View source for Right to a Trial Within a Reasonable Time

[[fr:Droit_à_un_procès_dans_un_délai_raisonnable]]
{{Currency2|July|2021}}
{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderDelay}}
==General Principles==
The right to a trial within a reasonable time is guaranteed by s. 7 and 11(b) of the Charter.

; Charter Right to Reasonable Time to Trial
Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter entitles any "person charged with an offence ... the right ... to be tried within a reasonable time". Where there is a breach of this right, the available remedy to a court is a [[Stay of Proceedings|stay of proceedings]].

; History
In 2016, the Supreme  Court of Canada re-framed the analysis for s. 11(b) by setting presumptive ceilings of 18 and 30 months depending on defence election. The new "Jordan" analysis removed from consideration the prejudice to the accused and the seriousness of the offence.<ref>
see {{CanLIIRP|Jordan|gsds3|2016 SCC 27 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ}}<br>
</ref>

; Types of Offences
The ceiling will apply to traffic tickets, beginning at the moment the charges are laid.<ref>
{{CanLIIR|Rakhra|k79mm|2024 ABCJ 198 (CanLII)}}{{perABCJ|Mah J}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}
===Purpose===
The objectives of both s. 7 and 11(b) of the Charter include ensuring "the fair and timely operation of the criminal justice system."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Dias|gffjg|2014 ABCA 402 (CanLII)|317 CCC (3d) 527}}{{TheCourtABCA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Sapara|5rjl|2001 ABCA 59 (CanLII)|41 CR (5th) 356}}{{perABCA|Russell JA}}<br>
</ref>
Timeliness is "one of the of the hallmarks of a free and democratic society."<ref>
{{infra1|Jordan}}{{AtL|gsds3|1}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|KGK|j5zfd|2020 SCC 7 (CanLII)|61 CR (7th) 233}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver J}}{{atL|j5zfd|25}} ("Section 11(b) of the Charter provides that any person charged with an offence has the right . . . to be tried within a reasonable time. This provision reflects and reinforces the notion that timely justice is one of the hallmarks of a free and democratic society"{{Marks removed}})
</ref>

The right protects both individual rights and societal rights.<Ref>
{{ibid1|KGK}}{{atL|j5zfd|25}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|KJM|j3c0k|2019 SCC 55 (CanLII)|381 CCC (3d) 293}}{{PerSCC|Moldaver J}}{{AtL|j3c0k|38}} ("This right serves both individual and societal interests...")<Br>
</ref>

Section 11(b) protects three individual rights:<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Qureshi|1j6q5|2004 CanLII 40657 (ON CA)|190 CCC (3d) 453}}{{perONCA|Laskin JA}}{{atsL|1j6q5|8| to 10}}<br>
{{ibid1|KGK}}{{atL|j5zfd|25}} and {{atL-np|j5zfd|27}}<br>
{{supra1|KJM}}{{atL|j3c0k|38}} ("At the individual level, it protects the accused’s “liberty, as regards to pre-trial custody or bail conditions; security of the person, in the sense of being free from the stress and cloud of suspicion that accompanies a criminal charge; and the right to make full answer and defence, insofar as delay can prejudice the ability of the defendant to lead evidence, cross-examine witnesses, or otherwise to raise a defence”")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|MacDougall|1fqpr|1998 CanLII 763 (SCC)|[1998] 3 SCR 45}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}{{atL|1fqpr|19}} ("The next question is whether the phrase “tried within a reasonable time” in s. 11(b) is capable of extending to sentencing. A purposive reading suggests that “s. 11(b) protects against an overlong subjection to a pending criminal case and aims to relieve against the stress and anxiety which continue until the outcome of the case is final”: R v Rahey, [citation removed], at p. 610 (emphasis added), per Lamer J., Dickson C.J. concurring. In the same case La Forest J., with whom McIntyre J. concurred, stated that “tried” means not “brought to trial”, but “adjudicated” (p. 632). Since the “outcome” of a criminal case is not known until the conclusion of sentencing, and since sentencing involves adjudication, it seems reasonable to conclude that “tried” as used in s. 11(b) extends to sentencing.")<Br>
</ref>
* the accused's right to security of person by minimizing the anxiety and stigma of criminal proceedings;
* the accused's right to liberty by minimizing the effect of pre-trial custody or restrictive bail conditions; and
* the accused's right to a fair trial by ensuring that the proceedings occur while evidence is fresh and available.

It also protects societal rights:<ref>
{{ibid1|Qureshi}}{{atsL|1j6q5|8| to 10}}<br></ref>
* the public's interest in having our laws enforced by having those who break the law tried quickly; 
* the public's interest in having those accused of crime dealt with fairly; and 

Timely trials also affect societal interests by benefiting victims and witnesses, and instills public confidence in the administration of justice.<Ref>
{{supra1|KGK}}{{atL|j5zfd|25}}<br>
{{supra1|KJM}}{{AtL|j3c0k|38}} ("At the societal level, “[t]imely trials allow victims and witnesses to make the best possible contribution to the trial, and minimize the ‘worry and frustration [they experience] until they have given their testimony’”, and permit them to move on with their lives (see Jordan, at paras. 23-24, citing Askov, at p. 1220). Society also has an interest in seeing that citizens accused of crimes are treated humanely and fairly (see Morin, at p. 786), and timely trials help maintain the public’s confidence in the administration of justice, which is “essential to the survival of the system itself” (Jordan, at paras. 25-26). “In short, timely trials further the interests of justice” (ibid., at para. 28).")<Br>
</ref>

; Jordan Framework
The new framework is designed in part to "do away with prejudice as an <u>express</u> factor in assessing delay." It was considered "confusing, hard to prove, and highly subjective."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|KN|hslcx|2018 BCCA 246 (CanLII)|362 CCC (3d) 288}}{{perBCCA|Fenlon JA}}{{atL|hslcx|35}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Jordan|gsds3| 2016 SCC 27 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ}}<br>
</ref> 
It does not, however, ignore the existence of prejudice, it simply creates a legal presumption of prejudice once the ceiling has been breached.<ref>
{{ibid1|KN}}{{atL|hslcx|35}}<Br>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|54}}<br>
</ref>

The reason also for the change was to address the "culture of complacency" among Crown, defence and courts that have developed in modern years.<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atsL|gsds3|4|}}, {{atsL-np|gsds3|40|}}, and {{atsL-np|gsds3|135|}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|KGK|j5zfd|2020 SCC 7 (CanLII)|61 CR (7th) 233}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver J}}{{atL|j5zfd|1}} (the framework was "designed to overcome a culture of complacency that had grown in the criminal justice system and was causing excessive delays in bringing accused persons to trial. ")
</ref>
This culture is exhibited in delay causing conduct, including:
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|40}}
* unnecessary procedures;
* unnecessary adjournments;
* inefficient practices by all parties; and
* inadequate institutional resources.

