View source for Similar Fact Evidence

{{Currency|August 2021}}
{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderCharacter}}
==General Principles==
{{seealso|Character Evidence|Discretionary Exclusion of Evidence}}
Similar Fact Evidence (SFE) is a form of character evidence that relates to "extrinsic misconduct by an accused" and is presumed inadmissible.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Handy|51r6|2002 SCC 56 (CanLII)|[2002] 2 SCR 908}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atL|51r6|36}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Luciano|2fhtn|2011 ONCA 89 (CanLII)|267 CCC (3d) 16}}{{perONCA|Watt JA}}{{atL|2fhtn|226}}<br>
See also:<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Shearing|51rb|2002 SCC 58 (CanLII)|[2002] 3 SCR 33}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|D(LE)|1ft4x|1989 CanLII 74 (SCC)|[1989] 2 SCR 111}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Sweitzer|1lpc8|1982 CanLII 23 (SCC)|[1982] 1 SCR 949}}{{perSCC-H|McIntyre J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Morris|1lpds|1983 CanLII 28 (SCC)|[1983] 2 SCR 190}}{{perSCC|Lamer J}} (dissenting on diff. issue) at pp. 201-2 (SCR)<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Morin|1ftc2|1988 CanLII 8 (SCC)|[1988] 2 SCR 345}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}} at pp. 367-68 (SCR)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|B(CR)|1fswk|1990 CanLII 142 (SCC)|[1990] 1 SCR 717}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}} at pp. 734-35 ("The principal reason for the exclusionary rule relating to propensity is that there is a natural human tendency to judge a person's action on the basis of character.  Particularly with juries there would be a strong inclination to conclude that a thief has stolen, a violent man has assaulted and a pedophile has engaged in pedophilic acts.  Yet the policy of the law is wholly against this process of reasoning.  This policy is reflected not only in similar acts cases but as well in the rule excluding evidence of the character of the accused unless placed in issue by him.  The stronger the evidence of propensity, the more likely it is that the forbidden inference will be drawn and therefore the greater the prejudice.")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Arp|1fqq7|1998 CanLII 769 (SCC)|[1998] 3 SCR 339}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}{{atL|1fqq7|40}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Robertson|1ftmk|1987 CanLII 61 (SCC)|[1987] 1 SCR 918}}{{perSCC|Wilson J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Seaboyer|1fskf|1991 CanLII 76 (SCC)|[1991] 2 SCR 577}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}{{atp|613}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Lepage|1frn1|1995 CanLII 123 (SCC)|[1995] 1 SCR 654}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|C(MH)|1fsmc|1991 CanLII 94 (SCC)|[1991] 1 SCR 763}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Litchfield|1frxj|1993 CanLII 44 (SCC)|[1993] 4 SCR 333}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|B(FF)|1fs4x|1993 CanLII 167 (SCC)|[1993] 1 SCR 697}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|ZWC|jddvg|2021 ONCA 116 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA|Strathy CJ}}{{AtL|jddvg|96}}
{{UKCase|R v Rowton| (1865), 169 E.R. 1497 (CCA)}} at p. 1506<br>
{{UKCase|Makin v The Attorney General for New South Wales|, [1894] A.C. 57}} at 65 (P.C.)<br>
</ref> 
The SFE rule is described as an exception to the general rule against bad character evidence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Percy|j56b3|2020 NSCA 11 (CanLII)}}{{perNSCA|Beveridge JA}}{{atL|j56b3|46}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|B(CR)|1fswk|1990 CanLII 142 (SCC)|[1990] 1 SCR 717}}{{Atps|724-5}}
</ref>
It has also been described as the "rule against general bad character".<REf>
{{CanLIIRP|MRS|jb6p4|2020 ONCA 667 (CanLII)|396 CCC (3d) 172}}{{perONCA|Paciocco JA}}{{atL|jb6p4|59}}
</ref>

SFE may be admitted even where some prejudice may attach to it so long as there is sufficient probative value to it.<ref>
{{supra1|Robertson}}
</ref>

SFE of general propensity, disposition or bad character that ''only'' goes to prove the accused is the "type of person" to commit the offence is ''always'' inadmissible.<ref>
{{supra1|MRS}}{{AtL|jb6p4|59}}
{{supra1|ZWC}}{{atL|jddvg|96}}<Br>
{{supra1|Handy}}{{atL|51r6|53}}<br>
{{supra1|Arp}}{{atL|1fqq7|41}}<Br>
see also {{CanLIIRP|JAT|fqmzd|2012 ONCA 177 (CanLII)|288 CCC (3d) 1}}{{perONCA|Watt JA}}{{atL|fqmzd|51}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|RO|gm801|2015 ONCA 814 (CanLII)|333 CCC (3d) 367}}{{perONCA|Tulloch JA}}{{atL|gm801|15}}
</ref>
Similarly, it is inadmissible when tendered to "establish character, as circumstantial proof of the accused's conduct."<ref>
{{supra1|ZWC}}{{atL|jddvg|96}}<Br>
{{supra1|Handy}}{{atL|51r6|31}}<br>
{{supra1|Luciano}}{{atL|2fhtn|221}}
</ref>

The determination of what use SFE can be made at trial has been described as "[o]ne of the greatest challenges face by a trial judge."<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|ZWC|jddvg|2021 ONCA 116 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA|Strathy CJ}}{{AtL|jddvg|94}}
</ref>

; SFE Rule Applies to Bad Acts Only
While Canadian law refers to the phrase "similar fact evidence", the term has been found to be misleading.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|LB|6hbz|1997 CanLII 3187 (ON CA)|116 CCC (3d) 481}}{{perONCA|Charron JA}}<Br>
</ref> 
Other terms for the rule include "prior discreditable conduct", "prior bad acts" or "similar offending".

