View source for Weighing Testimony of the Accused

{{Currency|December 2021}}
{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderWeighing}}
==General Principles==
When an accused testifies and their credibility is at issue, the trial judge must apply what is known as the "WD test" to determine what weight to put on their evidence.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|W(D)|1fsm9|1991 CanLII 93 (SCC)|[1991] 1 SCR 742}}{{perSCC|Cory J}} (4:1)<br> 
</ref>

; Purpose of W(D) Framework
The W(D) framework intends to explain "what reasonable doubt means in the context of conflicting testimonial accounts."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|JHS|1x1bb|2008 SCC 30 (CanLII)|[2008] 2 SCR 152}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}} (7:0){{atL|1x1bb|9}}<br>
</ref>
The W(D) test is to "ensure that the jury know how to apply the burden of proof to the issue of credibility.  The jury must be cautioned that a trial is not a contest of credibility between witnesses, and that they do not have to accept the defence evidence in full in order to acquit."
<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Van|23mt8|2009 SCC 22 (CanLII)|[2009] 1 SCR 716}}{{perSCC|LeBel J}} (5:4){{atL|23mt8|23}}<br>
{{supra1|W(D)}}{{atp|757}}<br>
</ref>

The purpose of the test is not "based on a choice between the accused's and the Crown's evidence, but on whether, based on the whole of the evidence, [the trier-of-fact] is left with a reasonable doubt."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|CLY|1vh6x|2008 SCC 2 (CanLII)|[2008] 1 SCR 5}}{{perSCC-H|Abella J}} (4:3){{atL|1vh6x|8}}<br>
</ref>

; When the W(D) Test Applies
The W(D) analysis is only necessary where credibility is a central or significant issue, usually between the accused and a complainant or eye-witness, and often where there is no significant extrinsic evidence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Daley|1v5dr|2007 SCC 53 (CanLII)|[2007] 3 SCR 523}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Smith|hr3xm|2018 ABQB 199 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Goss J}}{{atL|hr3xm|49}}<br>
</ref>

; Rule Against Shifting Burden
At no time should the trier-of-fact ever shift the burden "from the Crown to prove every element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt."<ref>
{{supra1|JHS}}{{atL|1x1bb|13}}<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Sufficiency of Analysis===
{{seealso|Sufficiency of Reasons}}

A judge does not need to discuss all the evidence of the accused on a given point. They must only show that they recognized credibility was a live issue and "grappled with the substance of the live issue".<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|REM|20xm6|2008 SCC 51 (CanLII)|[2008] 3 SCR 3}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|20xm6|64}}
</ref>

They do not need to "summarize specific findings on credibility" by giving statements on overall credibility.<ref>
{{ibid1|REM}}{{AtL|20xm6|64}}
</ref>

It is not necessary that the judge reconcile the positive findings of one witness against the negative findings of a contradictory witness.<ref>
{{ibid1|REM}}{{AtL|20xm6|65}}
</ref>

The W(D) questions are not supposed to be treated with a "level of sanctity or immutable perfection."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|JHS|1x1bb|2008 SCC 30 (CanLII)|[2008] 2 SCR 152}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}} 
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Application==
Where the accused and a complainant give contradictory evidence, the judge must apply the test from the case of R v (W)D.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|W(D)|1fsm9|1991 CanLII 93 (SCC)|[1991] 1 SCR 742}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRx|Fowler|1dbrv|1993 CanLII 1907 (BC CA)}}{{perBCCA|Toy JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|CLY|1vh6x|2008 SCC 2 (CanLII)|[2008] 1 SCR 5}}{{perSCC-H|Abella J}} (4:3)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|McKenzie (P.N.)|1mb50|1996 CanLII 4976 (SK CA)|141 Sask R 221 (Sask CA)}}{{perSKCA|Tallis JA}}{{atL|1mb50|4}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Rose (A.)|1d94v|1992 CanLII 987 (BCCA)|20 BCAC 7 (BCCA)}}{{TheCourtBCCA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Currie|21f9l|2008 ABCA 374 (CanLII)|446 AR 41}}{{perABCA|Côté JA}} (3:0)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|BGS|28cdh|2010 SKCA 24 (CanLII)|346 Sask R 150}}{{perSKCA|Ottenbreit JA}} (3:0)<br>
</ref>

The test in W(D) will primarily only apply to cases where the accused gives evidence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Warren|fpbz5|2011 CanLII 80607 (NL PC)}}{{perNLPC|Gorman J}} at 24</ref> 
However, the principles of DW will apply in any case where a crucial issue turns on creditability.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|FEE|fpbqd|2011 ONCA 783 (CanLII)|282 CCC (3d) 552}}{{perONCA|Watt JA}} (3:0){{atL|fpbqd|104}}</ref>

