Exceptions to Solicitor-Client Privilege: Difference between revisions
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{{Currency2|January|2020}} | |||
{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderPrivilege}} | {{LevelZero}}{{HeaderPrivilege}} | ||
==General Principles== | ==General Principles== | ||
{{seealso|Solicitor-Client Privilege}} | {{seealso|Solicitor-Client Privilege}} | ||
There are three primary occasions when solicitor‑client privilege may be overruled, namely when innocence at stake is engaged, the client's communications are themselves criminal, or it is necessary to protect public safety.<ref> | There are three primary occasions when solicitor‑client privilege may be overruled, namely when innocence at stake is engaged, the client's communications are themselves criminal, or it is necessary to protect public safety.<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRPC|Smith v Jones|1fqp9|1999 CanLII 674 (SCC)| | {{CanLIIRPC|Smith v Jones|1fqp9|1999 CanLII 674 (SCC)|[1999] 1 SCR 455}}{{perSCC|Cory J}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Any piercing of privilege should be considered an "extraordinary measure" | Any piercing of privilege should be considered an "extraordinary measure."<ref> | ||
{{ | {{CanLIIRP|Brown|51tj|2002 SCC 32 (CanLII)|[2002] 2 SCR 185}}{{perSCC-H|Major J}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Line 15: | Line 17: | ||
The threshold test for innocence at stake exemption from privilege has a two-step process. The accused must establish that:<ref> | The threshold test for innocence at stake exemption from privilege has a two-step process. The accused must establish that:<ref> | ||
{{ | {{CanLIIRP|McClure|5228|2001 SCC 445 (CanLII)|[2001] 1 SCR 445}}{{perSCC-H|Major J}} - this is the first case to recognize an innocence-at-stake exception to privilege<br> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|Brown|51tj|2002 SCC 32 (CanLII)|[2002] 2 SCR 185}}{{perSCC|Major J}}<br> | {{CanLIIRP|Brown|51tj|2002 SCC 32 (CanLII)|[2002] 2 SCR 185}}{{perSCC-H|Major J}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
* the information he seeks from the solicitor-client communication is not available from any other source; and | * the information he seeks from the solicitor-client communication is not available from any other source; and | ||
Line 26: | Line 28: | ||
* If the innocence at stake test is satisfied, the judge should order disclosure of the communications that are likely to raise a reasonable doubt, in accordance with the guiding principles discussed. | * If the innocence at stake test is satisfied, the judge should order disclosure of the communications that are likely to raise a reasonable doubt, in accordance with the guiding principles discussed. | ||
Privilege will not be permitted in criminal cases where the "the person claiming privilege no longer has any interest to protect, and when maintaining the privilege might screen from the jury information which would assist an accused" | Privilege will not be permitted in criminal cases where the "the person claiming privilege no longer has any interest to protect, and when maintaining the privilege might screen from the jury information which would assist an accused."<ref> | ||
{{ | {{CanLIIRP|Dunbar|gb3gd|1982 CanLII 3324 (ON CA)|68 CCC (2d) 13}}{{perONCA-H|Martin JA}}{{atL|gb3gd|80}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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==Crime/Fraud Exception== | ==Crime/Fraud Exception== | ||
Any legal "communications that are criminal in themselves" (such as a fraudulent legal aid application) or are "intended to obtain legal advice to facilitate criminal activities are not privileged" | Any legal "communications that are criminal in themselves" (such as a fraudulent legal aid application) or are "intended to obtain legal advice to facilitate criminal activities are not privileged."<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRPC|Smith v Jones|1fqp9|1999 CanLII 674 (SCC)| | {{CanLIIRPC|Smith v Jones|1fqp9|1999 CanLII 674 (SCC)|[1999] 1 SCR 455}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}{{atL|1fqp9|55}}<br> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|Mierzwinski|1lpc6|1982 CanLII 22 (SCC)|[1982] 1 SCR 860}}{{perSCC|Lamer J}} - re fraudulent legal aid application<br> | {{CanLIIRP|Mierzwinski|1lpc6|1982 CanLII 22 (SCC)|[1982] 1 SCR 860}}{{perSCC|Lamer J}} - re fraudulent legal aid application<br> | ||
{{ | {{CanLIIRP|Campbell|1fqp4|1999 CanLII 676 (SCC)|[1999] 1 SCR 565}}{{perSCC-H|Binnie J}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
