CanLII), 48 CR (7th) 410, par Doherty JA, au para 24
- ↑ , ibid., au para 24
- ↑ Dobson, supra, au para 24
Analysis
- Trial Steps
Where an NCR defence is being raised, the proper sequence should be as follows:[1]
- Determine whether the accused committed the actus reus of the charged offence. If the answer is yes, proceed to step 2.
- Determine whether the accused is criminally responsible for taking the action described in step 1. If the answer is yes, proceed to step 3.
- Determine what offence the accused committed.
- Presumption
There is a presumption that a person is "not ... suffer[ing] from a mental disorder so as to be exempt from criminal responsibility."[2]
- Burden of Proof
The party raising the issue of NCR has the burden.[3] Proof must be established on the balance of probabilities.[4]
Procedure
- Who Can Raise NCR
Defence counsel may not advance an NCR defence against the instructions of the accused. It must be accused not the counsel who asks.[5]
The Crown can only raise NCR if the accused puts his mental condition into issue or if the accused is convicted.[6]
- Evidence
A jury is not required to accept an uncontradicted expert opinion that there is a "strong circumstantial case for an NCR finding."[7] A jury can accept or reject the evidence in the "same manner as any other evidence."[8] The jury can accord less weight to the opinion if it is not based on proven facts or were based on assumptions.[9]
An appellate court reviewing an expert opinion must consider "whether there was a rational basis for rejecting it."[10]
- ↑
R c Worrie, 2019 ONSC 4924 (CanLII), par Barnes J, au para 3
R c David, 2002 CanLII 45049 (ON CA), 169 CCC (3d) 165, par Simmons JA, aux paras 55 to 56 - ↑ s. 16(2)
- ↑ s. 16(3)
R c Chaulk, 1990 CanLII 34 (SCC), [1990] 3 SCR 1303, par Lamer CJ (found this presumption violated s. 11(d) but was justified under s. 1 of the Charter)
- ↑
s. 16(2)
R c Schoenborn, 2010 BCSC 220 (CanLII), par Powers J, au para 233 (" No one can know for sure whether Mr. Schoenborn at the time of killing his children was suffering from a mental disorder that rendered him incapable of knowing that it was wrong. However, as I said at the beginning of this decision, the burden is not on Mr. Schoenborn to show that it is sure that s. 16 applies, but rather that the evidence must show that it is more likely than not that s. 16 applies. All of the evidence must be considered without sympathy or prejudice to anyone. I must consider all of the evidence with care and with a certain amount of skepticism.") - ↑
R c Szostak, 2012 ONCA 503 (CanLII), 289 CCC (3d) 247, par Rosenberg JA, au para 80
see also Role of the Defence Counsel - ↑
R c Swain, 1991 CanLII 104, [1991] 1 SCR 933, par Lamer CJ
see also .s 672.12(3) - ↑
R c Richmond, 2016 ONCA 134 (CanLII), 334 CCC (3d) 315, par Cronk JA, au para 57
- ↑
, ibid., au para 57
- ↑
R c Molodowic, 2000 CSC 16 (CanLII), [2000] 1 SCR 420, par Arbour J, au para 7
- ↑
, ibid.
Richmond, supra, au para 58
Assessment
Timing
The accused may raise the defence of "NCR at any time during the course of a trial, including after a finding of guilt but before a conviction is entered.[1]
The accused may lead evidence of NCR either during trial or after a verdict of guilt. However, if done after verdict, the defence cannot argue that there was no mens rea.[2]
- ↑ R c Swain, 1991 CanLII 104, [1991] 1 SCR 933, par Lamer CJ, au para 71
- ↑ R c Brown, 2006 BCSC 1581 (CanLII), 214 CCC (3d) 151, par Powers J
Ruling NCR
Consent by an accused to be declare NCR does not require the same standard as a gulity plea under s. 606(1.1). [1]
- ↑ R c Quenneville, 2010 ONCA 223 (CanLII), 207 CRR (2d) 360, par Goudge JA
Consequences of NCR Finding
- Conséquence du verdict de non- responsabilité criminelle pour cause de troubles mentaux
672.35 L’accusé qui fait l’objet d’un verdict de non-responsabilité criminelle pour cause de troubles mentaux n’est pas déclaré coupable de l’infraction ou condamné à l’égard de celle-ci; toutefois, les règles suivantes s’appliquent :
- a) l’accusé peut plaider autrefois acquit relativement à toute accusation subséquente relative à l’infraction;
- b) un tribunal peut prendre en considération le verdict lors de l’étude d’une demande de mise en liberté provisoire ou des mesures à prendre ou de la peine à infliger à l’égard de toute autre infraction;
- c) la Commission des libérations conditionnelles du Canada ou une commission provinciale des libérations conditionnelles peut prendre en considération le verdict lors de l’étude d’une demande de libération conditionnelle ou d’une demande de suspension du casier faite au titre de la Loi sur le casier judiciaire à l’égard de toute autre infraction commise par l’accusé.