The W(D) steps apply not only to the accused's testimony but also to any other exculpatory evidence that emerges during a trial that relates to a "vital issue."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|BD|2fbx2|2011 ONCA 51 (CanLII)|266 CCC (3d) 197}}{{perONCA|Blair JA}} (3:0){{atsL|2fbx2|113| to 114}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Cyr|fvfcv|2012 ONCA 919 (CanLII)|294 CCC (3d) 421}}{{perONCA|Watt JA}} (3:0){{atL|fvfcv|50}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ryon|hx99r|2019 ABCA 36 (CanLII)|371 CCC (3d) 225}}{{perABCA|Martin JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIR|PO|jfgrc|2021 ABQB 318 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Mandziuk J}}{{AtL|jfgrc|197}}<br>
</ref>

In the context of a voir dire, the principles of D.W. do not apply.<ref>See {{CanLIIRP|Kocovic|1jfkf|2004 ABPC 190 (CanLII)|25 CR (6th) 265}}{{perABPC|Semenuk J}}</ref> 
Guilt or innocence is not at issue and the standard of proof is one of reasonable doubt, thus an accused will be considered in the same manner as any other witness. Thus if the accused's version conflicts with a police officer, for example, then the court must determine who is telling the truth. If the court cannot decide who is telling the truth then the applicant must fail.

Where the accused and another witness testifies for the defence, the W(D) test is applied differently.<ref>
see {{CanLIIRP|Van|23mt8|2009 SCC 22 (CanLII)|[2009] 1 SCR 716}}{{perSCC|LeBel J}} (5:4){{AtsL|23mt8|20| to 23}}
</ref>

; Rejection of Evidence Not Evidence of Guilt
A trial judge cannot infer guilt from the fact that the accused's evidence is not worthy of belief. This inference is only permitted where there is independent evidence of fabrication or concoction.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|MacIsaac|h03gk|2017 ONCA 172 (CanLII)|347 CCC (3d) 37}}{{perONCA|Trotter JA}} (3:0)<br>
{{CanLIIRx|St Pierre|h2qb5|2017 ONCA 241 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0)<Br>
{{CanLIIRx|Turcotte|hr2gn|2018 SKCA 16 (CanLII)}}{{perSKCA|Schwann JA}}{{atL|hr2gn|14}}<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==The "W(D)" Test==
The proper analysis of testimony is designed to ensure that Judges do not engage in any weighing of competing versions of events in the absence of consideration of the presumption of innocence or reasonable doubt.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Newman|hsqqb|2018 ABPC 143 (CanLII)}}{{perABPC|Pharo J}}{{atL|hsqqb|18}}<br>
</ref>

; Purpose of W(D) Test
The purpose of the W(D) test is to ensure that the triers of fact "understand that the verdict should not be based on a choice between the accused’s and Crown’s evidence, but on whether, based on the whole of the evidence, they are left with a reasonable doubt as to the accused’s guilt".<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|CLY|1vh6x|2008 SCC 2 (CanLII)|[2008] 1 SCR 5}}{{perSCC-H|Abella J}} (4:3){{atL|1vh6x|8}}<br>
{{supra1|JHS}}{{atL|1wj9w|9}} (to “explain what reasonable doubt means in the context of evaluating conflicting testimonial accounts”)
</ref> 
It further intends to make clear that the burden never shifts from the Crown to prove every element of the offence.<ref>
{{supra1|JHS}}{{atL|1wj9w|13}}<br>
</ref>