The message from Jordan is that “all participants in the system are to take proactive measures at all stages of the trial process to move cases forward and bring accused persons to trial in a timely fashion.”<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Thanabalasingham|j8nps|2020 SCC 18 (CanLII)|447 DLR (4th) 310}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|j8nps|9}}
</ref>

Judges are charged with curtailing delay and changing courtroom culture.<ref>
{{ibid1|Thanabalasingham}}{{atL|j8nps|9}}
</ref>
Practices causing delay that were tolerated are no longer permitted. 
This can include denying defence adjournments where it could result in unacceptably long delay despite it being time attributable to defence. <ref>
{{ibid1|Thanabalasingham}}{{atL|j8nps|9}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Presumptive Ceiling==

; Presumptive Breach
There will be a presumptive breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter where the delay between the date of laying of charges and the conclusion of the trial is greater than the presumptive ceiling.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jordan|gsds3|2016 SCC 27 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ}}
</ref>
; Standard Duration

The duration of the presumptive ceiling will depend on the level of court in which the matter will be heard.
The "Jordan" framework sets a presumptive acceptable period of delay between charge and conclusion of trial is '''18 months''' for provincial court trials and '''30 months''' for superior court trial.<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}} (Judgement was rendered on July 8, 2016)<Br>
</ref> 

The period is calculated from the time of charging until the actual or anticipated end of trial, minus defence delays.<ref>
{{ibid1|Jordan}}{{atsL|gsds3|47| and 48}}<br>
</ref>
Where the ceiling is exceeded there is a presumption of unreasonablness which will amount to a breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter.<ref>
{{ibid1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|68}}<br>
</ref>


; Ceiling Where there is a Direct Indictment
The 30 month ceiling is not affected by the Crown decision to circumvent a preliminary inquiry through the use of a [[Direct Indictments|direct indictment]] under s. 577 of the Code.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Carter|hv2m2|2018 ABQB 657 (CanLII)|418 CRR (2d) 133}}{{perABQB|Poelman J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Jones|h4xw0|2018 ABQB 691 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Nielsen J}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRx|Wilson|gxgms|2017 ABQB 68 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Mahoney J}}{{atsL|gxgms|71| to 78}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRx|Nyznik|gwn6w|2017 ONSC 69 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Nordheimer J}} <br>
{{CanLIIRx|Nasery|hmvq9|2017 ABQB 564 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Gates J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Schenkels|h4nc3|2017 MBCA 62 (CanLII)|140 WCB (2d) 593}}{{perMBCA|Hamilton JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Wilson|gxgms|2017 ABQB 68 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Mahoney J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Cabrera|gw9k6|2016 ABQB 707 (CanLII)|372 CRR (2d) 62}}{{perABQB|Poelman J}}<br>
</ref>

This fixed time is not necessarily "free time" for the Crown as it will still be a factor to consider in a non-presumptive challenge.<ref>
{{supra1|Nyznik}}{{atL|gwn6w|31}}
</ref>

It has been suggested that Crown should seriously consider preferring a direct indictment in order to engage in the longer ceiling duration.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Manasseri|gtvtz|2016 ONCA 703 (CanLII)|344 CCC (3d) 281}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}} ("the Crown should give very serious consideration to preferring direct indictments to fulfill its mandate under s. 11(b) and to ensure, to the extent reasonably possible, that criminal trial proceedings do not exceed the presumptive ceilings set by Jordan.")
</ref>

; Ceiling Where Crown Consents to Re-Election
It is unsettled what duration applies where the Crown consents to a re-election. One approach says that on re-election shortly after the matter commences in Supreme Court will mean an 18 month ceiling.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Teeti|hv32n|2018 ABPC 207 (CanLII)}}{{perABPC|MacDonald J}}<br>
</ref>
A second approach says that the 30 month ceiling will continue despite a re-election.<reF>
{{CanLIIRx|Kaulback|hq965|2018 NLCA 8 (CanLII)}}{{perNLCA|Welsh JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|DMS|h1tk8|2016 NBCA 71 (CanLII)|353 CCC (3d) 396}}{{perNBCA|Quigg JA}}
</ref>

; Ceiling Where the Matter is Sent for Re-trial
There is a division in cases as to whether the normal ceilings apply. There is of course support for the ceiling "clock" resetting after the matter is sent back for trial.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Ricard|gxf9v|2017 MBQB 11 (CanLII)|MJ No 46}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Gakmakge|h4x2w|2018 QCCS 3279 (CanLII)}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Bowers|h3kfg|2017 NSPC 21 (CanLII)}}{{perNSPC|Tax J}}<br>
</ref>

Another approach says the 18/30 month presumptive ceiling does not apply when a matter is returned for re-trial after a successful appeal as all re-trial matters should be prioritized over regular matters.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|MacIsaac|ht1qm|2018 ONCA 650 (CanLII)|365 CCC (3d) 361}}{{perONCA|Hushcroft JA}}{{atL|ht1qm|27}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRx|Creglia|hrngq|2018 ONCJ 262 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Pringle J}}{{atL|hrngq|45}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Crant|hr81b|2018 ONSC 1479 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Nakatsuru J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Bruno|hv3s6|2018 ONCJ 627 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Pringle J}}<br>
{{supra1|Crowchild}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRx|Ferstl|hmvs3|2017 ABPC 266 (CanLII)}}{{perABPC|Fradsham J}}<Br>
</ref>
Few courts have set a number. With only some suggestion of between 5 to 12 months.<ref>
{{supra1|Crowchild}}<br>
{{supra1|Creglia}}<br>
</ref>

There is only a little support for the view that the ceilings should apply only once regardless of the number of re-trials.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Windibank|gxf29|2017 ONSC 855 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Howard J}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRx|Wu|hphvq|2017 BCSC 2373 (CanLII)}}{{perBCSC|Watchuk J}}<br>
cf. {{CanLIIRx|Crowchild|hs2kj|2018 ABQB 368 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Hall J}}{{atL|hs2kj|21}}
</ref>

; Ceiling Where the Accused is in Custody
The dominant view is that the ceiling applies whether or not the accused is in custody.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Carman|gx84n|2017 ONCJ 11 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Duncan J}}{{atL|gx84|17}}<br>
</ref>

; Rebutting the Presumptive Ceiling
The presumption can be rebutted where the Crown can show exceptional circumstances.<ref>
{{ibid1|Jordan}}{{atsL|hx1bh|47|, 48}}, {{atsL-np|hx1bh|69| to 81}}<Br> 
see Exceptions below
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Ceiling for Youth Accused===
Prior to Jordan, it was well understood that there are no special rights to speedy trial different from those granted to adult accused.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|GCM|g1jk1|1991 CanLII 7057 (ON CA)|[1991] OJ No 885 (CA)}}{{perONCA|Osborne JA}}{{atL|g1jk1|45}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|TR|1kwpv|2005 CanLII 18709 (ON CA)|[2005] OJ No 2150 (CA)}}{{perONCA|MacPherson JA}}<br>
</ref>
However, it has been made clear that there is an expectation that youth court matters will reach a conclusion more quickly than adult ones, and the analysis should be different.<Ref>
{{supra1|GCM}}{{atL|g1jk1|23}} ("youth court proceedings should proceed to a conclusion more quickly than those in the adult criminal justice system. Delay, which may be reasonable in the adult criminal justice system, may not be unreasonable in the youth court")<Br>
</ref>
Some pre-Jordan courts have recommended guidelines within 5 or 6 months of charge or up to 15 months from charge.<ref>
{{supra1|GCM}}{{atL|g1jk1|45}}<Br>
{{supra1|TR}} <Br>
</ref>

The shorter time to trial is necessary so that:<ref>
{{supra1|GCM}}{{atL|g1jk1|115}}<Br>
{{supra1|TR}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|DS|g1jwp|1991 CanLII 7055 (ON CA)|[1991] OJ No 1220 (CA)}}{{perONCA|Galligan JA}}, rev'd on other grounds at [http://canlii.ca/t/1fsbn 1992 CanLII 58] (SCC){{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}<Br> 
</ref>
# the young person can better appreciate the connection between behaviour and consequences;
# the distorted perception of time by a young person compared to adults;
# the need to deal with dispositions speedily while youth is still in their formative years.

