View source for Defence Delay Under Jordan Framework

{{Currency|March 2023}}
{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderDelay}}

==General Principles==
The second step of the Jordan framework concerns deduction of time due to defence-caused delay.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Cody|h4bfk|2017 SCC 31 (CanLII)|[2017] 1 SCR 659}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|h4bfk|28}}<br>
</ref>
This concerns any action or inaction that "solely or directly" caused the delay <ref>
{{ibid1|Cody}}{{atsL|h4bfk|28| and 30}}<br>
</ref>
or defence action that is illegitimate as it is not done to respond to the charges.<ref>
{{ibid1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|30}}
</ref>

Any delay that is the cause of the defence will not be used as time against the calculation of the presumptive ceiling.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jordan|gsds3|2016 SCC 27 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ}}{{atL|gsds3|21}} (“Accused persons may seek to avoid responsibility for their crimes by embracing delay, in the hope that the case against them will fall apart or they will obtain a stay of proceedings. This operates to the detriment of the public and of the system of justice as a whole. Section 11(b) was not intended to be a sword to frustrate the ends of justice.")<br>
</ref>

Defence counsel is prohibited from benefitting from its own conduct that causes delay.<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|60}} ("The defence should not be allowed to benefit from its own delay-causing conduct. As Sopinka J. wrote in Morin: “The purpose of s. 11(b) is to expedite trials and minimize prejudice and not to avoid trials on the merits” ")<br>
</ref>

Defence delay takes one of two forms. Either it is a defence waiver or it is a delay caused by the conduct of the defence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Coulter|gtw5r|2016 ONCA 704 (CanLII)|340 CCC (3d) 429}}{{perONCA|Gillese JA}}{{atL|gtw5r|42}}<br>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atsL|h4bfk|27|}}, {{atsL-np|h4bfk|30|}}<br>
</ref>

The Court may consider both the defence's decision to take a particular step and the manner in which the particular step was taken to decide whether to attribute delay to defence.<ref>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|32}} ("Defence conduct encompasses both substance and procedure — the decision to take a step, as well as the manner in which it is conducted, may attract scrutiny. To determine whether defence action is legitimately taken to respond to the charges, the circumstances surrounding the action or conduct may therefore be considered. ... Irrespective of its merit, a defence action may be deemed not legitimate in the context of a s. 11(b) application if it is designed to delay or if it exhibits marked inefficiency or marked indifference toward delay.")<br>
</ref>

Courts can consider the timeliness of filing of defence applications.<ref>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|32}} ("The overall number, strength, importance, proximity to the Jordan ceilings, compliance with any notice or filing requirements and timeliness of defence applications may be relevant considerations.")<br>
</ref>
As well as the number, strength, importance, and proximity to the Jordan ceiling.<ref>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|32}} ("The overall number, strength, importance, proximity to the Jordan ceilings, compliance with any notice or filing requirements and timeliness of defence applications may be relevant considerations.")<br>
</ref>

Inefficiencies in the defences approach to their applications will also be of possible attribution.<ref>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|32}}<br>
</ref>

Judges should not "second-guess" the steps taken by defence counsel in responding to the charges.<ref>
{{supra1|Cody}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Mullen|hvbh0|2018 ABQB 831 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Michalyshyn J}}{{atL|hvbh0|47}}<br>
</ref>

; Defence Delay That is ''Not'' to be Counted
The Jordan framework recognizes preparation as a necessary delay and does not go into the calculation.<ref>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|29}} ("this Court recognized that an accused person’s right to make full answer and defence requires that the defence be permitted time to prepare and present its case")<br>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|65}}, also {{atL-np|gsds3|53}} and {{atL-np|gsds3|83}} ("defence actions legitimately taken to respond to the charges fall outside the ambit of defence delay.", <br>
</ref>

Any "actions legitimately taken to respond to the charges fall outside ... defence delay."<ref>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|29}}] <br>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|65}} ("To be clear, defence actions legitimately taken to respond to the charges fall outside the ambit of defence delay. For example, the defence must be allowed preparation time, even where the court and the Crown are ready to proceed.")<br>
</ref>