; Formulations of the W(D) Test
Where the defence calls the accused to give evidence that contradicts the crown evidence, the trier of fact must determine:<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|W(D)|1fsm9|1991 CanLII 93 (SCC)|[1991] 1 SCR 742}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|PNM|1mb50|1996 CanLII 4976 (SK CA)|106 CCC (3d) 1}}{{perSKCA|Tallis JA}} - frames it as a four step inquiry<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Minuskin|1g3x0|2003 CanLII 11604 (ON CA)|181 CCC (3d) 542}}{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}}{{atp|550}}
{{CanLIIRP|BD|2fbx2|2011 ONCA 51 (CanLII)|266 CCC (3d) 197}}{{perONCA|Blair JA}}{{atsL|2fbx2|102| to 114}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Turmel|1j20g|2004 BCCA 555 (CanLII)|[2004] BCJ No. 2265 (CA)}}{{perBCCA|Newbury JA}}{{AtsL|1j20g|9| to 17}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Gray|fq3s7|2012 ABCA 51 (CanLII)|285 CCC (3d) 539}}{{perABCA|Martin JA}} (3:0){{atL|fq3s7|42}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Vuradin|fzfq2|2013 SCC 38 (CanLII)|[2013] 2 SCR 639}}{{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}} (5:0){{atL|fzfq2|21}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Tyers|gmh00|2015 BCCA 507 (CanLII)|381 BCAC 46}}{{perBCCA|Stromberg-Stein JA}} (3:0){{atsL|gmh00|12|, 15}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Mann|2dwvl|2010 BCCA 569 (CanLII)|297 BCAC 234}}{{perBCCA|Chiasson JA}}{{atL|2dwvl|31}}<br>
{{CanLIIR|Gauthier|jng8m|2022 ABCA 121 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|jng8m|30}}
</ref>
# If you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must acquit.
# If you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit.
# Even if you are not left in reasonable doubt by the evidence of the Accused you must ask yourself whether on the basis of the evidence which you do accept you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused. 

A more recent formulation with four steps suggests the following:<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|PDB|g902j|2014 NBQB 213 (CanLII)}}{{perNBQB|Ferguson J}}{{atL|g902j|67}} - this is taking into account the additional formulation from {{supra1|JHS}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|NM|hx4vs|2019 NSCA 4 (CanLII)|370 CCC (3d) 143}}{{perNSCA|Bourgeois JA}}{{atL|hx4vs|23}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRx|Wheyee|j1k8v|2019 ABQB 548 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Horner J}}{{atL|j1k8v|72}}<br>
</ref>
# if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must acquit;
# if you do not know whether to believe the accused or a competing witness, you must acquit;
# if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in a reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit; and
# even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, that is that his or her evidence is rejected, you must ask yourself whether on the basis of the evidence that you accept you are convinced beyond reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused.

Yet another version of the test was phrased as follows:<ref>
{{Article|David Paciocco|Doubt about Doubt: Coping with R. v W.(D.) and Credibility Assessment| (2017) 22 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 31}}  [https://search.proquest.com/openview/c5f88ddf8b354a0963ef896c58474a33/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=28146 at para 72]
</ref>
# If you accept as accurate evidence that cannot co-exist with a finding that the accused is guilty, obviously you must acquit;
# If you are left unsure whether evidence that cannot co-exist with a finding that the accused is guilty is accurate, then you have not rejected it entirely and you must acquit;
# You should not treat mere disbelief of evidence that has been offered by the accused to show his innocence as proof of the guilt of the accused; and
# Even where evidence inconsistent with the guilt of the accused is rejected in its entirety, the accused should not be convicted unless the evidence that is given credit proves the accused to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

; Application of the W(D) Test
The order of the steps is not significant but the steps must all be applied separately.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|JHS|1wj9w|2007 NSCA 12 (CanLII)|217 CCC (3d) 52}}{{perNSCA|Saunders JA}} - on appeal to SCC
</ref> 

It is wrong when considering conflicting evidence of credibility to "weigh" one story over the other.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|BGS|28cdh|2010 SKCA 24 (CanLII)|346 Sask R 150}}{{perSKCA|Ottenbreit JA}} (3:0){{atL|28cdh|9}}</ref>
The trier of fact cannot "prefer" one story over the other or consider who is "most" credible. The “either/or” approach, preferring one over the other should be avoided.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Challice|hv0g8|1979 CanLII 2969 (ON CA)|45 CCC (2d) 546 (Ont CA)}}{{perONCA|Morden JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Morin|1ftc2|1988 CanLII 8 (SCC)|[1988] 2 SCR 345}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Chan|1nnx5|1989 ABCA 284 (CanLII)|52 CCC (3d) 184}}{{TheCourtABCA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Jaura|1ps57|2006 ONCJ 385 (CanLII)|[2006] OJ No 4157}}{{perONCJ|Duncan J}}{{AtsL|1ps57|12|, 13}}
</ref>
To prefer one testimony over another has the effect of reversing the onus upon the accused.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Abdirashid|fpwzh|2012 ABPC 22 (CanLII)|[2012] A.J. No 131}}{{perABPC|Bascom J}}{{atL|fpwzh|6}}</ref>

There is nothing preventing a judge from believing both the complainant and the accused even where they gave divergent or contradictory evidence<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Nadeau|1lpfv|1984 CanLII 28 (SCC)|[1984] 2 SCR 570}}{{perSCC|Lamer J}}</ref>