This exception only applies in a limited fashion, or else it risks preventing any person charged with fraud from safely seeking legal advice.<ref> | This exception only applies in a limited fashion, or else it risks preventing any person charged with fraud from safely seeking legal advice.<ref> | ||
{{ | {{CanLIIRPC|Canbook Distribution Corp. v Borins|1w3s5|1999 CanLII 14842 (ON SC)|7 CBR (4th) 121}}{{perONSC|Ground J}}{{atL|1w3s5|21}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
; Future Crimes Exception | ; Future Crimes Exception | ||
The second branch of the criminal prohibition to privilege that relates to lawyers "facilitating criminal activities" is also referred to as the "future crimes exception" | The second branch of the criminal prohibition to privilege that relates to lawyers "facilitating criminal activities" is also referred to as the "future crimes exception."<ref> | ||
{{supra1|Smith v Jones}}<br> | {{supra1|Smith v Jones}}<br> | ||
{{ | {{CanLIIRPC|McDermott v McDermott|fwrsk|2013 BCSC 534 (CanLII)|46 BCLR (5th) 121}}{{perBCSC|Walker J}}{{AtsL|fwrsk|71|, 74}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Line 67: | Line 69: | ||
# the wrongful conduct being contemplated must be clearly wrong. | # the wrongful conduct being contemplated must be clearly wrong. | ||
Each of these elements are to be applied "stringently" | Each of these elements are to be applied "stringently."<ref> | ||
{{ibid1|McDermott}}{{atL|fwrsk|75}}<br> | {{ibid1|McDermott}}{{atL|fwrsk|75}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
It is considered "immaterial whether the lawyer was an unwitting dupe or knowing participant in providing the advice underlying the wrongful conduct"<ref> | It is considered "immaterial whether the lawyer was an unwitting dupe or knowing participant in providing the advice underlying the wrongful conduct"<ref> | ||
{{ | {{CanLIIRP|Solosky|1mjtq|1979 CanLII 9 (SCC)|[1980] 1 SCR 821}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}}{{atps|835-836}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
The focus is upon whether the client "had an illegal purpose in mind" not whether the lawyer was aware.<ref> | The focus is upon whether the client "had an illegal purpose in mind" not whether the lawyer was aware.<ref> | ||
{{ | {{CanLIIRxC|Markson v MBNA Canada Bank|2fmk4|2011 ONSC 871 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|C Horkins J}}{{atL|2fmk4|59}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Line 86: | Line 88: | ||
; Procedure | ; Procedure | ||
Before a judge will review an alleged SCP communication there must be an evidentiary foundation to show "prima facie evidence that the communication" is captured by one of the exceptions.<ref> | Before a judge will review an alleged SCP communication there must be an evidentiary foundation to show "prima facie evidence that the communication" is captured by one of the exceptions.<ref> | ||
{{ | {{CanLIIRxC|AARC Society v Sparks|hrwmp|2018 ABCA 177 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|hrwmp|5}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Hearsay evidence in the form of an affidavit can be sufficient to prove a prima facie case.<ref> | Hearsay evidence in the form of an affidavit can be sufficient to prove a prima facie case.<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRPC|Leibel|gdbtv|1993 CanLII 8780 ( | {{CanLIIRPC|Leibel|gdbtv|1993 CanLII 8780 (SK QB)|111 Sask R 107}}{{perSKQB| McLellan J}}{{atL|gdbtv|23}}<br> | ||
{{ | {{CanLIIRPC|Westra Law Office (Re)|245m4|2009 ABQB 391 (CanLII)|10 WWR 538}}{{perABQB|Greckol J}}{{atsL|245m4|49| to 50}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Line 100: | Line 102: | ||
; Non-Criminal Breaches of Law | ; Non-Criminal Breaches of Law | ||
This exception applies not just to communications that are "necessarily criminal in nature", it may also apply to communications in relation to any "unlawful conduct" that "causes injury to the legal rights of other citizens", which includes "breaches of regulatory statutes, breaches of contract, and torts and other breaches of duty" | This exception applies not just to communications that are "necessarily criminal in nature", it may also apply to communications in relation to any "unlawful conduct" that "causes injury to the legal rights of other citizens", which includes "breaches of regulatory statutes, breaches of contract, and torts and other breaches of duty."<ref> | ||