It has been suggested that normally a 1.5 month benchmark should be sufficient time for defence to prepare for a summary conviction case when taking into account their other work.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Zikhali|hx3t6|2019 ONCJ 24 (CanLII)|428 CRR (2d) 44}}{{atL|hx3t6|33}}<br>
</ref>

; Appellate Review
Attribution of defence delay is "highly discretionary" and so should be accorded deference.<ref>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|31}}] ("The determination of whether defence conduct is legitimate is ... highly discretionary, and appellate courts must show a correspondingly high level of deference thereto. While trial judges should take care to not second-guess steps taken by defence for the purposes of responding to the charges, they must not be reticent about finding defence action to be illegitimate where it is appropriate to do so.")<br>
{{CanLIIR|Ellis|jc25f|2020 NSCA 78 (CanLII)}}{{perNSCA|Derrick JA}}{{atsL|jc25f|103| to 105}}<Br>
</ref>

The process of according delay to one party or another is not given deference.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jurkus|hsb9q|2018 ONCA 489 (CanLII)|363 CCC (3d) 246}}{{perONCA|Fairburn JA}}{{atsL|hsb9q|25| to 26}}
</ref>
Efforts to expedite matters are determined on a standard of correctness.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Tummillo|hvg35|2018 MBCA 95 (CanLII)}}{{perMBCA|Cameron JA}}{{atL|hvg35|53}}<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Defence Waiver of Delay==
Any period of time that has been waived by the defence must be subtracted from the total time delayed.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Sharma|1fsc8|1992 CanLII 90 (SCC)|[1992] 1 SCR 814}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}{{atp|191}} (CCC)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Morin|1fsc6|1992 CanLII 89 (SCC)|[1992] 1 SCR 771}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}{{atp|15}}<br>
</ref>

Waiver while not fully apprised by the circumstances of the court docket does not necessarily render the time deductable from the Jordan ceiling.<ref>
{{supra1|Tummillo}} - accused waived delay of trial conference even though the conference was double-booked with other matters.
</ref>

; Burden
The burden is on the crown to prove there has been a waiver of any delay rights.

; Requirements
A waiver must be clear, unequivocal and with full knowledge of the right being waived.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jordan|gsds3|2016 SCC 27 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ}}{{atL|h4bfk|61}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Cody|h4bfk|2017 SCC 31 (CanLII)|[2017] 1 SCR 659}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|h4bfk|27}} ("A waiver of delay by the defence may be explicit or implicit, but must be informed, clear and unequivocal ... .")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|White|1npmd|1998 CanLII 13319 (NL CA)| Nfld. & PEIR 309 (NLCA)}}{{perNLCA|Cameron JA}}{{atL|1npmd|10}}]<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Richard|1fr67|1996 CanLII 185 (SCC)|[1996] 3 SCR 525}}{{perSCC|La Forest J}}<br>
</ref>
It does not have to be explicit, however.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Coulter|gtw5r|2016 ONCA 704 (CanLII)|340 CCC (3d) 429}}{{perONCA|Gillese JA}}{{atL|gtw5r|43}} ("Waiver can be explicit or implicit but, in either case, it must be clear and unequivocal.  The accused must have full knowledge of his or her rights, as well as the effect waiver will have on those rights")<br>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|61}}<br>
</ref>

An agreement as to a date does not amount to a waiver where the agreement is a "mere acquiescence to the inevitable."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Askov|1fsrp|1990 CanLII 45 (SCC)|[1990] 2 SCR 1199}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}{{atps|481 to 482}} (CCC)<br> 
{{supra1|Morin}}{{atp|l5}} (CCC)<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Pusic|1w9j5|1996 CanLII 8215 (ON SC)| OR (3d) 692 }}{{atps|70l to 702}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Richards|fvb3q|2012 SKCA 120 (CanLII)|405 Sask R 127}}{{perSKCA|Richards JA}}{{atL|fvb3q|25}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Brassard|1frxd|1993 CanLII 42 (SCC)|[1993] 4 SCR 287}}{{perSCC|L'Heureux-Dube J}}{{atp|287}}, 288 (SCR)<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Nuosci|1frx8|1993 CanLII 40 (SCC)|[1993] 4 SCR 283}}{{perSCC-H|Sopkina J}}{{atp|284}} (An “[a]greement to suggested dates cannot be characterized as acquiescing in the inevitable in the absence of evidence to that effect”)<br>
</ref>
The absence of any evidence that the "consents amount to acquiescence in the inevitable, the consents constitut[e] wavier or, as actions of the accused, were attributable to him."<ref>
{{ibid1|Brassard}}{{atp|287}} (SCR)<br>
</ref>

