View source for Principles of Fundamental Justice

[[Fr:Principes_de_justice_fondamentale]]
{{Currency2|January|2021}}
{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderChallenge}}{{HeaderPFJ}}
==General Principles==

Section 7 of the Charter prohibits the state from interfering a person's rights to "life, liberty and security of the person."
Section 7 states that:
{{quotation1|
; Life, liberty and security of person
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
|[http://canlii.ca/t/8q7l CCRF]
}}

The rights enumerated under s. 7 of the Charter can be compromised in the cases where the infringing law is in "accordance with the principles of fundamental justice."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Morgentaler|1ftjt|1988 CanLII 90 (SCC)|[1988] 1 SCR 30}}{{perSCC|Dickson CJ}} (concurring) (5:2){{atp|56}}
</ref>That is, there are core values within the justice system that must prevail over these rights for the greater good of society. These include natural justice and  substantive guarantees,<ref> first suggested in {{CanLIIRPC|Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act|dln|1985 CanLII 81 (SCC)|[1985] 2 SCR 486}}{{perSCC|Lamer J}} (7:0)<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)|1qljj|2007 SCC 9 (CanLII)|[2007] 1 SCR 350}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}} (9:0){{atL|1qljj|19}} ("Section 7  of the Charter  requires that laws that interfere with life, liberty and security of the person conform to the principles of fundamental justice — the basic principles that underlie our notions of justice and fair process.  These principles include a guarantee of procedural fairness, having regard to the circumstances and consequences of the intrusion on life, liberty or security...")<br>
</ref> 
including rights guaranteed by the other legal rights in the Charter (i.e., rights against unreasonable search and seizure, guaranteed under section 8 of the Charter, and against cruel and unusual punishments, under section 12, are part of fundamental justice under section 7 as well).  Other "Principles" are determined by the court and form the basis of the Canadian legal system.

; Requirements of a Principle of Fundamental Justice
It "must be a legal principle about which there is sufficient societal consensus that it is fundamental to the way in which the legal system should fairly operate, and it must be identified with sufficient precision to yield a manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty, or security of the person."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Malmo-Levine; R v Caine|1gbdn|2003 SCC 74 (CanLII)|[2003] 3 SCR 571}}{{perSCC|Gonthier and Binnie JJ}} (6:3)</ref>

The principle is "informed in part by the rules of natural justice and the concept of procedural fairness"<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Ruby v Canada (Solicitor General)|1k7|2002 SCC 75 (CanLII)|[2002] 4 SCR 3}}{{perSCC-H|Arbour J}} (9:0){{AtL|1k7|39}}<br>
{{supra1|Charkaoui}}{{atL|1qljj|19}}<br>
</ref>

; Procedural Requirements
The PFJ do not require that an accused be entitled to the most favourable procedures possible.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Lyons|1ftlw|1987 CanLII 25 (SCC)|[1987] 2 SCR 309}}{{perSCC|La Forest J}} (5:2)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Mills|1fqkl|1999 CanLII 637 (SCC)|[1999] 3 SCR 668}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin and Iacobucci
JJ}} (7:1) PFJs "do not guarantee the most favourable procedures conceivable."<br>
</ref>

Whether a particular procedure will conform to the PFJ is may require the judge "to balance the competing interests of the state and individual."<ref>
{{ibid1|Ruby}}{{atL|1k7|39}}<br>
{{supra1|Charkaoui}}{{atL|1qljj|20}} ("Section 7  of the Charter  requires not a particular type of process, but a fair process having regard to the nature of the proceedings and the interests at stake:")
</ref>
What is required will depend on the context.<ref>
{{supra1|Charkaoui}}{{atL|1qljj|20}}<br>
</ref>

; Established Principles of Fundamental Justice
Established ''Principles of Fundamental Justice'' include:
* Vagueness
* Arbitrariness
* Overbreadth
* Gross Disproportionality
* Right to Silence
* Minimum Level of Mens Rea
* Right to Full Answer and Defence