; Purpose
This form of evidence is admissible to show "that persons tend to act in a manner consistent with their character."<ref>
{{ibid1|LB}}
</ref>

It has been described that SFE imperils "fundamental tenants" of our system by inviting conviction "based on the kind of person the accused is shown to be or
based on acts other than those alleged against the accused."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Suzack|1fb1j|2000 CanLII 5630 (ON CA)|141 CCC (3d) 449, [2000] OJ No 100}}{{perONCA|Doherty JA}}
</ref>

The evidence should be treated cautiously as it risks violating the presumption of innocence by convicting based on prejudices, including their lifestyle, rather than proof of fact.<ref>
{{supra1|Handy}}{{atL|51r6|139}}<br>
{{CanLIIR-N|R v Bond|, [1906] 2 K.B. 389}}<Br>
</ref>
There is also a general presumption in criminal law that a person tried in a criminal court must only answer to evidence "limited to matters relating to the transaction which forms the subject of the indictment."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Koufis|fsmws|1941 CanLII 55 (SCC)|[1941] SCR 481}}{{atp|490}}<Br>
{{UKCase|Maxwell v DPP|, [1935] A.C. 309 (H.L.)}}{{atp|317}}<Br>
</ref>
Propensity evidence should also be avoided as it tends to direct the investigation on the "usual suspects" rather than on the offence itself and is counter to the assumption that offenders can rehabilitate.<ref>
{{supra1|Handy}}{{atL|51r6|38}}<br>
</ref>

In certain respects, the rule against SFE is a version of the broader rule of exclusion where the probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial effect.<Ref>
{{supra1|MRS}}{{atL|jb6p4|62}}
</ref>

; Propensity as Inference
Propensity evidence suggests two inferences that can be a legally relevant form of circumstantial evidence. First, it infers the accused's disposition and state of mind using collateral events. Second, it infers from that disposition that the accused acted in a certain way in the events that make up the subject of the case.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|WB|1fb7f|2000 CanLII 5751 (ON CA)|145 CCC (3d) 449}}{{perONCA|Doherty JA}}{{atL|1fb7f|97}} ("Propensity reasoning involves two inferences. First, one infers from conduct on occasions other than the occasion in issue that a person has a certain disposition (state of mind). Second, one infers from the existence of that disposition that a person acted in a certain way on the occasion in issue: ... . Assuming the evidence can reasonably support both inferences, there is nothing irrational or illogical in using propensity reasoning to infer that an accused committed the act alleged. Viewed in this way, the evidence of the accused's discreditable conduct is a form of circumstantial evidence and meets the legal relevance criterion")
</ref>

; What Evidence Applies
Evidence will be SFE where it:
# relates to prior conduct of the accused;
# may have a prejudicial effect;
# is being admitted for a purpose that establishes guilt.

SFE captures all types of prior discreditable conduct and is not limited to "criminal acts."<ref>
{{supra1|Robertson}}{{atL|1ftmk|42}}
</ref>

The rule will apply equally to evidence of multiple complainants reporting similar events used for the purpose of corroborating each others evidence as much as it applies to similar fact witnesses.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|White|glblr|2015 ABQB 601 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Graesser J}}{{atL|glblr|29}}<br>
</ref>

; Burden and Standard
SFE is "presumptively inadmissible" and viewed with suspicion as persons should generally not be punished for prior bad acts.<ref>
{{supra1|Handy}}{{atL|51r6|55}}<br>
{{supra1|B(CR)}}{{atp|15}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Perrier|1hwrn|2004 SCC 56 (CanLII)|[2004] 3 SCR 228}}{{perSCC-H|Major J}}{{atL|1hwrn|17}}
</ref> 
Consequently, it should only be "exceptionally" admitted where the crown discharges the burden.<ref> 
{{supra1|Handy}}{{atL|51r6|60}}<br>
{{supra1|B(CR)}}{{atp|732}}<br>
</ref>

The requirements of admissibility must be proven on a balance of probabilities.<ref>
{{supra1|Handy}}
</ref>
There is no obligation to prove the prior bad acts, whether criminal or not, on a criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Carpenter|27k3l|2010 BCCA 27 (CanLII)|279 BCAC 287}}{{perBCCA|Hall JA}}
</ref>

; Appellate Review
The requirements of the test of similar fact evidence is a question of law and reviewable on a standard of correctness.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Tessier|51wr|2002 SCC 6 (CanLII)|[2002] 1 SCR 144}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ward|1mktv|1979 CanLII 14 (SCC)|[1979] 2 SCR 30}}{{perSCC-H|Spence J}} <br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Moreau|gd93f|1986 CanLII 4618 (ON CA)|26 CCC (3d) 359}}{{perONCA-H|Martin JA}}<br>
</ref>
However, the conclusions of similar fact analysis on the law is "entitled to a high degree of deference" and should only be interfered with if "the analysis is unreasonable or if there is legal error or a misapprehension of material evidence."<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|JH|hr03p|2018 ONCA 245 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA|van Rensburg JA}}{{atL|hr03p|11}}<br>
</ref>

; History
Historically, the admission of SFE was based on categories such as proof of identity, to rebut innocent association or accident.<Ref>
{{supra1|Percy}}{{atL|j56b3|47}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Sweitzer|1lpc8|1982 CanLII 23 (SCC)|[1982] 1 SCR 949}}{{perSCC-H|McIntyre J}}<br>
Boardman v DPP, [1975] AC 421
</ref>
{{Reflist|2}}

==Admission of Similar Fact==
The modern view on SFE is the "principled approach" where the evidence is admissible only where the probative value out weighs the prejudicial effect.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Handy|51r6|2002 SCC 56 (CanLII)|[2002] 2 SCR 908}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|D(LE)|1ft4x|1989 CanLII 74 (SCC)|[1989] 2 SCR 111}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}<Br>
{{supra1|B(CR)}}{{Atp|22}} (CCC) ("while generally inadmissible, may exceptionally be admitted where the probative value of the evidence in relation to an issue in question is so high that it displaces the heavy prejudice which will inevitably inure to the accused where evidence of prior immoral or illegal acts is presented to the jury.")<Br>
</ref>
A categorical approach to SFE based on what purpose the evidence is being adduced for is not appropriate.<ref>
{{UKCase|Boardman v DPP|, [1975] AC 421}}
</ref>

The test requires that the judge be satisfied on a balance of probability that probative value outweighs its potential prejudice.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Percy|j56b3|2020 NSCA 11 (CanLII)|61 CR (7th) 7}}{{perNSCA|Beveridge JA}}{{atL|j56b3|49}} ("The test is easy to state. The Crown must satisfy the trial judge on a balance of probabilities that the probative value of the evidence in relation to a particular issue outweighs its potential prejudice")
</ref>

