View source for Role of the Trial Judge

[[fr:Rôle_du_juge_de_première_instance]]
{{Currency2|November|2022}}
{{LevelOne}}
{{HeaderTrials}}
==General Principles==
{{seealso|Role of the Defence Counsel}}
An accused person is entitled to a Constitutional right to an impartial trier-of-fact.<ref>
See s. 11(d) of the Charter which is the right "...to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal;"<br>
See also {{CanLIIRP|Valente|1ftzs|1985 CanLII 25 (SCC)|[1985] 2 SCR 673, (1985), 23 CCC (3d) 193}}{{perSCC|Le Dain J}}<br> 
[[Judicial Immunity]]
</ref>

A trial judge has a duty to ensure that the trial is fair and there are no miscarriage of justice.<ref>
see {{CanLIIRP|Harris|25cdz|2009 SKCA 96 (CanLII)|331 Sask R 283}}{{perSKCA|Richards JA}}{{atL|25cdz|28}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Amell|fxctg|2013 SKCA 48 (CanLII)|414 Sask R 152}}{{perSKCA|Lane JA}}{{AtL|fxctg|25}}<br>
</ref>

The trial judge is more than just an umpire but "is not to enter the arena and appear to take on the role of an advocate."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Stucky|22hv3|2009 ONCA 151 (CanLII)|240 CCC (3d) 141}}{{perONCA|Weiler and Gillese JJA}}{{atsL|22hv3|69| to 72}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Griffith|g012s|2013 ONCA 510 (CanLII)|309 OAC 159}}{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}}{{atL|g012s|25}}<br>
</ref>

; Adversarial System
Our criminal justice system is on that is "essentially adversarial" where the Crown presents evidence of guilt and the accused points out weaknesses in the evidence and presents contrary evidence. The trier of fact is a neutral arbiter of the dispute.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Osolin|1frvz|1993 CanLII 54 (SCC)|[1993] 4 SCR 595}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}} (in dissent){{atL|1frvz|?}}</ref>
For this reason, it is improper for the judge to usurp the role of counsel in an inquisitorial manner.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Corbett|26dnx|2009 ABQB 619 (CanLII)|485 AR 349}}{{perABQB|Ross J}}{{atL|26dnx|46}}<br>
</ref>

The role of the judge in an adversarial process is to "listen to the testimony, assess all the evidence, make assessments of credibility and findings of fact, apply the law to the facts and make an ultimate determination on the merits, keeping in mind throughout the applicable burdens of proof."<ref>
{{CanLIIRxC|Despres v MacDonald Crane Service Ltd. et al|hqtld|2018 NBCA 13 (CanLII)}}{{perNBCA|Richard JA}}{{atL|hqtld|67}}
</ref>
The judge is also expected to "ensure the proceedings are conducted fairly, properly and according to law, which include the rules governing procedure."<Ref>
{{ibid1|Despres}}{{atL|hqtld|67}}
</ref>

; Presumed to Know the Law
Trial judges are presumed to know the elementary principles of law.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Burns|1frvk|1994 CanLII 127 (SCC)|[1994] 1 SCR 656}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}<br>
</ref>
It is not necessary that a judge cite the leading authorities, it is only necessary that the legal principles be applied properly.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Al-Rawi|jldzv|2021 NSCA 86 (CanLII)}}{{perNSCA|Bourgeois JA}}{{atL|jldzv|92}}<br>
</ref>

; Inherent Jurisdiction
The court's inherent jurisdiction is limited by its role within the system of separate branches of government.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Ontario v Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario|fzw43|2013 SCC 43 (CanLII)|[2013] 3 SCR 3}}{{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}}{{AtsL|fzw43|28|, 30}}, {{atsL-np|fzw43|38|}}<br>
</ref>

; Duty to Raise Issues
A trial judge has a duty to "conduct [a] trial judicially quite apart from the lapses of counsel."<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Piamonte|h3h3l|2017 ONSC 2666 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Johnston J}}{{atL|h3h3l|9}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Sweezey|htwpb|1974 CanLII 1427 (ON CA)|20 CCC (2d) 400 (OCA)}}{{perONCA-H|Martin JA}}<br>
</ref>
This may include a duty to conduct a voir dire on issues such as voluntariness absent the request of counsel.<ref>
{{ibid1|Piamonte}}{{atL|h3h3l|9}}<br>
See also [[Voluntariness]]<br>
</ref>

; Duty of Restraint
A judge has a duty of restraint during their court work as well as in their personal life.<ref> 
{{CanLIIRPC|Ruffo v Conseil de la magistrature|1frgm|1995 CanLII 49 (SCC)|[1995] 4 SCR 267}}{{perSCC|Gonthier J}}
</ref>
It is a guarantee of judicial independence or impartiality.<ref>
{{ibid1|Ruffo}}
</ref>

Judges are required to be "shielded from tumult and controversy that may taint the perception of impartiality."<ref>
{{ibid1|Ruffo}}
</ref>

; Duty of Technological Competency
It has been suggested that courts and counsel have a duty of "technological competency."<Ref>
{{CanLIIRC|WORSOFF v MTCC 1168|jjf53|2021 ONSC 6493 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Myers J}}{{AtL|jjf53|32}}
</ref>

; ''ex mero motu''
The doctrine of "ex mero motu" ("of one's own accord") has traditionally permitted a judge to intervene on its own motion in proceedings by making rules or issuing orders so as to prevent an injustice.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Powell|hv0x4|1965 CanLII 671 (BC CA)|4 CCC 349}}{{perBCCA-H|Bull JA}} (2:1)<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Spilchen|jfgd4|2021 NSSC 131 (CanLII)}}{{perNSSC|Coady J}}<Br>
</ref>
This authority has been used to amend charges to conform with the evidence.<Ref>
{{ibid1|Spilchen}}
{{ibid1|Powell}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Clark|fp06t|1974 ALTASCAD 59 (CanLII)|19 CCC 445}}{{perABCA-H|Clehent JA}}
</ref>

; History
Currently, Justices of superior courts are required to retire at the age of 75. Prior to a 1960 amendment to the British North America Act, superior court justices had lifetime tenure.

