View source for Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

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==General Principles==
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{{seealso|Standard of Proof}}
The standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" (BARD) is a common law standard of proof in criminal matters.<Ref>
affirmed under the English common law of England in Woolmington v D.P.P., [1935] A.C. 462 at 481-82 (H.L.)</ref>
This standard is exclusively used in criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings. This includes not only adult criminal trials, but also young offender cases, adult sentencing, and certain provincial penal offences.

The standard of "reasonable doubt" consists of a doubt based on reason and common sense which must be logically based upon the  evidence or lack of evidence. It is not based on "sympathy or prejudice". <ref>
R v Lifchus, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqzt 1997 CanLII 319] (SCC), [1997] 3 SCR 320 at para 36<br>
See also:  In R v JMH, [http://canlii.ca/t/fnbb2 2011 SCC 45]  (CanLII) at para 39 ( “a reasonable doubt does not need to be based on the evidence; it may arise from an absence of evidence or a simple failure of the evidence to persuade the trier of fact to the requisite level of beyond reasonable doubt.”) </ref> 

'''Constitutional Foundation'''<Br>
The standard as the ultimate burden of proof is "inextricably intertwined with that principle fundamental to all criminal trials, the presumption of innocence".<ref>Lifchus{{supra}} at para 36</ref> The burden should never shift to the accused.<ref>Lifchus{{supra}} at para 36</ref>


'''Level of Certainty'''<br>
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt "it does not involve proof to an absolute certainty; it is not proof beyond any doubt nor is it an imaginary or frivolous doubt."<Ref>
Lifchus{{supra}}, at para 31, 36</ref> 

However, belief that the accused is "probably guilty" is not sufficient and must acquit.<ref>
Lifchus{{supra}} at para 36</ref>

The burden of proof placed upon the Crown lies “much closer to absolute certainty than to a balance of probabilities.”<ref>R v Starr, [http://canlii.ca/t/525l 2000 SCC 40] (CanLII) at para 242</ref> The standard is more "than proof that the accused is probably guilty" in which case the judge must acquit.<ref> 
Lifchus{{supra}} at 36</ref>

To know something with "absolute certainty" is to "know something beyond the possibility of any doubt whatsoever". <ref>
R v Layton, [http://canlii.ca/t/217bw 2008 MBCA 118] (CanLII)
</ref> 

'''Relationship to Evidence'''<br>
“[A] reasonable doubt does not need to be based on the evidence; it may arise from an absence of evidence or a simple failure of the evidence to persuade the trier of fact to the requisite level of beyond reasonable doubt.”<ref>R v JMH{{supra}}</ref>  

The standard of BARD only applies to the evaluation of the evidence as a whole and not individual aspects of the evidence.<ref>
R v Stewart, [http://canlii.ca/t/1z6bm 1976 CanLII 202], [1977] 2 SCR 748 at 759-61<br> 
R v Morin, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftc2 1988 CanLII 8], [1988] 2 SCR 345 at 354, 44 CCC (3d) 193<br> 
R v White, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqqt 1998 CanLII 789], [1998] 2 SCR 72, 125 CCC (3d) 385 at paras 38-41</ref>
The standard should be applied for the purpose of determining whether individual elements are proven beyond a reasonable doubt.<ref>
R v McKay, [http://canlii.ca/t/gx2z0  2017 SKCA 4] (CanLII) at para 18 ("The standard of proof, being beyond a reasonable doubt, is not to be applied to individual pieces of evidence. Rather, it is to be applied to the evidence as a whole for the purpose of determining whether each of the necessary elements of an offence has been established.")<br>
</ref>

'''Inferences and Conjecture'''<Br>
Reasonable doubt must come as a rational conclusion from the evidence available and not as a basis of conjecture.<Ref> 
R v Wild [http://canlii.ca/t/1xd3d 1970 CanLII 148] (SCC), [1971] SCR 101 at 113</ref>