{{Reflist|2}}

==Types of Defence Delay==
Defence delay concerns a various number of defence conduct. It encompasses "the decision to take a step, as well as the manner in which it is conducted."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Cody|h4bfk|2017 SCC 31 (CanLII)|[2017] 1 SCR 659}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|h4bfk|32}}<br>
</ref> 
It will include any conduct that is deemed not "legitimate" which will include conduct "designed to delay", shows "marked inefficiency" or "marked indifference towards defence delay."<ref>
{{ibid1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|32}}
</ref>

; Incentivising Advancement
Courts are directed to incentivize counsel to move matter forward in order to eliminate the "culture of complacency."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jordan|gsds3|2016 SCC 27 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ}} (5:4){{atsL|gsds3|94|}} and {{atsL-np|gsds3|104|}}<br>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|1}}<br>
</ref>

; Attributing Illegitimate Actions
Illegitimate action, inaction or omissions will be defence-attributable delay.<ref>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|33}}<br>
</ref>
This includes a failure of engaging in their duty to "collaborat[e] with the Crown" and "us[e] court time efficiently."<ref>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|33}}<br>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|138}}<br>
</ref>

What constitutes "illegitimate" does not need to rise to the level of "professional or ethical misconduct."<ref>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|35}}<br>
</ref>

; Unreasonable Action of Counsel
Delay attributable to the defence in a Jordan analysis includes all "unreasonable actions" on the part of the defence.<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|193}}<br>
</ref>

Unreasonable actions include:
* last‑minute changes in counsel<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|193}}<br></ref>
* adjournments flowing from a lack of diligence<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|193}}<br> 
</ref>
* pursuit of "unnecessary information"<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|193}}<br> 
</ref>

; Defence Assumed Diligent
Courts may consider "the level of diligence displayed by the accused" as a relevant factor.<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|86}}<br>
</ref>

The defence's refusal to concede uncontested matters is "fair game" to consider on whether defence cause delay.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Moreira|j03g7|2019 ONSC 2536 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Akhtar J}}{{atsL|j03g7|28| to 29}} ("At the preliminary inquiry, identity was not conceded until the Crown played video evidence. In addition, the defence originally indicated that all the Mr. Big witnesses were required to testify at the preliminary hearing. However, during the hearing, they specified that only two witnesses were required....these matters should have been conceded in advance of the hearing particularly after multiple judicial pre-trials had been held. I also agree that these matters are fair game when it comes to assessing defence-caused delay in s. 11(b) applications...")
</ref>

; Adjournments
Traditionally, a party who causes an adjournment is responsible for the entire period of delay until the matter is re-scheduled.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Picard|h5smx|2017 ONCA 692 (CanLII)|354 CCC (3d) 212}}{{perONCA|Rouleau JA}}{{atL|h5smx|117}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|M(NN)|1n6mj|2006 CanLII 14957 (ON CA)|209 OAC 331, 141 CRR (2d) 95 (CA)}}{{perONCA|Juriansz JA}} (“the party who causes an adjournment is responsible for the entire delay until the matter can be re-scheduled, unless the other party is unavailable for an unreasonable length of time”)
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}
===Lawyer-Client Events===
; Failure of Accused to Maintain Contact
The Court has the discretion to find that the failure of the accused to maintain contact with their counsel constitutes "illegitimate defence conduct" and will not be added to the delay calculation.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Evans|hxql9|2019 ABCA 74 (CanLII)|AJ No 229}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0){{atsL|hxql9|24| to 25}}<br>
</ref>

