View source for Confrontation Rule

==General Principles==
{{seealso|Cross-Examination}}
The confrontation rule, also known as the rule in ''Brown v Dunn'', states that where a party is advancing a theory that contradicts the testimony of a particular witness being questioned, the counter-version must be put to the witness.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Sawatzky|h4bfm|2017 ABCA 179 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atsL|h4bfm|23| to 26}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Dyck|gb5n1|1969 CanLII 988 (BC CA)|[1970] 2 CCC 283 (BCCA)}}{{perBCCA|Robertson JA}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Henderson|1f9fj|1999 CanLII 2358 (ON CA)| OR (3d) 628}}{{perONCA|Labrosse JA}}{{atp|636}}<br>
{{UKCase|Brown v Dunn| (1893), 6 R. 67 (H.L.)}} [http://canlii.ca/t/h6kw6 1893 CanLII 65] (FOREP) </ref> 
More specifically, the witness should have "an opportunity to address or explain the point upon which credibility is attacked." <ref>
{{CanLIIRP|II|fvhsd|2013 ABCA 2 (CanLII)|542 AR 52}}{{perABCA|Berger J}}{{atL|fvhsd|8}}citing McWilliams, Canadian Criminal Evidence, 4th ed. (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2003){{atp|18-104}}</ref>
The rule prevents a witness from being "ambushed."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Dexter|g2b2s|2013 ONCA 744 (CanLII)|313 OAC 226}}{{perONCA|Weiler JA}}{{atL|g2b2s|18}}
</ref>

; Flexible Application
Courts have not stuck strictly to the requirement of presenting the counter version in each and every case involving credibility, stating that it is not a hard and fast rule.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Palmer|1mjtn|1979 CanLII 8 (SCC)|[1980] 1 SCR 759}}{{perSCC-H|McIntyre J}} at 781
</ref>
The examiner does not need to "slog through a witness's evidence-in-chief putting him on notice of every detail the defence does not accept."<ref>
{{supra1|Dexter}}{{atL|g2b2s|18}}
</ref>

A more flexible approach has been to focus on whether the failure created an unfairness.
<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Johnson|2csn5|2010 ONCA 646 (CanLII)|[2010] OJ No 4153}}{{perONCA|Rouleau JA}}{{atL|2csn5|79}}: ("The rule is one of fairness, and is not absolute. ... Counsel should not necessarily be obliged to plod through a witness' evidence in-chief, putting him or her on notice of every detail that they do not accept. ... A pragmatic approach to the rule is most appropriate.")<br>
see also {{CanLIIRP|Henderson|1f9fj|1999 CanLII 2358 (ON CA)| OR (3d) 628}}{{perONCA|Labrosse JA}}{{atps|636-37}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Giroux|1n06n|2006 CanLII 10736 (ON CA)|207 CCC (3d) 512}}{{perONCA|Blair JA}}{{atL|1n06n|42}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Lyttle|1gd50|2004 SCC 5 (CanLII)|[2004] 1 SCR 193}}{{perSCC-H|Major and Fish JJA}}{{atL|1gd50|65}}<br>
{{supra1|Palmer}}{{atp|781}} [SCR]<br>
</ref>

; Purpose
The rule intends to create fairness for witness who is being impeached, the counsel who called the witness being impeached, and the trier of fact. <ref> 
{{CanLIIRP|Quansah|gh4jw|2015 ONCA 237 (CanLII)|323 CCC (3d) 191}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{atL|gh4jw|77}}<br>
</ref>

; When Applied
It has been suggested that the rule should only apply to "matters of substance" and not "minor details."<ref>
{{supra1|Giroux}}{{atL|1n06n|46}}
{{CanLIIRP|Werkman|1r4xs|2007 ABCA 130 (CanLII)|219 CCC (3d) 406}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|1r4xs|7}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|McNeill|1fb5h|2000 CanLII 4897 (ON CA)|144 CCC (3d) 551}}{{perONCA|Moldaver JA}}{{atL|1fb5h|45}}<br>
</ref>