{{ibid1|McDermott}}{{atsL|fwrsk|72| to 73}}<br> | {{ibid1|McDermott}}{{atsL|fwrsk|72| to 73}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Line 109: | Line 111: | ||
Public safety can trump privilege where a lawyer reasonably believes that a clear, serious and imminent threat to public safety exists.<ref> | Public safety can trump privilege where a lawyer reasonably believes that a clear, serious and imminent threat to public safety exists.<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRPC|Smith v Jones|1fqp9|1999 CanLII 674 (SCC)| | {{CanLIIRPC|Smith v Jones|1fqp9|1999 CanLII 674 (SCC)|[1999] 1 SCR 455}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}{{atL|1fqp9|26}} and later ("...society recognizes that the safety of the public is of such importance that in appropriate circumstances it will warrant setting aside solicitor-client privilege.")<br> | ||
''Smith v Jones'' was the first case to recognize the existence of public safety privilege. It related to communications giving detailed plans of assaulting and killing prostitutes in downtown eastside Vancouver.<br> | ''Smith v Jones'' was the first case to recognize the existence of public safety privilege. It related to communications giving detailed plans of assaulting and killing prostitutes in downtown eastside Vancouver.<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Line 116: | Line 118: | ||
{{ibid1|Smith v Jones}}{{atp|248}} [CCC]</ref> | {{ibid1|Smith v Jones}}{{atp|248}} [CCC]</ref> | ||
# '''Clarity of risk to an identifiable group or person:''' This can include consideration of the culprit's history of violence. | # '''Clarity of risk to an identifiable group or person:''' This can include consideration of the culprit's history of violence. | ||
# ''Seriousness of risk:''' The gravity must be one of violence, serious bodily harm, serious psychological harm or death. | # '''Seriousness of risk:''' The gravity must be one of violence, serious bodily harm, serious psychological harm or death. | ||
# '''Imminence:''' There must be an urgency that warrants intervention. This does not require short windows of time, and it could relate to violence anticipated years later. | # '''Imminence:''' There must be an urgency that warrants intervention. This does not require short windows of time, and it could relate to violence anticipated years later. | ||
Line 132: | Line 134: | ||
==Other Exemptions== | ==Other Exemptions== | ||
===Statutory Exemption=== | ===Statutory Exemption=== | ||
Legislation can exempt documents from solicitor-client privilege protections only where it is "absolutely necessary" | Legislation can exempt documents from solicitor-client privilege protections only where it is "absolutely necessary."<ref> | ||
{{ | {{CanLIIRPC|Canada (National Revenue) v Thompson|grxb3|2016 SCC 21 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 381}}{{perSCC|Wagner and Gascon J}}(6:0)<br> | ||
{{ | {{CanLIIRPC|Canada (Attorney General) v Chambres Notaires du Quebec|grxb1|2016 SCC 20 (CanLII)|[2016] 1 SCR 336}}{{perSCC|Wagner and Gascon J}}(7:0)<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
; Law Society Regulation | ; Law Society Regulation | ||
A Law Society has a right to access the privileged records of a member for the purpose of investigating complaints against a member.<ref> | A Law Society has a right to access the privileged records of a member for the purpose of investigating complaints against a member.<ref> | ||
{{ | {{CanLIIRPC|Law Society of Saskatchewan v Merchant|216ss|2008 SKCA 128 (CanLII)|300 DLR (4th) 462}}{{perSKCA|Richards JA}} (3:0), leave to SCC denied<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
{{reflist|2}} | {{reflist|2}} |
Latest revision as of 14:23, 14 July 2024
This page was last substantively updated or reviewed January 2020. (Rev. # 95326) |
General Principles
There are three primary occasions when solicitor‑client privilege may be overruled, namely when innocence at stake is engaged, the client's communications are themselves criminal, or it is necessary to protect public safety.[1]
Any piercing of privilege should be considered an "extraordinary measure."[2]
- ↑ Smith v Jones, 1999 CanLII 674 (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 455, per Cory J
- ↑
R v Brown, 2002 SCC 32 (CanLII), [2002] 2 SCR 185, per Major J
Innocence at Stake
The threshold test for innocence at stake exemption from privilege has a two-step process. The accused must establish that:[1]
- the information he seeks from the solicitor-client communication is not available from any other source; and
- he is otherwise unable to raise a reasonable doubt.