{{reflist|2}}
===Standing===
The meaning of "everyone" includes ever person physically present in Canada.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Singh v Minister of Employment and Immigration|1fv22|1985 CanLII 65 (SCC)|[1985] 1 SCR 177}}{{perSCC|Wilson J}} (6:0) ("I am prepared to accept that the term includes every human being who is physically present in Canada and by virtue of such presence amenable to Canadian law.")<br>
</ref>
All individuals, including those non-citizens within Canada, are able to claim rights under s. 7 Charter.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)|1qljj|2007 SCC 9 (CanLII)|[2007] 1 SCR 350}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}} (9:0){{atsL|1qljj|17| and 18}}<br>
</ref>

; Actions Outside of Canada
{{seealso|Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction of the Courts}}

Section 7 may be relied upon by a party for conduct occurring outside of Canada where it is established that the Canadian government participated "in activities of a foreign state or its agents that are contrary to Canada’s international obligations or fundamental human rights norms."<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr|27qn6|2010 SCC 3 (CanLII)|[2010] 1 SCR 44}}{{TheCourtSCC}} (9:0){{atL|27qn6|14}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Hape|1rq5n|2007 SCC 26 (CanLII)|[2007] 2 SCR 292}}{{perSCC|LeBel J}} (9:0){{atL|1rq5n|52}}<br>
</ref>

In extradition or deportations, the Canadian government are participants in any deprivation of rights under s. 7 of the Charter where it is a "foreseeable consequences" of their involvement and there is a "sufficient causal connection" between the government action and the deprivation of rights.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|United States v Burns|523r|2001 SCC 7 (CanLII)|[2001] 1 SCR 283}}{{TheCourtSCC}} (9:0){{atsL|523r|59| to 60}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)|51wf|2002 SCC 1 (CanLII)|[2002] 1 SCR 3}}{{TheCourtSCC}} (9:0){{atL|51wf|54}} ("where Canada’s participation is a necessary precondition for the deprivation and where the deprivation is an entirely foreseeable consequence of Canada’s participation, the government does not avoid the guarantee of fundamental justice merely because the deprivation in question would be effected by someone else’s hand")<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re)|1hblc|2004 SCC 42 (CanLII)|[2004] 2 SCR 248}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci and Arbour JJ}} (6:3){{atL|1hblc|75}} (The "guarantees of fundamental justice apply even where deprivations of life, liberty or security may be effected by actors other than the Canadian government, if a sufficient causal connection exists between the participation of the Canadian government and the ultimate deprivation effected")<br>
</ref>

; Corporate Persons
A corporation does not have the same rights under s. 7 of the Charter as those of an individual.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|British Columbia Securities Commission v Branch|1frjv|1995 CanLII 142 (SCC)|[1995] 2 SCR 3}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka and Iacobucci JJ}} (9:0)<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Irwin Toy Ltd. v Quebec (Attorney General)|1ft6g|1989 CanLII 87 (SCC)|[1989] 1 SCR 927}}{{perSCC|Dickson CJ, Lamer and Wilson JJ}} (3:2) <br>
</ref>
A corporation however may rely upon the Charter in its defence under criminal or civil proceedings advanced by the government.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Big M Drug Mart Ltd.|1fv2b|1985 CanLII 69 (SCC)|[1985] 1 SCR 295}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}} (6:0) <br>
{{CanLIIRP|Wholesale Travel Group Inc|1fsjf|1991 CanLII 39 (SCC)|[1991] 3 SCR 154}}{{perSCC|Cory J}} <br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Infringement of Life, Liberty and Security of the Person==
To find a breach under s. 7, a claimant must establish:<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Malmo-Levine|1gbdn|2003 SCC 74 (CanLII)|[2003] 3 SCR 571}}{{perSCC|Gonthier and Binnie JJ}}{{atL|1gbdn|83}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|White|1fqlm|1999 CanLII 689 (SCC)|[1999] 2 SCR 417}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}} (6:1){{atL|1fqlm|38}}<br> 
{{CanLIIRP|S(RJ)|1frmw|1995 CanLII 121 (SCC)|[1995] 1 SCR 451}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}} (9:0){{atp|479}}<br>
</ref>
# whether the accused was deprived of one of the three interests;
# whether the deprivation accords with any identified principle(s) of fundamental justice.

