View source for Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

{{Currency2|January|2023}}
{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderSearch}}
==General Principles==
{{seealso|Rights Against Search and Seizure}}
The law imposes a spectrum of different levels of privacy depending on the circumstances. Where the the level is sufficiently low, police may be able to intrude on that privacy on a foundation of "reasonable suspicion". Where the privacy level is sufficient, the intrusion must be based on "reasonable belief".

A search can only be unreasonable and be in violation of s. 8 of the Charter where it intrudes on a person's reasonable expectation of privacy.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Hunter v Southam Inc|1mgc1|1984 CanLII 33 (SCC)|[1984] 2 SCR 145}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}}{{atps|159 to 160}} - first acceptance of REP by SCC<br>
see {{CanLIIRP|Edwards|1frcd|1996 CanLII 255 (SCC)|[1996] 1 SCR 128}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}{{atsL|1frcd|33|}} and {{atsL-np|1frcd|39|}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Evans|1frf4|1996 CanLII 248 (SCC)|[1996] 1 SCR 8}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}{{atL|1frf4|11}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Pugliese|1npnm|1992 CanLII 2781 (ON CA)|71 CCC (3d) 295}}{{perONCA|Finlayson JA}} - referred to as the "true test" of rights under s. 8<br>
</ref>
The accused seeking to challenge a search or seizure must begin by establishing the existence of a s. 8 right by showing there is was a reasonable expectation of privacy.

; Normative Standard
An "expectation of privacy is a normative rather than a descriptive standard"<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Tessling|1j0wb|2004 SCC 67 (CanLII)|[2004] 3 SCR 432}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atL|1j0wb|42}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Patrick|231wj|2009 SCC 17 (CanLII)|[2009] 1 SCR 579}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atL|231wj|14}}<br>
</ref> 
It is concerned "with the degree of privacy needed to maintain a free and open society, not necessarily the degree of privacy expected by the individual or respected by the state in
a given situation…"<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Ward|ft0ft|2012 ONCA 660 (CanLII)|97 CR (6th) 377}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}} {{atL|ft0ft|86}}
</ref>

The determination of privacy rights is made "from the independent perspective of the reasonable and informed person who is concerned about the long-term consequences of government action for the protection of privacy."<ref>
{{supra1|Patrick}}{{atL|231wj|14}}</ref>

The key question in the context of police surveillance is whether "unauthorized surveillance ... would see the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Wong|1fsq9|1990 CanLII 56 (SCC)|[1990] 3 SCR 36}}{{perSCC|La Forest J}}<br>
</ref>

What constitutes reasonableness is a “function of both the importance of the state objective and the degree of impact on the individual’s privacy interest”.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Rodgers|1n3br|2006 SCC 15 (CanLII)|[2006] 1 SCR 554}}{{perSCC|Charron J}}{{atL|1n3br|27}} ("Where the constitutional line of “reasonableness” will be drawn then becomes a function of both the importance of the state objective and the degree of impact on the individual’s privacy interest.")<Br>
</ref>

; Standard Varies on Facts, Subject-Matter, and Relationships
The standard is "factually-driven" and "laden with value judgments" from the "independent perspective of the reasonable and informed person" concerned "with the long-term consequences of government action for the protection of privacy."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Spencer|g7dzn|2014 SCC 43 (CanLII)|[2014] 2 SCR 212}}{{perSCC|Cromwell J}}{{atL|g7dzn|18}}<br>
</ref>

What is the subject of a REP "can vary with the nature of the matter sought to be protected, the circumstances in which and the place where state intrusion occurs, and the purposes of the intrusion."<ref>
{{supra1|Patrick}}{{atL|231wj|38}}
</ref>

Privacy is held with respect to different parties. A person will hold a different expectation of privacy from an employer than from the police.<ref>
e.g. {{CanLIIRP|Buhay|1g6p7|2003 SCC 30 (CanLII)|[2003] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Arbour J}}: owner of locker allowed in locker but not police<br>
maid in a hotel can come into the room but not the police<br>
bank clerk has a master key to safety deposit box<br></ref>