; Elements of Admission
To admit SFE the judge should be satisfied that:
<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|RL|1vlq4|2007 CanLII 60171 (ONSC)}}{{perONSC|Spies J}}{{atL|1vlq4|7}} citing {{supra1|Handy}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Luciano|2fhtn|2011 ONCA 89 (CanLII)|267 CCC (3d) 16}}{{perONCA|Watt JA}}{{atL|2fhtn|227}}<br>
</ref>
# the conduct is that of the accused;
# the evidence is relevant;
# the evidence is material;
# the conduct is discreditable to the accused;
# the evidence is probative, to the extent that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

The answer must be in the affirmative to ''all'' of the elements.<ref>
{{ibid1|Luciano}}{{atL|2fhtn|227}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|B(L); R v G(MA)|6hbz|1997 CanLII 3187 (ON CA)|35 OR (3d) 35}}{{perONCA|Charron JA}}{{atL|6hbz|10}}<br>
</ref>

The admissibility question should focus on the acts themselves and whether their similarities permit admission.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|MacCormack|2289j|2009 ONCA 72 (CanLII)|241 CCC (3d) 516}}{{perONCA|Watt JA}}{{atL|2289j|52}}</ref>

SFE may be admitted where its probative value to an "issue in question" outweighs its prejudicial effect.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|CRB|1fswk|1990 CanLII 142 (SCC)|55 CCC (3d) 1}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}{{atp|22}} ("Evidence of propensity, while generally inadmissible, may exceptionally be admitted where the probative value of the evidence in relation to an issue in question is so high that it displaces the heavy prejudice which will inevitably inure to the accused where evidence of prior immoral or illegal acts is presented to the jury")
</ref>
The essence of the exception allows the judge to consider propensity only where the propensity evidence is sufficiently precise to overcome the prejudice it endures.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|GES|1rqlv|2007 CanLII 20796 (ONSC)}}{{perONSC|Seppi J}}{{atL|1rqlv|7}} ("evidence identifies a disposition or propensity with sufficient precision to make the evidence worth receiving")</ref>

Where it is presented only for the purpose of establishing that the accused's character makes him more likely to have committed the offence it is prohibited.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Clermont|1ftsd|1986 CanLII 26 (SCC)|[1986] 2 SCR 131}}{{perSCC|Lamer J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Morris|1lpds|1983 CanLII 28 (SCC)|[1983] 2 SCR 190}}{{perSCC-H|McIntyre J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Morin|1ftc2|1988 CanLII 8 (SCC)|[1988] 2 SCR 345}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}<br>
</ref> 

; Test Applies Whether or Not Acts are Extrinsic to Charges
The application of the test is the same whether it is evidence of extrinsic acts or arises from the evidence applied to other counts on the indictment.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Moo|25kzl|2009 ONCA 645 (CanLII)|247 CCC (3d) 34}}{{perONCA|Watt JA}}{{atL|25kzl|97}}<br>
</ref>

; Burden
The burden is upon the Crown on a balance of probabilities to establish the probative value outweighing the prejudicial effect.<ref>
{{supra1|Handy}}{{atL|51r6|55}} ("The onus is on the prosecution to satisfy the trial judge on a balance of probabilities that in the context of the particular case the probative value of the evidence in relation to a particular issue outweighs its potential prejudice and thereby justifies its reception.")<br>
</ref>

The Crown has the burden of adducing evidence of the "improbability of coincidence" between incidents.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Mahalingan|21h5z|2008 SCC 63 (CanLII)|[2008] 3 SCR 316}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|21h5z|72}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Johnson|2fgjp|2011 ONSC 195 (CanLII)|OJ No 317}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}{{atL|2fgjp|131}}<br>
</ref>

{{Quote box
|width = 35em
|bgcolor = #c6dbf7
|align = right
|quote = 
The court ''may'' allow similar fact evidence after establishing that:
# the conduct is that '''of the accused''';
# the evidence is '''relevant''';
# the evidence is '''material''';
# the conduct is '''discreditable to the accused''';
# the evidence is probative, to the extent that its probative value '''outweighs its prejudicial effect'''
|source = R v Handy
}}
{{reflist|2}}
===Count-to-Count (or "Cross-Count") Admissibility===
Generally, on a trial for a multi-count information, evidence relevant to one count cannot be used to support another count without violating the similar fact rule.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|TCF|22cch|2006 NSCA 42 (CanLII)|212 CCC (3d) 134}}{{perNSCA|Cromwell JA}}{{atL|22cch|23}} ("... generally evidence of the commission of a crime charged on one count of an indictment is not admissible to show that the accused committed some other crime charged in the indictment.  It also means that evidence tending to show only or mainly that the accused is of bad character or has committed discreditable acts is not to be used in deciding whether he or she is guilty of an offence. ")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Manitopyes|gr719|2016 SKCA 61 (CanLII)|336 CCC (3d) 386}}{{perSKCA|Lane JA}}{{atL|gr719|16}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Rarru|1fr9k|1996 CanLII 195 (SCC)|[1996] 2 SCR 165}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}{{atL|1fr9k|1}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|C(PE)|1kt58|2005 SCC 19 (CanLII)|[2005] 1 SCR 290}}{perSCC-H|Charron J}}{{atL|1kt58|1}}<Br>
</ref>

In a prosecution on a multi-count indictment with different complainants, the Crown may seek admission of evidence to apply across several counts as similar fact evidence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Johnson|2fgjp|2011 ONSC 195 (CanLII)|OJ No 317}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}{{atL|2fgjp|130}}<br>
</ref>
These applications are often dealt with at the conclusion of the Crown's evidence.<ref>
{{ibid1|Johnson}}{{atL|2fgjp|130}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Last|262nh|2009 SCC 45 (CanLII)|[2009] 3 SCR 146}}{{perSCC|Deschamps J}}{{atL|262nh|34}}</ref> 
Or at the end of the case.<ref>
e.g. {{CanLIIRP|UC|23f8p|2009 ONCA 367 (CanLII)|248 OAC 341}}{{perONCA|Moldaver JA}}{{atL|23f8p|19}}<br>
</ref>

