View source for Consent in Sexual Offences

[[fr:Consentement_aux_infractions_sexuelles]]
{{Currency2|August|2021}}
{{LevelZero}}
{{HeaderDefences}}
==General Principles==
{{seealso|Consent|Sexual Assault (Offence)}}

The element of consent "is generally the most important issue with regard to sexual assault."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|James|flc6x|2011 BCSC 612 (CanLII)|86 CR (6th) 107}}{{perBCSC|Romilly J}}{{atL|flc6x|18}}</ref>

Consent is a matter of the "actual state of mind of the complainant."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Ewanchuk|1fqpm|1999 CanLII 711 (SCC)|[199] 1 SCR 330}}{{perSCC-H|Major J}}{{atL|1fqpm|27}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Nguyen|h3h0n|2017 SKCA 30 (CanLII)|348 CCC (3d) 238}}{{perSKCA|Caldwell JA}}{{atL|h3h0n|8}}<br>
</ref> 
Belief in consent is a matter of the state of mind of the accused.<ref>
{{ibid1|Nguyen}}{{atL|h3h0n|8}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Dippel|fltq2|2011 ABCA 129 (CanLII)|281 CCC (3d) 33}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|fltq2|13}}<br>
</ref>

Consent applies to both the ''actus reus'' and ''mens rea'' of the offence. The ''actus reus'' concerns whether "the complainant was subjectively consenting in her mind" and the ''mens rea'' concerns whether "accused believed that the complainant communicated consent."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|JA|flkm1|2011 SCC 28 (CanLII)|[2011] 2 SCR 440}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|flkm1|37}}<br>
{{supra1|Ewanchuk}}{{atsL|1fqpm|48| to 49}}<br>
</ref>

The absence of consent must be determined on a subjective basis of the complainant "by reference to the complainant's subjective internal state of mind towards the touching, at the time it occurred."<ref>
{{ibid1|Ewanchuk}}{{atL|1fqpm|26}}<br>
</ref>

There is no obligation that the complainant "express her lack of consent or her revocation of consent" before the ''actus reus'' can be made out.<ref>
{{supra1|JA}}{{atL|flkm1|37}}<br>
</ref>

If the trial judge believes the complainant subjectively did not consent, the Crown has proved the absence of consent. The accused’s view of the complainant’s conduct is not relevant to whether the ''actus reus'' has been established. <ref>
{{supra1|Ewanchuk}}{{atL|1fqpm|29}}</ref>

; Implied Consent
There must be actual consent. It is not a defence to sexual assault to suggest implied consent.<ref>
{{supra1|Ewanchuk}}{{atL|1fqpm|31}}</ref>

Implied consent cannot rest on the assumption that there is consent if the woman fails to protest or resist.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|RGB|fprvr|2012 MBCA 5 (CanLII)|287 CCC (3d) 463}}{{perMBCA|Freedman and Chartier JJA}}{{atL|fprvr|54}}
</ref>

; Timing of Consent
Consent must coincide with the sexual activity and can be withdrawn at any time.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Hutchison|g62cv|2014 SCC 19 (CanLII)|[2014] 1 SCR 346}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ and Cromwell J}}{{atL|g62cv|17}}</ref>

; Proof of Lack of Consent
The proof of lack of consent requires that the accused "knew that the complainant was not consenting to the sexual act in question, or was reckless or wilfully blind to the absence of consent.."<ref>
{{supra1|JA}}{{atL|flkm1|24}}<br>
</ref>

In certain cases, the accused may raise a defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.<ref>
{{supra1|JA}}{{atL|flkm1|24}}<br>
</ref>

; Statutory Requirements
In relation to offences of [[Sexual Assault (Offence)|sexual assault]], [[Sexual Assault Causing Bodily Harm (Offence)|sexual assault causing bodily harm (or with a weapon)]], or [[Aggravated Sexual Assault (Offence)|aggravated assault]], consensual sexual activity must be consensual within the meaning of s. 273.1(1) of the Code. Section 273.1 states:

{{quotation2|
; Meaning of “consent”
273.1 (1) Subject to subsection (2) {{AnnSec2|273.1(2)}} and subsection 265(3) {{AnnSec2|265(3)}}, “consent” means, for the purposes of sections 271 {{AnnSec2|271}}, 272 {{AnnSec2|272}} and 273 {{AnnSec2|273}}, the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question.

; Consent
(1.1) Consent must be present at the time the sexual activity in question takes place.