; Purpose of Protections
The rights are intended to protect "biographical core of personal information which individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the state." It  further "include[s] information which tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Plant|1fs0w|1993 CanLII 70 (SCC)|[1993] 3 SCR 281}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}} at p. 293 ("In fostering the underlying values of dignity, integrity and autonomy, it is fitting that s. 8 of the Charter should seek to protect a biographical core of personal information which individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the state. This would include information which tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual.")</ref>

Section 8 protects persons not places.<ref>
{{supra1|Hunter v Southam Inc}}{{atps|158-9}} [SCR]</ref>
The Charter does not recognize regions of immunity.<ref>
{{supra1|Hunter v Southam Inc}}{{atps|158-9}}</ref> 
Solicitor-client meeting rooms, for example, or confessionals are given no heightened expectation of privacy due to their intended use.

; Broad Interpretation
Courts interpret privacy in a "broad and liberal manner."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Dyment|1ftc6|1988 CanLII 10 (SCC)|[1988] 2 SCR 417}}{{perSCC|La Forest J and Lamer J}}</ref>

; Abandonment
A person cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in what they knowingly expose to part or all of the public or abandons in a public place.<ref>
{{supra1|Tessling}}{{atL|1j0wb|40}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Boersma|1frs5|1994 CanLII 99 (SCC)|[1994] 2 SCR 488}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Stillman|1fr32|1997 CanLII 384 (SCC)|[1997] 1 SCR 607}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}<br>
{{supra1|Evans}}{{atL|1frf4|50}} (dissent)<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Baron v Canada|1fs68|1993 CanLII 154 (SCC)|[1993] 1 SCR 416}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}{{atp|453}}<br>
{{supra1|Dyment}}{{Atp|435}} (cited to SCR)<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Monney|1fqnx|1999 CanLII 678 (SCC)|[1999] 1 SCR 652}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}}{{atL|1fqnx|45}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Zones of Protection==
The Charter right protects a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. This is a protection of persons ''not'' places.<ref>See ''Katz v US'', 389 US 347 (1967){{atp|351}}</ref>  

The right manifests itself in protecting the zones of the person, territory, and information.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Tessling|1j0wb|2004 SCC 67 (CanLII)|[2004] 3 SCR 432}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atsL|1j0wb|20| to 23}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Gomboc|2dhlk|2010 SCC 55 (CanLII)|[2010] 3 SCR 211}}{{perSCC-H|Deschamps J}}{{atL|2dhlk|19}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Patrick|231wj|2009 SCC 17 (CanLII)|[2009] 1 SCR 579}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atL|231wj|42}}<Br>
</ref>
These zones will occasionally overlap and strict distinctions do not need to be made.<ref>
{{supra1|Patrick}}{{atL|231wj|42}}<Br>
{{supra1|Tessling}}{{atL|1j0wb|24}}
</ref>
{{Reflist|2}}

===Personal Privacy===

Personal privacy "protects bodily integrity, and in particular not to have our bodies touched or explored to disclose objects or matters we wish to conceal."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Tessling|1j0wb|2004 SCC 67 (CanLII)|[2004] 3 SCR 432}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atL|1j0wb|21}}</ref> 
It is for that reason that it is considered the strongest of the forms of privacy.<ref>
{{ibid1|Tessling}}{{atL|1j0wb|21}}</ref>