It is only the "nature of the proposed contradictory evidence and its significant aspects" that should be put to the witness.<ref>
{{supra1|Quansah}}{{atL|gh4jw|81}}<br>
{{supra1|Dexter}}{{atL|g2b2s|18}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Paris|1fbjt|2000 CanLII 17031 (ON CA)|150 CCC (3d) 162}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}, leave to appeal refused{{atL|1fbjt|22}}<br>
</ref>

; Nature of Confrontation
It is not necessary to confront witnesses with matters beyond their observations or knowledge for which they cannot testify to.<ref>
{{supra1|Quansah}}{{atL|gh4jw|83}}<br>
</ref>

; Failure to Confront
Some courts have simply put the failure to confront the witness as a matter of weight given to the evidence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|MacKinnon|1d9gq|1992 CanLII 488 (BC CA)|72 CCC (3d) 113}}{{perBCCA|Hollinrake JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|OGK|2325s|1994 CanLII 8742 (BC CA)|28 CR (4th) 129}}{{perBCCA|Taylor JA}}<br>
</ref>

Nevertheless, failure to put the counter story to a particular witness can result in an adverse finding on the counter-story.<ref>
{{CanLIIR-N|Mete|, (1973), 3 WWR 709 (BCCA)}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Khuc|5391|2000 BCCA 20 (CanLII)|142 CCC (3d) 276}}{{perBCCA|McEachern JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|McNeill|1fb5h|2000 CanLII 4897 |}}{{perONCA|Moldaver JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Carter|1l730|2005 BCCA 381 (CanLII)|199 CCC (3d) 74}}{{perBCCA|Thackray JA}}{{atsL|1l730|54| to 60}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ali|26bd2|2009 BCCA 464 (CanLII)|277 BCAC 154}}{{perBCCA|Kirkpatrick JA}}<br>
</ref>

Where the accused has not confronted the relevant Crown witnesses with the counter theory of events, the Crown will generally be given the option of recalling their witnesses to address the counter-story.<ref>e.g. see comments in {{CanLIIRP|Sparvier|fr25w|2012 SKPC 67 (CanLII)|396 Sask R 15}}{{perSKPC|Hinds J}}{{atL|fr25w|31}}</ref>

; Not Applicable to Accused Testimony
Where the accused testifies and refutes the Crown's evidence, the rule may not apply such that the Crown need not confront the accused's accused version of events. The accused would have been aware of the Crown evidence that came out in trial and would have been able to address it in their testimony.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|II|fvhsd|2013 ABCA 2 (CanLII)|542 AR 52}}{{perABCA|Berger JA}} - Crown only cross-examined on collateral matters and not the substance of the incident
</ref> 
However, this tactical choice not to confront will prohibit the Crown from making a full comparison between the witnesses versions and in a jury trial would require limiting instructions notifying the jury that the accused did not have "potential benefit" his credibility being tested.<ref>
{{ibid1|II}}{{atsL|fvhsd|20|, 23}}<br>
</ref>

There is no obligation under the confrontation rule to require the Crown to cross-examine an accused on a bare denial of the allegations.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Sylvain|g6pw2|2014 ABCA 153 (CanLII)|310 CCC (3d) 1}}{{TheCourtABCA}}(2:1){{atL|g6pw2|96}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|II|fvhsd|2013 ABCA 2 (CanLII)|542 AR 52}}{{perABCA|Berger J}}{{atL|fvhsd|10}}<br>
</ref>

; Breach of Duty
The decision whether a breach is found is at "the discretion of the trial judge after taking into account the circumstances of the case."<ref>
{{supra1|Dexter}}{{atL|g2b2s|20}}<br>
{{supra1|Paris}}{{atsL|1fbjt|21| to 22}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Giroux|1n06n|2006 CanLII 10736 (ON CA)|207 CCC (3d) 512}}{{perONCA|Blair JA}}, leave to appeal refused{{atL|1n06n|42}}<br>
{{supra1|Quansah}}{{atL|gh4jw|80}}<br>
</ref>