; Question of law
(1.2) The question of whether no consent is obtained under subsection 265(3) {{AnnSec2|265(3)}} or subsection (2) {{AnnSec2|273.1(2)}} or (3) {{AnnSec2|273.1(3)}} is a question of law.

; Where no consent obtained
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1) {{AnnSec2|273.1(2)}}, no consent is obtained if
:(a) the agreement is expressed by the words or conduct of a person other than the complainant;
:(a.‍1) the complainant is unconscious;
:(b) the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity for any reason other than the one referred to in paragraph (a.‍1);
:(c) the accused induces the complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a position of trust, power or authority;
:(d) the complainant expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to engage in the activity; or
:(e) the complainant, having consented to engage in sexual activity, expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to continue to engage in the activity.<br>

; Subsection (2) not limiting
(3) Nothing in subsection (2) {{AnnSec2|273.1(2)}} shall be construed as limiting the circumstances in which no consent is obtained.
<br>
{{LegHistory90s|1992, c. 38}}, s. 1; {{LegHistory10s|2018, c. 29}}, s. 19.<br>{{Annotations}}
|{{CCCSec2|273.1}}
|{{NoteUp|273.1|1|1.1|1.2|2|3}}
}}

{{quotation2|
; Where belief in consent not a defence
273.2 It is not a defence to a charge under section 271 {{AnnSec2|271}}, 272 {{AnnSec2|272}} or 273 {{AnnSec2|273}} that the accused believed that the complainant consented to the activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge, where
:(a) the accused’s belief arose from
::(i) the accused’s self-induced intoxication,
::(ii) the accused’s recklessness or wilful blindness, or
::(iii) any circumstance referred to in subsection 265(3) {{AnnSec2|265(3)}} or 273.1(2) {{AnnSec2|273.1(2)}} or (3) {{AnnSec2|273.1(3)}} in which no consent is obtained;
:(b) the accused did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting; or
:(c) there is no evidence that the complainant’s voluntary agreement to the activity was affirmatively expressed by words or actively expressed by conduct.

{{LegHistory90s|1992, c. 38}}, s. 1; 
{{LegHistory10s|2018, c. 29}}, s. 20.
|{{CCCSec2|273.1}} 
|{{NoteUp|273.1}}
}}

Analysis of consent for sexual offences requires a two-step process:<ref>
{{supra1|Hutchinson}}</ref>
# determine whether there is evidence establishing there was no "voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question" (s. 273.1(1))
# if there was consent (or a reasonable doubt of a lack of consent), then "consider whether there are any circumstances that may vitiate her apparent consent".

Once there is a "no" there is sufficient notice to the accused that there is a problem with consent. This obliges the accused to obtain a clear and unequivocal yes before there is any further sexual activity. <ref>
{{supra1|Ewanchuk}} at para 51
</ref>
The rule equally applies to an obvious statement such as "stop."<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|AE|jfvvt|2021 ABCA 172 (CanLII)}}{{perABCA|Martin JA}}
</ref>
A more modern approach requires that "[n]othing less than positive affirmation" will amount to consent.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Goldfinch||2015 SCC 38 (CanLII)}} at para 44 ("Today, not only does no mean no, but only yes means yes. Nothing less than positive affirmation is required.")
</ref>

; First Step
The first step "requires proof that the complainant did not voluntarily agree to the touching, its sexual nature, or the identity of the partner." 
Other conditions or qualities of the act, such as whether effective birth control was being used or the existence of a sexually transmitted disease are not relevant at this stage. <ref>
{{ibid1|Hutchison}}{{atsL|g62cv|5|}}, {{atsL-np|g62cv|55|}}</ref>
The "sexual activity in question" refers to the ''specific'' physical act, whether it be kissing, petting, oral sex, intercourse, or the use of sex toys. This will be as precise as the form of penetration or the part of the body to be touched.<ref>
{{ibid1|Hutchinson}}{{atL|g62cv|54}}</ref>  The sexual nature of the offence should distinguish from other forms of non-sexual activity such as medical examinations.<ref>
{{ibid1|Hutchinson}}{{atsL|g62cv|57|, 58}}<br>
</ref>
The identity of the sexual partner refers to "a specific individual known personally to her". Where the complainant is mistaken then there can be no consent on this first stage.<ref>
{{ibid1|Hutchinson}}{{atsL|g62cv|58|}}, {{atsL-np|g62cv|63|}}<br>
</ref>