Absent a ruling on similar fact in a trial on a multi-count indictment, the trial judge must give instructions warning a jury against the misuse of evidence from one county in relation to any other account."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Nduwayo|1xm5n|2008 BCCA 255 (CanLII)|256 BCAC 292}}{{perBCCA|Finch CJ}}
</ref>

The screening of "cross-count" use of evidence will involve more than just SFE factors as it may have other potential use.<Ref>
{{CanLIIR|Settle|jgddr|2021 ABCA 221 (CanLII)}}{{atL|jgddr|34}} ("Referring to this as “cross-count application and use of evidence” is a more comprehensive and precise way to understand the screening that is being done, because such adjudicative use of evidence is not exclusively based on ‘similar fact’ concepts")
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==="Issue in Question"===
The stated purpose of the evidence must be specific.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Handy|51r6|2002 SCC 56 (CanLII)|[2002] 2 SCR 908}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atL|51r6|96}}<br>
{{CanLIIR|JH|1q3wl|2006 CanLII 40664 (ON CA)}}{{AtL|1q3wl|34}}
</ref>

Simply stating the "credibility" of the accused is not specific enough.<ref>
{{ibid1|JH}} at para 34
</ref>

Evidence admitted for the purpose of establishing the ''actus reus'' has a lower standard of admission and may be admitted where the similarities of evidence is less cogent.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Cresswell|22981|2009 ONCA 95 (CanLII)|[2009] OJ No 363 (ONCA)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|22981|9}}<br>
</ref>

Examples of other purposes include:
* proof of actus reus
* identification 
* supporting reliability or credibility
* rebut inference of coincidence
* rebut consent or honest but mistaken belief

{{Reflist|2}}

==Factors==
Similar fact evidence is "presumptively inadmissible. The onus is on the prosecution to satisfy the trial judge on the balance of probabilities that in the context of the particular case the probative value of the evidence in relation to a particular issue outweighs its potential prejudice and thereby justifies its reception."
<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Handy|51r6|2002 SCC 56 (CanLII)|[2002] 2 SCR 908}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}<br>
The Law of Evidence, by David M. Paciocco and Lee Stuesser, 5th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2008){{atp|55}}</ref>

{{Reflist|2}}
===Similarities===
The necessary degree of similarity "depends on context."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Capewell|j5tqk|2020 BCCA 82 (CanLII)|386 CCC (3d) 192}}{{perBCCA|Abrioux JA}}{{atL|j5tqk|82}} ("While the degree of similarity required to establish the probative value of the evidence depends on context...")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|JM|281w5|2010 ONCA 117 (CanLII)|251 CCC (3d) 325}}{{atL|281w5|91}} ("it is not an invariable requirement that there be a strong peculiarity or unusual distinctiveness underlying the events compared")
{{CanLIIRx|Burman|gmn0w|2015 BCCA 519 (CanLII)}}{{perBCCA|Frankel JA}}{{atL|gmn0w|64}}
</ref>

When assessing the similarities of incidents in a similar fact evidence application, the court should consider:<ref>
e.g., {{CanLIIRP|Arp|1fqq7|1998 CanLII 769 (SCC)|[1998] 3 SCR 339}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}{{atL|1fqq7|50}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Handy|51r6|2002 SCC 56 (CanLII)|[2002] 2 SCR 908}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atL|51r6|82}}<br>
Watt’s Manual of Criminal Evidence, Thomson Reuters, 2010{{atp|503}}</ref>
#the temporal proximity of the incidents;<ref>
{{supra1|D(LE)}}{{atp|125}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Simpson|g1dvj|1977 CanLII 1142 (ON CA)|35 CCC (2d) 337}}{{perONCA-H|Martin JA}}{{atp|345}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Huot|g13xr|1993 CanLII 8652 (ON CA)|16 OR (3d) 214}}{{perONCA|Arbour JA}} (2:1){{atp|220}}<br>
</ref>
#the physical or spatial proximity of the events; 
#the similarity in detail between the various acts;<ref>
{{supra1|Huot}}{{atp|218}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Rulli|1f9c1|1999 CanLII 3712 (ON CA)|134 CCC (3d) 465}}{{perONCA|Finlayson JA}}{{atp|471}}<br>
{{supra1|C(MH)}}{{atp|772}}</ref>
#the number of putatively similar acts;<ref>
{{supra1|Batte}}{{atps|227-28}}</ref>
#the circumstances surrounding the incidents at issue;
#distinctive features unifying the incidents;<ref>
{{supra1|Arp}}{{atsL|1fqq7|43| to 45}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Fleming|270qv|1999 CanLII 18921 (NL CA)|171 Nfld. & PEIR 183 (Nfld. CA)}}{{atp|104-5}}<Br>
{{supra1|Rulli}}{{atp|472}}</ref>and
#the occurrence and nature of any intervening events.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Dupras|1q6hm|2000 BCSC 1128 (CanLII)|[2000] B.C.J. No 1513 (S.C.)}}{{perBCSC|Satanove J}}{{atL|1q6hm|12}}</ref>

The task of the judge in analysis is not to "add up similarities and dissimilarities and then, like an accountant, derive a net balance."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Shearing|51rb|2002 SCC 58 (CanLII)|[2002] 3 SCR 33}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atL|51rb|60}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|JH|hr03p|2018 ONCA 245 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA|van Rensburg JA}}{{atL|hr03p|20}}<Br>
</ref>

The question is better framed as whether there was a "persuasive degree of connection between the similar fact evidence and the offence charged'.<ref>
{{supra1|Shearing}}{{atL|51rb|48}}<Br>
{{supra1|JH}}{{atL|hr03p|20}}<br>
</ref>

There is no requirement that there be a "pattern of propensity, hallmark evidence or repeated conduct in a particular situation" for the evidence to be admissible.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|TLM|fl053|2011 NLCA 24 (CanLII)|[2011] NJ No 118}}{{perNLCA|Hoegg JA}} (dissent){{atL|fl053|62}}, adopted by SCC on appeal [2012] SCJ 6, [http://canlii.ca/t/fq35h 2012 SCC 6] (CanLII){{perSCC|Deschamps J}}<Br>
</ref>