; Change of Counsel
Any actions that relate to the change of counsel will be attributed to defence delay.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Cody|h4bfk|2017 SCC 31 (CanLII)|[2017] 1 SCR 659}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|h4bfk|40}} ("In this case, we would deduct two periods of time as defence delay. First, it was undisputed throughout the proceedings that the delay resulting from Mr. Cody’s first change of counsel should be deducted as defence delay.")<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Teng|gx4nj|2017 ONSC 568 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|MacDonnell J}}{{atsL|gx4nj|63| to 69}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Chonkolay|h0nnk|2017 ABQB 148 (CanLII)}}{{atsL|h0nnk|21| to 25}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Pelletier|gx367|2016 BCSC 2496 (CanLII)|136 WCB (2d) 264}}{{atsL|gx367|29| to 30}}<br>
</ref>

; Withdraw of Counsel
The withdraw of counsel, even in the case where the accused did not want them to withdraw, will still be treated as defence delay.<ref>
{{CanLIIR|Rahi|jvc45|2023 ONSC 905 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Ducharme J}}{{atL|jvc45|19}} ("This delay was attributable to the defence even though the accused did not want his lawyer removed from the record. I reject the applicant’s argument that this time period should not be considered defence delay because it was defence counsel’s decision to get off the record, not the accused’s. In our criminal justice system an accused’s lawyer is an extension of the accused. I am supported in this conclusion by the fact that the jurisprudence regarding defence delay refers to “the defence”, not simply “the accused”. These two terms are interchangeable in the s. 11(b) framework.")
</reF> 

[19]           



{{Reflist|2}}

===Delay of Election and Plea===
; Intake Period 
Under the pre-Jordan framekwork, intake period of two months for the purpose of retaining counsel, reviewing disclosure, and resolution meetings are considered typical.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Meisner|6xjm|2003 CanLII 49317 (ON SC)}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}{{atsL|6xjm|30| to 32}}{{affd}} [http://canlii.ca/t/1htns 2004 CanLII 30221] (ONCA)
</ref>

The presumptive ceiling takes into account an "intake period" which includes time to review disclosure, resolution meetings and retain counsel. It does not get removed from the delay period.<ref>
{{ibid1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|29}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Gandhi|gt8qf|2016 ONSC 5612 (CanLII)|133 WCB (2d) 29}}{{perONSC|Code J}}{{atL|gt8qf|24}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|McCready|gxd79|2017 ONCJ 15 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Hawke J}}{{atL|gxd79|35}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Luoma|gvs2g|2016 ONCJ 670 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Schreck J}}{{atL|gvs2g|22}}<br>
</ref>

Lawyers are not expected to be able to review the entirety of disclosure as soon as it arrives. It is expected that it will take in the range of 4 to 6 weeks.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Regan|hq97s|2018 ABCA 55 (CanLII)|359 CCC (3d) 53}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atsL|hq97s|61| to 62}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Taylor|h35p8|2017 ONSC 2263 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Gordon J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|McNab|gv5r6|2016 SKQB 333 (CanLII)|365 CRR (2d) 215}}{{perSKQB|McMurtry J}}{{atsL|gv5r6|40| to 41}}<br>
</ref>

; Legal Aid and Rowbotham Applications
The period required to seek a Rowbotham application or to seek the release of money for legal expenses is not attributable to defence as it is necessary to full answer and defence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|S(DM)|h1tk8|2016 NBCA 71 (CanLII)|353 CCC (3d) 396}}{{perNBCA|Quigg JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Isaacs|gv2k0|2016 ONSC 6214 (CanLII)|[2016] OJ No 5225}}{{perONSC|Lemay J}}{{perONSC|Lemay J}}{{atsL|gv2k0|88|}}, {{atsL-np|gv2k0|92|}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ny|gwl5t|2016 ONSC 8031 (CanLII)|343 CCC (3d) 512}}{{perONSC|Fairburn J}}<br>
</ref>
However, where the application for legal aid or Rowbotham counsel is delayed this will be attributable to defence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Sacoccia|h3lh1|2017 ONSC 2737 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Thorburn J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Paauw|gvsvp|2016 ONSC 7394 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|LaLiberte J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|R(D)|h2sc2|2017 ONSC 1770 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Molloy J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|McCully|gvv1b|2016 NSPC 70 (CanLII)}}{{perNSPC|Tax J}}<br>
</ref>
 