- If the threshold has been satisfied, the judge should proceed to the innocence at stake test, which has two stages.
- Stage #1: The accused seeking production of the solicitor-client communication has to demonstrate an evidentiary basis to conclude that a communication exists that could raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
- Stage #2: If such an evidentiary basis exists, the trial judge should examine the communication to determine whether, in fact, it is likely to raise a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
- It is important to distinguish that the burden in the second stage of the innocence at stake test (likely to raise a reasonable doubt) is stricter than that in the first stage (could raise a reasonable doubt).
- If the innocence at stake test is satisfied, the judge should order disclosure of the communications that are likely to raise a reasonable doubt, in accordance with the guiding principles discussed.
Privilege will not be permitted in criminal cases where the "the person claiming privilege no longer has any interest to protect, and when maintaining the privilege might screen from the jury information which would assist an accused."[2]
- Burden
The onus is upon the party claiming the existence of privilege. Once established, the burden switches to the party seeking to rely on the exception.[3]
- Effect of the Exception
Where the exception has been made out the communication remains privileged except for the limited purpose of disclosure.[4]
- ↑
R v McClure, 2001 SCC 445 (CanLII), [2001] 1 SCR 445, per Major J - this is the first case to recognize an innocence-at-stake exception to privilege
R v Brown, 2002 SCC 32 (CanLII), [2002] 2 SCR 185, per Major J
- ↑
R v Dunbar, 1982 CanLII 3324 (ON CA), 68 CCC (2d) 13, per Martin JA, at para 80
- ↑
Hubbard and Magotiaux, and Duncan, "The Law of Privilege in Canada " (Canada Law Book, 2016) at 11.190.30
- ↑
Dodek, Adam M., Solicitor-Client Privilege in Canada: Challenges for the 21st Century (February 14, 2011). Canadian Bar Association, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1761668 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1761668 at p. 12 to 13 ("Under the exceptions recognized by the Supreme Court to date (public safety and innocence of the accused), the communications remain privileged except for the limited basis of their disclosure; they cannot be used against the client."
Crime/Fraud Exception
Any legal "communications that are criminal in themselves" (such as a fraudulent legal aid application) or are "intended to obtain legal advice to facilitate criminal activities are not privileged."[1]
This exception only applies in a limited fashion, or else it risks preventing any person charged with fraud from safely seeking legal advice.[2]
- Future Crimes Exception
The second branch of the criminal prohibition to privilege that relates to lawyers "facilitating criminal activities" is also referred to as the "future crimes exception."[3]
The future crimes exception requires the following elements:[4]
- the challenged communications must pertain to proposed future conduct;
- the client must be seeking to advance conduct which it knows or should know is unlawful; and
- the wrongful conduct being contemplated must be clearly wrong.
Each of these elements are to be applied "stringently."[5]
It is considered "immaterial whether the lawyer was an unwitting dupe or knowing participant in providing the advice underlying the wrongful conduct"[6] The focus is upon whether the client "had an illegal purpose in mind" not whether the lawyer was aware.[7]
- Standard of Proof
Before the privilege will be removed the party seeking to remove privilege must establish a "prima facie case of fraud". A mere allegation is not enough.[8]
- Procedure
Before a judge will review an alleged SCP communication there must be an evidentiary foundation to show "prima facie evidence that the communication" is captured by one of the exceptions.[9]
Hearsay evidence in the form of an affidavit can be sufficient to prove a prima facie case.[10]
- Effect of the Exception
Where the criminality exception has been made out the communication becomes disclosable for all purposes..[11]
- Non-Criminal Breaches of Law
This exception applies not just to communications that are "necessarily criminal in nature", it may also apply to communications in relation to any "unlawful conduct" that "causes injury to the legal rights of other citizens", which includes "breaches of regulatory statutes, breaches of contract, and torts and other breaches of duty."[12]
- ↑
Smith v Jones, 1999 CanLII 674 (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 455, per Cory J, at para 55
R v Mierzwinski, 1982 CanLII 22 (SCC), [1982] 1 SCR 860, per Lamer J - re fraudulent legal aid application