; Dissimilarities
The existence of distinct dissimilarities does not preclude the acceptance of similar fact evidence.<ref>
{{supra1|Shearing}}{{AtL|51rb|60}} 
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Prejudice===
{{seealso|Discretionary Exclusion of Evidence#Prejudice}}

===Judge-alone Trials===
Reasoning and moral prejudice are considered less of a concern for trials by judge alone than trial by jury.
<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|TB|22m15|2009 ONCA 177 (CanLII)|[2009] OJ No 751}}{{perONCA|Borins JA}}</ref>

There is little risk of reasoning prejudice in a judge-alone trial given that the judge is "presumed to know the law and the proper and improper use of evidence."<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|JH|hr03p|2018 ONCA 245 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA|van Rensburg JA}}{{atL|hr03p|23}}<br>
</ref>

The risk of conviction on the basis of moral prejudice is not a "significant concern in a judge-alone trial."<ref>
{{ibid1|JH}}{{atL|hr03p|24}}<br>
{{supra1|TB}}{{atL|22m15|33}}<Br>
</ref>

Both forms of prejudice are "significantly reduced" where the application is on a count-to-count similar fact application, as the evidence is "admissible independent of its status as similar fact."<ref>
{{ibid1|JH}}{{atL|hr03p|24}}<Br>
</ref>

{{Reflist|2}}

==Probative Value and Prejudicial Effect==
The determination of the probative value will depend on the purpose and issue for which the evidence is to be admitted.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Johnson|2fgjp|2011 ONSC 195 (CanLII)|OJ No 317}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}{{atL|2fgjp|132}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Mahalingan|21h5z|2008 SCC 63 (CanLII)|[2008] 3 SCR 316}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|21h5z|72}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Handy|51r6|2002 SCC 56 (CanLII)|[2002] 2 SCR 908}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atL|51r6|69 to 75}}<br>
</ref>
The value of the evidence will be largely driven by the connection or "nexus" that exist between the proposed evidence and the offence(s).<ref>
{{ibid1|Handy}}{{atL|51r6|76}}<br>
</ref>

Where identity and mens rea are not at issue, SFE will be highly probative as corroborative evidence and should generally be useful in evaluating credibility.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|CRB|1fswk|1990 CanLII 142 (SCC)|[1990] 1 SCR 717}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}} <Br>
</ref>

Where actus reus is at issue, the degree of similarity may be higher or lower than in an ID case.<ref>
{{supra1|Handy}}{{AtL|51r6|78}}
</ref>

The judge must analyze the "cogency" and "strength" of the SFE.<Ref>
{{supra1|Handy}}{{AtsL|51r6|82|}} and 134
</ref>

Factors favouring admission include:<ref>
{{supra1|Handy}}{{atsL|51r6|82| to 83}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Headley|hvd6q|2018 ONSC 5818 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Barnes J}}{{atL|hvd6q|9}}<br>
</ref>
* the degree of similarity of the acts; 
* the temporal connection of the acts to the offence; 
* the number of similar acts; any distinguishing features, and the similarity of the circumstances. 

Those factors favouring the exclusion include:<ref>
{{supra1|Handy}}<br>
{{supra1|Headley}}<Br>
</ref>
* the potential for distracting the trier of fact; 
* the potential of consuming inordinate court time; 
* the extent to which the evidence is prejudicial and whether there is other less prejudicial evidence to prove the same point.

There is no requirement for admissibility that the prior conduct be "strikingly similar" outside of the case of identity evidence.<ref>
{{supra1|Robertson}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|CRB|1fswk|1990 CanLII 142 (SCC)|[1990] 1 SCR 717}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}
===Specificity===
Evidence of general disposition, general character, "generic" similarities, or "vague" facts will never be admissible.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Johnson|2fgjp|2011 ONSC 195 (CanLII)|OJ No 317}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}{{atsL|2fgjp|133|}}, {{atsL-np|2fgjp|135|}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Perrier|1hwrn|2004 SCC 56 (CanLII)|[2004] 3 SCR 228}}{{perSCC-H|Major J}}{{atL|1hwrn|18}} - disposition<br>
{{CanLIIRP|UC|23f8p|2009 ONCA 367 (CanLII)|248 OAC 341}}{{perONCA|Moldaver JA}}{{atL|23f8p|41}} - disposition<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Chapman|1mdh6|2006 CanLII 1178 (ON CA)|204 CCC (3d) 449}}{{perONCA|Simmons JA}}{{atL|1mdh6|24}} - character
</ref>

Generic similarities common among the commission of the type of offence will not be admissible.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Cresswell|22981|2009 ONCA 95 (CanLII)|OJ No 363}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|22981|8}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|RB|1fzl6|2003 CanLII 13682 (ON CA)|68 OR (3d) 75}}{{perONCA|Simmons  JA}} (2:1){{atsL|1fzl6|49|}}, {{atsL-np|1fzl6|64|}}, {{atsL-np|1fzl6|69|}} aff’d [http://canlii.ca/t/1j0wd 2004 SCC 69] (CanLII), [2004] 3 SCR 503{{TheCourtSCC}}<br>
</ref>

Facts that are "vague" will not be admissible.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Handy|51r6|2002 SCC 56 (CanLII)|[2002] 2 SCR 908}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atL|51r6|85}}<Br>
e.g. {{CanLIIRP|OC|1mj8d|2006 CanLII 3258 (ON CA)|205 CCC (3d) 167}}{{perONCA|Sharpe JA}} - judge rejected generic similarities: young female victims, touched in genital areas followed by apology<Br>
</ref>

; General Disposition and Character Propensity Not Admissible
Whenever the propensity evidence relates only to general disposition and character, the prejudicial effect will usually outweigh any probative value and will not be admissible.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|McNamara (No. 1)|gd1kv|1981 CanLII 3120 (ON CA)|56 CCC (2d) 193, [1981] OJ No 3254}}{{TheCourt}}{{atp|285}} (leave to appeal refused [1981] 1 SCR xi, 56 CCC (2d) 576n)<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Headley|hvd6q|2018 ONSC 5818 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Barnes J}}{{atL|hvd6q|7}}
</ref>