In this first step the Crown must prove the absence of a subjective voluntary agreement to the sexual act in question.<ref>
{{ibid1|Hutchinson}}{{atL|g62cv|55}}</ref>
The absence of consent, as an element of the offence, is "judged subjectively from the complainant's point of view."<ref>
{{ibid1|Hutchison}}{{atL|g62cv|17}}</ref>

; Position of Trust
Section 273.1(2)(c) does not require coercion. It is applicable where the “use of personal feelings and confidence engendered by that relations to secure an apparent consent to sexual activity”.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Lutoslawski|28pdv|2010 ONCA 207 (CanLII)|258 CCC (3d) 1}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}
</ref>

{{Reflist|2}}
===Sexual Activity in Question===
Consent in sexual assault set out in s. 273.1 requires "voluntary agreement" between the persons to "the sexual activity in question". This is meaning is restricted to the complainant's subjective agreement to the "touching and its sexual nature."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Hutchison|g62cv|2014 SCC 19 (CanLII)|[2014] 1 SCR 346}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ and Cromwell J}}
</ref>
The "sexual activity in question" refers to the "physical sex act itself (for example, kissing, petting, oral sex, intercourse, or the use of sex toys)."<ref>
{{ibid1|Hutchison}}{{atL|g62cv|54}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}
===Statutory Exceptions To Consent===
{{seealso|Consent}}
Section 265(3) deems an absence of consent despite evidence of consent in certain circumstances consisting of:<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Hutchison|g62cv|2014 SCC 19 (CanLII)|[2014] 1 SCR 346}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ and Cromwell J}}{{atL|g62cv|4}}</ref> 
* application of force to complainant or another (s. 265(3)(a))
* threats or fear of force to the complainant or another (s. 265(3)(b))
* fraud  (s. 265(3)(c))
* exercise of authority (s. 265(3)(d))

The circumstances set own s. 265(3) identify "situations in which it complainant's apparent consent is not effective because it is not a true reflection of the exercise of the complainant's free will."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Geddes|ghf0g|2015 ONCA 292 (CanLII)|322 CCC (3d) 414}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|ghf0g|32}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

===Statutory Exemption Under s. 273.1(2)===
Section 273.1(2) is a non-exhaustive list of circumstances in which no consent is obtained.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|JA|flkm1|2011 SCC 28 (CanLII)|[2011] 2 SCR 440}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|flkm1|29}} </ref> 
While s. 273.1(3) provides a manner in which courts may consider other circumstances.<ref>
{{ibid1|JA}}{{atL|flkm1|29}}</ref>

; Purposes
The purpose of the provision under s. 273.1(2)(c) is “[t]he protection of the vulnerable and the weak and the preservation of the right to freely choose to consent to sexual activity”.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Snelgrove|hzbr1|2019 SCC 16 (CanLII)|[2019] 2 SCR 98}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Hogg|1fbc4|2000 CanLII 16865 (ON CA)|148 CCC (3d) 86}}{{perONCA|Finlayson JA}}{{atL|1fbc4|17}}<br>
</ref>

; Meaning of "Consent"
"Consent" in s. 273.1 refers to "consent as the conscious agreement of the complainant to engage in every sexual act in a particular encounter."<ref>
{{supra1|JA}}{{atL|flkm1|31}}</ref> 
Consent requires "a conscious, operating mind, capable of granting, revoking or withholding consent to each and every sexual act."
<ref>
{{supra1|JA}}{{atsL|flkm1|44|, 66}}</ref>

All non-verbal behaviours that are being relied upon as "expressions of consent" must be "unequivocal."<ref>
{{CanLIIR-N|TS|, [1999] OJ No 268 (Ont. Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}{{Atp|158}}<br>
</ref>

; Consent Expected in Sexual Encounters
A sexual encounter between two strangers requires "as a matter of logic and common sense ... clear and unambiguous communication of consent."<ref>
{{ibid1|TS}}{{at-|158}}<br>
</ref>
Depending on the circumstances, context of the prior relationship "may, in certain circumstances, impliedly provide scope for the perception of the existence of consent."<ref>
{{ibid1|TS}}{{at-|158}}<br>
</ref>

{{Reflist|2}}

==Capacity to Consent==
Section 273.1(2)(b) deems there to be no consent where "the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity."

