Enumerated Purposes of Sentencing: Difference between revisions

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[[fr:Objectifs_énumérés_de_la_détermination_de_la_peine]]
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==General Principles==
==General Principles==
{{seealso|Purpose and Principles of Sentencing}}
{{seealso|Purpose and Principles of Sentencing}}
The purposes of sentencing are laid out in section 718 of the Criminal Code:
The purposes of sentencing are laid out in section 718 of the Criminal Code:
{{quotation|
{{quotation2|
'''Purpose'''<br>
; Purpose
718. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:
718. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:
:(a) to denounce unlawful conduct;
:(a) to denounce unlawful conduct;
Line 13: Line 15:
:(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community.
:(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community.


R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 718; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 155; 1995, c. 22, s. 6.
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 718;  
|[http://canlii.ca/t/7vf2#sec718 CCC]}}
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.)}}, s. 155;  
 
{{LegHistory90s|1995, c. 22}}, s. 6.
The fundamental purpose as stated is that there be "respect for the law" and the maintenance of a "just, peaceful and safe society". <Ref>R v Whicher, [http://canlii.ca/t/5kdn 2002 BCCA 336] (CanLII)<br>
|{{CCCSec2|718}}  
R v Priest [http://canlii.ca/t/6hxl 1996 CanLII 1381] (ON CA){{perONCA| JA}}</ref>
|{{NoteUp|718}}
}}


The public is protected "through sanctions a court imposes upon a person...[e]ach codified objective of sentencing is designed to further the protection of the community."<ref>
; Fundamental Purpose
R v Berner, [http://canlii.ca/t/fx6j8 2013 BCCA 188] (CanLII){{perBCCA| JA}}
The fundamental purpose as stated is that there be "respect for the law" and the maintenance of a "just, peaceful and safe society."<ref>
</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Whicher|5kdn|2002 BCCA 336 (CanLII)|165 CCC (3d) 535}}{{perBCCA|Hall JA}} (3:0)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Priest|6hxl|1996 CanLII 1381 (ON CA)|110 CCC (3d) 289}}{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}}</ref>


This fundamental purpose will generally take precedent over the welfare of the accused.<ref>
This fundamental purpose will generally take precedent over the welfare of the accused.<ref>
R v Cole, [http://canlii.ca/t/1t943 2004 CanLII 58282] (QC CM)<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Cole|1t943|2004 CanLII 58282 (QC CM)}} ''per'' Discepola J<br>
R.v. Jackson (1977) 21 N.S.R. (2d) 17 (NSCA) {{NOCANLII}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Jackson|jsk20|1977 CanLII 3243 (NS CA)| 21 NSR (2d) 17 (NSCA)}}{{perNSCA|MacKeigan JA}}<br>
R v Smith, [1987] 1 SCR 1045, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftmr 1987 CanLII 64] (SCC){{perSCC| J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Smith|1ftmr|1987 CanLII 64 (SCC)|[1987] 1 SCR 1045}}{{perSCC|Lamer J}}<br>
R.v. Sweeney, [http://canlii.ca/t/1q093 1992 CanLII 4030] (BC CA){{perBCCA| JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Sweeney|1q093|1992 CanLII 4030 (BC CA)|71 CCC (3d) 82}}{{perBCCA|Hutcheon JA}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Objectives'''<br>
; How Public is Protected
There is no single "sentencing objective [that] trumps the other". It is to "the sentencing judge to determine which objective or objectives merit the greatest weight, given the particulars of the case."<ref>R v Nasogaluak, [http://canlii.ca/t/2848x 2010 SCC 6] (CanLII){{perSCC| J}} at para 43</ref>
The public is protected "through sanctions a court imposes upon a person...[e]ach codified objective of sentencing is designed to further the protection of the community."<ref>
 
{{CanLIIRP|Berner|fx6j8|2013 BCCA 188 (CanLII)|297 CCC (3d) 69}}{{TheCourtBCCA}}
In the Canadian system, "the respective importance of prevention, deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation will vary according to the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the offender". None of these factors can be excluded from consideration.<Ref>
R v Lyons, [1987] 2 SCR 309, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftlw 1987 CanLII 25] (SCC){{perSCC| J}} at para 26<br>
</ref>
</ref>