Courts have recognized the high value of personal privacy, including a person's body.<Ref>
{{CanLIIR|VanBree|jrqjg|2022 ONSC 4948 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Carroccia J}}{{AtL|jrqjg|68}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Jarvis|hxj07|2019 SCC 10 (CanLII)|[2019] 1 SCR 488}}{{perSCC|Wagner CJ}}{{atL|hxj07|65}}<br>
{{supra1|Tessling}}{{atL|1j0wb|21}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|M(MR)|1fqq9|1998 CanLII 770 (SCC)|[1998] 3 SCR 393}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}{{atL|1fqq9|32}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Golden|51xm|2001 SCC 83 (CanLII)|[2001] 3 SCR 679}}{{perSCC-H|Iacobucci and Arbour JJ}}{{AtsL|51xm|83|, 89-90, 98-99 and 106}}
</ref>

The connection between personal privacy and dignity is "especially palpable."<Ref>
Jarvis at para 65
</ref>

Unauthorized interference with bodily integrity is an "affront to human dignity."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Stillman|1fr32|1997 CanLII 384 (SCC)|[1997] 1 SCR 607}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}{{atL|1fr32|42}}<br>
</ref>

Section 8 is implicated by searches affecting "dignity, integrity and autonomy."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Plant|1fs0w|1993 CanLII 70 (SCC)|84 CCC (3d) 203}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}} {{atL|1fs0w|17}}
</ref>

This form of privacy is most often considered in a strip search<ref>
e.g. {{supra1|Golden}}</ref> or a warrantless seizure of a bodily sample.<ref>
e.g. {{CanLIIRP|Stillman|1fr32|1997 CanLII 384 (SCC)|[1997] 1 SCR 607}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Colarusso|1frw6|1994 CanLII 134 (SCC)|[1994] 1 SCR 20}}{{perSCC|La Forest J}}</ref>

As a result of the high degree of intrusion of strip searches, they have the added requirement of a reasonable belief that it was necessary.<ref>
{{supra1|Golden}}{{atL|51xm|104}}<br>
see also [[Manner of Search#Strip Searches]]<br>
</ref>
{{Reflist|2}}

===Territorial Privacy===
Privacy over personal territory traces back to the English common law with the maxim that "the house of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress."<ref>
{{supra1|Semayne's Case}}{{at-|1}}</ref>
It prohibits authorities from intruding on dwelling houses as well as other recognized zones of privacy.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Tessling|1j0wb|2004 SCC 67 (CanLII)|[2004] 3 SCR 432}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atL|1j0wb|22}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Wise|1fsdl|1992 CanLII 125 (SCC)|[1992] 1 SCR 527}}{{perSCC|Cory J}} <Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Mellenthin|1fs79|1992 CanLII 50 (SCC)|[1992] 3 SCR 615}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Belnavis|1fqzw|1997 CanLII 320 (SCC)|[1997] 3 SCR 341}}<Br>

</ref>
This has since been adopted into the common law of Canada and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.<ref>
Adopted in common law in {{CanLIIRPC|Eccles v Bourque et al|1z1gw|1974 CanLII 191 (SCC)|[1975] 2 SCR 739}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}} <br>
Adopted as applicable to Charter in {{CanLIIRPC|Colet v The Queen|1lpb2|1981 CanLII 11 (SCC)|[1981] 1 SCR 2}}{{perSCC|Ritchie J}}<br>
</ref>

The use of the concept of territoriality of certain privacy rights does not contradict the notion that privacy protect people and not places because territoriality is simply an "analytical tool to evaluate the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy."<ref>
{{supra1|Tessling}}{{atL|1j0wb|22}}
</ref>

The expectation of territorial privacy has been divided into a "hierarchy" with the home being at the top due to it being the place where "our most intimate and private activities are most likely to take place."<ref>
{{ibid1|Tessling}}{{atL|1j0wb|22}}<Br>
{{CanLIIR|Stairs|jnl5w|2022 SCC 11 (CanLII)|}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver and Jamal JJ}}
</ref> 
Lesser places include, in descending order, of "perimeter space around the home", "commercial space", "private cars", schools, and prison.<ref>
{{ibid1|Tessling}}{{atL|1j0wb|22}}<br>
</ref>