The real issue is not who is telling the truth, but instead, whether, on the entirety of the evidence, the crown has proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt.<ref>Canadian Criminal Evidence, Second Edition, by P.R. McWilliams, Q.C., at page 652<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Nykiforuk|g78kq|1946 CanLII 202 (SK CA)|86 CCC 151}}{{perSKCA|MacKenzie JA}}</ref>

; Standard of Appellate Review
Any error in applying the W(D) test must be reviewed as a question of law on a standard of correctness.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|JAH|fv3b9|2012 NSCA 121 (CanLII)|NSJ No 644}}{{perNSCA|Bryson JA}}{{atL|fv3b9|7}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|NM|hx4vs|2019 NSCA 4 (CanLII)|370 CCC (3d) 143}}{{perNSCA|Bourgeois JA}}{{atL|hx4vs|25}}<br>
{{CanLIIRT|Coburn|jccr3|2021 NSCA 1 (CanLII)}}{{perNSCA|Wood JA}}{{atL|jccr3|27}}<Br>
</ref>

In reviewing the reasons given in W(D) analysis, the appellate judge should not "cherry-pick" parts of the reasons but rather look at them as a whole.<ref>
{{ibid1|NM}}{{atL|hx4vs|25}}
</ref>

; Mis-statement of the Test
A mere failure to use the exact words of the W(D) test before a judge or jury is not fatal.<ref>
{{supra1|W(D)}}{{atp|758}} [SCR]<br>
{{supra1|JHS}}{{atL|1wj9w|14}} <br>
{{CanLIIRP|Vuradin|fzfq2|2013 SCC 38 (CanLII)|[2013] 2 SCR 639}}{{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}} (5:0){{atL|fzfq2|26}}
</ref>
Equally, an exact recitation does not protect the decision from review where the principles were wrongly applied.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|JP|g68vz|2014 NSCA 29 (CanLII)|342 NSR (2d) 324}}{{perNSCA|Beveridge JA}}{{atsL|g68vz|62| to 64}}, {{atsL-np|g68vz|73|}}, {{atsL-np|g68vz|85|}}<br>
</ref>

; Proposed Reformulation
In Alberta, the test for credibility has been re-written as comprising several stages.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Ryon|hx99r|2019 ABCA 36 (CanLII)|371 CCC (3d) 225}}{{perABCA|Martin JA}} (3:0)
</ref>
At the first stage, it should be made clear that:<ref>
{{ibid1|Ryon}}{{atL|hx99r|49}}</ref>
# the [credibility] instruction applies only to exculpatory evidence, that is, to evidence that either negates an element of the offence or establishes a defence (other than a reverse onus defence);
# it applies to exculpatory evidence whether presented by the Crown or the accused.

At the second stage analysis should be as follows:<ref>
{{ibid1|Ryon}}{{atL|hx99r|51}}</ref>
# The burden of proof is on the Crown to establish the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that burden remains on the Crown so that the accused person is never required to prove his innocence, or disprove any of the evidence led by the Crown. (Subject to the caveat that this does not apply to defences, such as that found in s 16 of the Criminal Code, where the onus rests with the proponent of the defence.)
# In that context, if the jury believes the accused’s evidence denying guilt (or any other exculpatory evidence to that effect), or if they are not confident they can accept the Crown’s version of events, they must acquit. (Subject to defences with additional elements such as an objective component ...).
# While the jury should attempt to resolve conflicting evidence bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused, a trial is not a credibility contest requiring them to decide that one of the conflicting versions is true. If, after careful consideration of all the evidence, the jury is unable to decide whom to believe, they must acquit.
# Even if the jury completely rejects the accused’s evidence (or where applicable, other exculpatory evidence), they may not simply assume the Crown’s version of events must be true. Rather, they must carefully assess the evidence they do believe and decide whether that evidence persuades them beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. Mere rejection of the accused’s evidence (or where applicable, other exculpatory evidence) cannot be taken as proof of the accused’s guilt.

Finally, it must be understood that where there are multiple charges, it must be understood that "reasonable doubt with regard to one offence will not necessarily entitle the accused to an acquittal on all charges."<ref>
{{ibid1|Ryon}}{{atL|hx99r|52}}
</ref>
{{reflist|2}}

===Looking at Evidence as a Whole===
The steps of W(D) are not considered "watertight" compartments. The analysis at each step should take into account the evidence as a whole.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Berg|gpj6p|2016 SKPC 55 (CanLII)}}{{perSKPC|Kovatch J}} - commentary by Kovatch PCJ<Br>
</ref>
It is essential that the court not look at any witnesses' evidence in a vacuum and instead look at it in relation to all the evidence presented "as a whole".
<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Lake|1m8c8|2005 NSCA 162 (CanLII)|NSJ No. 506}}{{perNSCA|Fichaud JA}} (3:0)<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Newman|hsqqb|2018 ABPC 143 (CanLII)}}{{perABPC|Pharo J}}{{atL|hsqqb|18}} ("Although the phrase “in context of the evidence as a whole” is not repeated in the first step of the formula instructions, it should be read into those instructions.")<br>
</ref>