{{Reflist|2}}
; Objectives Will Vary By Case
There is no single "sentencing objective [that] trumps the other". It is to "the sentencing judge to determine which objective or objectives merit the greatest weight, given the particulars of the case."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Nasogaluak|2848x|2010 SCC 6 (CanLII)|[2010] 1 SCR 206}}{{perSCC|LeBel J}} (9:0){{atL|2848x|43}} ("... No one sentencing objective trumps the others and it falls to the sentencing judge to determine which objective or objectives merit the greatest weight, given the particulars of the case.  The relative importance of any mitigating or aggravating factors will then push the sentence up or down the scale of appropriate sentences for similar offences.  The judge’s discretion to decide on the particular blend of sentencing goals and the relevant aggravating or mitigating factors ensures that each case is decided on its facts, subject to the overarching guidelines and principles in the Code and in the case law.")</ref>


== Denunciation - s.718(a) ==
In the Canadian system, "the respective importance of prevention, deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation will vary according to the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the offender". None of these factors can be excluded from consideration.<ref>
Denunciation refers to the Court's "communication of society's condemnation of the offender's conduct." The "denunciatory element represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender’s conduct should be punished for encroaching on our society’s basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law".<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Lyons|1ftlw|1987 CanLII 25 (SCC)|[1987] 2 SCR 309}}{{perSCC|La Forest J}} (5:2){{atL|1ftlw|26}} ("... In a rational system of sentencing, the respective importance of prevention, deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation will vary according to the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the offender. No one would suggest that any of these functional considerations should be excluded from the legitimate purview of legislative or judicial decisions regarding sentencing.")<br>
R v Proulx, [http://canlii.ca/t/527b 2000 SCC 5] (CanLII){{perSCC|Lamer CJ}} at para 102
R v M(CA) [http://canlii.ca/t/1frb9 1996 CanLII 230], [1996] 1 SCR 500{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}} ("A sentence which expresses denunciation is simply the means by which these values are communicated.")
</ref>
</ref>


Section 718(a) sets out the objective of "denounc[ing] unlawful conduct". The principle of denunciation "mandates that a sentence should communicate society's condemnation of that particular offender's conduct. In short, a sentence with a denunciatory element represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender's conduct should be punished for encroaching on our society's basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law."<ref>
; Meaning of Emphasized Objectives
M(CA){{supra}} at para 81</ref>
Where statutes or courts declare that certain objectives are to be emphasized as primary, it would then be prohibited for a court to emphasize secondary objectives over the primary ones.<ref>
 
{{CanLIIRx|Friesen|j64rn|2020 SCC 9 (CanLII)}}{{perSCC|Wagner CJ and Rowe J}}{{atL|j64rn|104}}<br>
The denuncatory sentence must also "positively instill the basic set of communal values shared by all Canadians as expressed by the Criminal Code."<ref>
M(CA){{supra}} at para 81
</ref>
</ref>


The principles of denunciation and deterrence can sometimes be satisfied without incarceration. One of these circumstances is where the publicity of the case provides for public humiliation. <ref>
{{Reflist|2}}
R v Ewanchuk, [http://canlii.ca/t/506z 2002 ABCA 95] (CanLII){{TheCourt}} at para 65<br>
R v Ambrose, [http://canlii.ca/t/5rqs 2000 ABCA 264] (CanLII){{TheCourt}} at para 134<br>
R v Kneale, [1999] OJ No 4062 (SCJ) at para 35 {{NOCANLII}}</ref>


Denunciation becomes a major consideration in situations where "there is a “high degree of planning and premeditation, and where the offence and its consequences are highly publicized, [so that] like‑minded individuals may well be deterred by severe sentences” [citation omitted] This is particularly so where a victim is a vulnerable person with respect to age, disability, or other similar factors."<ref>
==Denunciation and Deterrence (s. 718(a), (b))==
R v Latimer, [http://canlii.ca/t/523c 2001 SCC 1] (CanLII){{TheCourt}} at para 86
* [[Denunciation and Deterrence]]
</ref>


In any case emphasizing "general or specific deterrence and denunciation", "the courts have very few options other than imprisonment for meeting these objectives, which are essential to the maintenance of a just, peaceful and law‑abiding society."<ref>  
== Separation from Society - 718(c) ==
R v Safarzadeh-Markhali, [http://canlii.ca/t/gpg9w 2016 SCC 14] (CanLII){{perSCC|McLachlin CJ}}
A sentencing judge must take into account "the exigencies of the case" before determining whether total deprivation of liberty is necessary.<ref>
</ref>
{{CanLIIR-N|Creighton|, [1997] OJ No 2220}}{{at-|6}}<br>
 