Consent in this context means the "conscious agreement of the complainant to engage in every sexual act in the particular encounter."<ref>
{{CanLIIRT|JA||2011 SCC 28 (CanLII)}}{{atL||31}}<Br>
</ref>

Capacity is as necessary precondition to consent.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|GF|jfwh1|2021 SCC 20 (CanLII)}}<!--no SCR decision-->{{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}}{{AtL|jfwh1|55}}
</ref>

A complainant who is (a) unable to say "no" or (b) believes they have no choice in the matter, is not capable of forming subjective consent.<REf>
{{ibid1|GF}}{{AtL|jfwh1|57}}
</ref>

; Burden of Proof
The Crown has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either the absence of a capacity to consent or the absence of consent as a fact.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Haraldson|frdg4|2012 ABCA 147 (CanLII)|102 WCB (2d) 531}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|frdg4|17}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Jensen|6jfs|1996 CanLII 1237 (ON CA)|106 CCC (3d) 430}}{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}} at 439<br>
{{CanLIIRT|Patriquen||2005 NSCA 27 (CanLII)|}}{{AtL||19}}<br> 
</ref>

; Standard of Proof
The existence of "subjective consent requires that the complainant subjectively agree to:<ref>
{{supra1|GF}}{{atL|jfwh1|32}}
</ref>
# the act;
# its "sexual nature";
# the "specific identity of their partner; and
# the existence of a choice to refuse to participate in the sexual act.

The proof beyond a reasonable doubt of absence of any one of these elements will render the complainant unable to consent to the sexual activity.<Ref>
{{supra1|GF}}{{atsL|jfwh1|57|to 58}}
</ref>

Incapacity is established where the evidence is shown that the complainant is "incapable of understanding the sexual nature of the act" or was "not able to appreciate that they may choose to decline to decline to participate in the activity."<ref>
{{supra1|Jensen}} appeal to SCC quashed, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fr43 1997 CanLII 368] (SCC), [1997] 1 SCR 304{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}<br>
</ref>

; Effect of Incapacity
If incapacity is established, the Crown does not need to prove the absence of any prior consent.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Ashlee|1p5bg|2006 ABCA 244 (CanLII)|212 CCC (3d) 477}}{{perABCA|Paperny JA}} (2:1){{atL|1p5bg|20}}<br>
{{supra1|Hutchison}}<br>
</ref>

; Lack of Memory of the Event
The alleged victim's loss of memory of the event "is direct evidence of nothing except the fact that the witness cannot testify as to what happened during a particular period."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|JR|1nw3b|2006 CanLII 22658 (ON SC)|40 CR (6th) 97}}{{perONSC|T Ducharme J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Cedeno|1k1rv|2005 ONCJ 91 (CanLII)|[2005] OJ No 1174 (C.J.)}}{{perONCJ|Duncan J}}<br>
</ref>
It can also permit, in combination with other evidence, the inference that alleged victim did not or was not capable of consenting.<ref>
{{ibid1|JR}}
</ref>
While not strictly necessary, "expert evidence will almost always be essential" is such a case.<ref>
{{ibid1|JR}}
</ref>

A complainant with no memory can testify to their "pre-existing attitudes and assumptions" that they would not have consented to sexual activity at any time. That evidence can be used to make the inference that the complainant subjectively did not consent.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Garciacruz|gg0n5|2015 ONCA 27 (CanLII)|320 CCC (3d) 414}}{{perONCA|Rouleau JA}}{{atL|gg0n5|69}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Kontzamanis|fl1b5|2011 BCCA 184 (CanLII)}}{{perBCCA|Kirkpatrick JA}}{{AtL|fl1b5|31}}<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}
===Broad Advanced Consent===
It is impermissible for a judge to apply a "broad advanced consent" to find that the complainant agreed to figure sexual activity with an "undefined scope."<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Barton|j0fqj|2019 SCC 33 (CanLII)|[2019] 2 SCR 579}}{{atL|j0fqj|99}}<br>
{{CanLIIR|AE|jmjkn|2022 SCC 4 (CanLII)}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver J}}
</ref>

For consent to be valid it must be:<Ref>
{{ibid1|AE}}
</ref>
* "linked to the sexual activity in question";
# "must exist at the time the activity occurs"; and 
* "it can be withdrawn at any time".