R v Campbell, 1999 CanLII 676 (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 565, per Binnie J
- ↑
Canbook Distribution Corp. v Borins, 1999 CanLII 14842 (ON SC), 7 CBR (4th) 121, per Ground J, at para 21
- ↑
Smith v Jones, supra
McDermott v McDermott, 2013 BCSC 534 (CanLII), 46 BCLR (5th) 121, per Walker J, at paras 71, 74
- ↑
McDermott, ibid., at para 75
- ↑
McDermott, ibid., at para 75
- ↑ R v Solosky, 1979 CanLII 9 (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 821, per Dickson J, at pp. 835-836
- ↑
Markson v MBNA Canada Bank, 2011 ONSC 871 (CanLII), per C Horkins J, at para 59
- ↑
Canbook Distribution Corp v Borins, supra, at para 19
McDermott, supra - ↑ AARC Society v Sparks, 2018 ABCA 177 (CanLII), per curiam, at para 5
- ↑
Leibel, 1993 CanLII 8780 (SK QB), 111 Sask R 107, per McLellan J, at para 23
Westra Law Office (Re), 2009 ABQB 391 (CanLII), 10 WWR 538, per Greckol J, at paras 49 to 50
- ↑
Dodek, Adam M., Solicitor-Client Privilege in Canada: Challenges for the 21st Century (February 14, 2011). Canadian Bar Association, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1761668 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1761668 at p. 12 to 13 ("The difference between an exclusion and exception is a distinction with an important consequence. Under the exceptions recognized by the Supreme Court to date (public safety and innocence of the accused), the communications remain privileged except for the limited basis of their disclosure; they cannot be used against the client. However, crime-fraud is no limited exception; it is a complete negation of the Privilege. The communications may be disclosed and used for any purpose, including against the client. Indeed, this is the basis for seeking to apply crime-fraud.")
- ↑
McDermott, ibid., at paras 72 to 73
Public Safety
Public safety can trump privilege where a lawyer reasonably believes that a clear, serious and imminent threat to public safety exists.[1]
Factors to consider consist of:[2]
- Clarity of risk to an identifiable group or person: This can include consideration of the culprit's history of violence.
- Seriousness of risk: The gravity must be one of violence, serious bodily harm, serious psychological harm or death.
- Imminence: There must be an urgency that warrants intervention. This does not require short windows of time, and it could relate to violence anticipated years later.
Public safety will outweigh the interests of privilege in only "rare circumstances" where a "compelling public interest" justifies it.[3]
- Effect of the Exception
Where the exception has been made out the communication remains privileged except for the limited purpose of disclosure.[4]
- ↑
Smith v Jones, 1999 CanLII 674 (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 455, per Cory J, at para 26 and later ("...society recognizes that the safety of the public is of such importance that in appropriate circumstances it will warrant setting aside solicitor-client privilege.")
Smith v Jones was the first case to recognize the existence of public safety privilege. It related to communications giving detailed plans of assaulting and killing prostitutes in downtown eastside Vancouver.
- ↑ Smith v Jones, ibid., at p. 248 [CCC]
- ↑
Smith v Jones, ibid., at para 74/, at pp. 248-49 (CCC) ("In rare circumstances, these public interests may be so compelling that the privilege must be displaced. Yet the right to privacy in a solicitor-client relationship is so fundamentally important that only a compelling public interest may justify setting aside solicitor-client privilege.")
- ↑
Dodek, Adam M., Solicitor-Client Privilege in Canada: Challenges for the 21st Century (February 14, 2011). Canadian Bar Association, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1761668 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1761668 at p. 12 to 13 ("Under the exceptions recognized by the Supreme Court to date (public safety and innocence of the accused), the communications remain privileged except for the limited basis of their disclosure; they cannot be used against the client."
Other Exemptions
Statutory Exemption
Legislation can exempt documents from solicitor-client privilege protections only where it is "absolutely necessary."[1]
- Law Society Regulation
A Law Society has a right to access the privileged records of a member for the purpose of investigating complaints against a member.[2]
- ↑
Canada (National Revenue) v Thompson, 2016 SCC 21 (CanLII), [2016] 1 SCR 381, per Wagner and Gascon J(6:0)
Canada (Attorney General) v Chambres Notaires du Quebec, 2016 SCC 20 (CanLII), [2016] 1 SCR 336, per Wagner and Gascon J(7:0)
- ↑
Law Society of Saskatchewan v Merchant, 2008 SKCA 128 (CanLII), 300 DLR (4th) 462, per Richards JA (3:0), leave to SCC denied