{{CanLIIRx|Shahcheraghi|gx3s6|2017 ONSC 574 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|MOrgan J}}{{atL|gx3s6|19}}<br>
Where denunciation is a paramount consideration a conditional sentence is not necessarily ruled out.<Ref>
R v Wells, [http://canlii.ca/t/527n 2000 SCC 10] (CanLII){{perSCC|Iacobucci J}} at paras 31 to 35<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Conditional Sentence'''<br>
; Mental Health
A conditional sentence under s. 742.1 that includes "onerous" conditions may provide some denunciation but incarceration will generally provide greater denunciation.<ref>
Where a person with mental illness poses a risk to the public the court may need to resort to separating the offender from society, rather than focus on treatment.<ref>
Proulx{{supra}} at para 102 ("Incarceration will usually provide more denunciation than a conditional sentence, as a conditional sentence is generally a more lenient sentence than a jail term of equivalent duration. That said, a conditional sentence can still provide a significant amount of denunciation.  This is particularly so when onerous conditions are imposed and the duration of the conditional sentence is extended beyond the duration of the jail sentence that would ordinarily have been imposed in the circumstances.")<br>
see {{CanLIIRx|Desjardins-Paquette|ft2c1|2012 ONCA 674 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Virani|frdwp|2012 ABCA 155 (CanLII)|[2012] AJ No 507 (CA)}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0){{atL|frdwp|16}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Retribution'''<br>
Treatment in the community is generally preferred over incarceration.<ref>
Retribution is a principle of sentencing "based on an offender's moral blameworthiness or culpability, and the seriousness of the offence and its circumstances."<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Lundrigan|fs0sg|2012 NLCA 43 (CanLII)|[2012] NJ No 231 (NLCA)}}{{perNLCA|Rowe JA}} (3:0){{atL|fs0sg|20}}<br>
R v Denny, [http://canlii.ca/t/gp2h1 2016 NSSC 76] (CanLII){{perNSSC|Rosinski J}} at para 123<br>
CAM{{supra}} (retribution "... properly reflects the moral culpability of the offender, having regard to the intentional risk-taking of the offender, the consequential harm caused by the offender, and the normative character of the offender’s conduct. Furthermore, unlike vengeance, retribution incorporates a principle of restraint; retribution requires the imposition of a just and appropriate punishment, nothing more")<br>
see also R v Vienneau, [http://canlii.ca/t/gml8c 2015 ONCA 898] (CanLII){{perONCA| JA}}<Br>
</ref>  
</ref>  
 
However, this is less so for serious offences.<ref>
Denunciation should not be equated with retribution which is a separate legitimate purpose of sentencing.<ref>
see {{CanLIIR-N|JM|, [2008] NJ No 262 (P.C.) }}<br>
CAM{{supra}} at para 81 ("Retribution, as well, should be conceptually distinguished from its legitimate sibling, denunciation...")
{{CanLIIRP|Taylor|fs56r|2012 CanLII 42053 (NL PC)|[2012] NJ No 251 (P.C.)}}{{perNLPC|Mennie J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


== Deterrence - 718(b) ==
== Rehabilitation - s.718(d)==
Deterrence "refers to the imposition of a sanction for the purpose of discouraging the offender and others from engaging in criminal conduct."<ref>
Section 718(d) sets out the objective of "assist[ing] in rehabilitating offenders."<ref>
R v BWP; R v BVN, [http://canlii.ca/t/1nn6n 2006 SCC 27] (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 941{{perSCC|Charron J}} at para 2</ref>
see also {{CanLIIRP|Gill|1msxn|2006 BCCA 127 (CanLII)|206 CCC (3d) 525}}{{perBCCA|Mackenzie JA}} (2:1)</ref>  
 
Rehabilitation can be seen to achieve the objective of protecting the public as it assists in preventing further offences.<ref>
Section 718(b) sets out the objectives of "deter[ing] the offender and other persons from committing offences" We refer to these as the twin objectives of "general deterrence" and "specific deterrence".
{{CanLIIRP|Simmons, Allen and Bezzo|hv01l|1973 CanLII 1522 (ON CA)|13 CCC 65}}{{perONCA|Brooke JA}}<br>
</ref>