{{reflist|2}}
===Liberty===
The principle of "liberty" protects a person's right to make fundamental personal choices free from state interference.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission)|525t|2000 SCC 44 (CanLII)|[2000] 2 SCR 307}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}{{atL|525t|54}} (Liberty is "the right to make fundamental personal choices free from state interference")<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Carter v Canada (AG)|gg5z4|2015 SCC 5 (CanLII)|[2015] 1 SCR 331}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|gg5z4|64}}} ("Underlying both of these rights is a concern for the protection of individual autonomy and dignity.  Liberty protects “the right to make fundamental personal choices free from state interference”:  ...")<br>
</ref>

It applies particularly "where state compulsions or prohibitions affect important or fundamental life choices."<ref>
{{supra1|Blencoe}}{{atL|525t|49}}
</ref>

It is "rooted in fundamental notions of human dignity, personal autonomy, privacy and choice in decisions regarding an individual’s fundamental being."<ref>
{{supra1|Blencoe}}{{AtL|525t|50}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Arbitrariness==
It is a principle of fundamental justice that laws should not be arbitrary.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Malmo-Levine; R v Caine|1gbdn|2003 SCC 74 (CanLII)|[2003] 3 SCR 571}}{{perSCC|Gonthier and Binnie JJ}} (6:3)</ref>
That is, the state cannot limit an individual's rights where "it bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the objective that lies behind [it]."<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General)|1frz0|1993 CanLII 75 (SCC)|[1993] 3 SCR 519}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}} (5:4)</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Vagueness==
The "Principles of Fundamental Justice" require laws to have a clear and understandable interpretation so as to properly define the rule or offence.

A law is unconstitutionally vague if it does not have clarity enough to create "legal debate". There must be clarity of ''purpose'', ''subject matter'', ''nature'', ''prior judicial interpretation'', ''societal values'', and '' related provisions''. This does not prevent the use of broadly defined terms so long as societal objectives can be gleaned from it.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Ontario v Canadian Pacific Ltd|1frjl|1995 CanLII 112 (SCC)|[1995] 2 SCR 1031}}{{perSCC|Gonthier J}} (9:0)<br>
{{supra1|Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society}}<br>
</ref>

When Parliament chooses to criminalize "preliminary" conduct overbreadth and vagueness become concerns.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|United States of America v Nadarajah|2f044|2010 ONCA 859 (CanLII)|266 CCC (3d) 447}}{{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0)</ref>

To conform with s. 7, a law must "afford citizens of fair notice of the consequences of their conduct" and must "limit the discretion of those charged with its enforcement."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Levkovic|fx94z|2013 SCC 25 (CanLII)|[2013] 2 SCR 204}}{{perSCC-H|Fish J}} (7:0)<br>
</ref>

A law is unconstitutionally vague where it does not give a person fair notice of what to avoid and does not limit the discretion of law enforcement with clear and explicit legislative standards.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society|1fs9g|1992 CanLII 72 (SCC)|[1992] 2 SCR 606}}{{perSCC|Gonthier J}} (7:0)<br>
{{supra1|Levkovic}}{{atL|fx94z|2}}</ref>

Factors to be considered include:<ref>
{{supra1|Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society}}<br>
</ref>
# the need for flexibility and the interpretative role of the courts; 
# the impossibility of achieving absolute certainty, a standard of intelligibility being more appropriate, and 
# the possibility that many varying judicial interpretations of a given disposition may exist and perhaps coexist.

To determine if a law is vague the court should look at it's full interpretive context, including:<ref>
{{supra1|Levkovic}}{{atL|fx94z|48}}</ref>
# prior judicial interpretations; 
# the legislative purpose; 
# the subject matter and nature of the impugned provision; 
# societal values; and 
# related legislative provisions
 
{{reflist|2}}

==Overbreadth==
The "Principles of Fundamental Justice" require that ''means'' used to achieve a societal purpose or objective must be reasonably necessary.

A law is "overbreadth" when there is no connection between the persons' s. 7 interests and the purpose of the law.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Bedford|g2f56|2013 SCC 72 (CanLII)|[2013] 3 SCR 1101}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|g2f56|101}} ("Another way in which laws may violate our basic values is through what the cases have called “overbreadth”: the law goes too far and interferes with some conduct that bears no connection to its objective.")
</ref>
That is, the law's effect upon the personal rights of the claimant is unnecessary to the objective. 