; Evidence Must be "Specific"
A "specific" disposition can be admitted where the evidence supports "a legitimate chain of reasoning and a 'persuasive degree of connection' justifying a similar fact ruling in favour of the prosecution."<ref>
{{supra1|Johnson}}{{atL|2fgjp|135}}<Br>
</ref>

Examples of admissible disposition evidence include:
* “a specific disposition to sexually abuse his companion’s two young daughters”<ref>
{{supra1|UC}}{{atL|23f8p|41}}<br></ref>
* “specific propensity to engage in sexual misconduct with boys in his care who came to him in a vulnerable condition”<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|B(R)|1lj70|2005 CanLII 30693 (ON CA)|77 OR 171 (CA)}}{{perONCA|Laskin JA}}{{atL|1lj70|11}}<br>
</ref>
* showing the state of mind such as a "plan, scheme, system, design, intention, ... knowledge, motive, to rebut innocent intent, mistake."<ref>
{{supra1|Headley}}{{atL|hvd6q|8}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Downey|1ckjr|2002 CanLII 18692 (ONSC)|, [2002] OJ No 2228}}{{perONSC|Hall J}}{{atL|1ckjr|315}}</ref>

It is important to also take note of material dissimilarities between transactions.<ref>
{{supra1|Handy}}{{atL|51r6|123}}<br>
{{supra1|Johnson}}{{atL|2fgjp|136}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Collusion===
{{seealso|Analyzing Testimony#Evidence of Collusion or Tainting}}

Where there are "strikingly similar" incidents given by independent witnesses, the improbability of coincidental recollection give probity to the evidence as being connected.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|UC|23f8p|2009 ONCA 367 (CanLII)|248 OAC 341}}{{perONCA|Moldaver JA}}{{atL|23f8p|40}}<br>
</ref>
But where there is collusion between witnesses and they share their evidence with each other prior to giving evidence, this sharing either intentionally or unintentionally alters their evidence to be more similar and consistent.

; Use of Collusion Evidence
Collusion is to be considered both in determining the admissibility of similar fact evidence as well as the reliability of the witness's evidence overall.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|CL|fvldt|2013 ONSC 277 (CanLII)|274 CRR (2d) 342}}{{perONSC|Campbell J}}{{atL|fvldt|71}}</ref>

The existence of collusion can rebut the premise upon which admissibility depends.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Handy|51r6|2002 SCC 56 (CanLII)|[2002] 2 SCR 908}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atL|51r6|110}}<br>
</ref>

Evidence of collusion can reduce or eliminate the probative value of the witness's evidence as it ceases to be independent and compelling.<ref>
{{supra1|CL}}{{atL|fvldt|71}}</ref>

; Collusion Evidence for Juries
Collusion is generally not something that should simply be left to the jury to decide.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Handy|1fb5j|2000 CanLII 5707 (ON CA)|145 CCC (3d) 177}}{{perONCA|Charron JA}}{{atL|1fb5j |52}}, {{affd}} on appeal to SCC<br>
cf. {{CanLIIRP|Dorsey|fqslg|2012 ONCA 185 (CanLII)|288 CCC (3d) 62}}{{perONCA|MacPherson JA}}{{atL|fqslg|26}} - opportunity of collusion ''should'' be left to the jury<br>
</ref> 

; Burden
Where there is an air of reality to the existence of collusion there is then a condition precedent for the Crown to prove on a balance of probabilities that the similar fact evidence was not tainted by the collusion.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Johnson|2fgjp|2011 ONSC 195 (CanLII)|OJ No 317}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}{{atsL|2fgjp|133|}}, {{atL|2fgjp|141}}<br>
{{supra1|Handy (SCC)}}{{atL|51r6|112}}<br>
</ref>

; Exposure to Media and Rumours
Potential inadvertent collusion through rumours and media accounts may occur and should not by itself exclude similar fact evidence. However, such occurrence should go to the weight.<ref>
{{ibid1|Dorsey}}</ref>

; Complainant Contact Without Collusion
In certain contexts such as for historical sexual assaults, it can be natural for complainants to have discussions about the incidents and will not amount to collusion.<ref>
{{CanLIIR|Coreman|jg6xj|2021 ABCA 107 (CanLII)}}{{atL|jg6xj|49}}<br>
{{CanLIIR|GDP|gf3x9|2014 ABQB 643 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Hall J}}
</ref>

; Opportunity Only
Where the evidence amounts simply to an "opportunity" to collaborate then the issue will be left to the trier-of-fact to determine the weight.<ref>
{{supra1|Handy (SCC)}}{{atL|51r6|111}} ("[t]he issue is concoction or collaboration, not contact. If the evidence amounts to no more than opportunity, it will usually be best left to the jury")<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Similarities Between Acts===

The degree of similarity required "is assessed in relation to the issue sought to be established and must be evaluated in relation to the other evidence in the case."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Shearing|51rb|2002 SCC 58 (CanLII)|[2002] 3 SCR 33}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}<br>
e.g. {{CanLIIRP|H(J)|1q3wl|2006 CanLII 40664 (ON CA)|215 CCC (3d) 233}}{{perONCA|Lang JA}}
</ref>

What would be called "generic similarities" are to be given less consideration. The risk of "relying primarily on generic similarities" to support evidence establishing the ''actus reus'' includes the risk that the "initial inference arising from the prior conduct becomes so general, that it approaches bad personhood" and also the risk the accused's "non-specific character, generic similarities may mask underlying dissimilarities that could be important in a particular case."
<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Blake|1fzl6|2003 CanLII 13682 (ON CA)|181 CCC (3d) 169}}{{perONCA|Simmons JA}} (2:1), affirmed [http://canlii.ca/t/1j0wd 2004 SCC 69] (CanLII), 188 CCC (3d) 428{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|1j0wd|64}}<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Prejudicial Effects===
{{seealso|Discretionary Exclusion of Evidence}}

Evidence will be prejudicial where it "involves the distraction of the jury from the proper focus of the charge."<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|MT|23v6c|2009 CanLII 29204 (ON SC)}}{{perONSC|Echlin J}}{{atL|23v6c|18}}<br>
</ref>  