Deterrence in the "widest sense" refers to a "sentence by emphasizing community disapproval of an act and branding it as reprehensible has a moral or educative effect and thereby affects the attitude of the public" with the expectation that a person will not likely commit such an act.<ref>
; Rehabilitation Protects the Public
R v Roussy, [1977] O.J. No. 1208 (Ont. C.A.){{perONCA|Zuber JA}} at para 5 {{NOCANLII}}<br>
Where there is a "strong chance" of "complete rehabilitation" for a young offender, the imposition of a suspended sentence is a suitable method to protect the public.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Thompson|jsl38|1983 CanLII 5099 (NS CA)|58 NSR (2d) 21}}{{perNSCA|Hart JA}} at 24
</ref>
</ref>


In any case emphasizing "general or specific deterrence and denunciation", "the courts have very few options other than imprisonment for meeting these objectives, which are essential to the maintenance of a just, peaceful and law‑abiding society."<ref>
; Rehabilitation Mitigates Sentence
R v Safarzadeh-Markhali, [http://canlii.ca/t/gpg9w 2016 SCC 14] (CanLII){{perSCC|McLachlin CJ}}
An offender's "positive potential for rehabilitation" should be to the benefit of the accused on sentence.<ref>
</ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Gouliaeff|ft6x6|2012 ONCA 690 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0){{atL|ft6x6|12}}</ref>
 
It is "an error of principle for a trial court to discount the deterrent effect of any particular kind of punishment provided for in the Criminal Code, such as imprisonment, because he or she believes that imprisonment has not proven effective".<ref>
R v Tran, [http://canlii.ca/t/2d2xm 2010 ABCA 317] (CanLII){{perABCA|Moen JA}} at para 12<br>
R v Song, [http://canlii.ca/t/2734x 2009 ONCA 896] (CanLII){{TheCourt}} at paras 8 to 12<Br>
</ref>
 
'''Specific Deterrence'''<br>
Specific deterrence targets the specific offender before the court.<ref>
BWP{{supra}} at para 2</ref>
 
'''General Deterrence'''<br>
General deterrence targets potential criminals by encouraging them not to "engage in criminal activity because of the example provided by the punishment imposed on the offender." <ref>
BWP{{supra}} at para 2<br>
R v McGinn (1989), 49 CCC (3d) 137 (SKCA), [http://canlii.ca/t/g8f2g 1989 CanLII 4784] (SK CA){{perSKCA|Cameron JA}}, (general deterrence is "punishment of the offender for what other might do")<br>
</ref>
The objective of general deterrence as a factor will normally result in the offender being “punished more severely, not because he or she deserves it, but because the court decides to send a message to others who may be inclined to engage in similar criminal activity.” <ref>
BWP{{supra}} at para 2</ref>
 
When general deterrence is emphasized, the deterrent effect of incarceration can be somewhat speculative and so should be used with great restraint.<ref>
R v Biancofiore, [http://canlii.ca/t/6hjk 1997 CanLII 3420] (ON CA), (1997), 119 CCC (3d) 344{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}} at para 23</ref> A lengthy sentence is not the only way of achieving the objective of general deterrence.<ref>
See R v Morrissette (1970), 1 CCC (2d) 307 (Sask. C.A.), [http://canlii.ca/t/g7bxk 1970 CanLII 642] (SK CA){{perSKCA|Culliton J}}, at 310</ref>
 
Crimes committed out of desperation or addiction, such as much drug trafficking, are not offences for which general deterrence has much effect.<ref>R v Frost, [http://canlii.ca/t/ftvn8 2012 NBCA 94] (CanLII){ ("these crimes are not committed out of desperation or the result of an addiction, crimes for which general deterrence would be of little effect")</ref>
 
Crimes motivated by profit, which can also be drug trafficking, will be addressable by general deterrence.<ref>
Frost{{ibid}} ("cases such as this, where profit is the offender’s motivation, a significant penalty is generally a deterrent to others who might consider whether or not to undertake such criminal activity")</ref>
 
