View source for Statutory Interpretation of the Charter

{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderInterpretation}}
==General Principles==
The goal of Charter interpretation to secure for all people "the full benefit of the Charter's protection".<ref>
{{CanLIIR|Morgentaler|1ftjt|1988 CanLII 90 (SCC)}}{{perSCC|Dickson CJ}}{{Atp|51}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Big M Drug Mart Ltd|1fv2b|1985 CanLII 69 (SCC)|[1985] 1 SCR 295}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}}{{atp|344}}<br>
</ref>

; Purposive Interpretation
This requires a judge to interpret a Charter right using a "purposive approach"<ref>
{{CanLIIR|Brydges|1ft0k|1990 CanLII 123 (SCC)}}{{perSCC|Lamer J}}</ref> (or sometimes called  "purposive analysis").<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Hunter v Southam Inc|1mgc1|1984 CanLII 33 (SCC)|[1984] 2 SCR 145}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Big M Drug Mart Ltd.|1fv2b|1985 CanLII 69 (SCC)|[1985] 1 SCR 295}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}}<br>
{{CanLIIR|KRJ|gsm3w|2016 SCC 31 (CanLII)}}{{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}}{{atL|gsm3w|29}} - re s. 11(i)<br>
{{CanLIIR|Rodgers|1n3br|2006 SCC 15 (CanLII)}}{{perSCC|Charron J}}{{atsL|1n3br|61| and 63}} - re s. 11(i)<br>
</ref>
This mean that a right is to be understood "in light of the interests it was meant to protect".<ref>
{{supra1|Big M Drug Mart}}{{atp|344}}<br>
{{supra1|Morgentaler}}{{atp|52}}<br>
{{supra1|Hunter v Southam}}<br>
{{CanLIIR|Therens|1fv11|1985 CanLII 29 (SCC)}}{{Plurality}}<br>
</ref>
It should be interpreted in "a manner that best ensures the attainment of its objects".<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|974649 Ontario Inc|51xh|2001 SCC 81 (CanLII)|[2001] 3 SCR 575, 159 CCC (3d) 321}}{{perSCC|McLachlin CJ}} (9:0){{atL|51xh|18}}<br>
</ref>

It is important that the right be "generous" and not "a legalistic one", while at the same time not to "overshoot" the "actual purpose" of the right.<ref>
{{supra1|Big M Drug Mart}}{{atp|117}}<br>
</ref>
The effect of a purposive interpretation should "normally ... be to narrow the scope of the right".<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Stillman|j1n56|2019 SCC 40 (CanLII)|36 DLR (4th) 193}}{{perSCC|Moldaver and Brown JJ}}{{atL|j1n56|21}}<br>
Hogg, Peter W., Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp. Scarborough, Ont.: Thomson/Carswell, 2007 (updated 2017, release 1) ("In the case of most rights ... the widest possible reading of the right, which is the most generous interpretation, will “overshoot” the purpose of the right, by including behaviour that is outside the purpose and unworthy of constitutional protection. The effect of a purposive approach is normally going to be to narrow the scope of the right. Generosity is a helpful idea as long as it is subordinate to purpose.")
</ref>

Similarly the interpretation of any Charter right must not "second-guess" and instead should "respect proper choice[s]" of the government.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Vriend v Alberta|1fqt5|1998 CanLII 816 (SCC)|[1998] 1 SCR 493}}{{perSCC|Cory and Iacobucci JJ}}{{atL|1fqt5|136}}<br>
</ref>

The right must be "placed in its proper linguistic, philosophic and historical contexts".<ref>
{{supra1|Big M Drug Mart}}{{atp|117}}<br>
</ref>
<!-- THIS IS ALL IN DISSENT by McIntyre J 

This requires a "fair, large and liberal construction" to the Charter provisions.<ref>
{{supra1|Morgentaler}}{{atp|140}}<br>
</ref> 
However, is also means that the interpretation must also ''exclude'' the "non-purposive".<ref>
{{ibid1|Morgentaler}}{{atp|140}} ("That Charter interpretation is to be purposive necessarily implies the converse: it is not to be "non-purposive"")<br>
</ref>

This approach means the Court must "interpret the Charter in a manner calculated to give effect to its provisions, not to the idiosyncratic view of the judge who is writing".<ref>
{{ibid1|Morgentaler}}{{atp|140}}<br>
</ref>
The meaning must be "confine[d]" to the purposes of the Charter right and cannot abandon "its traditional adjudicatory function in order to formulate its own conclusions on questions of public policy".<ref>
{{ibid1|Morgentaler}}{{atp|140}}<br>
</ref>
-->

In interpreting the Charter judges must avoid  "adjudicati[ng] the merits of public policy".<ref>
{{ibid1|Re BC Motor Vehicles}}{{atp|499}}<br>
{{supra1|Morgentaler}}{{atp|53}}<br>
</ref>

; Living Tree Doctrine
The Charter is to be interpreted using the "living tree" doctrine, which requires the meaning of the text to be capable of "growth and expansion".<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act|dln|1985 CanLII 81 (SCC)|[1985] 2 SCR 486}}{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}}{{atL|dln|53}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Law society of Upper Canada v Skapinker|1czjg|1984 CanLII 3 (SCC)|[1984] 1 SCR 357}}{{perSCC|Estey J}}<br>
</ref>

"Historical materials" such as legislative history should not be used to "stunt [the Charter's] growth".<ref>
{{ibid1|Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act}}{{atL|dln|53}}<br>
</ref>

; Legislative History
Speeches and statements of public servants and minutes of the parliamentary committees who assisted in drafting the Constitution are of limited weight for reasons including that it would freeze the rights as they were at the time of drafting.<ref>
{{ibid1|Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act}}{{atL|dln|53}}<br>
</ref>

; Remedies
When applying purposive interpretation it requires that remedies be interpreted in a way to provide "a full effective and meaningful remedy for Charter violations".<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education)|4nx4|2003 SCC 62 (CanLII)|[2003] 3 SCR 3}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci and Arbour JJ}}{{atL|4nx4|25}}<br>
</ref>
A Charter remedy must crafted to be responsive and effective.<ref>
{{ibid1|Doucet-Boudreau}}{{atL|4nx4|25}}<br>
</ref>

; United States
In the US constitutional interpretation of the Eighth Amendment (similar to our s. 8 of the Charter) the provision "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."<ref>
''Trop v Dulles'' 356 U.S. 86 (1958) [https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/356/86]
</ref>

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