The first two steps in the W(D) test require the "weighing [of] the accused's evidence together with the conflicting Crown evidence."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Humphrey|flm3k|2011 ONSC 3024 (CanLII)|[2011] O.J. No. 2412 (Sup. Ct.)}}{{perONSC|Code J}}{{atL|flm3k|152}}<br>
see also {{CanLIIRx|Newton|1mt9j|2006 CanLII 7733 (ON CA)}}{{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0){{AtL|1mt9j|5}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Hull|1p2bf|2006 CanLII 26572 (ON CA)|70 WCB (2d) 274}}{{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0){{atL|1p2bf|5}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Snider|1mr20|2006 ONCJ 65 (CanLII)| [2006] O.J. 879}}{{perONCJ|MacDonnell J}}{{atL|1mr20|37}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Hoohing|1snwb|2007 ONCA 577 (CanLII)|74 WCB (2d) 676}}{{perONCA|Feldman JA}}{{atL|1snwb|15}}<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===First Step: Whether to Reject the Accused's Evidence===
The accused's evidence should be the evidence considered first.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|CLY|1vh6x|2008 SCC 2 (CanLII)|[2008] 1 SCR 5}}{{perSCC-H|Abella J}} (4:3)<br>
</ref>

The accused's evidence can be rejected on the basis of:<ref>
e.g. {{canLIIR|Burton|h0850|2017 NSSC 57 (CanLII)}}{{perNSSC|Arnold J}}{{atL|h0850|216}}
</ref>
* implausible claims:
** conclusory statements without basis;
** inconsistent or implausible observation, memory and recollection;
* internally inconsistent;
* contradicted by other reliable evidence;
* contrived:
** tailored to defeat the complainant's allegations;
** shows effort to avoid culpability.

; Obligation to Give Reasons
It is necessary that in any case that turns on the accused's credibility, the judge's reasons "should disclose whether she believes or disbelieves the accused."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Lake|1m8c8|2005 NSCA 162 (CanLII)|203 CCC (3d) 316}}{{perNSCA|Fichaud JA}} (3:0){{atL|1m8c8|14}} - however an implied conclusion is sufficient, see para 17<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Maharaj|1h39c|2004 CanLII 39045 (ON CA)|186 CCC (3d) 247}}{{perONCA|Laskin JA}} (3:0)
</ref>

However, where the judge fails to give reasons and the "road to conviction is nonetheless clear" the omission will not be fatal.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Stamp|1r6qh|2007 ABCA 140 (CanLII)|219 CCC (3d) 471}}{{perABCA|Berger JA}}{{AtL|1r6qh|25}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|CJJ|hpp9d|2018 ABCA 7 (CanLII)|358 CCC (3d) 163}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|hpp9d|35}}<br>
</ref>

; When in Conflict with the Complainant's Evidence
It is crucial that the judge not discount the accused's evidence for the reason that the complainant is believed. Otherwise, the defence is completely neutered before even testifying. <ref>
{{supra1|Lake}}{{atL|1m8c8|21}}</ref>
Simply rejecting the accused's evidence on the basis that it conflicts with the complainant's evidence which has been accepted without explanation shifts the burden of proof unconstitutionally.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|YM|1h39c|2004 CanLII 39045 (ON CA)|186 CCC (3d) 247}}{{perONCA|Laskin JA}} (3:0){{atL|1h39c|30}}
</ref>

There is some support to suggest that "trial judge can reject the evidence of an accused and convict solely on the basis of his acceptance of the evidence of the complainant, provided that he also gives the evidence of the defendant a fair assessment and allows for the possibility of being left in doubt, notwithstanding his acceptance of the complainant's evidence."<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Surana|fzgkx|2013 ABPC 164 (CanLII)}}{{perABPC|Allen J}}{{atL|fzgkx|78}}<br>
</ref>
 
It is certainly permissible however to reject the accused's evidence on the basis that when "stacked beside" all the other evidence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|TS|fr6gh|2012 ONCA 289 (CanLII)|284 CCC (3d) 394}}{{perONCA|Watt JA}}{{atL|fr6gh|79}} ("…as a matter of law, reasoned acceptance of a complainant’s evidence is a basis upon which a trial judge can reject the evidence of an accused and find guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  A reasoned and considered acceptance of the complainant evidence is as much as explanation for rejecting the contrary evidence of an accused as are problems inherent in an accused’s own testimony.")
</ref>