Offences against recognized classes of vulnerable victims require the Courts to heighten their emphasis on general deterrence.<ref>
R v Petrovic (1984), 47 OR (2d) 97, [http://canlii.ca/t/g1b0c 1984 CanLII 2003] (ON CA){{perONCA|Lacourciere JA}}<br>
R v Inwood, [http://canlii.ca/t/1p78h 1989 CanLII 263] (ONCA)<br>
</ref>


Vulnerable classes have included young female victims of distribution of intimate images.<ref>
In certain cases, where there is a realistic possibility of rehabilitation, the courts may opt not to impose a jail sentence where it would otherwise be appropriate.<ref>
R v Zhou, [http://canlii.ca/t/gt89m 2016 ONCJ 547] (CanLII), [2016] OJ No 4641{{perONCJ| J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Preston|1d89g|1990 CanLII 576 (BC CA)|79 CR (3d) 61}}{{TheCourtBCCA}} (5:0)</ref>
R v CNT, [http://canlii.ca/t/gk29w 2015 NSPC 43] (CanLII){{perNSPC| J}} at para 9 overturned at [http://canlii.ca/t/gr50z 2016 NSCA 35] (CanLII){{perNSCA| JA}} on other grounds<br>
</ref>
 
'''Publicity'''<br>
The degree to which the case is covered by media is relevant to general deterrence.<Ref>
R v Matheson, [http://canlii.ca/t/1sxvg 2007 NSPC 43] (CanLII){{perNSPC| J}} at para 27<br>
R v Clarke, [1990] NSJ 427 (NSSC){{NOCANLII}} per Nunn J, ("If it receives no publicity then there is no general deterrence, other than the several people who may be in court at the time the sentence is given"<br>
</ref>
Where there is no publicity of the case at all then there can be no general deterrence.<ref>
Clarke{{ibid}}
</ref>
 
'''Achieving Deterrence'''<br>
There continues to be controversy outside of the courts about whether deterrence is effective.<ref>
e.g. see BWP{{supra}} at para 3<br>
</ref>
Some have suggested that the availability of conditional sentences is an concession that general deterrence is "speculative".<ref>
R v Wismayer [http://canlii.ca/t/6h6j 1997 CanLII 3294] (ON CA), (1997), 5 C.R. (5th) 248 (C.A.){{perONCA| JA}}, at para 49, 50<br>
R v Biancofiore at p. 356 (cited to CCC)<br>
</ref>
 
Given that incarceration is harsher than a conditional sentence it is considered more effective at providing deterrence.<ref>
R v Proulx, [2000] 1 SCR 61, [http://canlii.ca/t/527b 2000 SCC 5] (CanLII){{perSCC| J}}, at para 107 ("Incarceration, which is ordinarily a harsher sanction, may provide more deterrence than a conditional sentence")</ref>
 
It has been said that conditional sentences are not necessarily capable of providing general deterrence.  <ref>
Frost{{supra}} ("The question is whether a conditional sentence is capable of providing general deterrence. ...The answer is clearly no.")</ref> This is apparent due to the frequency that CSO are rejected on serious offences.
 
For a conditional sentence to achieve the goals of "denunciation and general deterrence, the punishment must be meaningful by being visible, sufficiently restrictive, enforceable and capable of attracting stern sanction for failure to comply with the conditions."<ref>
Wismayer{{supra}} at para 52</ref>
 
It is an error of law for a judge to increase the sentence to achieve specific deterrence without considering whether the sentence is still proportionate.<ref>
Rogers{{supra}} at para 43</ref>
 
{{reflist|2}}
 
== Separation from Society - 718(c) ==
 
Where a person with mental illness poses a risk to the public the court may need to resort to separating the offender from society, rather than focus on treatment.<Ref>
see R v Desjardins-Paquette, [http://canlii.ca/t/ft2c1 2012 ONCA 674] (CanLII){{perONCA| JA}}<br>
R v Virani, [http://canlii.ca/t/frdwp 2012 ABCA 155] (CanLII), [2012] A.J. No. 507 (C.A.), at para 16<br>
</ref>
 
Treatment in the community is generally preferred over incarceration.<Ref>
R v Lundrigan, [http://canlii.ca/t/fs0sg 2012 NLCA 43] (CanLII), [2012] NJ No 231 (NLCA){{perNLCA| JA}} at para 20<br>
</ref> However, this is less so for serious offences.<ref>
see R v J.M., [2008] N.J. No. 262 (P.C.) {{NOCANLII}}<br>
R v Taylor, [http://canlii.ca/t/fs56r 2012 CanLII 42053] (NL PC), [2012] N.J. No. 251 (P.C.){{perNLPC| J}}<br>
</ref>
 