There is some suggestion that for youth charged under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the presumptive ceiling should be set at 12 months<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|DA|hqt04|2018 ONCJ 143 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|O’Marra J}}<br>
</ref>
, 15 months<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|ZN|ht50g|2018 ONCJ 501 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Webber J}}{{atsL|ht50g|124|}}, {{atsL-np|ht50g|132| to 133}}
{{CanLIIRP|JM|gx04f|2017 ONCJ 4 (CanLII)|344 CCC (3d) 217 }}{{perONCJ|Paciocco J}}{{atsL|gx04f|136| to 138}} - recommends 15 month ceiling<br>
</ref>
, and 16 months.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|SM|gxch0|2016 ONCJ 793 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Gattrell J}}<br>
</ref>

Others have suggested that there should be no change to the presumptive ceiling, rather can be dealt with an a non-presumptive breach.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRx|DMB|hppd9|2018 ONCJ 15 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Christie J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|RV|h3qwh|2017 ONCJ 305 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Wadden J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|KM|hpnpl|2018 ONCJ 8 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Vaillancourt J}}<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Obligations on the Crown, Defence, and Judges==
All parties, including the courts, have a "responsibility to ensure that criminal proceedings are carried out in a manner ... consistent with" the right under s. 11(d).<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Cody|h4bfk|2017 SCC 31 (CanLII)|[2017] 1 SCR 659}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|h4bfk|1}}<br>
</ref> 

{{reflist|2}}
===Crown Role===
The Crown has an obligation to bring an accused to trial<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Heaslip|gbskj|1983 CanLII 3519 (ON CA)|9 CCC (3d) 480}}{{perONCA-H|Martin JA}}{{atp|321}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Adam et al|1mt4b|2006 BCSC 350 (CanLII)|70 WCB (2d) 1008}}{{perBCSC|Romilly J}} The crown has an obligation to"bring the accused to trial within a reasonable time”<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Godin|23rhf|2009 SCC 26 (CanLII)|[2009] 2 SCR 3}}{{perSCC|Cromwell J}}{{atL|23rhf|11}}<br>
</ref> and is also obligated to ensure that "the trial proceedings, once engaged, are not unduly delayed."<ref>
see {{CanLIIRP|MacDougall|1fqpr|1998 CanLII 763 (SCC)|[1998] 3 SCR 45}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}{{atL|1fqpr|49}}
</ref>

It is also observed that "each charge that should not have been laid or pursued, deprives other worthy litigants of timely access to the courts."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jordan|gsds3|2016 SCC 27 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ}}{{atL|gsds3|43}}<br>
</ref>

The Crown duties include:
* "making reasonable and responsible decisions regarding who to prosecute"<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|138}} ("For Crown counsel, this means making reasonable and responsible decisions regarding who to prosecute and for what,...")</ref>
* "making reasonable and responsible decisions" regarding choices of offences to prosecute<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|138}} ("For Crown counsel, this means making reasonable and responsible decisions regarding who to prosecute and for what,...")</ref>
* "delivering on their disclosure obligations promptly with the cooperation of police,"<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|138}} ("For Crown counsel, this means making reasonable and responsible decisions ... delivering on their disclosure obligations promptly with the cooperation of police, creating plans for complex prosecutions, and using court time efficiently. It may also require enhanced Crown discretion for resolving individual cases.")</ref>
* "creating plans for complex prosecutions";<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|138}}</ref>
* use court time efficiently;<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|138}}</ref>
* use discretion to resolve cases;<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|138}}</ref>
* making "reasonable admissions";<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|138}}</ref>
* "streamlining the evidence";<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|138}}</ref>
* "anticipating issues that need to be resolved in advance."<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|138}}</ref>

Where there is a re-trial the Crown has an obligation to expedite the matter to trial.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Creglia|hrngq|2018 ONCJ 262 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Pringle J}}{{atL|hrngq|45}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|MacIsaac|ht1qm|2018 ONCA 650 (CanLII)|365 CCC (3d) 361}}{{perONCA|Huscroft JA}}{{atsL|ht1qm|27|}}, {{atsL-np|ht1qm|59| to 65}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRx|GVE|gmtmx|2016 ONCJ 14 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Schwarzl J}}{{atL|gmtmx|76}}<Br>
</ref>
Expediting the matter can include agreeding to non-consecutive trial dates even where it is "suboptimal."<Ref>
{{supra1|MacIsaac}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Defence Counsel Role===

The defence counsel's duties include:
* "actively advancing their clients’ right to a trial within a reasonable time"<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jordan|gsds3|2016 SCC 27 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ}}{{AtL|gsds3|138}} ("For defence counsel, this means actively advancing their clients’ right to a trial within a reasonable time, collaborating with Crown counsel when appropriate and, like Crown counsel, using court time efficiently. Both parties should focus on making reasonable admissions, streamlining the evidence, and anticipating issues that need to be resolved in advance.")</ref>
* "collaborating with Crown counsel when appropriate"<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|138}}</ref>
* "using court time efficiently"<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|138}}</ref>
* making "reasonable admissions" <ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|138}}</ref>
* "streamlining the evidence"<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|138}}</ref>
* "anticipating issues that need to be resolved in advance."<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|138}}</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Judge Role===
Judges role include "changing courtroom culture."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Cody|h4bfk|2017 SCC 31 (CanLII)|[2017] 1 SCR 659}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|h4bfk|37}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Jordan|gsds3|2016 SCC 27 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ}}{{atL|gsds3|114}}<Br>
</ref>
This would include denying adjournments even where it may be defence-attributed delay.<ref>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|37}}<br>
</ref>

Judges should be active to encourage parties to improve efficiencies by means including recommending proceeding "on a documentary record alone."<ref>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|39}}<br>
</ref>

; Screening Applications
Judges should screen application by requiring counsel to prove the merit of an application by written summary of the evidence to show that it has a "reasonable prospect of success". Otherwise the application should be dismissed.<ref>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|38}}<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Start and End of Jordan Ceiling==

; Jordan Delay Not Same as Total Delay
The Jordan rule does not represent a departure from the principle that "period of delay to be considered ... is not assumed equivalent to total delay."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|KN|hslcx|2018 BCCA 246 (CanLII)|362 CCC (3d) 288}}{{perBCCA|Fenlon JA}}{{atL|hslcx|20}} ("Jordan revised the analytical framework but did not depart from the longstanding principle that the period of delay to be considered on a s. 11(b) application is not assumed to be equivalent to total delay. In both Jordan and R v Cody, 2017 SCC 31, the Court assessed whether the remaining delay — not the total delay — was reasonable.")<br>
</ref>