; Trial Readiness
Where the Crown and Court are ready to proceed but the defence is not will be a delay attributable to the defence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jordan|gsds3|2016 SCC 27 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ}} (5:4){{atL|gsds3|64}} (" As another example, the defence will have directly caused the delay if the court and the Crown are ready to proceed, but the defence is not. The period of delay resulting from that unavailability will be attributed to the defence.")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Coulter|gtw5r|2016 ONCA 704 (CanLII)|340 CCC (3d) 429}}{{perONCA|Gillese JA}}{{atL|gtw5r|44}}<br>
</ref>
This does not include necessary "preparation time" for the defence.<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|65}} ("To be clear, defence actions legitimately taken to respond to the charges fall outside the ambit of defence delay. For example, the defence must be allowed preparation time, even where the court and the Crown are ready to proceed. ... While this is by no means an exact science, first instance judges are uniquely positioned to gauge the legitimacy of defence actions.")<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}
===Advancing to Trial Without Complete Disclosure===
Defence cannot wait until they receive every last shred of relevant material before agreeing to move the matter forward to trial.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Regan|hq97s|2018 ABCA 55 (CanLII)|359 CCC (3d) 53}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|hq97s|65}} ("The accused cannot hold out for every last shred of disclosure before setting hearing dates: ... In some cases it is reasonable to expect defence counsel to book a trial or preliminary inquiry before they have had an opportunity to review all of the Crown’s disclosure.")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Kovacs-Tatar|1j99g|2004 CanLII 42923 (ON CA)|73 OR (3d) 161}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|1j99g|47}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|NNM|1n6mj|2006 CanLII 14957 (ON CA)|209 OAC 331}}{{perONCA|Juriansz JA}}{{atL|1n6mj|37}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|JEK|grxwj|2016 ABCA 171 (CanLII)|337 CCC (3d) 222}}{{atL|grxwj|66}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Gandhi|gt8qf|2016 ONSC 5612 (CanLII)|133 WCB (2d) 29}}{{perONSC|Code J}}{{atsL|gt8qf|31| to 33}}<br>
</ref>

Defence should proceed once they have "substantial dislosure."<ref>
{{supra1|Gandhi}}{{atsL|gt8qf|31| to 33}} (refences the standard of "substantial disclosure")<br>
</ref>

However, delay arising out of the Crown's failure to disclose cannot be then used against the accused.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Frail|h6lbd|2017 ONSC 5886 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Schreck J}}{{atL|h6lbd|44}} ("Crown cannot fail to meet its obligation to make timely disclosure and then attempt to attribute the ensuing delay to the defence for failing to do without material it ought to have received")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Walker|g0khm|2013 SKCA 95 (CanLII)|291 CRR (2d) 41}}{{perSKCA|Ottenbreit JA}}{{atsL|g0khm|28| to 30}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Stanley|gwk6p|2016 ONCJ 730 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Schreck J}}{{atL|gwk6p|29}}<br>
</ref>

; No Delay for Non-Relevant Disclosure
The defence should not be permitted to generate delay by requesting evidence that is not relevant, even where the Crown agrees to disclose.<Ref>
{{supra1|NNM}}{{atL|1n6mj|37}} ("A person charged with an offence should not be able to generate a basis for a s. 11(b) application by making a continuous stream of requests for materials that have no potential relevance, even if the Crown agrees to provide them.")
</ref>

; Sufficiency of Disclosure
Generally, defence should be equipped with sufficient disclosure to ensure efficiency at the pre-trial phase of proceedings.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jurkus|hsb9q|2018 ONCA 489 (CanLII)|363 CCC (3d) 246}}{{perONCA|Fairburn JA}}{{atL|hsb9q|32}}
</ref>

Defence are expected to have a "reasonable opportunity to review the essential aspects of the Crown case."<ref>
{{supra1|Regan}}{{atL|hq97s|65}} ("But defence counsel should not be expected to set a hearing date before they have a reasonable opportunity to review the essential aspects of the Crown’s case.")<br>
</ref>
The necessary disclosure before advancing to trial should be those materials that are "pivotal in understanding the nature of the case, the proof and the material's impact on advising her client on issues such as the nature of the plea, mode of trial" and similar.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Vitalis|hq11q|2018 ONCJ 43 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|O'Marra J}}{{atL|hq11q|41}}<br>
</ref>
Failure to have an opportunity to review such material would be "irresponsible" and would waste judicial resources.<ref>
{{ibid1|Vitalis}}{{atL|hq11q|42}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Mahenthiranathan|h51pr|2017 ONCJ 497 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Bhabha J}}{{atsL|h51pr|17|}}, {{atsL-np|h51pr|31|}}<br>
</ref>