As an initial step to the analysis of overbreadth is it necessary to "identify the law's purpose and effects" to determine "whether there is a disconnect between the two."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Moriarity|gm4nr|2015 SCC 55 (CanLII)|[2015] 3 SCR 485}}{{perSCC|Cromwell J}} (9:0){{atL|gm4nr|24}}<br>
</ref>

The party challenging the law only needs to show that the law is overbreadth for a single person.<Ref>
{{Supra1|Bedford}}{{atsL|g2f56|111|, 113, 121}}
</ref>
A law that is overbreadth is one where the scope "includes ''some'' conduct that bears no relation to its purpose" and it has "no rational connection between the purpose of the law and ''some'', but not all, of its impact."<ref>
{{Supra1|Bedford}}{{atL|g2f56|112}}
</ref>

; Means 
This principle is violated when the government, in pursuing a "legitimate objective", uses "means" that unnecessarily and disproportionately interfere with an individual's rights. <ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Heywood|1frnd|1994 CanLII 34 (SCC)|[1994] 3 SCR 761}}{{perSCC|Cory J}} (5:4) </ref>

; "Preliminary" Conduct
When Parliament chooses to criminalize "preliminary" conduct overbreadth and vagueness become concerns.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|United States of America v Nadarajah|2f044|2010 ONCA 859 (CanLII)|266 CCC (3d) 447}}{{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0)</ref>

; Deference
Policy-maker may make choices within a range of options.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Ndhlovu|j9hc6|2020 ABCA 307 (CanLII)}}{{perABCA|Schutz JA}} (2:1){{atL||88}} (under appeal)
</ref>
Courts are not to micromanage the policy choices of the legislature.<Ref>
{{ibid1|Ndhlovu}}{{atL|j9hc6|88}} (under appeal)
</ref> 

Once harm is made out, the weighing and calculation of the nature and extent of harm is parliament's job.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Malmo-Levine; R v Caine|1gbdn|2003 SCC 74 (CanLII)|[2003] 3 SCR 571}}{{atL|1gbdn|133}}
</ref>

The courts will vary deference to the objective depending on the "social context in which the limitation on rights is imposed" and where there is "difficulty of devising legislative solutions to social problems which may be only incompletely understood."<Ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General)|1frgz|1995 CanLII 64 (SCC)|[1995] 3 SCR 199}}{{AtsL|1frgz|135|, 127}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}
===Object of the Law===
The first step in the analysis is to identify "the object" of the impugned law.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Carter v Canada (Attorney General)|gg5z4|2015 SCC 5 (CanLII)|[2015] 1 SCR 331}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atL|gg5z4|73}}
</ref>

; Object at face-value 
The object of the law and whether it achieves the objective should be taken at "face value" at this stage.<Ref>
{{supra1|Bedford}}{{atL|g2f56|125}}
</ref>

; Context-dependent 
The purpose must be considered in the "context of the legislative scheme" in which it is found.<ref>
{{ibid1|Moriarity}}{{atL|gm4nr|24}}<br>
</ref>

; Scope of Object
The identified purpose must be not too general or too specific.<ref>
{{ibid1|Moriarity}}{{atL|gm4nr|28}} ("If the purpose is articulated in too general terms, it will provide no meaningful check on the means employed to achieve it, almost any challenged provision will likely be rationally connected to a very broadly stated purpose... On the other hand, if the identified purpose is articulated in too specific terms, then the distinction between ends and means may be lost and the statement of purpose will effectively foreclose any separate inquiry into the connection between them.")<br>
</ref>
The appropriate generality must be one of an "animating social value."<ref>
{{ibid1|Moriarity}}{{atL|gm4nr|28}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Carter v Canada (AG)|gg5z4|2015 SCC 5 (CanLII)|[2015] 1 SCR 331}}{{TheCourtSCC}} (9:0){{AtL|gg5z4|76}}<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}
===Relationship with s. 1 of the Charter===
The analysis in s. 7 concerns whether the negative effect of the law on the enumerated protections accord with the PFJ. While analysis under s. 1 concerns the negative effect of the law are proportionate to the goals of the law in furtherance of the public interest.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Bedford|g2f56|2013 SCC 72 (CanLII)|[2013] 3 SCR 1101}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|g2f56|125}} ("The question under s. 7 is whether the law’s negative effect on life, liberty, or security of the person is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. With respect to the principles of arbitrariness, overbreadth, and gross disproportionality, the specific questions are whether the law’s purpose, taken at face value, is connected to its effects and whether the negative effect is grossly disproportionate to the law’s purpose.  Under s. 1, the question is different — whether the negative impact of a law on the rights of individuals is proportionate to the pressing and substantial goal of the law in furthering the public interest.  The question of justification on the basis of an overarching public goal is at the heart of s. 1, but it plays no part in the s. 7 analysis, which is concerned with the narrower question of whether the impugned law infringes individual rights.")
</ref>