While there is a fixed "presumptive ceiling", there may still be compelling "case-specific factors" are still relevant considerations to reasonableness of the delay.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jordan|gsds3|2016 SCC 27 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ}}{{atL|gsds3|51}}<br>
</ref>

; Different Start Times
There are several views on when the "clock" starts for the calculation of delay.
The dominant line of cases suggests that the calculation starts at the time of the laying of charges.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Kalanj|1ft46|1989 CanLII 63 (SCC)|[1989] 1 SCR 1594}}{{perSCC-H|McIntyre J}}{{atsL|1ft46|17|}}, {{atsL-np|1ft46|54|}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRx|Akumu|ht3zg|2018 BCCA 297 (CanLII)}}{{perBCCA|Harris JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Thind|hqxsb|2018 ONSC 1337 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Coroza J}}{{atsL|hqxsb|55| to 61}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Sundralingam|h49d0|2017 ONCJ 400 (CanLII)|OJ No 3097}}{{perONCJ|Blacklock J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Isaacs|gv2k0|2016 ONSC 6214 (CanLII)|OJ No 5225}}{{perONSC|Lemay J}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ashraf|gtxgk|2016 ONCJ 584 (CanLII)|367 CRR (2d) 30}}{{perONCJ|Band J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Gandhi|gt8qf|2016 ONSC 5612 (CanLII)|133 WCB (2d) 29}}{{perONSC|Code J}}{{atL|gt8qf|5}} ("In R v Jordan, supra at paras. 49, 61 and 63, the majority held that the “most important feature of the new framework” for s. 11(b) analysis is that “it sets a ceiling beyond which delay is presumptively unreasonable.” The ceiling for an indictable trial in this Court is “30 months from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial.” However, the majority went on to hold that “delay attributable to the defence must be subtracted” and that this subtracted period includes both “delay waived by the defence” and “delays caused solely or directly by the defence’s conduct.”")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Rice|hqqdm|2018 QCCA 198 (CanLII)|44 CR (7th) 83}}{{perQCCA|Vauclair JA}}{{atL|hqqdm|41}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Millar|j20mr|2019 BCCA 298 (CanLII)|1 CTC 182}}{{perBCCA|Fitch JA}}{{atL|j20mr|80}}
</ref>
Many cases rely on the pre-Jordan approach which took the time to start at the laying of charges.<ref>
{{supra1|Kalanj}}{{atsL|1ft46|17|}}, {{atsL-np|1ft46|54|}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Nguyen|fwl92|2013 ONCA 169 (CanLII)|2 CR (7th) 70}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{atL|fwl92|49}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Milani|g7xfm|2014 ONCA 536 (CanLII)|314 CCC (3d) 101}}{{perONCA|van Rensburg JA}}{{atL|g7xfm|25}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|McHale|29rrx|2010 ONCA 361 (CanLII)|256 CCC (3d) 26}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{atL|29rrx|70}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRx|Sanghera|frdbc|2012 BCSC 711 (CanLII)}}{{perBCSC|Holmes J}}{{atL|frdbc|39}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Carter|1ftrv|1986 CanLII 18 (SCC)|[1986] 1 SCR 981}}{{perSCC|Lamer J}}{{atsL|1ftrv|11|, 13}}<Br>
{{supra1|Morin}}{{at|35}}<br>
</ref>
The second line of cases suggests that the time begins at the arrest and becoming aware of charges.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Gleiser|h3pp6|2018 ONSC 2858 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|KP Wright J}} - judge took into calculation three week delay between arrest and laying and information<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Albardy|hqj5j|2018 ONCJ 114 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Doody J}}{{atL|hqj5j|9}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Luoma|gvs2g|2016 ONCJ 670 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Schreck J}}{{atsL|gvs2g|19| to 31}}<br>
see also pre-Jordan case of {{CanLIIRx|Nash|gf133|2014 ONSC 6025 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Bale J}}{{atL|gf133|7}} ("From the date of the arrest, therefore, the accused was engaged in the criminal justice system. He was an “accused” as defined in section 193 of the Criminal Code, and was required to attend, on particular dates, both at the local police station (pursuant to the ''Identification of Criminals Act''), and in court. ...Notwithstanding that no information had yet been laid, he was therefore subject to constraint, and stood accused before the community of committing a crime. The individual rights that section 11(b) seeks to protect, in particular, the right to security of the person, and the right to liberty, were then placed in jeopardy.")<br>
</ref>
The rationale in the second line of cases relies on the notion that the police should not be able to seek protection behind their delays and errors in laying a charge reasonably promptly as required under s. 505.<ref>
{{supra1|Luoma}}<br>
</ref>
There is a variation on the second line of cases which suggests that the time should be at the time the charges are sworn or when they ''should have'' been sworn.<ref>
{{supra1|Luoma}}
</ref>

; End of Clock
Under the presumptive Jordan ceilings, the time period ends once the deliberations begin.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|KGK|j5zfd|2020 SCC 7 (CanLII)|61 CR (7th) 233}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver J}}{{atL|j5zfd|23}} ("Although the right to be tried within a reasonable time enshrined in s. 11(b) of the Charter extends beyond the end of the evidence and argument at trial, I am of the view that the presumptive ceilings established by this Court in Jordan do not.")
</ref>
The rights under s. 11(b) continues throughout the proceedings, but simply not under the Jordan timetable.<ref>
{{ibid1|KGK}}
</ref>

Under the pre-Jordan framework, the delay clock ended only after sentencing.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|MacDougall|1fqpr|1998 CanLII 763 (SCC)|128 CCC (3d) 483}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}{{atsL|1fqpr|33| to 37}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Gallant|1fqpt|1998 CanLII 764 (SCC)|[1998] 3 SCR 80}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}<br>
</ref>
<!--
The dominant line of cases suggests that the period ends once a verdict is rendered.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Pelletier|gx367|2016 BCSC 2496 (CanLII)|136 WCB (2d) 264}}{{perBCSC|Kelleher J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Akumu|h5t49|2017 BCSC 896 (CanLII)|396 CRR (2d) 121}}{{perBCSC|Fisher J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Dadmand|h66bt|2017 BCSC 1644 (CanLII)|396 CRR (2d) 121}}{{perBCSC|Pearlman J}}{{atsL|h66bt|49 to 58}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Pelletier|hx74t|2019 NBCA 9 (CanLII)}}{{perNBCA|Quigg JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Crant|hr81b|2018 ONSC 1479 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Nakatsuru J}}<bR>
{{CanLIIRP|SCW|hslcx|2018 BCCA 246 (CanLII)|362 CCC (3d) 288}}{{perBCCA|Fenlon JA}}{{atL|hslcx|35}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Warring|h3fq8|2017 ABCA 128 (CanLII)|347 CCC (3d) 391}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atsL|h3fq8|10| to 11}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Tsega|h409g|2017 ONSC 3090 (CanLII)|139 WCB (2d) 92}}{{perONSC|Aitken J}}<bR>
{{CanLIIRP|KGK|h41zl|2017 MBQB 96 (CanLII)|11 WWR 179}}{{perMBQB|Joyal J}} on appeal to SCC<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Brown|ht185|2018 NSCA 62 (CanLII)|364 CCC (3d) 238}}{{perNSCA|Derrick JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Rice|hqqdm|2018 QCCA 198 (CanLII)|44 CR (7th) 83}}{{perQCCA|Vauclair JA}}{{atL|hqqdm|41}}<br>
</ref>