; Example Disclosure
The availability of a preliminary inquiry transcript was considered crucial enough to the advancement of the matter to trial.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|King|hwc02|2018 NLCA 66 (CanLII)|369 CCC (3d) 1}}{{perNLCA|Barry JA}}{{atsL|hwc02|78| to 80}} and{{atsL|hwc02|106| to 107}}
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}

===Scheduling===

; Unavailability of Defence Counsel
The dominant case law suggests that the unavailability of counsel when both court and Crown are available will be attributed to defence in most circumstances.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Mullen|hvbh0|2018 ABQB 831 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Michalyshyn J}}{{atL|hvbh0|41}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|RMP|hss5m|2018 ONSC 4117 (CanLII)|148 WCB (2d) 573}}{{perONSC|Bell J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Mamouni|hmqj2|2017 ABCA 347 (CanLII)|356 CCC (3d) 153}}{{perABCA|Watson JA}}
</ref>
This effectively overturns the pre-Jordan rule established by ''R v Godin'', which did not necessarily attribute delay to defence due to unavailability.<ref>
see {{CanLIIRP|Godin|23rhf|2009 SCC 26 (CanLII)|[2009] 2 SCR 3}}{{atsL|23rhf|21| to 23}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|P(RM)|hss5m|2018 ONSC 4117 (CanLII)|148 WCB (2d) 573}}{{atsL|hss5m|44| to 45}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Ewanochko|hrg34|2018 MBPC 14 (CanLII)}}{{atL|hrg34|37}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Grewal|hqhdr|2018 ONCJ 108 (CanLII)|405 CRR (2d) 30}}{{perONCJ|Monahan J}}{{atsL|hqhdr|14| to 16}}<br>
cf. {{CanLIIRP|Albinowski|hwtrz|2018 ONCA 1084 (CanLII)|371 CCC (3d) 190}}{{perONCA|Roberts JA}}<br>
and {{CanLIIRP|King|hwc02|2018 NLCA 66 (CanLII)|369 CCC (3d) 1}}{{perNLCA|Barry JA}}{{atL|hwc02|108}}<br>
</ref>

However, there are some courts that maintain the rule from Godin still remains.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Roberts|hqd8p|2018 ONSC 545 (CanLII)|OJ No 732}}{{atL|hqd8p|92}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Bardsley|gxjd8|2017 ONCJ 42 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Pringle J}}{{atL|gxjd8|40}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Sepka|hp4bv|2017 BCPC 356 (CanLII)}}{{atL|hp4bv|46}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Wu|hphvq|2017 BCSC 2373 (CanLII)}}{{atL|hphvq|62}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Akumu|h5t49|2017 BCSC 896 (CanLII)}}{{perBCSC|Fisher J}}{{atL|h5t49|114}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ashraf|gtxgk|2016 ONCJ 584 (CanLII)|367 CRR (2d) 30}}{{perONCJ|Band J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Gasana|gw1q9|2016 ONCJ 724 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Monahan J}}<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Defence Applications===
Defence applications to seek out evidence to which the Crown had a McNeil duty to seek out would result in the time required to obtain the records would not be attributable to the defence.<ref>
e.g. {{CanLIIRx|King (No. 5)|h2q8n|2017 CanLII 15296 (NLSCTD)}}{{perNLSC|Marshall J}}{{atL|h2q8n|53}}<br>
</ref>