There may exist territorial privacy in semi-public places, such as school hallways, depending on the circumstances.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jarvis|hxj07|2019 SCC 10 (CanLII)|[2019] 1 SCR 488}}{{perSCC|Wagner CJ}}
</ref>

{{Reflist|2}}

===Informational Privacy===
The right to information relates to the rights of an individual to control when, how, and the extent of which information can be made available to others.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Tessling|1j0wb|2004 SCC 67 (CanLII)|[2004] 3 SCR 432}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atL|1j0wb|23}}<br>

</ref>
It protects the "biographical core of personal information" that includes "information which tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Plant|1fs0w|1993 CanLII 70 (SCC)|[1993] 3 SCR 281}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}</ref>
It also includes information that, if disclosed, would compromise their "dignity, integrity and autonomy."<REf>
{{CanLIIR|Major|jqz0p|2022 SKCA 80 (CanLII)}}{{perSKCA|Tholl JA}}{{AtL|jqz0p|70}}
</reF>
It permits "individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Gomboc|2dhlk|2010 SCC 55 (CanLII)|[2010] 3 SCR 211}}{{perSCC|Deschamps J}}{{atL|2dhlk|19}}<br>
</ref>

It is said to be at its "strongest" when it relates to "identity" including "lifestyle", "intimidate relations", "political or religious options."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Mills|1fqkl|1999 CanLII 637 (SCC)|[1999] 3 SCR 668}} at para 80 ("These privacy concerns are at their strongest where aspects of one’s individual identity are at stake, such as in the context of information “about one’s lifestyle, intimate relations or political or religious opinions”<br>
British Columbia Securities Commission v. Branch, 1995 CanLII 142 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 62<br>
Thomson Newspapers, supra, at p. 517, per La Forest J<br>
</ref>

; Privacy as Anonymity
Informational privacy includes the concept of "secrecy and confidentiality", "privacy as control", and "privacy as anonymity."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Spencer|g7dzn|2014 SCC 43 (CanLII)|[2014] 2 SCR 212}}{{perSCC|Cromwell J}}{{atL|g7dzn|38}}<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

=="Totality of the Circumstances" Test==
The "totality of the circumstances" test determines the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Buhay|1g6p7|2003 SCC 30 (CanLII)|[2003] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Arbour J}}{{atL|1g6p7|18}}<br> 
See also {{CanLIIRP|Cole|ft969|2012 SCC 53 (CanLII)|[2012] 3 SCR 34}}{{perSCC-H|Fish J}}{{atL|ft969|39}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Edwards|1frcd|1996 CanLII 255 (SCC)|[1996] 1 SCR 128}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}{{atL|1frcd|31}}<br>
</ref>

The "totality of the circumstances" has been described as having four lines of inquiry:<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Tessling|1j0wb|2004 SCC 67 (CanLII)|[2004] 3 SCR 432}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atsL|1j0wb|31|, 32}}</ref>
# what is the subject matter of the search?
# did the accused have direct interest in the subject matter?
# did the accused have a subjective expectation of privacy?
# if so, was the expectation objectively reasonable?

The expectation will "vary with the nature of the matter sought to be protected, the circumstances in which and the place where state intrusion occurs, and the purposes of the intrusion."<ref> 
{{CanLIIRP|Patrick|231wj|2009 SCC 17 (CanLII)|[2009] 1 SCR 579}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{AtL|231wj|38}}, citing {{CanLIIRP|Colarusso|1frw6|1994 CanLII 134 (SCC)|[1994] 1 SCR 20}}{{perSCC|Lamer CJ and Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ}}{{atp|53}} and {{supra1|Buhay}}{{atsL|1g6p7|22|, 23 and 24}}<br>
</ref>
The test "needs to be tailored to the circumstances of the ...case."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Tessling|1j0wb|2004 SCC 67 (CanLII)|[2004] 3 SCR 432}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atL|1j0wb|31}}<br>
</ref>
In practice, the factual circumstances engaging s. 8 will vary greatly.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Finley|fxctz|2013 SKCA 47 (CanLII)}}{{perSKCA|Jackson JA}}{{atL|fxctz|32}}: facts engaging s.8 will vary greatly.
</ref>