SFE should not be admitted where the "facts may induce in the minds of the jury sentiments of revulsion and condemnation which might well deflect them from the rational, dispassionate analysis upon which the criminal process."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|D(LE)|20zzt|1987 CanLII 2536 (BCCA)|, 20 BCLR (2d) 384 (CA)}}{{perBCCA-H|McLachlin JA}}{{atp|399}}<br>
{{supra1|MT}}{{atL|23v6c|18}}<Br>
</ref> 

In judge-alone trials the typical moral and reasoning prejudices are reduced.<ref>
e.g. {{CanLIIRx|Conway|gw0n2|2016 CanLII 85720 (NLSCTD)}}{{perNLSC|Adams J}}{{atL|gw0n2|69}}<br>
</ref>

{{Reflist|2}}

==Types of Probative Similar Fact Evidence==
SFE can be admitted to show the accused's state of mind.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Brooks|22wf2|1989 CanLII 2894 (BCCA)|71 CR (3d) 25}}{{perBCCA|MacFarlane JA}} at 12<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Leblanc|1z6fd|1975 CanLII 190 (SCC)|[1977] 1 SCR 339, 29 CCC (2d) 97}}{{perSCC|De Grandpre J}} at 111<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===History of Abuse===

It has also been probative to admit evidence of an abusive relationship that would warrant animus between the complainant and accused.<ref>
e.g. {{CanLIIRx|Hindessa|25nl1|2009 CanLII 48836 (ONSC)}}{{perONSC|Molloy J}}
</ref>

Evidence of prior abuse by the accused can be admissible to show that fear was a factor in delayed disclosure.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|F, DS|1f9cp|1999 CanLII 3704 (ON CA)|132 CCC (3d) 97}}{{perONCA|O'Connor JA}}
</ref>

A propensity to physically control and assault the complainant in particularly degrading ways can be probative to show valid disposition to commit the offence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|S(P)|1r6tp|2007 ONCA 299 (CanLII)|221 CCC (3d) 45}}{{perONCA|Goudge JA}}{{atL|1r6tp|38}}
</ref>

Patterns of "bizarre" sexual behaviour including a complete indifference to whether the complainant was consenting is relevant to a sexual assault.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Stroud|1t6wq|2007 ONCA 697 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA|Moldaver and Armstrong JA}}
</ref>

It has been observed that failure to present the history of the relationship as narrative evidence risks "presenting an entirely sterile and antiseptic record devoid of the realities of the individual circumstances of the participants."<ref>
{{CanLIIR-N|SB|, [1996] O.J. No. 1187 (Gen. Div.)}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}, at para. 31<Br>

</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Rebut an Anticipated Defence===
Evidence of prior bad conduct may be admitted to rebut the defence that the offence could not have occurred where there were other adults nearby and could detect the offence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|TLM|fq35h|2012 SCC 6 (CanLII)|[2012] 1 SCR 233}}{{perSCC|Deschamps J}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Moore|231tm|1994 CanLII 8730 (ON CA)|92 CCC (3d) 281}}{{TheCourtONCA}}<br>
</ref>

SFE can be used to rebut defence evidence of an alternate suspect.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Sparkes|1kg3j|2005 CanLII 15707 (ON CA)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Vanezis|1pzst|2006 CanLII 37954 (ON CA)|213 CCC (3d) 449}}{{perONCA|Moldaver JA}}<Br>
</ref>

{{Reflist|2}}

===Identity of Accused===
Evidence showing the accused committing the same offence in other instances may only be admitted where there is a "high degree of similarity between the acts renders the likelihood of coincidence objectively improbable."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Arp|1fqq7|1998 CanLII 769 (SCC)|[1998] 3 SCR 339}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}{{atL|1fqq7|43}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Perrier|1hwrn|2004 SCC 56 (CanLII)|[2004] 3 SCR 228}}{{perSCC-H|Major J}}{{atL|1hwrn|19}}
</ref>
The features must be "distinctive" and amount to a "signature."<ref>
{{supra1|Capewell}}{{atL|j5tqk|82}} ("If .. the purpose of the evidence was to prove identity, distinctive features amounting to a "signature" may be required...")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Cresswell|22981|2009 ONCA 95 (CanLII)|OJ No 363}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|22981|9}} ("We note as well that Handy states that admissibility is conditioned by the issue to which the evidence is directed.  Here, the evidence went not to identity, where distinctive features amounting to a “signature” may be required, but rather to the actus reus, where less cogent similarities may render the evidence admissible.")
</ref>

There is a two step procedure for admitting SFE to establish identity:<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Butorac|g0sfd|2013 BCCA 421 (CanLII)|301 CCC (3d) 504}}{{perBCCA|Neilson JA}}{{atL|g0sfd|30}}<br>
</ref>
# the trial judge must examine the factual nexus between the proposed similar fact evidence and the offence charged, and evaluate whether the degree of similarity between them is sufficient to establish the objective probability that the same person committed them; and
# the trial judge must consider whether there is "some evidence" linking the accused to the similar acts.

On the first step the crown must establish that the "proposed evidence of similar acts bears a “striking similarity” to the offence charged" which would include observing "a unique hallmark or signature, or from the cumulative effect of a number of similarities."<ref>
{{ibid1|Butorac}}{{atL|g0sfd|30}}<br>
</ref>
At this step, evidence linking the accused to the past acts is not relevant.<ref>
{{ibid1|Butorac}}{{atL|g0sfd|30}}<br>
</ref> 
Factors to be considered include:<ref>
{{ibid1|Butorac}}{{atL|g0sfd|30}}<br></ref>
# proximity in time, 
# similarity in detail, 
#the number of occurrences, 
#circumstances surrounding or relating to the similar acts, 
#distinctive features unifying the incidents, and 
#intervening events.