There is limited support for Jordan delay to apply up to the point of sentencing.<ref> 
{{CanLIIRP|Charley|hspcp|2018 ONSC 3551 (CanLII)|414 CRR (2d) 45}}{{perONSC|Morgan J}}{{atsL|hspcp|3|}}, {{atsL-np|hspcp|8|}}, {{atsL-np|hspcp|22| to 23}}
</ref>
However, the interests implicated in a delay to sentencing are not exactly the same as those implicated to trial.<ref>
{{CanLIIR-N|DN|, 1993 CarswellYukon 6, (1993) 27 CR (4th) 114 (YKTC)}}<br>
{{supra1|Gallant}}<Br>
</ref>

It is an open question whether the time it takes for the judge to deliberate a verdict is included in the time period.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|MacIsaac|ht1qm|2018 ONCA 650 (CanLII)|365 CCC (3d) 361}}{{perONCA|Huscroft JA}}{{atL|ht1qm|37}} - refused to decide issue<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Gambilla|hmqj2|2017 ABCA 347 (CanLII)|356 CCC (3d) 153}}{{perABCA|Watson JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Brown|ht185|2018 NSCA 62 (CanLII)|364 CCC (3d) 238}}{{perNSCA|Derrick JA}}<br>
</ref>
Some courts have determined that the time should not be included.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Basha|h6kv6|2017 ONSC 5897 (CanLII)|399 CRR (2d) 240}}{{perONSC|Kane J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|KGK|hxfhp|2019 MBCA 9 (CanLII)|373 CCC (3d) 1}}{{perMBCA|Cameron JA}}{{atL|hxfhp |188}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|ZN|ht50g|2018 ONCJ 501 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Webber J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Zilney|h5wfn|2017 ONCJ 610 (CanLII)|390 CRR (2d) 209}}{{perONCJ|Cooper J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Camaergo|hvqbk|2018 ONCJ 740 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Rahman J}}<br>
</ref>
That is, unless the amount of time needed is "shocking, inordinate, and unconscionable."<ref>
{{CanLIIR-N|Kehler|, [2017] MJ No 148}}{{perMBQB|Joyal CJ}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Zilney|h5wfn|2017 ONCJ 610 (CanLII)|390 CRR (2d) 209}}{{perONCJ|Cooper J}}{{atL|h5wfn|18}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Mamouni|hmqj2|2017 ABCA 347 (CanLII)|356 CCC (3d) 153}}{{perABCA|Watson JA}}{{atsL|hmqj2|72| to 93}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Brown|ht185|2018 NSCA 62 (CanLII)|364 CCC (3d) 238}}{{perNSCA|Derrick JA}}{{atsL|ht185|72| to 75}}<br>
</ref>

Other courts found it should be included.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|King|hwc02|2018 NLCA 66 (CanLII)|369 CCC (3d) 1}}{{perNLCA|Barry JA}}{{atsL|hwc02|139| to 142}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Pelletier|hx74t|2019 NBCA 9 (CanLII)}}{{perNBCA|Quigg JA}}{{atL|hx74t|14}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|JM|gx04f|2017 ONCJ 4 (CanLII)|344 CCC (3d) 217}}{{perONCJ|Paciocco J}}{{atsL|gx04f|29 to 42}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ashraf|gtxgk|2016 ONCJ 584 (CanLII)|367 CRR (2d) 30}}{{perONCJ|Band J}}{{atsL|gtxgk|73| to 76}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Formusa|hrfg7|2018 ONCJ 236 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Murray J}}{{atL|hrfg7|97}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Madill|hx1bh|2019 ONCJ 19 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Broderick J}}{{atsL|hx1bh|21| to 33}}<bR>
</ref>
-->
; Effect of Crown Stay 
A Crown of proceedings will stop the Jordan clock absent of element of "illegitimacy or manipulation."<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Kanda|jgskr|2021 BCCA 267 (CanLII)}}{{perBCCA|Grauer JA}}
</ref>

; Effect of Guilty Plea
The right against delay is extinguished upon a guilty plea as it constitutes a waiver of trial rights.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Naderi|1w6k1|1996 CanLII 8168 (ONSC)|40 CRR (2d) 312 (Gen Div)}}{{perONSC|Marchand J}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Lachance|ggpzn|2002 CMAC 7 (CanLII)|6 CMAR 274}}, ''per'' Letourneau JA <br>
</ref>
The waiver however does not affect the right to speedy sentencing.<ref>
{{ibid1|Lachance}}<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Jordan Analytical Framework==
; Three Step Framework
The first step requires the court to "calculat[e] the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jordan|gsds3|2016 SCC 27 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ}}{{atL|gsds3|60}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Cody|h4bfk|2017 SCC 31 (CanLII)|[2017] 1 SCR 659}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|h4bfk|21}} ("The first step under this framework entails “calculating the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial” (Jordan, at para. 60). In this case, an information was sworn against Mr. Cody on January 12, 2010, and his trial was scheduled to conclude on January 30, 2015. This makes the total delay approximately 60.5 months.")<br>
</ref>
The second step is to subtract the delay attributable to the defence.<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|60}}<Br>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|22}} ("After the total delay is calculated, “delay attributable to the defence must be subtracted” (Jordan, at para. 60). The result, or net delay, must then be compared to the applicable presumptive ceiling. The analysis then “depends upon whether the remaining delay — that is, the delay which was not caused by the defence — is above or below the presumptive ceiling”")<br>
</ref>
The "net delay" is then compared to the presumptive ceilings. The third step will depend on whether the net delay is above or below the ceiling.<ref>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|22}} ("After the total delay is calculated, “delay attributable to the defence must be subtracted” (Jordan, at para. 60). The result, or net delay, must then be compared to the applicable presumptive ceiling. The analysis then “depends upon whether the remaining delay — that is, the delay which was not caused by the defence — is above or below the presumptive ceiling”")<br>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|67}}<Br>
</ref>

; Delay ''Under'' the Presumptive Ceiling
Where the net delay is below the presumptive ceiling the matter can still be stayed for delay.<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|48}}<br>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|23}} ("If the net delay falls below the ceiling, ...then the onus is on the defence to show that the delay is unreasonable. To do so, the defence must establish that (1) it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, and (2) the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.")<br>
</ref>