{{reflist|2}}
===Right of Parties to be Heard===
There is a fundamental tenant that all parties affected by a decision shall be given an opportunity to be heard by the court before the court makes a ruling. This is the principle of ''audi alteram partem ''.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Gustavson|1jlf7|2005 BCCA 32 (CanLII)|193 CCC (3d) 545}}{{perBCCA|Prowse JA}} at 64<br>
See also {{CanLIIRPC|Moreau‑Bérubé v New Brunswick (Judicial Council)|5221|2002 SCC 11 (CanLII)|[2002] 1 SCR 249}}{{perSCC-H|Arbour J}}{{atL|5221|75}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 301 v Montreal (City)|1fr36|1997 CanLII 386 (SCC)|[1997] 1 SCR 793}}{{perSCC|L’Heureux-Dubé J}}{{atL|1fr36|73}} - refereed to as the rule that “no man be condemned unheard"<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|A(LL) v B(A)|1frdk|1995 CanLII 52 (SCC)|[1995] 4 SCR 536}}{{perSCC|L'Heureux‑Dubé J}}, at para. 27<br>
</ref>
The right to be heard also provides a person "the right to know the case to be met."<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Devon Canada Corp. v Alberta (Energy and Utilities Board)|1tg9z|2003 ABCA 167 (CanLII)|AJ No 622}}{{perABCA|McFadyen JA}}{{atL|1tg9z|19}}<br>
</ref>

The judge has an obligation to allow each party who may be affected by a ruling to be permitted to respond to the case against them.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)|1qljj|2007 SCC 9 (CanLII)|[2007] 1 SCR 350}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|1qljj|53}} ("a fair hearing requires that the affected person be informed of the case against him or her, and be permitted to respond to that case")
</ref>

A failure to afford each side to present argument before a judgment is a denial of that right will violate procedural fairness and is fatal.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Berry|g7n0v|2014 ABQB 379 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Ross J}}{{atL|g7n0v|7}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Graham|1rdhm|2007 ABCA 153 (CanLII)|404 AR 300}}{{perABCA|Ritter JA}}{{atsL|1rdhm|11| to 12}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Fraser v Fraser|2dbbl|1994 ABCA 275 (CanLII)|(1994) 157 AR 98 (CA)}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|2dbbl|10}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|MacLean|1ms63|1991 CanLII 2526 (NS CA)|(1991), 106 N.S.R. (2d) 213}}{{perNSCA|Chipman JA}}{{AtL|1ms63|5}} ("In our opinion, it is incumbent upon a trial judge to give a party appearing before him an opportunity to present argument before making a decision on any issue. In particular, a party must be allowed to make submissions at the close of the evidence. ...")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Aucoin|1tx6w|1979 CanLII 29 (SCC)|[1979] 1 SCR 554}}{{perSCC-H|Laskin CJ}}
</ref>

This right is protected by s. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter as well as s. 802(1) of the Code.<ref>
{{supra1|MacLean}} at para 5 "(In the context of a criminal case, these rights are among those guaranteed to an accused as a component of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter, and more particularly by s. 11(d) thereof, and by s. 802(1) of the Criminal Code.")<br>
</ref>

The right is not unqualified. A declaration of a party as a "vexatious litigant" has the effect of removing this right. Accordingly, it is only used sparingly.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Kallaba v Bylykbashi|1mkm2|2006 CanLII 3953 (ON CA)|207 OAC 60}}{{perONCA|Cronk and Juriansz JA}}{{atL|1mkm2|31}}
</ref>

Related to this principle is the common law rule that "a person cannot be deprived of his liberty or property without notice."<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Marton|gp3kr|2016 ONSC 2269 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Cronk and Juriansz JJA}}{{atL|gp3kr|25}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Buchholz|gd9vc|1958 CanLII 435 (MB CA)|121 CCC 293}}{{perMBCA|Adamson CJ}}{{atL|gd9vc|8}}<br>
</ref>

Refusal to consider an evidentiary objection is an improper refusal to assume jurisdiction that affects trial fairness.<ref> 
{{CanLIIRP|Garofoli|1fss5|1990 CanLII 52 (SCC)|[1990] 2 SCR 1421}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}} at 1449 citing {{CanLIIRP|Dersch|1p6pl|1987 CanLII 155 (BC CA)|36 CCC (3d) 435}}{{perBCCA|Esson JA}}<br>
</ref>

The right is not an unlimited right to oral or in-person hearings before the decision-maker.<ref>
{{CanLIIR|Agengo|fm6dx|2011 ABQB 430 (CanLII)}}{{atL|fm6dx|15}} ("...the principle of natural justice and specifically the audi alteram partem rule has no absolute requirement of according persons entitled to its benefit an oral or in‑person hearing before the ultimate decision‑maker...")<Br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Hoffman‑La Roche Ltd v Delmar Chemicals Ltd|227mx|1965 CanLII 57 (SCC)|[1965] SCR 575}}{{perSCC-H|Martland J}}{{atL|227mx|23}}, 50 DLR (2d) 607{{fix}}
</ref>

Often the right can be satisfied by providing parties to make written submissions only.<ref>
{{supra1|Agengo}} at para 15 ("...it is recognized by the courts that frequently, the requirement to give a hearing is satisfied by providing an opportunity to make written submissions..")<bR>
{{CanLIIRPC|National Aviation Consultants Ltd v Starline Aviation Ltd|jqmb2|1973 CanLII 2294 (FCA)|[1973] FC 571}} per Thrulow J at para 13<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Rules of Court==
{{seealso|Case Management|Rules of Court}}
Under s. 482(1) and (2), a superior court and provincial have the power to make rules governing criminal proceedings.