{{Reflist|2}}

===Credibility in Sexual Assault Cases===
In sexual assault cases, "the similarities and dissimilarities between the sexual acts are ... often not as compelling as the circumstances surrounding the incidents."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|LB|6hbz|1997 CanLII 3187 (ON CA)|116 CCC (3d) 481}}{{perONCA|Charron JA}}{{atL|6hbz|37}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRx|JH|hr03p|2018 ONCA 245 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA|van Rensburg JA}}<br>
</ref>

Differences such as the ages of the victims or the sexual act may not undermine the similarity or connectedness arising from the relationship between victims and accused and the opportunity to commit the offence as it relates to the issue of whether the assaults occurred.<ref>
{{ibid1|JH}}{{atL|hr03p|21}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|RB|1lj70|2005 CanLII 30693 (ON CA)|, 77 OR (3d) 171}}{{perONCA|Laskin JA}}<Br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Fraud===
Similar fact evidence may be admissible to show that the accused undertook a system to defraud the victim.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Foley|1f0g6|1996 CanLII 708 (BC CA)|75 BCAC 195}}{{perBCCA|Cumming JA}}{{atL|1f0g6|17}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Brooks|22wf2|1989 CanLII 2894 (BCCA)|71 CR (3d) 25}}{{perBCCA|MacFarlane JA}}{{atL|22wf2|12}}<br>
</ref>

This can also be used to negate the defence of "innocent intent."<ref>
e.g. {{CanLIIRP|Winter|20s60|2008 CanLII 46998 (NL PC)|846 APR 1}}{{perNLPC|Hyslop J}}
</ref>

{{Reflist|2}}

===Proving Actus Reus/Enhancing Credibility===

; Same Complainant
Generally, court have admitted similar fact evidence that came from the "same complainant."<ref> 
See: {{CanLIIRP|D(LE)|1ft4x|1989 CanLII 74 (SCC)|50 CCC (3d) 142}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}{{atps|155-162}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|R(G)|g9s5s|1993 CanLII 14699 (ON CA)|80 CCC (3d) 130}}{{perONCA|Doherty JA}}{{atps|137-140}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Litchfield|1frxj|1993 CanLII 44 (SCC)|86 CCC (3d) 97}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}}{{atps|116-117}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|H(DA)|208j4|1997 CanLII 14385 (NSCA)|119 CCC (3d) 238}}{{perNSCA|Freeman JA}}{{atps|263 to 264}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|W(DD)|1wnw8|1997 CanLII 12487 (BCCA)|114 CCC (3d) 506}}{{perBCCA|McEachern JA}} (2:1){{atsL|1wnw8|54| to 58}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|F(DS)|1f9cp|1999 CanLII 3704 (ON CA)|132 CCC (3d) 97}}{{perONCA|O'Connor JA}}{{atsL|1f9cp|19| to 35}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Batte|1fb7d|2000 CanLII 5750 (ON CA)|145 CCC (3d) 449}}{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}}{{atsL|1fb7d|102| to 114}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|MacDonald|1cf10|2002 CanLII 14251 (ON CA)|170 CCC (3d) 46}}{{perONCA|Doherty JA}}{{atsL|1cf10 |34| to 35}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|C(DAR)|hp3rj|2002 PESCAD 22 (CanLII)|170 CCC (3d) 64}}{{perPEICA|McQuaid JA}}{{atsL|hp3rj|22| to 49}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|D(TJ)|1gvm6|2004 CanLII 39037 (ON CA)|, [2004] OJ No 1444 (CA)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atsL|1gvm6|1 to 4}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|L(D)|1j5vb|2004 CanLII 39930 (ON CA)|[2004] OJ No 4692 (CA)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|W(S)|1hzzd|2004 CanLII 33348 (ON CA)|, [2004] OJ No 4164 (CA)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|R(B)|1p5tw|2006 CanLII 29082 (ON CA)|212 CCC (3d) 65}}{{perONCA|Cronk JA}}{{atsL|1p5tw|29| to 43}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|S(P)|1r6tp|2007 ONCA 299 (CanLII)|221 CCC (3d) 45}}{{perONCA|Goudge JA}}{{atsL|1r6tp|23| to 42}}<br>
</ref>

; Multiple Complainants
Absent an application for SFE, where the accused is being tried for multiple offences of a similar nature, such as sex offences, that are against different complainants the evidence of each complainant must be considered separately or else it will be seen as being used as propensity evidence. It is wrong to suggest that because one complainant is telling the truth it is more likely another is as well.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Popal|23jz5|2009 ONCA 408 (CanLII)|252 OAC 10}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|23jz5|7}}
</ref>
A limiting jury instructions would be needed to direct the use of multi-complainant evidence.<ref>
{{ibid1|Popal}}</ref>

However, evidence of each complainant can be used to rebut suggestions that the witnesses independently invented their evidence.<ref>
{{CanLIIR-N|Finelli|, [2008] OJ No 2242 (Sup. Ct.)}}{{perONSC|Spies J}}
</ref>
{{reflist|2}}

==Procedure==
Where the Crown intends to rely on 'count-to-count' similar fact evidence, the Crown must provide notice to defence and the court prior to the commencement of trial.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Tsigirlash|j1w5z|2019 ONCA 650 (CanLII)|157 WCB (2d) 46}}{{perONCA|Zarnett JA}}
</ref>
There does not need to be a separate voir dire as the Court may rely upon the trial evidence to make a determination.<ref>
e.g. {{ibid1|Tsigirlash}}
</ref>

Notice must be given to the defence of an application to adduce similar fact evidence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|DLW|fz49v|2013 BCSC 1016 (CanLII)}}{{perBCSC|Romilly J}}{{atsL|fz49v|19| to 21}}<br>
</ref>
This notice should be given no later than at the closing of the Crown's case and before the defence decides whether to call evidence.<ref>
{{ibid1|DLW}}{{atsL|fz49v|19| to 21}}<br>
</ref>

The SFE application can also be done ahead of trial by way of police statements and transcripts.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Lim #2|jcr22|2021 ONSC 44 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Molloy J}}{{atL|jcr22|5}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Case Digests==
* [[Similar Fact Evidence (Cases)|Similar Fact Evidence]]

==See Also==
* [[Precedent - Notice to Adduce Similar Fact Evidence]]
* [[Character of Accused]]
* [[Character of Non-Accused Persons]]
* [http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/sites/default/files/projectAvailableFormats/NZLC%20IP4.pdf New Zealand Report on Prior Bad Acts in Criminal Law]