{{Reflist|2}}
===Unconsciousness===
An unconscious person cannot provide consent in advance. Such a person is "incapable of consciously evaluating whether she is consenting is therefore not consensual". Consent requires an ongoing conscious consent throughout the sexual activity.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|JA|flkm1|2011 SCC 28 (CanLII)|[2011] 2 SCR 440}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|flkm1|66}}
</ref> 

If a victim is unconscious then the crown may prove lack of consent by circumstantial evidence. <ref>
{{CanLIIRP|JR|1nw3b|2006 CanLII 22658 (ON SC)|[2006] OJ No 2698 (S.C.)}}{{perONSC|T Ducharme J}}</ref> 
While not required, for such evidence to be probative, some expert evidence is often necessary.
<ref>
{{ibid1|JR}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRx|BSB|1zh2w|2008 BCSC 917 (CanLII)}}{{perBCSC|Romilly J}}, affirmed {{CanLII|26tjd|2009 BCCA 520 (CanLII)}}{{perBCCA|Donald JA}}</ref>

As for capacity to consent, courts can infer a lack of capacity where there is direct evidence that:<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|CA|2bn8c|2010 YKSC 32 (CanLII)}}{{perYKSC|Veale J}}</ref>
# the complainant was extremely intoxicated;
# the complainant was asleep or unconscious when the sexual touching commenced; or
# the complainant was asleep or unconscious during all of the sexual touching ({{supra1|BSB}}{{atL|1zh2w|45}}).

{{reflist|2}}

===Intoxication===
The capacity to consent requires more than simply the “baseline physical functions”.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Haraldson|frdg4|2012 ABCA 147 (CanLII)|102 WCB (2d) 531}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|frdg4|7}}</ref>

It is not so low as to render "relatively primitive actions such as walking a short distance, or unassisted vomiting" as being signs of capacity to consent.<ref>
{{CanLIIR-N|JWM|, [2004] OJ No 1295 (S.C.)}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}<br>
</ref>

Drunkeness is not the same as incapacity.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jensen|6jfs|1996 CanLII 1237 (ON CA)|106 CCC (3d) 430}}{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}}</ref> 
Poor decision making, memory loss, or loss of inhibition or self-control due to alcohol does not negate consent.<ref>
{{CanLIIR-N|Merritt|, [2004] OJ No 1295 (Ont. SCJ) }}</ref>
An intoxicated complainant may still have the ability to consent.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|JR|1nw3b|2006 CanLII 22658 (ON SC)| CR (6th) 97 (Ont. SCJ)}}{{perONSC|T Ducharme J}}{{atsL|1nw3b|17| to 19}}, {{atsL-np|1nw3b|43|}}</ref>

Where alcohol may have vitiated consent, it may be best established by way of expert evidence. But it is not necessary as a matter of law.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Faulkner|6hln|1997 CanLII 1193 (ON CA)|120 CCC (3d) 377}}{{perONCA|Goudge JA}}<br>
{{supra1|Merritt}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Hernandez|2dfdr|1997 ABCA 297 (CanLII)|[1997] AJ No 955}}{{perABCA|Sulatycky JA}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|Cedeno|1k1rv|2005 ONCJ 91 (CanLII)|195 CCC (3d) 468}}{{perONCJ|Duncan J}}{{atL|1k1rv|18}}</ref>

Consent may be vitiated by abusing a position of trust, power or authority.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Asfour|1mc1x|2006 CanLII 577 (ON CA)|206 OAC 210}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}</ref>

Threats or abuse that occur after the event cannot go towards vitiation of consent.<ref>
{{ibid1|Asfour}}</ref>

The judge may not make a finding that consent was "not possible" on the sole basis that the complainant was "drinking heavily."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|AW|217c8|2008 NLCA 52 (CanLII)|856 APR 199}}{{perNLCA|Rowe JA}}</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

== Abuse of Position of Trust (s. 265(3)(d) and 273.1(3)(c))==
The term "exercise of authority" under s. 265(3)(d) is intended to capture relationships in which one party has "the power to influence the conduct and actions" of others.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Matheson|1f9fs|1999 CanLII 3719 (ON CA)|134 CCC (3d) 289}}{{perONCA|Austin JA}}<br>
</ref> 
However, influence "is a question of degree" whereby at some point "influence becomes coercion and a parent consent is nothing more than submission". it is when it becomes coercion that section 265(3)(d) is engaged.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Geddes|ghf0g|2015 ONCA 292 (CanLII)|322 CCC (3d) 414}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|ghf0g|34}}</ref> 