In explaining the reason for rejecting the accused's evidence it can be sufficient to justify it based on the reasoned acceptance beyond a reasonable doubt of a fact that conflicts with the evidence rejected. <ref>
{{CanLIIRP|JJRD|1q36m|2006 CanLII 40088 (ON CA)|215 CCC (3d) 252}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|1q36m|53}} ("An outright rejection of an accused’s evidence based on a considered and reasoned acceptance beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of conflicting evidence is as much an explanation for the rejection of an accused’s evidence as is a rejection based on a problem identified with the way the accused testified or the substance of the accused’s evidence.")
</ref>
This means that The accused evidence can be rejected on the sole basis that it conflicts with other evidence that is accepted beyond a reasonable doubt.
<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|DP|h2x02|2017 ONCA 263 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0){{atsL|h2x02|23| to 25}}<br>
</ref>

Impugning the accused's credibility is a permissible form of post-offence conduct.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jaw|25qz1|2009 SCC 42 (CanLII)|[2009] 3 SCR 26}}{{perSCC|LeBel J}} (7:2){{atL|25qz1|39}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|White|1fqqt|1998 CanLII 789 (SCC)|[1998] 2 SCR 72}}{{perSCC-H|Major J}} (7:0){{atL|1fqqt|26}}<br>
</ref>

; Rejection Where No Obvious Flaw in Exculpatory Testimony
A trier-of-fact may reject the accused's evidence even if there are no obvious flaws in the testimony where the Crown mounts a strong prosecution.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|CL|j6gm2|2020 ONCA 258 (CanLII)|OJ No 1669}}{{perONCA|Paciocco JA}}{{atL|j6gm2|30}} ("In such a case a trier of fact may appropriately find that the incriminating evidence is so compelling that the only appropriate outcome is to reject the exculpatory evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. There may be exceptional cases where it is appropriate for a trial judge to explain this avenue of conviction to the jury.")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|OM|g7wfg|2014 ONCA 503 (CanLII)|313 CCC (3d) 5}}{{perONCA|Cronk JA}}{{atL|g7wfg|40}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|JJRD|1q36m|2006 CanLII 40088 (ON CA)|215 CCC (3d) 252}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|1q36m|53}} ("...The trial judge rejected totally the appellant’s denial because stacked beside A.D.’s evidence and the evidence concerning the diary, the appellant’s evidence, despite the absence of any obvious flaws in it, did not leave the trial judge with a reasonable doubt.  An outright rejection of an accused’s evidence based on a considered and reasoned acceptance beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of conflicting credible evidence is as much an explanation for the rejection of an accused’s evidence as is a rejection based on a problem identified with the way the accused testified or the substance of the accused’s evidence.")<Br>
</ref>
Where the judge makes a "considered and reasoned acceptance" of the evidence conflicting with the accused's evidence, it is sufficient to reject the otherwise flawless defence evidence.<Ref>
{{CanLIIR|MHL|jk1bd|2021 NSCA 74 (CanLII)}}{{perNSCA|Beaton JA}}{{atsL|jk1bd|33| to 34}}<br>
see also {{supra1|JJRD}}{{atL|1q36m|53}}
</ref>

The accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because his evidence did not have any obvious problems or flaws.<ref>
{{CanLIIR|GC|jgjs7|2021 ONCA 441 (CanLII)}}{{AtL|jgjs7|15}}
{{CanLIIR|RA|h5x3n|2017 ONCA 714 (CanLII)}}{{AtL|h5x3n|55}}
</ref>
The absence of any flaws in the accused's denial the trial judge may still reject the evidence when considered context of the evidence as a whole.<ref>
{{CanLIIR|GC|jgjs7|2021 ONCA 441 (CanLII)}}{{AtL|jgjs7|13}}
</ref>

; Accused's Access to Disclosure
It is impermissible to use the fact that the accused had access to their disclosure as a reason to discount their testimony.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Gordon|fspxl|2012 ONCA 533 (CanLII)|[2012] O.J. No. 4059 (ONCA)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|fspxl|6}} ("Crown counsel…seemed to invite the jury at one point in his closing to draw an inference against the appellant's credibility because the appellant had the benefit of full disclosure and hearing the Crown's case before testifying. At the outset of his charge to the jury, the trial judge emphatically advised the jury that no such inference could be drawn.")
</ref>