Under s. 482.1, the courts also have the power to make rules with respect to case management.<ref>
See also [[Case Management]]
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Hearing Evidence at Trial==

; Must Consider All Admissible Evidence
A trial judge must consider all evidence relating to the issue of innocence or guilt.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Morin|1fs8t|1992 CanLII 40 (SCC)|[1992] 3 SCR 286}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}} at 296 (SCR)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|DLW|fzsvr|2013 BCSC 1327 (CanLII)|BCJ No 1620}}{{perBCSC|Romilly J}}{{atL|fzsvr|3}}<br>
</ref> 
Failure to do so is an error of law.<ref>
{{supra1|Morin}}{{atp|296}} (SCR)</ref>

However, there is no requirement that the judge "record all or any specific part of the process of deliberation on the facts."<ref>
{{supra1|Morin}}{{atp|296}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Walle|fs5k8|2012 SCC 41 (CanLII)|[2012] 2 SCR 438}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver J}}{{atL|fs5k8|46}}<br>
</ref>
A failure to record facts does not give rise to an error unless the judge's reasons demonstrate that not all the facts were considered.<ref>
{{supra1|Morin}}{{atp|296}}<br>
{{supra1|Walle}}{{atL|fs5k8|46}}<br>
</ref>

When considering evidence on a multi-count indictment, the judge just give ''separate'' consideration to a verdict on each count.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Howe|1jkc6|2005 CanLII 253 (ON CA)|192 CCC (3d) 480}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|1jkc6|44}}
</ref>

; Exposure to Inadmissible Evidence
Judges are regularly required to decide on whether it is properly admissible or not and disregard inadmissible evidence they are exposed to. It will not generally create an apprehension of bias. <ref>
{{CanLIIRx|SS|1jlp5|2005 CanLII 791 (ON CA)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|1jlp5|3}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Novak|1ddg2|1995 CanLII 2024 (BC CA)|27 WCB (2d) 295}}{{perBCCA|Prowse JA}}{{atL|1ddg2|8}}<br>
See [[Reasonable Apprehension of Bias]]
</ref>

; Considering Theories of Counsel
Subject to "due process concerns", there is no prohibition on the trial judge making findings of guilt on a theory that has not been advanced by the Crown.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Dagenais|hq0mg|2018 ONCA 63 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA|McCombs JA}} (ad hoc){{atL|hq0mg|55}} ("It is well-established that, subject to due process concerns, a conviction may be founded on a theory of liability that has not been advanced by the Crown, provided that theory is available on the evidence")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Pickton|2bttm|2010 SCC 32 (CanLII)|[2010] 2 SCR 198}}{{perSCC|Charron J}}{{atsL|2bttm|19| to 21}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Khawaja|2f041|2010 ONCA 862 (CanLII)|273 CCC (3d) 415}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atsL|2f041|143| to 145}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ranger|5xwr|2003 CanLII 32900 (ON CA)|178 CCC (3d) 375}}{{perONCA|Charron JA}}{{atsL|5xwr|34| to 35}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Groot|6g9l|1998 CanLII 2151 (ON CA)|129 CCC (3d) 293, 41 O.R. (3d) 280 (C.A.)}}{{perONCA|McMurtry CJ}}{{atL|6g9l|25}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRx|Pawluk|hn8wm|2017 ONCA 863 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA|Paciocco JA}}<br>
</ref>
However, where a judge relies on a theory that has not been argued, fairness requires that the defence be given an opportunity to respond to the avenue of conviction.<Ref>
{{CanLIIR|RH|jm0mv|2022 ONCA 69 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA|Nordheimer JA}}{{AtL|jm0mv|20}}<bR>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Limiting Evidence===
The judge is required to listen to evidence that "advances the work of the court". He or she cannot be required to listen to irrelevant or pointless evidence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Malmo-Levin|1gbdn|2003 SCC 74 (CanLII)|[2003] 3 SCR 571}}{{perSCC|Gonthier and Binnie JJ}}</ref> 
The judge may even disallow the submission of non-relevant evidence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Schneider|1hq95|2004 NSCA 99 (CanLII)|188 CCC (3d) 137}}{{TheCourtNSCA}}</ref>

The judge has an obligation to track the admission of evidence to ensure that the record is restricted to what is admissible, and also that it is only used for the purpose for which it was admitted.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Morrisey|6jtj|1995 CanLII 3498 (ON CA)|22 OR (3d) 514}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Smith|fmrh8|2011 ONCA 564 (CanLII)|274 CCC (3d) 34}}{{perONCA|Epstein JA}}{{atL|fmrh8|59}}</ref>

The judge has the jurisdiction to edit the evidence, including written statements and oral testimony, as it is given. The judge may edit out portions of the evidence that is prejudicial or otherwise irrelevant or immaterial only so long as it does not distort the probative evidence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Dubois|g96q5|1986 CanLII 4683 (ON CA)|27 CCC (3d) 325}}{{perONCA|Morden JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Toten|1p79f|1993 CanLII 3427 (ON CA)|14 OR (3d) 225}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Weighing Evidence===
{{seealso|Analyzing Testimony}}

No judge is expected to be a "tabula rasa."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|JM|jdnw3|2021 ONCA 150 (CanLII)|154 OR (3d) 401}}{{perONCA|Brown JA}}{{AtL|jdnw3|48}}
</ref>

A judge should only be deciding cases on the evidence adduced in the courtroom.<Ref>
{{supra|JM}}{{atL|jdnw3|51}}
</ref>

A judge cannot act based only on personal knowledge and familiarity of a matter without more.<REf>
{{CanLIIRP|Potts|g1k0t|1982 CanLII 1751 (ON CA)|66 CCC (2d) 219}}{{perONCA-H|Thorton JA}} at p. 204<br>
{{supra1|JM}}{{atL|jdnw3|51}}
</ref>

A judge may not "detach" a part of the evidence.<Ref>
{{CanLIIR|Johnson|jvst4|2023 ONCA 120 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Control over Trial Process==
A criminal trial court to "control its process" is a fundamental value of the criminal justice system."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Romanowicz|1f9lt|1999 CanLII 1315 (ON CA)|138 CCC (3d) 225}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|1f9lt|56}}<br>
</ref>
A judge has "considerable" powers to intervene in a criminal trial to manage the proceedings.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Auclair|g0trw|2013 QCCA 671 (CanLII)|302 CCC (3d) 365}}{{TheCourtQCCA}}{{atL|g0trw|55}}<Br>
</ref>

A judge is authorized to make orders "necessary to ensure an orderly trial, without which the administration of justice risks being ...thrown into disrepute."<ref>
{{ibid1|Auclair}}{{atL|g0trw|55}}<Br>
</ref>