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Where the issue is the reliability or credibility of a witness, the courts must generally consider corroborative evidence.<ref> 
R v Kehler, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ggzb 2004 SCC 11] (CanLII), [2004] 1 SCR 328 at paras 12-23</ref>
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'''Risk of Wrongful Conviction'''<br>
A verdict of guilt must be considered carefully in order to protect the liberty of the accused and protect against a wrongful conviction.<ref>
R v W(R), [http://canlii.ca/t/1fsbj 1992 CanLII 56] (SCC), [1992] 2 SCR 122 in context of child witnesses ("Protecting the liberty of the accused and guarding against the injustice of the conviction of an innocent person require a solid foundation for a verdict of guilt")<br>
</ref>

'''Jury Instructions'''<Br>
The standard should not be articulated in a way that would likely cause the standard to be applied subjectively.<ref>
R v Stubbs, [http://canlii.ca/t/g01lb 2013 ONCA 514] (CanLII) at para 99<br>
R v Bisson, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqvv 1998 CanLII 810] (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 306 at p. 311 (SCR)
</ref>

'''Consequence of Reasonable Doubt'''<br>
The finding of reasonable doubt "is not the same as deciding in any positive way that [the allegations] never happened."<ref>
R v Ghomeshi, [http://canlii.ca/t/gnzpj 2016 ONCJ 155] (CanLII) at para 140<br> 
</ref> It is simply a finding that the evidence is not of "sufficient clarity" to allow an acceptance of the essential facts to an "acceptable degree of certainty or comfort" sufficient to displace the presumption of innocence.<Ref>
Ghomeshi{{ibid}} at para 140 and 141<Br>
</ref>

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==Use of Illustrations in Articulating the Standard==
Examples and illustrations are permissible in describing the standard of BARD as long as it does not takeaway the right to reach their own conclusions.<ref>
R v Stavroff, [http://canlii.ca/t/1tx8m 1979 CanLII 52] (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 411 including p. 416 (SCR)
</ref>

The use of illustrations or examples in articulating the standard of BARD is "fraught with difficulty".<ref>
R v Stubbs, [http://canlii.ca/t/g01lb 2013 ONCA 514] (CanLII) at para 98</ref> The use of examples tends to lower the standard to that of a balance of probabilities and encourage a subjective standard.<ref>
Stubbs{{ibid}} at para 99</ref>

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==Raising a Doubt==
{{seealso|Inferences}}
A reasonable doubt cannot be based on "speculation or conjecture".<Ref>
R v Henderson, [http://canlii.ca/t/frc2m 2012 NSCA 53] (CanLII) at para 40<br>
R v White, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mqmc 1994 CanLII 4004] (NS CA)<br>
R v Eastgaard, [http://canlii.ca/t/fllm5 2011 ABCA 152] (CanLII) at para 22, aff’d [http://canlii.ca/t/fqmw7 2012 SCC 11] (CanLII)<br>
</ref>

The Crown has no burden to "negativing every conjecture to which circumstantial evidence might be consistent with the innocence of the accused."<ref>
R v Tahirsylaj, [http://canlii.ca/t/fqmw7 2015 BCCA 7] (CanLII) at para 39<Br>
R v Paul (1975), [http://canlii.ca/t/1z6dt 1975 CanLII 185] (SCC), 27 CCC (2d) 1 (S.C.C.), at 6, (1975), [1977] 1 SCR 181, 64 D.L.R. (3d) 491 (S.C.C.)<Br>
</ref>

'''"Bero" defence'''<Br>
The absence of evidence due to the police's failure to take investigative steps will sometimes be an important consideration in whether the Crown has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.<Ref> 
R v Bero [http://canlii.ca/t/1fbg9 2000 CanLII 16956] (ON CA), (2000), 151 CCC (3d) 545 (Ont.C.A.) at paras 56 to 58<br>
</ref>

The defence is permitted to elicit evidence from witnesses of potential inadequacies in the investigation. Oversights in investigation "can be particularly important where no defence evidence is called."<Ref>
R v Gyimah, [http://canlii.ca/t/2bmkw 2010 ONSC 4055] (CanLII), at para 20
Bero<Br>
</ref>

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==See Also==
*[[Jury Instructions]]