; Effect of Rejection of Evidence
The rejection of the accused's evidence does not amount to evidence in favour of the Crown.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Nedelcu|ftmw1|2012 SCC 59 (CanLII)|[2012] 3 SCR 311}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver J}} (6:3) (“rejection of an accused’s testimony does not create evidence for the Crown”)
</ref>

A trial judge's observations that the accused testimony was "self-serving" can lead to the appearance that the judge suspects the accused testimony was inherently unreliable since it would be advantageous for him to misrepresent events in order to acquit himself.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Drescher|280cg|2010 ABQB 94 (CanLII)|488 AR 341}}{{perABQB|Lee J}}{{AtL|280cg|30}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Murray|6h6h|1997 CanLII 1090 (ON CA)|115 CCC (3d) 225}}{{perONCA|Charron JA}} (3:0)<br>
{{CanLIIR-N|BG| (2000), O.J. No. 1347 (Ont. C.A.)}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Masse|1fb87|2000 CanLII 5755 (ON CA)|O.J. No. 2687 (Ont. C.A.)}}{{TheCourtSCC}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|MJ|1vbfj|2002 CanLII 49364 (ON CA)|OJ No 1211 (Ont. CA)}}{{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0)<br>
</ref>
Disbelieving the accused because of their self-interest to be acquitted is a reversible error.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|LB|g1fhl|1993 CanLII 8508 (ON CA)|82 CCC (3d) 189}}{{perONCA|Arbour JA}} (3:0)
</ref>

The disbelief of the accused evidence cannot be used as "positive proof of guilt by moving directly from disbelief to a finding of guilt."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|MQ|27skb|2010 ONSC 61 (CanLII)|OJ No 378}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}
</ref>

It is an error of law to infer guilt merely from the fact that the accused's evidence has been disbelieved.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|To|1d996|1992 CanLII 913 (BCCA)|, 16 B.C.A.C. 223}}{{perBCCA|McEachern JA}} (3:0){{atsL|1d996|24|, 28}} <br>
{{CanLIIRx|Moore|1jt9c|2005 BCCA 85 (CanLII)}}{{perBCCA|Rowles JA}} (3:0)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Levy|1p78n|1991 CanLII 2726 (ON CA)|62 CCC (3d) 97}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}} at 101<br>
</ref>

; Accused Has No Burden to Explain the Allegations
It is not permissible to reject the accused's evidence due to the fact that the accused was unable to explain why the accuser would have made allegations against him.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|JCH|2f83d|2011 NLCA 8 (CanLII)|267 CCC (3d) 166}}{{perNLCA|Rowe JA}} (3:0) {{atL|2f83d|18}}<Br>
</ref>

; Application of Personal Experience
The judge cannot apply their own ''specific'' personal experience, as a form of judicial notice, to make determinations of credibility against the accused.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRx|JM|jdnw3|2021 ONCA 150 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA|Brown JA}}{{AtsL|jdnw3|49| to 50}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Second Step===
The second step in W(D) requires that the trier-of-fact consider, after deciding not to believe the evidence of the accused, whether they "are left in reasonable doubt" by the accused's evidence.<ref>
See {{supra1|WD}}<br>
</ref>

The importance of this step is to avoid the risk of a binary view of credibility analysis, which would be an error of law.<ref>
{{supra1|WD}}
</ref>
The trier may have a "total acceptance, total rejection, or something in between."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Morin|1ftc2|1988 CanLII 8 (SCC)|[1988] 2 SCR 345}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}} (6:0){{atp|357}} (SCR)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Thatcher|1ftkz|1987 CanLII 53 (SCC)|[1987] 1 SCR 652}}{{perSCC|Dickson CJ}} (7:0)<br>
</ref>
This means that where there is not a "total acceptance" the trier must consider whether any part of the accused evidence creates doubt on an essential element of the offence.
 
It is important to remember that this step does ''not'' ask whether the evidence is "possibly true". The step only considers whether the evidence creates a "reasonable possibility of innocence" or that the evidence "might reasonably be true"<Ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Graham|jflrm|2021 BCCA 163 (CanLII)}}{{AtL|jflrm|24}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Roberts|g92hq|1975 CanLII 1394 (BC CA)|24 CCC (2d) 539}}{{perONCA-H|Carrothers JA}} at 550 (cited with approval in WD)
</ref>
The phrase "might reasonably be true" must be used with caution and applies mostly to instances relating to the doctrine of recent possession. Its use poses the risk of unintentionally reversing the burden proof.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Murray|j51lk|2020 BCCA 42 (CanLII)}} at para. 54
</ref>