The jurisdiction over process includes the power to "penalize counsel for ignoring rules or orders, or for inappropriate behaviour such as tardiness, incivility, abusive cross-examination, improper opening or closing addresses or inappropriate attire."<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Anderson|g784t|2014 SCC 41 (CanLII)|[2014] 2 SCR 167}}{{atL|g784t|58}}
</ref> 
Penalties can include directions to "comply, adjournments, extensions of time, warnings, cost awards, dismissals, and contempt proceedings."<Ref>
{{ibid1|Anderson}} at para 58<br>
</ref>

Inappropriate behaviour is ''not'' accorded deference.<ref>
{{ibid1|Anderson}} at para 59<br>
</ref>

However, legitimate tactical decisions should be looked at with deference.<ref>
{{ibid1|Anderson}} at paras 58 and 59<br>
</ref>

; Superior Court
A Superior Court Justice has the inherent jurisdiction to eliminate any procedural unfairness that arises during a trial.<ref> 
{{CanLIIRP|Rose|1fqq5|1998 CanLII 768 (SCC)|[1998] 3 SCR 262}}{{perSCC|Cory, Iacobucci and Bastarache JJ}}</ref>

The Superior court has inherent jurisdiction to control the disclosure process of a matter before the provincial court.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|DP v Wagg|1h4vv|2004 CanLII 39048 (ON CA)|71 OR (3d) 229}}{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}}<br>
see [[Crown Duty to Disclose|Disclosure]]<br>
</ref>

; Provincial Court
The "procedural directions contained in the Code are of necessity exhaustive". The powers of a provincial court judge are "entirely statutory."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Doyle|1z6fv|1976 CanLII 11 (SCC)|[1977] 1 SCR 597}}{{perSCC|Ritchie J}}</ref> 
However, "the authority to control the court's process and oversee the conduct of counsel is necessarily implied in the grant of power to function as a court of law. This Court has affirmed that courts can apply a ‘doctrine of jurisdiction by necessary implication’ when determining the powers of a statutory tribunal.” <ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Cunningham|28tlt|2010 SCC 10 (CanLII)|[2010] 1 SCR 331}}{{perSCC|Rothstein J}}{{atL|28tlt|19}}</ref>

The inherent powers of a superior court judge to control the court process is said to be equally available to provincial court judges either expressly by statute or by necessary implication.<ref>
{{supra1|Doyle}} ("Whatever inherent powers may be possessed by a superior court judge in controlling the process of his own Court, it is my opinion that the powers and functions of a magistrate acting under the ''Criminal Code'' are circumscribed by the provisions of that statute and must be found to have been thereby conferred either expressly or by necessary implication.")</ref> 

Consequently, a provincial court judge has implied jurisdiction to "vary one of its own orders in order to correct clerical mistakes or errors arising from an accidental slip or omission or in order to properly reflect the intention of the court"<ref>see {{CanLIIRP|Rhingo|6h4r|1997 CanLII 418 (ON CA)|[1997] OJ No 1110}}{{perONCA|Charron JA}}<Br> {{CanLIIRP|Robichaud|ft95p|2012 NBCA 87 (CanLII)|[2012] NBJ No 175 (CA)}}{{perNBCA|Bell JA}}</ref> 

; Reconsidering Judgements
Generally, a "court has a limited power to reconsider and vary its judgment disposing of the case as long as the court is not functus."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Adams|1frdt|1995 CanLII 56 (SCC)|[1995] 4 SCR 707}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}{{atL|1frdt|29}}</ref>

; Exclusion of Evidence
There is a limited power of a trial judge to exclude evidence in order to ensure trial fairness where other remedies are not sufficient. However, it is considered an "unusual exercise" of the trial management power.
<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Spackman|fvf9n|2012 ONCA 905 (CanLII)|295 CCC (3d) 177}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}<Br>
</ref>

; Prohibition Orders on Defence Conducting their Defence
A judge may limit the examination or cross-examination of witnesses or the right to call defence witness only where it is justified in "clear and compelling circumstances."<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Colpitts|gx9q8|2017 NSSC 22 (CanLII)}}{{perNSSC|Coady J}}{{atL|gx9q8|18}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Schneider|1hq95|2004 NSCA 99 (CanLII)|188 CCC (3d) 137}}{{perNSCA|Cromwell JA}}<br>
</ref>

; Directing Crown Counsel
A trial judge should never direct Crown as to whom they must call to give evidence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Cook|1fr1f|1997 CanLII 392 (SCC)|[1997] 1 SCR 1113}}{{perSCC|L’Heureux-Dubé J}}{{atL|1fr1f|56}} ("...nor do I think that a trial judge should ever order the Crown to produce a witness.  If the Crown wished to adopt such a procedure in a given case, however, this would, of course, be within the legitimate exercise of its discretionary authority.")<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Judicial Intervention==
* [[Judicial Intervention During Trial]]

==Reserving Questions for Decision==

{{quotation2|
; Trial continuous
645 <br>
{{removed|(1), (2) and (3)}}
; Questions reserved for decision
(4) A judge, in any case tried without a jury, may reserve final decision on any question raised at the trial, or any matter raised further to a pre-hearing conference, and the decision, when given, shall be deemed to have been given at the trial.
<br>
; Questions reserved for decision in a trial with a jury
(5) In any case to be tried with a jury, the judge before whom an accused is or is to be tried has jurisdiction, before any juror on a panel of jurors is called pursuant to subsection 631(3) {{AnnSec6|631(3)}} or (3.1) {{AnnSec6|631(3.1)}} and in the absence of any such juror, to deal with any matter that would ordinarily or necessarily be dealt with in the absence of the jury after it has been sworn.
<Br>
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 645;
 R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.)}}, s. 133; 
{{LegHistory90s|1997, c. 18}}, s. 76; 
{{LegHistory00s|2001, c. 32}}, s. 43.
{{Annotation}}
|{{CCCSec2|645}}
|{{NoteUp|645|4|5}}
}}

==Exclusion Public from Hearing==
* [[Excluding People From Court]]

==Fact Finding==
{{seealso|Analyzing Testimony#Findings of Fact}}

==Self-Represented Accused==
see [[Right to Self-Representation]]
==Sitting Position of Accused==
* [[Accused in Court]]