A REP is a function of the nature of the information sought and the purpose for which it is made available.<ref>
{{ibid1|Finley}}{{atL|fxctz|32}}<br>
see also {{supra1|Tessling}}, and {{CanLIIRP|Gomboc|2dhlk|2010 SCC 55 (CanLII)|[2010] 3 SCR 211}}{{perSCC|Deschamps J}}
</ref>

Analysis requires "value judgements" from the "perspective of the reasonable and informed person who is concerned about the long-term consequences of government action for the protection of privacy."<ref>
{{supra1|Patrick}}{{AtL|231wj|14}}<br>
{{ibid1|Gomboc}}{{AtL|2dhlk|34}} ("appropriate question is whether the information is the sort that society accepts should remain out of the state’s hands")<br>
</ref>

; Presumptive Expectations
It is presumed, "unless the contrary is shown", that the information that exists in the home is regarded as private.<ref>
{{supra1|Patrick}}{{AtL|231wj|19}}<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}
===Subjective and Objective Components===
When assessing the circumstances there should be a subjective expectation of privacy and an objective reasonableness of the expectation and does not require the testimony of the accused.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Edwards|1frcd|1996 CanLII 255 (SCC)|[1996] 1 SCR 128}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}{{AtL|1frcd|45}}, citing ''United States v Gomez'', 16 F.3d 254 (8th Cir. 1994){{atp|256}}
</ref>
The objective component considers whether one ought to expect privacy and if so to what level.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Trapp|fp3n3|2011 SKCA 143 (CanLII)|[2012] 4 WWR 648}}{{perSKCA|Cameron JA}}
{{CanLIIRx|Finley|fxctz|2013 SKCA 47 (CanLII)}}{{perSKCA|Jackson JA}} {{atL|fxctz|32}}
</ref>

The accused must not have conducted himself in "a manner that was inconsistent with the continued (and customary) expectation of privacy that an independent and informed observer would reasonably expect."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Patrick|231wj|2009 SCC 17 (CanLII)|[2009] 1 SCR 579}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atL|231wj|16}}<Br>
</ref>

; Subjective Component
The subjective component asks whether the accused had or is presumed to have an expectation of privacy in the zone.<ref>
{{ibid1|Patrick}}{{atL|231wj|37}}
</ref> 
It is not considered a "high hurdle."<ref>
{{ibid1|Patrick}}{{atL|231wj|17}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Jones|hp63x|2017 SCC 60 (CanLII)|[2017] 2 SCR 696}}{{perSCC|Cote J}}{{atL|hp63x|20}} <br>
{{CanLIIRP|Marakah|hp63v|2017 SCC 59 (CanLII)|[2017] 2 SCR 608}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|hp63v|22}} <Br><br>
</ref> 
It is often presumed to exist in certain contexts such the contents of residences and computers, or the contents of a conversation.<ref>
e.g. see {{CanLIIRP|Gomboc|2dhlk|2010 SCC 55 (CanLII)|[2010] 3 SCR 211}}{{perSCC|Deschamps J}}{{atL|2dhlk|25}} - home<br>
{{supra1|Tessling}}{{atL|1j0wb|42}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Morelli|28mrg|2010 SCC 8 (CanLII)|[2010] 1 SCR 253}}{{perSCC-H|Fish J}}{{atL|28mrg|2}} - computers<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Cole|ft969|2012 SCC 53 (CanLII)|[2012] 3 SCR 34}}{{perSCC-H|Fish J}}{{atL|ft969|1}} - computers <br>
{{CanLIIRP|Lam|1gwv9|2004 ABQB 289 (CanLII)|355 AR 355}}{{perABQB|Burrows J}}{{atL|1gwv9|30}} ("An accused has standing to challenge only those intercepted communications in which he had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Prima facie this will include those intercepted communications to which he was a party, though circumstances in which an expectation of privacy would not exist in those calls may exist")<br>
</ref>