Arguments concerning the justification for the scope of a law should generally be considered in the s. 1 analysis and not the s. 7 overbreadth analysis.<ref>
{{supra1|Bedford}}{{atL|g2f56|144}}
</ref>
This would include consideration of the practicalities of enforcement.<ref>
{{supra1|Bedford}}{{atL|g2f56|113}}
</reF>

{{reflist|2}}

==Gross Disproportionality==
The rule against gross disproportionality concerns laws that impose deprivation that is out of sync with the objective measure.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Bedford|g2f56|2013 SCC 72 (CanLII)|[2013] 3 SCR 1101}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atp|g2f56|120}} (Gross disproportionality "targets the second fundamental evil:  the law’s effects on life, liberty or security of the person are so grossly disproportionate to its purposes that they cannot rationally be supported.  The rule against gross disproportionality only applies in extreme cases where the seriousness of the deprivation is totally out of sync with the objective of the measure.  This idea is captured by the hypothetical of a law with the purpose of keeping the streets clean that imposes a sentence of life imprisonment for spitting on the sidewalk.  The connection between the draconian impact of the law and its object must be entirely outside the norms accepted in our free and democratic society. ")
</ref> 
The impact upon life, liberty and security of person is so high that it overides the achievement of the objective.

The inquiry assumes that the law achieves its objectives.<ref>
{{ibid1|Bedford}}{{atL|g2f56|121}}
</ref>

The analysis does not consider the beneficial effects of the law. It only balances the negative effect against the objective.<ref>
{{ibid1|Bedford}}{{AtL|g2f56|121}} ("Gross disproportionality under s. 7 of the Charter does not consider the beneficial effects of the law for society.  It balances the negative effect on the individual against the purpose of the law, not against societal benefit that might flow from the law.")
</ref>

It compares "the rights infringement ... with the objective of the law, not with the law's effectiveness."<Ref>
{{ibid1|Bedford}}{{AtL|g2f56|123}}
</ref>

The number of people affected by the law is not a concern so long as it impacts at least one person.<ref>
{{ibid1|Bedford}}{{AtL|g2f56|122}} ("Thus, gross disproportionality is not concerned with the number of people who experience grossly disproportionate effects; a grossly disproportionate effect on one person is sufficient to violate the norm. ")
</ref>

; Proportion
The proportionality considers whether the effects of the law are "totally out of sync" with the objectives of the law such that it is "entirely outside the norms accepted in our free and democratic society."<Ref>
{{ibid1|Bedford}}{{AtL|g2f56|120}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Requirement of Mens Rea==
The "principles of fundamental justice" require that criminal offences that have sentences involving prison must have a ''mens rea'' element.<ref>
See {{CanLIIRPC|Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act|dln|1985 CanLII 81 (SCC)|[1985] 2 SCR 486}}{{perSCC|Lamer J}} (7:0)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Vaillancourt|1fthw|1987 CanLII 2 (SCC)|[1987] 2 SCR 636}}{{perSCC|Lamer J}} (6:1)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Pontes|1frgr|1995 CanLII 61 (SCC)|[1995] 3 SCR 44}}{{perSCC|Cory J}} (5:4)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Hess|1fst0|1990 CanLII 89 (SCC)|[1990] 2 SCR 906}}{{perSCC|Wilson J}} (5:2)<br>
</ref>