==Independent Research of the Judge==
A judge should not enter "into the fray" by doing self-directed research that puts them in a role of being "advocate, witness and judge."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Bornyk|gg1rf|2015 BCCA 28 (CanLII)|320 CCC (3d) 393}}{{perBCCA|Saunders JA}} (3:0) - judge did separate research on finger print evidence and performed own analysis<br>
{{CanLIIRx|BMS|gr50z|2016 NSCA 35 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtNSCA}} (3:0)
</ref>

A judge can only rely on social studies, literature or scientific reports after they have been tested by the parties.<ref>
{{ibid1|BMS}}{{AtL|gr50z|17}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|SDP|231v1|1995 CanLII 8923 (ON CA)|98 CCC (3d) 83}}{{Plurality}}{{AtsL|231v1|33|, 36}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Cronk v Canadian General Insurance Co|6jnb|1995 CanLII 814 (ON CA)|, 85 OAC 54}}{{perONCA|Lacourciere JA}}{{AtsL|6jnb|47|}}, {{atsL-np|6jnb|49| to 51}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Désaulniers|1pb5q|1994 CanLII 5909 (QC CA)|93 CCC (3d) 371}}{{perQCCA|Tourigny JA}}{{atsL|1pb5q|21|, 23-24, 26-27}}<br>
</ref>

It is not inappropriate to use academic articles merely to outline the generally understood features of evidence already reflected in the commentary and practice, adnd are not outside the general knowledge of judges.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Hernandez-Lopez|j4j46|2020 BCCA 12 (CanLII)|384 CCC (3d) 119}}{{perBCCA|Groberman JA}}<bR>
{{CanLIIRP|JM|jdnw3|2021 ONCA 150 (CanLII)|154 OR (3d) 401}}{{perONCA|Brown JA}}{{AtsL|jdnw3|75| to 76}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Judge Bound to Proceedings==
{{quotation3|
; Any justice may act before and after trial
790 (1) Nothing in this Act or any other law shall be deemed to require a justice before whom proceedings are commenced or who issues process before or after the trial to be the justice or one of the justices before whom the trial is held.
<Br>
; Two or more justices
(2) Where two or more justices have jurisdiction with respect to proceedings, they shall be present and act together at the trial, but one justice may thereafter do anything that is required or is authorized to be done in connection with the proceedings.
<Br>
(3) and (4) [Repealed, R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.)}}, s. 172]
<Br>
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 790; R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.)}}, s. 172.
|{{CCCSec2|790}}
|{{NoteUp|790|1|2}}
|{{terms-
|"Act" (s. 2)
|[[Definition_of_Judicial_Officers_and_Offices#.22Justice.22|"justice" (s. 2)]]
}}
}}
===Loss of Judge During Proceedings===
* [[Loss of Judge During Proceedings]]

==Doctrine of Functus Officio==
* [[Functus Officio]]

==Communications with Counsel Out of Court==
''Ex parte'' communications (i.e. communications in absence of one of the parties) concerning an ongoing proceedings should be avoided. It is a rule that relates to the "public perception of fairness within the administration of justice."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Deleary|237tk|2007 CanLII 71720 (ON SC)|246 CCC (3d) 382}}{{perONSC|Templeton J}}{{atL|237tk|22}}</ref> 
It also preserves "confidence of the public in the impartiality of the judiciary and thereby in the administration of justice."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jones|1vtsn|1996 CanLII 8006 (ON SC)|107 CCC (3d) 517}}{{perONSC|Then J}}</ref>

Ex parte communications between judge and counsel concerning a case will "almost invariably raise a reasonable apprehension of bias."<ref>
{{ibid1|Jones and Deleary}}</ref>

; "Off the Record" communciations
So called "off the record" conversations between the judge and counsel concerning a criminal proceedings are only permitted insofar as they are efforts to reach an informal resolution on the merits of the case.<ref>
{{CanLIIR|KJMJ|k1dmz|2023 NSCA 84 (CanLII)}}{{perNSCA|Bryson JA}}{{AtL|k1dmz|47}}
</ref>
They should not happen mid-trial in front of the trial judge.<Ref>
{{ibid1|KJMJ}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Maintaining Order==

{{quotation3|
; Preserving order in court
484 Every judge or provincial court judge has the same power and authority to preserve order in a court over which he presides as may be exercised by the superior court of criminal jurisdiction of the province during the sittings thereof.

R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 484; R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.)}}, s. 203.
|{{CCCSec2|484}}
|{{NoteUp|484}}
|{{terms-
|"provincial court judge" (s. 2)
|"superior court of criminal jurisdiction" (s. 2)
}}
}}

This section permits a judge to make an order of [[Contempt of Court (Offence)|contempt]] for:
*  persistent refusal of accused to stand on entry of the presiding judge.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Heer|23r3p|1982 CanLII 786 (BC SC)|68 CCC (2d) 333}}{{perBCSC|Andrews J}}{{atL|23r3p|17}}<br>
''Re Hawkins'', 53 WWR 406, 53 DLR (2d) 453, [1966] 3 CCC 43 (sub nom. {{CanLIIRP|Hume; Ex parte Hawkins|gbcsq|1965 CanLII 655 (BC SC)|3 CCC 43}}{{perBCSC|Branca J}}<br>
</ref>
* the use of recording devices in the court against the order of the judge.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Barker (Burke)|fp5vx|1980 ABCA 75 (CanLII)|53 CCC (2d) 322}}{{perABCA|Morrow JA}} (3:0)
</ref>
* the high degree of intoxication of the accused appearing at trial<ref>
{{supra1|Heer}}</ref>

This section ''cannot'' be used to order the mode of dress of counsel.<ref>
{{supra1|Heer}}{{atL|23r3p|17}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Samson; Bardon v Carver Prov. J.|gwgnx|1974 CanLII 1292 (NS SC)| (1974), 14 NSR (2d) 592, 29 CRNS 129, (sub nom. Re Samson and R.) 18 CCC (2d) 552, 50 DLR (3d) 365}}{{perNSSC|Hart J}}<br>
</ref>

; Ordering Sheriff to Detain Accused
Flowing from the trial management powers, the trial judge as a right and responsibility to control proceedings and control the conduct of those before them. This includes directing the sheriffs to detain, handcuff or otherwise interfere with the accused's liberty where necessary.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Millar|j20mr|2019 BCCA 298 (CanLII)|[2020] 1 CTC 182}}{{perBCCA|Fitch JA}}{{atsL|J20mr|68| to 70}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Misc Powers==
The judge does not have the power to order that counsel not communicate with a witness who is not in the middle of testimony. The rules of contempt of court and Professional Conduct are the only limitations on counsel's right to speak with witnesses and clients in court.<ref> 
{{CanLIIR-N|Arsenault|, 115 CCC 400 (NBCA)}}</ref>

; Execution of Orders
Under s. 3.1 of the Code, any order made by any type of judge will be effective immediately unless otherwise stated:
{{quotation2|
; Effect of judicial acts
3.1 (1) Unless otherwise provided or ordered, anything done by a court, justice or judge is effective from the moment it is done, whether or not it is reduced to writing.