; Objective Component
The objective component considers whether the subjective expectation is reasonable and whether an "independent and informed observer, viewing the matter objectively would consider reasonable."<ref>
{{supra1|Patrick}}{{AtsL|231wj|20|}}, {{atsL-np|231wj|37|}}<br>
</ref>

Reasonableness will vary depending on whether it is in a criminal or regulatory context.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|British Columbia Securities Commission v Branch|1frjv|1995 CanLII 142 (SCC)|[1995] 2 SCR 3}}{{perSCC-H|Sopkina and Iacobucci JJ}}{{atL|1frjv|52}}<br>
</ref>

The place of search is considered an "analytical tool" that is used to assess whether the expectation is reasonable.<ref>
{{supra1|Tessling}}{{atL|1j0wb|22}}<br>
</ref>

Factors to consider reasonableness are listed below.<ref>
see below reference to {{supra1|Tessling}}{{atsL|1j0wb|32|}} and {{atsL-np|atL|1j0wb|43|}}<br>
</ref>

External heat patterns of a residence, detectable by FLIR technology, does not satisfy the reasonableness component of privacy.<ref>
see {{supra1|Tessling}}{{atL|atL|1j0wb|63}}<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}
===Factors===
Factors considered in assessing the "totality of the circumstances" includes (Edwards factors):<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Edwards|1frcd|1996 CanLII 255 (SCC)|[1996] 1 SCR 128}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}{{atL|1frcd|45}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Felger|g2vsd|2014 BCCA 34 (CanLII)|306 CCC (3d) 143}}{{perBCCA|Garson JA}}
</ref>
#presence at the time of the search; 
#possession or control of the property or place searched; 
#ownership of the property or place; 
#historical use of the property or item; 
#the ability to regulate access, including the right to admit or exclude others from the place; 
#the existence of a subjective expectation of privacy; and 
#the objective reasonableness of the expectation. 

; Considerations for "Informational Privacy" Only
When in the context of "informational privacy", the Edwards criteria were amended to include other considerations and factors:<ref>
{{supra1|Tessling}} and {{CanLIIRP|Patrick|231wj|2009 SCC 17 (CanLII)|[2009] 1 SCR 579}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{AtL|231wj|27}}</ref>
# What was the nature or subject matter of the evidence gathered by the police?
# Did the appellant have a direct interest in the contents?
# Did the appellant have a subjective expectation of privacy in the informational content of the evidence?
# If so, was the expectation objectively reasonable?  In this respect, regard must be had to:
## the place where the alleged “search” occurred 
## whether the informational content of the subject matter was in public view;
## whether the informational content of the subject matter had been abandoned;
## whether such information was already in the hands of third parties; if so, was it subject to an obligation of confidentiality?
## whether the police technique was intrusive in relation to the privacy interest;
## whether the use of this evidence gathering technique was itself objectively unreasonable;
## whether the informational content exposed any intimate details of the accused’s lifestyle, or information of a biographic nature.

; Consideration for Communications:
There are factors that are often considered where the subject matter is a communication:<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Mills|hzv2r|2019 SCC 22 (CanLII)|[2019] 2 SCR 320}}{{atL|hzv2r|20}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Marakah|hp63v|2017 SCC 59 (CanLII)|[2017] 2 SCR 608}}{{perSCC|McLachlin CJ}}{{AtL|hp63v|24}}
</ref>
# the place where the search occurred, whether it be a real physical place or a metaphorical chat room; 
# the private nature of the subject matter; 
# control over the subject matter;
# the nature of the investigative technique used by police,  
# the nature of the relationship between the communicants; and 
# policy considerations.