1991, ch. 43, art. 4; 2012, ch. 1, art. 145 et 160.
Once a finding has been made the judge shall make a decision on disposition under s. 672.45:
- Décision judiciaire
672.45 (1) Lorsqu’un verdict d’inaptitude à subir son procès ou de non-responsabilité criminelle pour cause de troubles mentaux est rendu à l’égard d’un accusé, le tribunal peut d’office, et doit, à la demande de l’accusé ou du poursuivant, tenir une audience pour déterminer la décision à rendre.
- Transmission des documents à la commission d’examen
(1.1) S’il ne tient pas d’audience en vertu du paragraphe (1) [audiences de décision – pouvoir de commencer l'audience], le tribunal est tenu de faire parvenir à la commission d’examen compétente, sans délai après le prononcé du verdict, tout procès-verbal et tout autre renseignement ou pièce se rapportant à l’instance qui sont en sa possession, ou des copies de ceux-ci.
- Idem
(2) Lors de l’audience, le tribunal rend une décision à l’égard de l’accusé s’il est convaincu qu’il est en mesure de rendre une décision à son égard sans difficulté et qu’une telle décision devrait être rendue sans délai.
1991, ch. 43, art. 4; 2005, ch. 22, art. 14 et 42(F).
[annotation(s) ajoutée(s)]
NCR verdict cannot be considered where the Code requires a harsher punishment due to a previous conviction (s. 672.36).
- Nature du verdict
672.36 Un verdict de non-responsabilité criminelle pour cause de troubles mentaux ne constitue pas une condamnation antérieure à l’égard de toute infraction prévue par une loi fédérale pour laquelle une peine plus élevée peut être infligée en raison de telles condamnations.
1991, ch. 43, art. 4.
- Application for Federal Employment
- Définition de demande d’emploi relevant d’une autorité fédérale
672.37 (1) Au présent article, demande d’emploi relevant d’une autorité fédérale s’entend de l’un des documents suivants :
- a) une demande d’emploi dans un ministère au sens de la Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques;
- b) une demande d’emploi dans une société d’État au sens du paragraphe 83(1) de la Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques;
- c) une demande d’enrôlement dans les Forces canadiennes;
- d) une demande présentée en vue d’un emploi exercé dans une entreprise qui relève de la compétence législative du Parlement ou lié à une telle entreprise.
- Demande d’emploi
(2) Il est interdit d’inscrire dans une demande d’emploi relevant d’une autorité fédérale une question qui exige du demandeur de révéler qu’il a fait l’objet d’un verdict de non-responsabilité criminelle pour cause de troubles mentaux ou d’une accusation ayant donné lieu à un tel verdict si le demandeur a été libéré sans condition ou ne fait plus l’objet d’une décision rendue à son égard au titre de cette infraction.
- Peine
(3) Toute personne qui utilise ou permet que soit utilisé un formulaire qui contrevient aux dispositions du paragraphe (2) [interdiction au gouvernement fédéral de s'enquérir des résultats de NCR pour l'emploi] est coupable d’une infraction punissable par procédure sommaire.
1991, ch. 43, art. 4
[annotation(s) ajoutée(s)]
Consequences of Failure to Find NCR
Where evidence falls short of making out a mental disorder that renders the accused not criminally responsible the evidence can be used to raise doubt on whether there is specific intent.[1]
- ↑
R c Kam, 2020 BCSC 893 (CanLII), au para 103 ("Evidence of a mental condition that falls short of a mental disorder that renders the accused not criminally responsible, may raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused had the necessary specific intent.")
R c Robinson, 2010 BCSC 368 (CanLII), par Joyce J, au para 110 ("Such consideration does not create the notion of diminished responsibility, which does not exist in our law. Rather it simply recognizes that if the accused was suffering from some sort of mental condition at the time of the offence, that mental condition is a circumstance that might affect whether or not he formed the necessary specific intent.")
R c Bailey, 1996 CanLII 2524 (BC CA), 111 CCC (3d) 122, par Donald JA, aux paras 13 to 15