; Clerk of the court
(2) Unless otherwise provided or ordered, if anything is done from the bench by a court, justice or judge and it is reduced to writing, the clerk of the court may sign the writing.

{{LegHistory00s|2002, c. 13}}, s. 2; {{LegHistory10s|2019, c. 25}}, s. 3
|{{CCCSec2|3.1}}
|{{NoteUp|3.1|1|2}}
}}

{{reflist|2}}

===View===
* [[Demonstrative Evidence#View]]

===Superior Court Inherent Jurisdiction===
All Courts that are created by s. 96 of  the Constitution Act, 1867 are vested with "inherent jurisdiction" to make orders on matters that are not necessarily authorized by statute.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Caron|2fkpf|2011 SCC 5 (CanLII)|[2011] 1 SCR 78}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}} (8:1){{atL|2fkpf|21}} (These powers are derived "not from any statute or rule of law, but from the very nature of the court as a superior court of law" to enable "the judiciary to uphold, to protect and to fulfil the judicial function of administering justice according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner".)<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Ontario v Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario|fzw43|2013 SCC 43 (CanLII)|[2013] 3 SCR 3}}{{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}} (5:4){{atL|fzw43|18}}<br>
</ref>

The doctrine is of an "amorphous nature."<ref>
{{supra1|Ontario v CLAO}}{{atL|fzw43|22}}<br>
</ref>
And can be used in "an apparently inexhaustible variety of circumstances and may be exercised in different ways."<ref>
{{supra1|Caron}}{{atL|2fkpf|29}}<br>
</ref>

The doctrine is available as a "residual source of powers" that is available to a judge "whenever it is just or equitable to do so", which includes:<ref>
{{supra1|Ontario v CLAO}}{{atL|fzw43|20}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Parsons v Ontario|ggpnt|2015 ONCA 158 (CanLII)|64 CPC (7th) 227, 381 DLR (4th) 667}}{{perONCA|Lauwers JA}}<Br>
</ref>
* ensuring "the observance of due process of law";
* preventing "improper vexation or oppression";
* "do justice between the parties" and
* securing "a fair trial" between the parties.

It can be used to "supplement under-inclusive legislation or to otherwise fill gaps in appropriate circumstances."<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|CR v Children's Aid Society of Hamilton|1gw3b|2004 CanLII 34407 (ONSC)|70 OR (3d) 618}}{{perONSC|Czutrin J}}{{atL|1gw3b|29}}<Br>
</ref>

This jurisdiction may allow for the superior court to order the funding of costs associated with a matter before the provincial court where the following criteria are met:<ref>
{{supra1|Caron}}{{atL|2fkpf|39}}
</ref>
# the litigation would be unable to proceed if the order were not made; 
# the claim to be adjudicated is prima facie meritorious; 
# the issues raised transcend the individual interest of the particular litigant, are of public importance, and have not been resolved in previous cases. 

In considering these criteria, the justice must be satisifed that the matter is "sufficiently special that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to deny the advance costs application."<ref>
{{supra1|Caron}}{{atL|2fkpf|39}}
</ref> 

; Limitations
The doctrine may be limited by statute. It cannot be used in such a way that it contravenes any statutory provision.<ref>
{{supra1|Parsons}}{{atL|ggpnt|71}}<Br>
{{supra1|Ontario v CLAO}}{{AtL|fzw43|23}}<br>
</ref>

It is also limited by "institutional roles and capacities that emerge out of our constitutional framework and values."<ref>
{{supra1|Parsons}}{{atsL|ggpnt|72| to 73}}<Br>
{{supra1|Ontario v CLAO}}{{AtL|fzw43|24}}<br>
</ref>

It generally should be exercised "sparingly and with caution", such as where "inferior tribunals are powerless to act act and it is essential to avoid an injustice that
action be taken."<ref>
{{supra1|Caron}}{{atL|2fkpf|30}}<br>
</ref>

; Examples of Application
A publication ban was ordered by inherent jurisdiction.<ref>
{{CanLIIR-N|Church of Scientology of Toronto|, 1986 CarswellOnt 925 (S.C.)}}
</ref>
A publication ban can also be removed by inherent jurisdiction.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Ireland|1m57b|2005 CanLII 45583 (ON SC)|203 CCC (3d) 443}}{{perONSC|Del Frate J}}<br>
</ref>

A superior court has limited inherent powers to reconsider its own orders, except where the legislation otherwise prohibits reconsideration.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Adams|1frdt|1995 CanLII 56 (SCC)|[1995] 4 SCR 707}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}{{AtL|1frdt|28}} - in context of reconsidering a publication ban under s. 486<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Doctrine of Mootness===
Under the doctrine of "mootness" suggests that a court may decline to decide a case that "raises merely a hypothetical or abstract question" that "will not have the effect of resolving some controversy which affects or may affect the rights of the parties."<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Borowski v Canada (Attorney General)|1ft7d|1989 CanLII 123 (SCC)|[1989] 1 SCR 342}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}{{atL|1ft7d|15}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Smith|1glp1|2004 SCC 14 (CanLII)|[2004] 1 SCR 385}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Civility and Professionalism==

; Tone of Reasons
The reasons for judgement should be "restrained and appropriate, clinical in tone and minimalist in approach."<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Canada v Olumide|h0prt|2017 FCA 42 (CanLII)|[2018] 2 FCR 328}}, ''per'' Stratas JA{{AtL|h0prt|39}}<Br>
</ref>

; Sleeping
A judge found to be sleeping during trial will affect trial fairness and warrant a retrial.<ref>
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cesan_v_The_Queen ''Cesan v The Queen'',  (2008) 83 ALJR 43] (Australia High Court) </ref>