{{reflist|2}}

===Subject Matter of the Protection===
It is necessary, before analyzing the privacy right, to determine the subject matter of the search. The characterization of the subject matter will have a "major contribution to a different result."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Patrick|231wj|2009 SCC 17 (CanLII)|[2009] 1 SCR 579}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atL|231wj|29}} - discussing the characterization of the privacy interest regarding detectable odours from a suitcase<br>
</ref>

The defining of the subject matter of privacy must be "defined functionally, not in terms of physical acts, physical space, or modalities of transmission."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Marakah|hp63v|2017 SCC 59 (CanLII)|[2017] 2 SCR 608}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|hp63v|15}}<br>
</ref>
The Court must inquire "what the police were really after."<ref>
{{ibid1|Marakah}}{{atL|hp63v|15}}<br>
</ref>

Section 8 protects persons not places.<ref>
{{supra1|Hunter v Southham}}<br>
</ref>

; Illegal Objects
The fact that the target of the search is illegal does not render the expectation of privacy eliminated.
<ref>
{{supra1|Patrick}}{{atsL|231wj|32| to 34}}<Br>
</ref>
The nature of privacy interests do not vary on whether they are masking legal or illegal activities.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Spencer|g7dzn|2014 SCC 43 (CanLII)|[2014] 2 SCR 212}}{{perSCC|Cromwell J}}{{atL|g7dzn|36}}<br>
</ref>
Analysis of whether or not there is a REP should be content neutral.<Ref>
{{supra1|Marakah}}{{atL|hp63v|48}}<br>
{{supra1|Spencer}}{{atL|g7dzn|36}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|M(A)|1wnbf|2008 SCC 19 (CanLII)|[2008] 1 SCR 569}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{AtL|1wnbf|72}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Buhay|1g6p7|2003 SCC 30 (CanLII)|[2003] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Arbour J}}{{atL|1g6p7|19}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Duarte|1fszz|1990 CanLII 150 (SCC)|[1990] 1 SCR 30}}{{perSCC|LaForest J}}, at pp. 51-52<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Wong|1fsq9|1990 CanLII 56 (SCC)|[1990] 3 SCR 36}}{{perSCC|La Forest J}}, at p. 50<Br>
</ref>

; Nature of the Information at issue
The analysis should not focus the "actual contents" of the information that is being considered for protection. It should be treated as an "opaque and sealed bag of information."<ref>
{{supra1|Marakah}}{{atL|hp63v|32}}<br>
{{supra1|Patrick}}{{atL|231wj|32}}<br>
</ref>
The main question is whether the information "tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual."<ref>
{{supra1|Plant}}{{atp|293}}<br>
{{supra1|Marakah}}{{atL|hp63v|32}}<br>
</ref>
{{reflist|2}}

===Control===
When concerning "electronic communications" the factor of control is one amongst many factors and is not determinative.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Marakah|hp63v|2017 SCC 59 (CanLII)|[2017] 2 SCR 608}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}} <Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Pelucco|gkrd1|2015 BCCA 370 (CanLII)|327 CCC (3d) 151}}{{perBCCA|Groberman JA}} (2:1)<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Bennett|gpbj5|2016 BCCA 154 (CanLII)|335 CCC (3d) 28}}{{perBCCA|Bennett JA}} 
</ref>

; Third Party Seizure
Where a non-state actor discloses evidence to police there may be an intrusion on privacy.<REf>
{{CanLIIRP|Reeves|hwk3k|2018 SCC 56 (CanLII)|[2018] 3 SCR 531}}{{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}}
</reF>
The third party cannot waive on behalf of the privacy-holder.<Ref>
{{ibid1|Reeves}}<Br>
See also [[Consent Search]]
</ref>