The onus is upon the accused to show that the net delay that is under the presumptive ceiling was "unreasonable."<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|48}} ("If the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial (minus defence delay or a period of delay attributable to exceptional circumstances) falls below the presumptive ceiling, then the onus is on the defence to show that the delay is unreasonable. To do so, the defence must establish that (1) it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, and (2) the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have. We expect stays beneath the ceiling to be rare, and limited to clear cases.")<br>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|23}} ("If the net delay falls below the ceiling, ...then the onus is on the defence to show that the delay is unreasonable. To do so, the defence must establish that (1) it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, and (2) the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.")<br>
</ref>
This requires that the accused show that:<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|48}} ("If the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial (minus defence delay or a period of delay attributable to exceptional circumstances) falls below the presumptive ceiling, then the onus is on the defence to show that the delay is unreasonable. To do so, the defence must establish that (1) it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, and (2) the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have. We expect stays beneath the ceiling to be rare, and limited to clear cases.")<br>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|23}} ("If the net delay falls below the ceiling, ...then the onus is on the defence to show that the delay is unreasonable. To do so, the defence must establish that (1) it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, and (2) the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.")<br>
</ref>
# it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings; and 
# the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

; Delay ''Over'' the Presumptive Ceiling
Where the net delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, the burden is upon the Crown to establish the "presence of exceptional circumstances" otherwise the proceedings must be stayed.<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|47}} ("If the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial (minus defence delay) exceeds the ceiling, then the delay is presumptively unreasonable. To rebut this presumption, the Crown must establish the presence of exceptional circumstances. If it cannot, the delay is unreasonable and a stay will follow.")<br>
{{supra1|Cody}}{{atL|h4bfk|24}} ("f the net delay exceeds the ceiling,...then the delay is presumptively unreasonable. To rebut this presumption, the Crown must establish the presence of exceptional circumstances. If it cannot, the delay is unreasonable and a stay will follow.")<br>
</ref>

; Recommended Approach
A recommended approach to Jordan analysis involves the following:<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Coulter|gtw5r|2016 ONCA 704 (CanLII)|340 CCC (3d) 429}}{{perONCA|Gillese JA}}{{atsL|gtw5r|34| to 41}}<br>
</ref>
# Calculate the total time between charge to actual or anticipated conclusion of trial<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|47}}<br>
</ref>
# subtract from the total time, the defence delay, resulting in the "net delay"<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|66}}<br>
</ref>
# compare the net delay to the presumptive ceiling<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|66}}<br>
</ref>
#   If the Net Delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, it is presumptively unreasonable. To rebut the presumption, the Crown must establish the presence of exceptional circumstances <ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|47}}</ref>. If it cannot rebut the presumption, a stay will follow<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|47}}</ref>. In general, exceptional circumstances fall under two categories: discrete events and particularly complex cases <ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|71}}</ref>.
#  Subtract delay caused by discrete events from the Net Delay (leaving the "Remaining Delay") for the purpose of determining whether the presumptive ceiling has been reached<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|75}}</ref>.
#  If the Remaining Delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, the court must consider whether the case was particularly complex such that the time the case has taken is justified and the delay is reasonable<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|80}}</ref>.
#  If the Remaining Delay falls below the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the defence to show that the delay is unreasonable<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|48}}</ref>.
#  The new framework, including the presumptive ceiling, applies to cases already in the system when Jordan was released (the "Transitional Cases")<ref>
{{supra1|Jordan}}{{atL|gsds3|96}}</ref>.

; Expectation
One cannot usually take into account events occurring before the charges were laid.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|AK and AV|1k54p|2005 CanLII 11389 (ON CA)|195 CCC (3d) 501}}{{TheCourtONCA}} at 162</ref>

;Anticipatory Delay 
Anticipatory delay is generally not considered.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Norman|g8x2m|1988 CanLII 5407 (NLSCTD)|223 APR 177}}{{perNLSC|Noel J}}{{atL|g8x2m|7}} ("It was an error in law to accept the anticipated delay as a breach of the respondent's right to be tried within a reasonable time")
</ref>

; Replacement Informations
Where a replacement information is laid charging effectively the same offence as an initial information, the time is still calculated from the time of the first information.<ref>
{{CanLIIR-N|Travassos|, [2003] OJ 1877 (ONCJ)}}<br>
</ref>

; Gap Time
Under the pre-Jordan framework, s. 11(b) does not apply to delays arising from an appeal from conviction (ie. appellate delay).<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Potvin|1fs21|1993 CanLII 113 (SCC)|[1993] 2 SCR 880}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}</ref>

The time between the discharge of an information by a preliminary inquiry judge and the re-commencement of a charge by a direct indictment does not count as delay time.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Milani|g7xfm|2014 ONCA 536 (CanLII)|314 CCC (3d) 101}}{{perONCA|van Rensburg J}}<Br>
</ref>

; Calculating 
Where there is cascading delay or rippling-effect resulting from a single small delay can be accounted for in the attribution analysis.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Pugh|jh8jl|2021 BCCA 293 (CanLII)}}{{perBCCA|JA}}{{AtL|jh8jl|73}} ("In R. v. Potter; R. v. Colpitts, 2020 NSCA 9, the court confirmed it appropriate for a judge to assess the “ripple-effect” of developments in a case (at para. 331). As noted at para. 332 of the decision, “[r]elatively small timing delays” that have a “cascading effect” may result in a significant attribution of delay, depending on the circumstances.")<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Colpitts|j528d|2020 NSCA 9 (CanLII)|385 CCC (3d) 1}}{{TheCourtNSCA}}
</ref>
{{reflist|2}}

==Defence Delay==
* [[Defence Delay Under Jordan Framework]]

==Extraordinary Circumstances==
* [[Extraordinary Circumstances in Jordan Delay Analysis]]

==Breach Within the Presumptive Ceiling==

* [[Breach Within the Presumptive Ceiling]]

== Unreasonable Delay in Verdict ==
It has been suggested that there should be a 5 month ceiling between conviction and sentence.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRT|Charley||2019 ONCA 726 (CanLII)}}
</ref>

The reasonableness of the delay in rendering verdict must account for the realities that there are other commitments. The consideration should regard to their workload, different approaches to reasoning, and realities of daily lives.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|KGK|j5zfd|2020 SCC 7 (CanLII)|61 CR (7th) 233}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver J}}{{atL|j5zfd|61}} 
(“... a reasonable amount of verdict deliberation time must account for the practical constraints that trial judges face, both individually and institutionally. Reasonableness under s. 11(b) has always accounted for the reality that “[n]o case is an island to be treated as if it were the only case with a legitimate demand on court resources” ... verdict deliberation time that goes to one case cannot go to another. The appropriate division of time between cases therefore has regard to individual judges’ workloads, different approaches to reasons and reasoning, and the realities of their daily lives (see, e.g., K.J.M., at para. 102). That said, trial judges can and should consider proximity to the Jordan ceiling in determining how to prioritize cases in their workload.“)</ref>

While there are significant limitations of judicial resources, judges “must work within these institutional restrictions and manage their workloads as efficiently as possible.”<ref>
{{ibid1|KGK}}{{at|j5zfd|62}}
</ref>