;Criticizing Judges
It is the public's right to criticize judges as long as it does not cast aspersions on their motives.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Dalke|23m2l|1981 CanLII 366 (BC SC)|59 CCC (2d) 477}}{{perBCSC|Munroe J}} at pp. 479-80, 21 C. R. (3d) 380 at pp. 383-4{{fix}}<br>
</ref>

; Courtroom conduct
The judges are expected to display an attitude that reflects their authority. They must not use it to intimidate or belittle others.<REf>
Luc Huppé, La déontologie de la magistrature : droit canadien : perspective internationale (Montréal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2018) at No. 173 [https://cjc-ccm.ca/en/news/cjc-recommends-justice-gerard-dugre-be-removed-office]
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Judicial Decisions==
{{seealso|Sufficiency of Reasons|Trial Verdicts}}
When drafting a decision, judges are expected to articulate the contested elements of the offence and give each element "dedicated attention" in their analysis.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Bradley|j5xsp|2020 ONCA 206 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{AtL|j5xsp|9}} ("It is always appreciated when trial judges articulate the contested elements of the offence and give each dedicated attention, but it is not an error to fail to do so where it is apparent that the required conclusions were made. That is the case here.")
</ref>

; Rulings and Orders
The decision to exercise discretion and require the reading of charges despite waiver, is not an order but is a ruling that can be reviewed on certiorari.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|AA|1wcw7|2000 CanLII 22813 (ON SC)|150 CCC (3d) 564}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}{{atL|1wcw7|9}}{{affd}} 170 CCC (3d) 449
</ref>

; No Personal Preferences, Ideologies or Political Beliefs
A judge should not "wander into the public square" by using their decisions to signal their personal preferences, ideologies or political beliefs.<ref>
{{CanLIIRC|Canada (Attorney General) v Kattenburg|j9z5f|2020 FCA 164 (CanLII)}} per Stratas JA
</ref>

; Reading Decisions
Where the decision is lengthy there is no prohibition against reading a summary in the presence of the accused then giving a written version at a later point.<REf>
{{CanLIIR|Lawrence|j8nrv|2020 ABCA 268 (CanLII)}}{{AtL|j8nrv|21}}
</ref>
It is possible to give reasons part orally and part written. However, it is only the oral reasons that are operative.<ref>
{{ibid1|Lawrence}}{{atL|j8nrv|21}}
</ref>

The principle of openness and accountability requires that the essential reasoning be given orally.<ref>
{{ibid1|Lawrence}}{{atL|j8nrv|23}}
</ref>

The essential reasoning should include a "summary [to] clearly set out the offence, the essential reasoning of the trial judge, and the conclusion on the charge."<ref>
{{ibid1|Lawrence}}{{atL|j8nrv|23}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Timing of Interim Rulings===
Where a party seeks exclusion of evidence it is for the trial judge to "decide what procedure should be followed."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Hamill|1nnxs|1984 CanLII 39 (BCCA)|[1984] 6 WWR 530}}{{perBCCA|Esson JA}}<br>
</ref>

With "rare exceptions," a judge is "empowered to reserve on any application until the end of the case."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|DeSousa|1fsb0|1992 CanLII 80 (SCC)|[1992] 2 SCR 944}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}<br>
</ref>
This would include an application to quash an indictment.<ref>
{{ibid1|DeSousa}} ("He or she is not obliged, therefore, to rule on a motion to quash for invalidity of the indictment until the end of the case after the evidence has been heard.")<br>
</ref>

The judge has discretion to defer rulings on the basis that:<ref>
{{ibid1|DeSousa}}</ref>
# "criminal proceedings should not be fragmented by interlocutory proceedings which take on a life of their own" and 
# it "discourages adjudication of constitutional issues without a factual foundation."

An exception for deferment of rulings are where the "interests of justice necessitate an immediate decision."<ref>
{{ibid1|DeSousa}}
</ref>
This will include where "the trial court itself is implicated in a constitutional violation" or where "substantial on-going constitutional violations require immediate attention."<ref>
{{ibid1|DeSousa}}
</ref>
As well, situations where an "apparently meritorious Charter challenge of the law under which the accused is charged which is not dependent on facts to be elicited during the trial" should be exceptions.<ref>
{{ibid1|DeSousa}} 
</ref>
This is especially true where the trial is expected to be of considerable duration.<ref>
{{ibid1|DeSousa}} 
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Delivery of Decisions===

When a decision is lengthy, the trial judge may read a summary in court before the accused and then provide a more comprehensive and detailed copy in the written version that is filed on the record.<REf>
{{CanLIIRx|Lawrence|j8nrv|2020 ABCA 268 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atsL|j8nrv|21| to 24}}
</ref>
However, it is the reasons given to the accused orally that are the "operative reasons" or "essential reasons."<Ref>
{{ibid1|Lawrence}}{{AtsL|j8nrv|21| and 23}}
</ref>
A failure to include sufficient reasons in the oral decision could run afoul of s. 650 and s. 7 and 11(d){{CCRF}}.
<ref>
{{supra1|Lawrence}}{{AtL|j8nrv|23}}
</ref>
The essential or operative parts of the reasons must include (a) the charges, (b) the verdict on each charge (c) some explanation for the result.<Ref>
{{supra1|Lawrence}}{{AtL|j8nrv|24}}
</ref>