For many cases, however, an objective standard of negligence has been acceptable where the elements included a proof of a "marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would take in the circumstances". This has been specifically affirmed for 
careless use of a firearm (86),<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Gosset|1fs0c|1993 CanLII 62 (SCC)|[1993] 3 SCR 76}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}} (8:0) <br>
{{CanLIIRP|Finlay|1fs0f|1993 CanLII 63 (SCC)|[1993] 3 SCR 103}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}} (5:0) <br>
</ref>
failing to provide the necessities of life (215),<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Naglik|1fs0h|1993 CanLII 64 (SCC)|[1993] 3 SCR 122}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}} (7:2) </ref>
dangerous operation of a motor vehicle (249),<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Hundal|1fs58|1993 CanLII 120 (SCC)|[1993] 1 SCR 867}}{{perSCC|Cory J}} (8:0)</ref>
manslaughter (234 to 236),<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Creighton|1fs09|1993 CanLII 61 (SCC)|[1993] 3 SCR 3}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}} (9:0)
</ref>
and offences composed of "causing bodily harm" (267, 272, 255).<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|DeSousa|1fsb0|1992 CanLII 80 (SCC)|[1992] 2 SCR 944}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}} (5:0)</ref>

An objective fault has otherwise been endorsed as constitutional with the exception of a small group of the most serious offences.<ref>
{{supra1|Creighton}} ("an objective fault requirement is constitutionally sufficient for a broad range of offences other than 
</ref>

For more serious crimes such as murder that impose a stigma as part of the conviction, the minimum mental element must be proven on a "subjective" level.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Martineau|1fssd|1990 CanLII 80 (SCC)|[1990] 2 SCR 633}}{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}} (5:2)</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Punishments That Shock the Conscience==
{{seealso|Cruel and Unusual Punishment}}
Government decisions to extradite people are bound by section 7 of the Charter.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Canada v Schmidt|1ftp0|1987 CanLII 48 (SCC)|[1987] 1 SCR 500}}{{perSCC|La Forest J}} (7:0)
</ref>
Moreover, it is possible that a potential punishment in the receiving country "shocks the conscience" to the extent that the Canadian government would breach fundamental justice if they extradited people there, and thus put them at risk of something shocking.  In determining what would shock the conscience, the Court said some elements of fundamental justice in Canada, such as the presumption of innocence, could be seen as "finicky" and thus irrelevant to extradition.  In contrast, the possibility of torture would be shocking.<ref>
{{ibid1|Canada v Schmidt}}</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Right to a Fair Trial==

===Racial Profiling===
* [[Racial Profiling]]

===Right to Make Full Answer and Defence===
{{seealso|Right to Make Full Answer and Defence}}

===Abuse of Process===
* [[Abuse of Process]]

===Right to Counsel===
* [[Ineffective Counsel]]

Effective counsel is a principle of fundamental justice.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|GDB|526g|2000 SCC 22 (CanLII)|[2000] 1 SCR 520}}{{perSCC-H|Major J}} (5:0){{atL|526g|24}} ("Today the right to effective assistance of counsel extends to all accused persons.  In Canada that right is seen as a principle of fundamental justice.  It is derived from the evolution of the common law, s. 650(3) of the Criminal Code of Canada and ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.")<br>
</ref>

As is the prohibition against imposing duties on counsel that undermine their commitment to their clients' causes.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada|gg977|2015 SCC 7 (CanLII)|[2015] 1 SCR 401}}{{atL|gg977|84}} ("We should, in my view, recognize as a principle of fundamental justice that the state cannot impose duties on lawyers that undermine their duty of commitment to their clients’ causes.")
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Right to Silence==
{{seealso|Right Against Self-Crimination}}
The right to silence was a principle of fundamental justice.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Hebert|1fst9|1990 CanLII 118 (SCC)|[1990] 2 SCR 151}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}} (9:0)</ref> 
Statements of the accused cannot be achieved through police trickery and silence cannot be used to make any inference of guilt.

{{reflist|2}}

==Diminished Moral Culpability for Youths==
{{seealso|Sentencing Young Offenders}}
It is a PFJ that "young people are entitled to a presumption of diminished moral culpability"<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|DB|1wxc8|2008 SCC 25 (CanLII)|[2008] 2 SCR 3}}{{perSCC-H|Abella J}} (5:4){{atL|1wxc8|70}}</ref> and so the ''Youth Criminal Justice Act'' cannot create a presumption of an adult sentence upon youths.