This step can also be addressed by acquitting if the judge "cannot decide whether the evidence inconsistent with guilt is true."<ref>
{{supra1|Graham}}{{atL|jflrm|27}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Third Step===
The court simply rejecting the accused story is not enough. <ref>
{{CanLIIRP|BCG|2crnz|2010 MBCA 88 (CanLII)|[2010] MJ No. 290}}{{perMBCA|Chartier JA}} (3:0) (“reasonable doubt is not forgotten” simply because a trial judge rejects “the accused’s version of events.”) <br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Liberatore|2d3ss|2010 NSCA 82 (CanLII)|[2010] NSJ No. 556}}{{perNSCA|Hamilton JA}} (3:0), at 15 stated W(D) prevents “a trier of fact from treating the standard of proof as a simple credibility contest” <br>
</ref> 
The purpose of the third part of the test is to convey that "a complete rejection of the [accused's] evidence does not mean that his guilt is established."
<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Gray|fq3s7|2012 ABCA 51 (CanLII)|285 CCC (3d) 539}}{{perABCA|Martin JA}} (3:0){{atL|fq3s7|40}}</ref>

It is an error to "use disbelief of the accused’s evidence as positive proof of guilt by moving directly from disbelief to a finding of guilt"<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Dore|1hz5t|2004 CanLII 32078 (ON CA)|189 CCC (3d) 526}}{{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0){{atp|527}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|SH|1fblj|2001 CanLII 24109 (ON CA)|OJ No 118 (CA)}}{{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0){{atsL|1fblj|4| to 6}}<br>
</ref>

It is an error of law to use the disbelief of the accused's evidence as proof of guilt.<ref>
{{supra1|Dore}}{{atp|527}}<br>
{{supra1|SH}}{{atsL|1fblj|4| to 6}}<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==="Fourth" Step===
Several Courts of Appeal recommend an additional element to the D.W. test after the first step directing the judge that "If after careful consideration of all of the evidence, you are unable to decide whom to believe, you must acquit."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|CWH|1q090|1991 CanLII 3956 |68 CCC (3d) 146}}{{perBCCA|Wood JA}} (3:0)<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|PNM|1mb50|1996 CanLII 4976 (SKCA)|106 CCC (3d) 1}}{{perSKCA|Tallis JA}}
</ref>

A judge cannot take into account roadside statements in the assessment of the accused's credibility.<ref>
{{CanLIIR-N|Huff|, [2000] O.J. No. 3487}} leave to appeal to SCC denied [2000] SCCA No 562
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Other Considerations==
It has sometimes been suggested that the proper approach should be to consider the accused's evidence first before looking at the complainant's evidence in order to avoid creating a burden upon the accused.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Moose|1j3h8|2004 MBCA 176 (CanLII)|190 CCC (3d) 521}}{{perMBCA|Huband JA}} (3:0){{atL|1j3h8|20}}</ref> 
But this approach has had some critics.<ref>
{{CanLIIR-N|DAM|2010 NBQB 80}}{{ats-|53 and 56}}<!-- not on canlii--><br>
{{CanLIIRP|Schauman|1p6cp|2006 ONCJ 304 (CanLII)|OJ No 3425}}{{perONCJ|Fairgrieve J}}{{atL|1p6cp|6}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|CLY|1vh6x|2008 SCC 2 (CanLII)|[2008] 1 SCR 5}}{{perSCC-H|Abella J}} (4:3)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Currie|21f9l|2008 ABCA 374 (CanLII)|[2008] AJ No 1212}}{{perABCA|Côté JA}} (3:0)<br>
</ref>

A judge may reject the accused evidence on the sole basis that it contradicts the accepted evidence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|JJRD|1q36m|2006 CanLII 40088 (ON CA)|215 CCC (3d) 252}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|1q36m|53}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|REM|20xm6|2008 SCC 51 (CanLII)|[2008] 3 SCR 3}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}} (7:0){{atL|20xm6|66}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Thomas|fv11d|2012 ONSC 6653 (CanLII)|OJ No 5692}}{{perONSC|Code J}}{{atL|fv11d|26}}<br>
</ref>

; Blanket Denials
An accused's testimony which merely denies the offence and provides no further detail cannot be the basis to dismiss the testimony as unworthy of belief.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Surana|fzgkx|2013 ABPC 164 (CanLII)}}{{perABPC|Allen J}}{{atL|fzgkx|71}}</ref> 

It should also be acknowledged that a general denial will "necessarily be lacking in detail" and should be considered in that context.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Freamo|jf8sb|2021 ONCA 223 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atsL|jf8sb|9|to 10}}
</ref>

{{Reflist|2}}