Sufficiency of reasons could be in the range of 9 paragraphs summarizing a 33 page decision.<Ref>
e.g. see {{supra1|Lawrence}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Supplementary Reasons===
The judge may lawfully provide supplementary reasons in the following circumstances:<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|CD|jksxq|2021 NUCA 21 (CanLII)|NJ No 55}}{{perNUCA|Slatter JA}}{{AtL|jksxq|14}}<br>
{{CanLIIR|Mitchell|jtgd9|2022 NSCA 77 (CanLII)}}{{perNSCA|Beaton JA}}{{atL|jtgd9|27}}
</ref>
#  "A trial judge may declare an outcome with "reasons to follow""<ref>
e.g. {{CanLIIRP|Teskey|1rq5q|2007 SCC 25 (CanLII)|[2007] 2 SCR 267}}{{perSCC|Charron J}} - verdict{{fix}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Sundman|jd2rq|2021 BCCA 53 (CanLII)|402 CCC (3d) 463}}{{perBCCA|Fitch JA}}{{atsL|jd2rq|55| to 56}} - mid-trial rulings{{fix}}<br>
</ref>
# "The trial judge may have lengthy reasons prepared, and essentially finalized, but due to the length read only a summary, followed by immediate release of the longer version."<ref>
e.g. {{CanLIIR|Vander Leeuw|jd6mr|2021 ABCA 61 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|jd6mr|9}}<br>
</ref>
# "The trial judge may announce his or her decision, but then correct that decision when an obvious error or illegality is identified."<br>
e.g. {{CanLIIRP|Vader|j0c4h|2019 ABCA 191 (CanLII)|89 Alta LR (6th) 146}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atsL|j0c4h|56| to 57}}
</ref>
# "The trial judge gives reasons that appear to deal with all the issues, and outline all of his or her reasons, but then releases truly “supplemental” reasons that add arguments or issues."<ref>
e.g. 
{{CanLIIRPC|PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc v Perpetual Energy Inc|jcs27|2021 ABCA 16 (CanLII)|457 DLR (4th) 1}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{AtL|jcs27|61}}
</ref>

How much an initial decision and supplementary reasons can change depends on the circumstances.<ref>
{{supra1|CD}}{{atL|jksxq|14}}
</ref>

Generally, editing for punctuation, grammar,  citations are permitted.<Ref>
{{supra1|CD}}{{atL|jksxq|14}}
</ref>
But changes that revise, correct, or reconsider the words spoken or the substance of the reasoning are not permitted.<Ref>
{{supra1|CD}}{{atL|jksxq|14}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Wang|2b3v3|2010 ONCA 435 (CanLII)|256 CCC (3d) 225}}{{perONCA|Rouleau JA}}{{atL|2b3v3|9}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Desmond|j4gnn|2020 NSCA 1 (CanLII)|384 CCC (3d) 461}}{{perNSCA|Scanlan JA}}{{atsL|j4gnn|24| to 25}}
</ref>

; Appellate Review of Supplementary Decisions
Parties are permitted to argue the discrepancies between the decisions.<Ref>
{{supra1|CD}}{{atL|jksxq|15}}<br>
{{supra1|Vander Leeuw}}{{atL|jd6mr|9}}
</ref>

It is open to the appellate court to ignore the supplementary reasons.<REf>
{{CanLIIRPC|Wilde v Archean Energy Ltd|1v15t|2007 ABCA 385 (CanLII)|82 Alta LR (4th) 203, 62 CCEL (3d) 1}}{{perABCA|Hunt JA}}{{atL|1v15t|24}}<Br>
</ref>
And may simply review the decision on the initial reasoning.<REf>
{{CanLIIRPC|Nova Scotia (Minister of Community Services) v CKZ|gsqtx|2016 NSCA 61 (CanLII)|376 NSR (2d) 113}}{{perNSCA|Bourgeois and Van den Eynden JJA}}{{atsL|gsqtx|61| to 63}}
</ref>

The appeal courts can examine both sets of reasons when assessing the issue of appeal.<REf>
Perpetual Energy at para. 66<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ball|frpvx|2012 ABCA 184 (CanLII)|557 WAC 102}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|frpvx|4}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Relationship with the Legislatures==

A judge must act as a "constitutionally mandated referee."<Ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v NAPE|1j0tg|2004 SCC 66 (CanLII)|[2004] 3 SCR 381}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}{{atL|1j0tg|105}}
</ref>

It is not courts that limit legislatures, rather it is the constitution that limits them by means of judicial interpretation.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Vriend v Alberta|1fqt5|1998 CanLII 816 (SCC)|[1998] 1 SCR 493}}{{perSCC-H|Cory J}}{{atL|1fqt5|56}} ("...it is not the courts which limit the legislatures.  Rather, it is the Constitution, which must be interpreted by the courts, that limits the legislatures.")
</ref>

It is the role of the legislature to assume the "responsibility of law reform."<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Watkins v. Olafson|1ft1x|1989 CanLII 36 (SCC)|[1989] 2 SCR 750}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}} at 583-4 (DLR) ("Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the long-established principle that in a constitutional democracy it is the legislature, as the elected branch of government, which should assume the major responsibility for law reform.")
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Judicial Neutrality and Bias==
* [[Judicial Neutrality and Bias]]

==Sufficiency of Reasons for Judgement==
* [[Sufficiency of Reasons]]

==Misc Authority of Youth Court Justice==
* [[Miscellaneous Authority of a Youth Court Justice]]

==Misc Other Authorities==

===Provincial Court Judges===
{{quotation3|
; Officials with powers of two justices
483 Every judge or provincial court judge authorized by the law of the province in which he is appointed to do anything that is required to be done by two or more justices may do alone anything that this Act or any other Act of Parliament authorizes two or more justices to do.
<br>
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 483; R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.)}}, s. 203.
|{{CCCSec2|483}}
|{{NoteUp|483}}
|{{terms-
|"Act" (s. 2)
|"province" (s. 35 IA)
|"provincial court judge" (s. 2)
|"two justices" (s. 35 IA)
}}
}}

===Federal Judges Code of Ethics===
The Canadian Judicial Council publishes Ethical Principles that outline rules concerning a superior and appellate judge's conduct.<Ref>
[https://cjc-ccm.ca/sites/default/files/documents/2021/CJC_20-301_Ethical-Principles_Bilingual_Final.pdf]
</ref>
The principles cover:
* Judicial Independence (1 A to D)
* Integrity and Respect (2 A to G)
* Diligence and Competence (3 A to D)
* Equality (4 A to D)
* Impartiality (A to E)


{{reflist|2}}

==See Also==
* [[Judicial Immunity|Judicial Immunity/Judicial Independence]]
* [[Judicial Notice]]
* [[Trial Verdicts]]
* [[Juries]]
* [[Criminal Code and Related Definitions#Judges]]
; Other Parties
* [[Accused in Court|Role of the Accused]] 
* [[Role of the Defence Counsel]]
* [[Role of the Victim and Third Parties]]
* [[Role of Law Enforcement]]
* [[Role of the Crown]]
* [[Role of Court Administration]]