; Frivolous Application
Any frivolous application will be delay attributable to the defence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Coulter|gtw5r|2016 ONCA 704 (CanLII)|340 CCC (3d) 429}}{{perONCA|Gillese JA}}{{atL|gtw5r|44}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Jordan|gsds3|2016 SCC 27 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ}} (5:4){{atL|gsds3|63}} ("Deliberate and calculated defence tactics aimed at causing delay, which include frivolous applications and requests, are the most straightforward examples of defence delay. Trial judges should generally dismiss such applications and requests the moment it becomes apparent they are frivolous.")<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Multiple Co-Accused===
The delay caused by multiple co-accused should be taken as a "fact of life" and should be taken into account for what is a "reasonable" amount of time. One accused can prevent a co-accused from proceeding expeditiously. In such a case the court should look at whether the delayed accused took "proactive steps", including prompt disclosure review, pushing for case management, collaborate with Crown to streamline issues, make concessions, and make Crown and Court aware of delay problems.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Vassell|gs9r9|2016 SCC 26 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 625}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver J}}{{atL|gs9r9|6}} ("In many cases, delay caused by proceeding against multiple co-accused must be accepted as a fact of life and must be considered in deciding what constitutes a reasonable time for trial. ... the delay caused by the various co-accused not only prevented the Crown’s case from moving forward, it also prevented Mr. Vassell from proceeding expeditiously, ... it is [a case] in which he took proactive steps throughout, from start to finish, to have his case tried as soon as possible. In this regard, his counsel reviewed disclosure promptly, pushed for a pre-trial conference or case management, worked with the Crown to streamline the issues at trial, agreed to admit an expert report, made the Crown and the Court aware of s. 11(b) problems, and at all times sought early dates.")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Gopie|h69tn|2017 ONCA 728 (CanLII)|140 OR (3d) 171}}{{perONCA|Gillese JA}}{{atL|h69tn|174}}<br>
</ref>
The court should not simply question whether the petitioning accused caused delay or not.<ref>
{{ibid1|Vassell}}{{atL|gs9r9|6}}("Importantly, this is not a case where Mr. Vassell simply did not cause any of the delay; ")
</ref>

The approach on such cases should be "individualized."<Ref>
{{supra1|Gopie}}{{atL|h69tn|128}} ( "an individualized approach must be taken to the attribution of defence-caused delay in cases of jointly-charged accused")
</ref>

The main question is whether it is in the "interest of justice" to have matters advanced jointly.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Albinowski|hwtrz|2018 ONCA 1084 (CanLII)|371 CCC (3d) 190}}{{perONCA|Roberts JA}}{{atsL|hwtrz|36| to 39}}<br>
{{supra1|Gopie}}{{atL|h69tn|171}}<!--correct citations?--><br>
{{CanLIIRP|Manasseri|gtvtz|2016 ONCA 703 (CanLII)|344 CCC (3d) 281}}{{perONCA-H|Watts JA}}{{atL|gtvtz|323}}<br>
</ref>
Where the interests of justice are no longer being served, the Crown is expected to mitigate delay caused by co-accused matters where one co-accused is being "held hostage" by the delay caused by another.<ref>
{{supra1|Albinowski}}{{atL|hwtrz|39}}<br>
{{supra1|Vassell}}{{atL|gs9r9|7}}<br>
see [[Joinder and Severance of Charges]]
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Defence Obligation to Bring the Matter to Trial==
It is not enough for defence counsel to make "token efforts" on the record to seek early trial dates.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jordan|gsds3|2016 SCC 27 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ}}{{atL|gsds3|85}}<br>
</ref>

Courts may consider whether the defence have acted with diligence in bringing the matter to trial.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Summerfield|gwl99|2016 MBQB 241 (CanLII)|MJ No 366}}{{perMBQB|Edmond J}}<br>
{{CanLIIR-N|Amyot and Emslie|, 2016 MBQB 186}}<br>
</ref>
This would be with a view to:<ref>
{{supra1|Summerfield}}{{atL|gwl99|38}}<br>
</ref>
* whether counsel raised the issue of delay;
* whether counsel took active steps to move the matter forward expeditiously by inquiring on early trial dates;
* whether counsel met in advance of hearings to streamline the process;
* the seriousness of the charges
* the prejudice they delay had on the evidence

{{reflist|2}}

==Morin Framework (Pre-Jordan, 2016 SCC 27)==
* [[Morin Framework (Pre-Jordan 2016)]]

==See Also==
* [[Charter Delay (Cases)]]
* [[Charter Applications]]

[[Category:Canadian Charter Rights]]