A dangerous offender application is considered an "exceptional circumstance" for the purpose of a delay ceiling.<Ref>
{{CanLIIR|Valle-Quintero|jg97m|2021 ONCA 390 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|jg97m|24}}<br>
{{CanLIIRT|McLean||2020 ONSC 1931 (CanLII)}}, at paras. 12-18<br>
{{CanLIIR|JT||2021 ONSC 365 (CanLII)}}{{atL||32}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Application to Pre-Jordan Cases / Transitional Exception ==
{{seealso|Morin Framework (Pre-Jordan 2016)}}
The "Jordan" framework came into effect on July 8, 2016. It should be applied "contextually and flexibly for cases currently in the system."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jordan|gsds3|2016 SCC 27 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 631}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ}}{{atL|gsds3|94}}<br>
</ref>

Where the administrative guidelines are exceeded it is only a factor to consider and does not automatically compel a breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Swaminathan|gst6j|2016 ONSC 4913 (CanLII)|OJ No 4150}}{{perONSC|O'Marra J}}{{atL|gst6j|13}}<Br>
</ref>

Courts cannot ignore the delay jurisprudence pre-existing Jordan. Jordan was a revisiting of the framework.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|KN|hslcx|2018 BCCA 246 (CanLII)|362 CCC (3d) 288}}{{perBCCA|Fenlon JA}}{{atL|hslcx|20}}<br>
</ref>

The new framework does not apply strictly to traditional cases since "the analysis must be contextually sensitive to the law and the legal culture that exists at the relevant time."<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Porter|gvqbn|2016 ONSC 7173 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Pomerance J}}{{atL|gvqbn|7}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Cabrera|gw9k6|2016 ABQB 707 (CanLII)|372 CRR (2d) 62}}{{perABQB|Poelman J}}{{atL|gw9k6|42}}<br>
</ref>

; Burden
The burden is upon the Crown to show that the transitional exception applies.<ref>
{{ibid1|Cabrera}}{{atL|gw9k6|43}}<Br>
</ref>

; Standard
The Crown must show that the net time is justifiable on the basis of "reasonable reliance on the law as it previously existed."<ref>
{{ibid1|Cabrera}}{{atL|gw9k6|43}}<br>
</ref>
This includes reliance on the acceptability of the speed of the case under the old rules in light of the old factors such as seriousness of the offence and prejudice to the accused.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Cody|h4bfk|2017 SCC 31 (CanLII)|[2017] 1 SCR 659}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|h4bfk|68}}<br>
</ref>

Factors that are considered include:<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|C(J)|j088n|2018 ONCA 986 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|j088n|21}}<br>
</ref>
# the complexity of the case
# the period of delay in excess of the Morin guidelines
# the Crown's response to institutional delays
# the defence efforts to move the case along
# the prejudice to the accused.

Like under the Morin framework, the existence of prejudice may be inferred by the passage of time. <ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Rice|hqqdm|2018 QCCA 198 (CanLII)|44 CR (7th) 83}}{{perQCCA|Vauclair JA}}{{atL|hqqdm|20}}<br>
{{supra1|C(J)}}{{atL|j088n|45}}
</ref>

The seriousness of the case also continues to be a factor.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Picard|h5smx|2017 ONCA 692 (CanLII)|354 CCC (3d) 212}}{{perONCA|Rouleau JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Regan|hq97s|2018 ABCA 55 (CanLII)|359 CCC (3d) 53}}{{TheCourtABCA}}<Br>
</ref>

Rarely will the transitional exception be permitted where the case would have failed under Morin.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Thanabalasingham|j8nps|2020 SCC 18 (CanLII)|390 CCC (3d) 400 }}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{AtL|j8nps|8}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Remedy on Breach==
Where a delay is unreasonable under s. 11(b) of the Charter, the only available remedy is a stay of proceedings.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Mills|1cxmx|1986 CanLII 17 (SCC)|[1986] 1 SCR 863}}{{perSCC-H|McIntyre J}}<br>
</ref>

The standard for a stay in only the "clearest of cases" does not apply to s. 11(b) as a stay is the only available remedy.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Thomson|26g5w|2009 ONCA 771 (CanLII)|248 CCC (3d) 477}}{{TheCourtONCA}}</ref>

Where the breach is insufficient to warrant a stay of proceedings, the delay can still be a mitigating factor on sentence in limited circumstances.<ref>
see [[Sentencing Factors Relating to the Offender]]<Br>
</ref>

Postponement of a sentencing hearing can in some circumstances result in mitigation of sentence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Patterson|1fbcj|2000 CanLII 16873 (ON CA)|135 OAC 324}}{{perONCA|MacPherson JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIR-N|KN|, [1999] OJ 4572 (ONSC)}}<Br>
</ref>
{{reflist|2}}

==Procedure==

; Judge Cannot Raise Delay
The judge should generally not raise a Charter delay issue on behalf of the accused.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Foisy|1fbgd|2000 CanLII 16959 (ON CA)|138 OAC 188}}{{perONCA|Finlayson J}}
</ref>

; Evidence
The applicant must establish an evidentiary foundation for their application.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|GCM|g1jk1|1991 CanLII 7057 (ON CA)|65 CCC (3d) 232}}{{perONCA|Osborne J}} ("Generally, s.11(b) applications are matters for the trial court. For it to succeed, there must be an evidentiary foundation for the application. Absent evidence, the alleged violation cannot be found."
</ref>

Often counsel can draft an agreed statement of fact on the history of proceedings.<ref>
{{ibid1|GCM}} ("In many cases, the history of the proceedings will best be dealt with by an agreed statement of fact.")
</ref>

The applicant should also file a transcript of the previous proceedings.<ref>
{{CanLIIR-N|Silveira|, [1998] OJ No 1622 (SCJ)}}
</ref>

; Notice
The applicant must give sufficient notice to the Crown to allow them to respond with evidence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Firth|1mrwx|1992 CanLII 2585 (NS CA)|70 CCC (3d) 376}}{{perNSCA|Hallett JA}}<br>
{{supra1|GCM}} ("Notice should be given to the Crown. I do not think rigid rules should be established by this court concerning the amount of notice required. It should at least be reasonable - that is, sufficient to give the Crown an opportunity to respond.")
</ref>

; Timing
The trial process should generally be permitted to "run its carefully laid course" before a court should engage in an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter to stay proceedings.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Fast|gv43s|2016 ONSC 6426 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Leach J}}{{atsL|gv43s|21| and 22}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Spears|h36c8|2017 NSPC 17 (CanLII)}}{{perNSPC|Derrick J}}{{atL|h36c8|21}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Colpitts|gx9q8|2017 NSSC 22 (CanLII)}}{{perNSSC|Coady J}}<br>
</ref>