; Factors 
To determine a breach of the Brown v Dunn rule, a number of factors can be considered:<ref>
{{supra1|Dexter}}{{atL|g2b2s|20}}<br>
{{supra1|Quansah}}{{atsL|gh4jw|84|}}, {{atsL|gh4jw|117|}}: - considers (1) nature of the subject, (2) overall tenor of the cross-examination, (3) overall conduct of the defence<br>
{{supra1|Paris}}{{atsL|1fbjt|23}}<br>
</ref>
* The seriousness of the breach;
* The context in which the breach occurred;
* The stage in the proceedings when an objection to the breach was raised;
* The response by counsel, if any, to the objection;
* Any request by counsel to re-open its case so that the witness whose evidence has been impugned can offer an explanation;
* The availability of the witness to be recalled; and
* In the case of a jury trial, whether a correcting instruction and explanation of the rule is sufficient or whether trial fairness has been so impaired that a motion for a mistrial should be entertained.

; Jury Trials
The Crown must be cautious in arguing a breach of the Browne and Dunn rule to a jury in closing as it risk creating the false impression of a reversed burden of proof.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Brown|hs5fr|2018 ONCA 1064 (CanLII)|361 CCC (3d) 510}}{{perONCA|Epstein JA}}{{atsL|hs5fr|15| to 18}}<br>
</ref>

; Appellate Review
The question of whether the rule in Browne and Dunn applies is reviewed on a standard of correctness.<ref>
{{CanLIIRxC|Nagy v BCAA Insurance Corporation|9z5n|2020 BCCA 270 (CanLII)}}{{perBCCA|Grauer JA}}{{atL|9z5n|23}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Drydgen|fxn2v|2013 BCCA 253 (CanLII)|338 BCAC 299}}{{perBCCA|Donald JA}}{{AtL|fxn2v|22}}<br>
</ref>
There is however deference to the “factual findings underpinning the trial judge’s conclusion”. <Ref>
{{CanLIIRxC|Hamman v Insurance Corporation of British Columbia|j8978|2020 BCCA 170 (CanLII)}}{{perBCCA|Fitch J}}{{atL|j8978|77}} (“...deference is owed to the factual findings underpinning the trial judge’s conclusion on whether or not the rule is engaged”)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Lyttle|1gd50|2004 SCC 5 (CanLII)|[2004] 1 SCR 193}}{{perSCC-H|Major and Fish JJA}}{{atL|1gd50|65}}<br>
</ref>

{{Reflist|2}}

====Remedy====
The timeliness of the objection is a factor to be considered to determine a proper remedy.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Quansah|gh4jw|2015 ONCA 237 (CanLII)|323 CCC (3d) 191}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{atsL|gh4jw|123| to 124}}<br>
</ref>

A reviewing court must accord "substantial deference" to the trial judge on their use of discretion in deciding on a remedy.<ref>
{{ibid1|Quansah}}{{atL|gh4jw|118}}<br>
</ref>

; Recalling the Witness
The first remedy to be considered is the possibility of recalling the witness.<ref>
{{ibid1|Quansah}}{{atL|gh4jw|120}}<br>
{{CanLIIR|McNeill|1fb5h|2000 CanLII 4897 (ON CA)}}
</ref>

If the option to recall a witness is determined to be inappropriate or "highly impracticable," it should be left to the trial judge to determine whether the jury needs special instructions.<REf>
{{ibid1|McNeill}}{{AtL|1fb5h|49}}
</ref> An instruction should involve warning them that the weight given to uncontradicted evidence should take into account the opposing witness was never questioned.<ref>
{{ibid1|McNeill}}{{AtL|1fb5h|49}}
</ref>

The logistics of recalling a witness should be left to the discretion of the trial judge.<Ref>
{{ibid1|McNeill}}{{AtL|1fb5h|48}}
</ref>

If the Crown declines an offer by the court to recall a witness, there is no obligation upon the judge to provide special instructions to the jury on considering the evidence.<ref>
{{ibid1|McNeill}} at para 47 ("If the opportunity is declined, then, in my view, no special instruction to the jury is required beyond the normal instruction that the jury is entitled to believe all, part or none of a witness's evidence, regardless of whether the evidence is uncontradicted.")
</ref>

A significant gap between the initial testimony and the recall period can be of concern for fairness.<Ref>
e.g. see {{CanLIIR|Werkman|1r4xs|2007 ABCA 130 (CanLII)}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}