A third party is legally entitled to inform police of discovery of a crime and police are entitled to receive the information without a warrant.<ref>
R. v Cole, 2012 SCC 53 at para. 73, [2012] 3 SCR 34 (“legally entitled to inform the police of [her] discovery of contraband”)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Orlandis-Habsburgo|h59h9|2017 ONCA 649 (CanLII)|352 CCC (3d) 525}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|h59h9|34}} ("I have considerable difficulty with the submission that s. 8 is engaged if the police look at information in which an accused has a legitimate privacy interest, even if that information is brought to the police by an independent third party acting on its own initiative. On that approach, s. 8 would be engaged if a “whistleblower” took confidential documents belonging to her employer to the police to demonstrate the employer’s criminal activity. Must the police refuse to look at the documents to avoid violating the employer’s s. 8 rights? As Duarte teaches, it is one thing to say that Canadian values dictate that the state’s power to decide when and how it will intrude upon personal privacy must be carefully circumscribed, and quite another to say that an individual’s private information is cloaked in the protection of s. 8 no matter how that information comes to the police.")<br>
contra Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, [2017] 2 SCR 608 at para 50 ("Assuming that s. 8 is engaged when police access text messages volunteered by a third party (see R. v. Orlandis-Habsburgo, 2017 ONCA 649, at paras. 21-35), a breach can be avoided if the police obtain a warrant prior to accessing the text messages.")<br>
{{CanLIIR|King|jh781|2021 ABCA 271 (CanLII)}}{{atL|jh781|12}}<br>
</ref>

Whether the third party "stole" the property or not is of limited impact on the assessment of privacy interests.<Ref>
{{ibid1|King}}{{atL|jh781|13}}
</ref>

Delivery of evidence to a police station by a third party will generally not invoke a reasonable expectation of privacy or breach of the Charter.<ref>
{{ibid1|King}}{{atL|jh781|14}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Other Circumstances Considered===
; Contracts of Adhesion
The mere signing of a contract setting out terms of use of a service and the circumstances disclosure does not necessarily eliminate privacy rights.<ref>
e.g. see {{CanLIIRP|Gomboc|2dhlk|2010 SCC 55 (CanLII)|[2010] 3 SCR 211}}{{perSCC|Deschamps J}} - divided court on whether REP in electricity use<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ward|ft0ft|2012 ONCA 660 (CanLII)|97 CR (6th) 377}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Spencer|g7dzn|2014 SCC 43 (CanLII)|[2014] 2 SCR 212}}{{perSCC|Cromwell J}}<br>
</ref>

Terms of use policies will only be a factor in the analysis.<ref>
See {{CanLIIRP|Cole|ft969|2012 SCC 53 (CanLII)|[2012] 3 SCR 34}}{{perSCC-H|Fish J}}
</ref>

; Public Spaces
Privacy cannot be protected where it can only be preserved by whispering.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Playford|1npn5|1987 CanLII 125 (ON CA)|, 63 OR (2d) 289 (CA)}}{{perONCA|Goodman JA}}{{atL|1npn5|47}}<br>
</ref>

; Text messages
The focus of analysis of a text conversation is whether there was "potential" that the accused would share personal information with the other persons in the conversation.<REf>
Marakah at para 32<Br>
see {{CanLIIR|Mootoo|jm1v8|2022 ONSC 367 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Davie J}{{atL|jm1v8|22}}
</ref>
The actual content is not relevant.<ref>
Marakah at para 32<Br>
</ref>

The risk that the recipient may disclose the communications does not mean the sender assumes the risk of the state intercepting the communication.<ref>
Marakah at paras 40 and 45<Br>
</ref>

There are not many other types of conversations other than text messages that offer privacy.<Ref>
Marakah at para 35 (“it is difficult to think of a type of conversation or communication that is capable of promising more privacy than text messaging”)
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Established Areas of Privacy==
* [[Established Areas of Privacy]]

==See Also==
* [[Applying for Judicial Authorizations|Warrant Searches]]
* [[Warrantless Searches]]
** [[Warrantless Search of Abandoned Property]]