A failure to bring an application under s. 11(b) before or at trial will usually be fatal to the applicant.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Rabba|g1j59|1991 CanLII 7073 (ON CA)|, 3 OR (3d) 238}}{{perONCA|Arbour JA}} (2:1){{atp|239}} (CA) ("the failure to move for a stay of proceedings, either before or at trial, would, in most cases, be fatal. The failure to move for a stay of proceedings would normally amount to a waiver of any claim which may arise under s. 11(b) of the Charter.")<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Cortes Rivera|hxh6v|2019 ABCA 62 (CanLII)}}{{perABCA|Costigan JA}}{{atL|hxh6v|4}} (“ In Warring, this Court concluded that the record established the appellant sat on his s 11(b) rights until after he was convicted. The Court found support for this conclusion in R v Rabba ... where the court stated “the failure to move for a stay of proceedings, either before or at trial, would, in most cases, be fatal. The failure to move for a stay of proceedings would normally amount to a waiver of any claim which may arise under s. 11(b) of the Charter.””)
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Appeals from Jordan Rulings==
{{seealso|Appeals Other Than Verdicts or Sentences#Crown Appeal of a Stay of Proceedings or Quashing of Charges}}
The [[Standard of Appellate Review|standard of review]] of the analysis of the delay factors and allocation of time periods is reviewable on a standard of correctness.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Christhurajah|j1150|2019 BCCA 210 (CanLII)|376 CCC (3d) 423}}{{TheCourtBCCA}}{{atsL|j1150|110| to 113}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|KN|hslcx|2018 BCCA 246 (CanLII)|362 CCC (3d) 288}}{{perBCCA|Fenlon JA}}{{atL|hslcx|13}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Khan|2g0kn|2011 ONCA 173 (CanLII)|270 CCC (3d) 1}}{{perONCA|Karakatsanis JA}}{{atL|2g0kn|18}}, appeal refused [2011] SCCA No 195<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Schertzer|26c6f|2009 ONCA 742 (CanLII)|248 CCC (3d) 270}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|26c6f|71}}, appeal refused [2010] SCCA No 3<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Williamson|g8n83|2014 ONCA 598 (CanLII)|314 CCC (3d) 156}}{{perONCA|Lauwers JA}} (the characterization of delay is the application of a legal principle to fact)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Komstantaskos|g2l81|2014 ONCA 21 (CanLII)|298 CRR (2d) 310}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|g2l81|5}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|D(C)|gf93w|2014 ABCA 333 (CanLII)|316 CCC (3d) 457}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|gf93w|5}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Vassell|gmnjs|2015 ABCA 409 (CanLII)|331 CCC (3d) 97}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (2:1){{atsL|gmnjs|5| or 7}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Widdifield|g6pw0|2014 BCCA 170 (CanLII)|354 BCAC 237}}{{perBCCA|Frankel JA}}{{atL|g6pw0|76}}<Br>
</ref>

; Allocation of Time
The characterization and allocation of time of periods of delay are reviewable on the standard of correctness.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Horner|fpl43|2012 BCCA 7 (CanLII)|283 CCC (3d) 453}}{{perBCCA|Ryan JA}}{{atL|fpl43|70}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|KN|hslcx|2018 BCCA 246 (CanLII)|362 CCC (3d) 288}}{{perBCCA|Fenlon JA}}{{atL|hslcx|13}}<br>
R. v. Jurkus, 2018 ONCA 489, 363 C.C.C. (3d) 246, at para. 25, leave to appeal refused, [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 325{{fix}}
</ref>

; Concessions on Attribution
The appellate court is not bound by "erroneous concessions."<Ref>
R v Long, 2023 ONCA 679 (CanLII) per Pepall JA at para 38 ("It is well established that on an appeal from a decision on a s. 11(b) application, this court is not bound by erroneous concessions")<br>
R. v. Shaikh, 2019 ONCA 895, 148 O.R. (3d) 369, at para. 63{{Fix}}<bR>
R. v. Tran, 2012 ONCA 18, 288 C.C.C. (3d) 177, at para. 31<br>
R. v. Steele, 2012 ONCA 383, 288 C.C.C. (3d) 255, at para. 19{{Fix}}<Br>
R. v. Konstantakos, 2014 ONCA 21, 315 O.A.C. 123, at para. 10<br>
R. v. Picard, 2017 ONCA 692, 137 O.R. (3d) 401, at para. 102{{Fix}}<br>
{{supra1|Jurkus}}{{atL||71}}
</ref>

; Findings of Fact
Findings of fact underlying the delay however are reviewed on a standard of palpable and overriding error.<ref>
{{supra1|Schertzer}}{{atL|26c6f|71}}<br>
{{supra1|D(C)}}{{atsL|gf93w|5| to 6}}<br>
{{supra1|Horner}}{{atL|fpl43|70}}
</ref>

; Decision to Stay Owed Deference
The ultimate decision to stay a proceeding as a remedy under s.24(1) of the Charter on finding of a breach is owed deference.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Bellusci|fs7kv|2012 SCC 44 (CanLII)|[2012] 2 SCR 509}}{{perSCC-H|Fish J}}<br>
</ref>
However, it is a question of law reviewable on a standard of correctness.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Conway|1ft4d|1989 CanLII 66 (SCC)|[1989] 1 SCR 1659}}{{perSCC|L'Heureux‑Dubé J}}{{atp|1676}}<br>
{{supra1|Widdifield}}<br>
</ref>

; Appellate Consideration ''ab initio''
Appellate courts should reluctant to make findings of s. 11(b) where the trial judge had not considered it on the merits.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Imola|j184j|2019 ONCA 556 (CanLII)|439 CRR (2d) 352}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{AtL|j184j|24}} ("Appellate courts should be reluctant to determine a s. 11(b) application where a trial court has not done so on its merits")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Rabba|g1j59|1991 CanLII 7073 (ON CA)|, 3 OR (3d) 238}}{{perONCA|Arbour JA}}<br>
</ref>

{{Reflist|2}}

==Delay Outside of Jordan Framework==
The temporal scope of 11(b){{CCRF}} includes the verdict deliberation time, which is not part of the Jordan framework.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|KGK|j5zfd|2020 SCC 7 (CanLII)|61 CR (7th) 233}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver J}}{{AtL|j4zfd|26}} ("On this appeal, no one disputes the temporal scope of s. 11(b). Specifically, the parties agree that the right to be tried within a reasonable time encompasses verdict deliberation time.")
</ref>

===Sentencing Delay===
There has been proposed a separate ceiling for sentencing as being set at 5 months.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Charley|j2ggk|2019 ONCA 726 (CanLII)|147 OR (3d) 497}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|j2ggk|3}}
</ref>
The suggested remedy for breach of this ceiling is not a stay of proceedings but rather sentence mitigation.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Hartling|j69s8|2020 ONCA 243 (CanLII)|150 OR (3d) 224}}{{perONCA|Benotto JA}}
</ref>

The 5 month ceiling will not be counted as including time necessary to litigate a dangerous offender application regardless of its outcome.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|JC|jdj61|2021 ONCA 131 (CanLII)|70 CR (7th) 38}}{{perONCA|Paciocco JA}}
</ref>
{{reflist|2}}

==Morin Framework (Pre-Jordan, 2016 SCC 27)==
* [[Morin Framework (Pre-Jordan 2016)]]

==See Also==
* [[Sentencing Factors Relating to the Criminal Proceedings#Delay]]
* [[Charter Delay (Cases)]]
* [[Charter Applications]]
* [[Detention Order for Things Seized Under Section 489 or 487.11]] - detention may be extended under s. 490(3) where delays occur without charge
* [https://albertacourts.ca/qb/resources/announcements/npp-inquiries-about-the-status-of-reserved-decisions Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Policy on Inquiry of Verdict Delay]

[[Category:Canadian Charter Rights]]