{{reflist|2}}

==Privacy of Youth==
There is some suggestion that youth privacy protected under the YCJA is a PFJ.<Ref>
{{CanLIIR|CD|k3zh1|2024 NSPC 22 (CanLII)}}{{perNSPC|Buckle J}}
</ref>

==Presumption of Innocence==
{{seealso|Presumption of Innocence}}

; Conviction of the Innocent
It is also a principle of fundamental justice that "the innocent must not be convicted."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Mills|1fqkl|1999 CanLII 637 (SCC)|[1999] 3 SCR 668}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ}}{{atL|1fqkl|71}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Leipert|1fr41|1997 CanLII 367 (SCC)|[1997] 1 SCR 281}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}{{atL|1fr41|24}}<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Accused's Autonomy in Trial==
The right of an accused to certain aspects of decision-making in conducting a defence is a PFJ.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Swain|1fsks|1991 CanLII 104 (SCC)|[1991] 1 SCR 933}}{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Solicitor-Client Privilege==
{{seealso|Solicitor-Client Privilege}}

The right  solicitor-client privilege is a principle of fundamental justice.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Canada (National Revenue) v Thompson|grxb3|2016 SCC 21 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 381}}{{perSCC|Wagner and Gascon JJ}} (6:0){{AtL|grxb3|17}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|McClure|5228|2001 SCC 14 (CanLII)|[2001] 1 SCR 445}}{{perSCC-H|Major J}}{{atps|453 to 460}}<br>
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==Border Security==
There is some suggestion that "Canada's effective control over its borders" is important enough to be a "principle of fundamental justice."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jones|1p4dt|2006 CanLII 28086 (ON CA)|211 CCC (3d) 4}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}} (3:0){{atL|1p4dt|31}}
</ref>

{{Reflist|2}}

==Rejected Principles==
Throughout the development of fundamental justice, petitioners have suggested many principles that the Courts have rejected for not being sufficiently fundamental to justice.

; Harm Requirement for Criminal Law
An element of "harm" is not an essential component to all criminal offences.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Malmo-Levine|1gbdn|2003 SCC 74 (CanLII)|[2003] 3 SCR 571}}{{perSCC|Gonthier and Binnie JJ}} (6:3), - argued to strike down marijuana laws</ref>

; Symmetry of Actus Reus and Mens Rea
There is no need for there to be symmetry between the ''actus reus'' and mens rea in all offences.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|DeSousa|1fsb0|1992 CanLII 80 (SCC)|[1992] 2 SCR 944}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}} (5:0)
</ref>

; The Best Interests of the Child
Laws affecting children do not always have to be "in the best interest of the child."<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (Attorney General)|1g990|2004 SCC 4 (CanLII)|[2004] 1 SCR 76}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}} (6:3)
</ref>

; Human Dignity
Human dignity is not a protected interest as a principle of fundamental justice.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General)|1frz0|1993 CanLII 75 (SCC)|[1993] 3 SCR 519}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}} (5:4){{AtL|1frz0|145}}<br>
</ref> 
It is however protected under the "life, liberty and security of person" clause of s. 7 of the Charter.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Morgentaler|1ftjt|1988 CanLII 90 (SCC)|37 CCC (3d) 449}}{{perSCC|Wilson J}} (concurring) (5:2){{atps|549-550}}<br> 
{{supra1|Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General)}}{{atsL|1frz0|136| to 137}}<br>
</ref>

; Aboriginal Status
It is not a PFJ that Crown must consider the accused's aboriginal status before making decisions that will limit the judge's sentencing options.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Anderson|g784t|2014 SCC 41 (CanLII)|[2014] 2 SCR 167}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver J}} (7:0){{atsL|g784t|29| to 33}}<br>
</ref>

; Requirement to Proclaim Statutory Provisions
The legislatures' failure to proclaim law an alternative measures program does not violate s. 7 or 15 of the Charter.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|GS|1fstm|1990 CanLII 66 (SCC)|[1990] 2 SCR 294}}{{perSCC|Dickson CJ}}
</ref>

{{reflist|2}}

==See Also==
* [[Justifiable Limitations on Rights]]