The accused will be in a position of authority when he "can coerce the complainant into consent by virtue of their relationship."<ref>
{{supra1|Geddes}}{{atL|ghf0g|36}} ("An accused stands in a position of authority over a complainant if the accused can coerce the complainant into consent by virtue of their relationship.")</ref> 
Such a relationship does not necessarily mean that lawful consent is impossible. Rather the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual activity was obtained by "the exercise of that coercive authority over the complainant."<ref>
{{supra1|Geddes}}{{atL|ghf0g|36}} ("The Crown must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused secured the complainant’s apparent consent to the sexual activity which is the subject matter of the charge by the exercise of that coercive authority over the complainant")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Samkov|1w4gb|2008 ONCA 192 (CanLII)|[2008] OJ No 1005}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|1w4gb|7}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Farler|fvvf8|2013 NSCA 13 (CanLII)|326 NSR (2d) 255}}{{perNSCA|Beveridge JA}}{{atsL|fvvf8|77| to 78}}<br>
</ref>

Section 273.1(3)(c) states "For the purpose of subsection (1), no consent is obtained if ...(c) the accused induces the complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a position of trust, power or authority;"

The determination of whether the coercive exercise of authority vitiates consent requires considerations of elements including:<ref>
{{supra1|Geddes}}{{atL|ghf0g|37}} ("The determination of whether apparent consent is vitiated by a coercive exercise of authority will require an examination of the nature of the relationship between the accused and the complainant, as well as the specific circumstances surrounding the apparent consent to the sexual activity in issue. There is no closed list of factors relevant to the assessment of the nature of the relationship and no one factor is necessarily determinative of the nature of the relationship. ")
</ref>
* the nature of the relationship
* the specific circumstances surrounding the apparent consent
* any other issues relevant to the assessment the nature of the relationship

The type of coercion suggested in s. 265(3) is not the same as that found in s. 273.1(2).<Ref>
{{supra1|Hogg}}
</ref>

Coercion under s. 265(3) addresses "consent obtained where the complainant submits or does not resist by reason" of the exercise of authority.<ref>
{{supra1|Hogg}}
</ref>

Coercion under s. 273.1(2) include the use of "personal feelings and confidence engendered by that relationship to secure an apparent consent."<ref>
{{supra1|Hogg}}
</ref>

Such positions of authority can include doctor-patient relationships or student-teacher relationships.<ref> 
{{supra1|Geddes}}{{atL|ghf0g|37}}</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Fraud==
In a sexual assault context, fraud will vitiate consent where an "objectively dishonest act" (i.e. falsehoods or failure to disclose) has "the effect of exposing the person consenting to a significant risk of serious bodily harm."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Cuerrier|1fqr9|1998 CanLII 796 (SCC)|[1998] 2 SCR 371}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}{{atsL|1fqr9|14|}}, {{atsL-np|1fqr9|128|}}</ref>
To be dishonest, the acts must be those that "a reasonable person would find them to be dishonest."<ref>
{{ibid1|Cuerrier}} at 49<br>
</ref>

Trivial harm or mere risk of harm is not sufficient to vitiate an otherwise consensual act.<ref>
{{ibid1|Cuerrier}}{{atL|1fqr9|128}}</ref>
Thus, "careful use of a condom might reduce risk" to a point that consent is not vitiated.<ref>
{{ibid1|Cuerrier}}{{atL|1fqr9|129}}</ref>

The failure of the accused to disclose that they are HIV positive before sex can vitiate any consent for sex that the victim gave.<ref>
{{ibid1|Cuerrier}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Mabior|ft1pq|2012 SCC 47 (CanLII)|[2012] 2 SCR 584}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}
</ref>

Where "deception causes a misunderstanding as to the nature of the act itself there is no legally recognized consent because what happened is not that for which consent was given"<ref>
{{ibid1|Cuerrier}}{{atL|1fqr9|99}}
</ref>Consent that is not based on a knowledge of the significant relevant factors in not valid.<ref>
{{supra1|Cuerrier}}{{atL|1fqr9|127}}</ref>

{{Reflist|2}}

==Honest but Mistaken Belief in Consent==
* [[Honest But Mistaken Belief in Consent]]

==Capacity for Consent for Under 16 Years of Age== 
* [[Age of Consent in Sexual Offences]] (s. 150.1)

==See Also==
* [[Mistaken Belief of Age]]
* [https://beta.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/uk/cases/UKHL/1993/19.html R v Brown <nowiki>[1993]</nowiki> UKHL 19]