A sentencing judge must take into account "the exigencies of the case" before determining whether total deprivation of liberty is necessary.<Ref>
R v Creighton, [1997] OJ No 2220{{NOCANLII}} at para 6<br>
R v Shahcheraghi, [http://canlii.ca/t/gx3s6 2017 ONSC 574] (CanLII){{perONSC| J}} at para 19<Br>
</ref>
 
{{reflist|2}}
 
== Rehabilitation - s.718(d)==
Section 718(d) sets out the objective of "assist[ing] in rehabilitating offenders".<ref>see also R v Gill (2006), [http://canlii.ca/t/1msxn 2006 BCCA 127] (CanLII){{perBCCA| JA}}</ref> Rehabilitation can be seen to achieve the objective of protecting the public as it assists in preventing further offences.<Ref>R v Simmons, Allen and Bezzo (1973), 13 CCC 65 (Ont.C.A.), [http://canlii.ca/t/hv01l 1973 CanLII 1522] (ON CA){{perONCA| JA}}, per Brooke JA</ref>
In certain cases, where there is a realistic possibility of rehabilitation, the courts may opt not to impose a jail sentence where it would otherwise be appropriate.<ref>R v Preston, [http://canlii.ca/t/1d89g 1990 CanLII 576] (BC CA){{perBCCA| JA}}</ref>


; Rehabilitation Requires Acceptance of Responsibility
Effective rehabilitation has been seen by some courts as requiring an acceptance of responsibility, likely by way of a guilty plea, and an understanding of the harm done.<ref>
Effective rehabilitation has been seen by some courts as requiring an acceptance of responsibility, likely by way of a guilty plea, and an understanding of the harm done.<ref>
See R v Lee [http://canlii.ca/t/fnsvh 2011 NSPC 81] (CanLII){{perNSPC| J}} at para 83<br>
See {{CanLIIRP|Lee|fnsvh|2011 NSPC 81 (CanLII)|979 APR 163}}{{perNSPC|Derrick J}}{{atL|fnsvh|83}}<br>
R v Seguin [1997] OJ No 5439 at 18 {{NOCANLII}}</ref>
{{CanLIIR-N|Seguin|, [1997] OJ No 5439 at 18 }}</ref>
 
An offender's "positive potential for rehabilitation" should be to the benefit of the accused on sentence.<ref>
R v Gouliaeff, [http://canlii.ca/t/ft6x6 2012 ONCA 690] (CanLII){{perONCA| JA}} at para 12</ref>


; Rehabilitation Always a Factor
No sentence should deprive the offender of any hope of rehabilitation.<ref>
No sentence should deprive the offender of any hope of rehabilitation.<ref>
R v Johnson, [http://canlii.ca/t/frdwc 2012 ONCA 339] (CanLII){{perONCA| JA}} at paras 15-25<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Johnson|frdwc|2012 ONCA 339 (CanLII)|285 CCC (3d) 120}}{{perONCA|Blair JA}}{{atsL|frdwc|15| to 25}}<br>
R v Parry, [http://canlii.ca/t/fqn6q 2012 ONCA 171] (CanLII){{perONCA| JA}} at paras 17-19<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Parry|fqn6q|2012 ONCA 171 (CanLII)|289 OAC 201}}{{perONCA|Armstrong JA}}{{atsL|fqn6q|17| to 19}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 211: Line 114:
In 2005 and 2009, sections 718.01 and 718.02 were added:
In 2005 and 2009, sections 718.01 and 718.02 were added:


{{quotation|
{{quotation1|
'''Objectives — offences against children'''<br>
; Objectives — offences against children
718.01 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of eighteen years, it shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct.
718.01 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of eighteen years, it shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct.
<br>
<br>
2005, c. 32, s. 24.
{{LegHistory00s|2005, c. 32}}, s. 24.
|[http://canlii.ca/t/7vf2#sec718.01 CCC]
|{{CCCSec2|718.01}}
|{{NoteUp|}}
}}
}}
{{quotation|
{{quotation1|
'''Objectives — offence against peace officer or other justice system participant'''<br>
; Objectives — offence against peace officer or other justice system participant
718.02 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence under subsection 270(1), section 270.01 or 270.02 or paragraph 423.1(1)(b), the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.
718.02 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence under subsection 270(1) {{AnnSec2|270(1)}}, section 270.01 {{AnnSec2|270.01}} or 270.02 {{AnnSec2|270.02}} or paragraph 423.1(1)(b) {{AnnSec4|423.1(1)(b)}}, the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.
<br>
<br>
2009, c. 22, s. 18.
{{LegHistory00s|2009, c. 22}}, s. 18.
|[http://canlii.ca/t/7vf2#sec718.02 CCC]
{{Annotation}}
|{{CCCSec2|718.02}}
}}
 
{{quotation1|
; Objectives — offence against certain animals
718.03 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence under subsection 445.01(1) {{AnnSec4|445.01(1)}}, the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.
 
{{LegHistory10s|2015, c. 34}}, s. 4.
{{Annotation}}
|{{CCCSec2|718.04}}
}}
 
{{quotation1|
; Objectives — offence against vulnerable person
718.04 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person who is vulnerable because of personal circumstances — including because the person is Aboriginal and female — the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.
 
{{LegHistory10s|2019, c. 25}}, s. 292.1
|{{CCCSec2|718.04}}
}}
}}


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}
==Non-Criminal Code Offences==
* [[Sentencing for Drug Offences]]

Latest revision as of 14:24, 14 July 2024

This page was last substantively updated or reviewed January 2021. (Rev. # 95386)

General Principles

See also: Purpose and Principles of Sentencing

The purposes of sentencing are laid out in section 718 of the Criminal Code:

Purpose

718. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:

(a) to denounce unlawful conduct;
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community.

R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 718; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 155; 1995, c. 22, s. 6.

– CCC (CanLII), (DOJ)

Note up: 718

Fundamental Purpose

The fundamental purpose as stated is that there be "respect for the law" and the maintenance of a "just, peaceful and safe society."[1]

This fundamental purpose will generally take precedent over the welfare of the accused.[2]

How Public is Protected

The public is protected "through sanctions a court imposes upon a person...[e]ach codified objective of sentencing is designed to further the protection of the community."[3]

Objectives Will Vary By Case

There is no single "sentencing objective [that] trumps the other". It is to "the sentencing judge to determine which objective or objectives merit the greatest weight, given the particulars of the case."[4]

In the Canadian system, "the respective importance of prevention, deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation will vary according to the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the offender". None of these factors can be excluded from consideration.[5]

Meaning of Emphasized Objectives

Where statutes or courts declare that certain objectives are to be emphasized as primary, it would then be prohibited for a court to emphasize secondary objectives over the primary ones.[6]

  1. ↑ R v Whicher, 2002 BCCA 336 (CanLII), 165 CCC (3d) 535, per Hall JA (3:0)
    R v Priest, 1996 CanLII 1381 (ON CA), 110 CCC (3d) 289, per Rosenberg JA
  2. ↑ R v Cole, 2004 CanLII 58282 (QC CM) per Discepola J
    R v Jackson, 1977 CanLII 3243 (NS CA), 21 NSR (2d) 17 (NSCA), per MacKeigan JA
    R v Smith, 1987 CanLII 64 (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 1045, per Lamer J
    R v Sweeney, 1992 CanLII 4030 (BC CA), 71 CCC (3d) 82, per Hutcheon JA
  3. ↑ R v Berner, 2013 BCCA 188 (CanLII), 297 CCC (3d) 69, per curiam
  4. ↑ R v Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6 (CanLII), [2010] 1 SCR 206, per LeBel J (9:0), at para 43 ("... No one sentencing objective trumps the others and it falls to the sentencing judge to determine which objective or objectives merit the greatest weight, given the particulars of the case. The relative importance of any mitigating or aggravating factors will then push the sentence up or down the scale of appropriate sentences for similar offences. The judge’s discretion to decide on the particular blend of sentencing goals and the relevant aggravating or mitigating factors ensures that each case is decided on its facts, subject to the overarching guidelines and principles in the Code and in the case law.")
  5. ↑ R v Lyons, 1987 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1987] 2 SCR 309, per La Forest J (5:2), at para 26 ("... In a rational system of sentencing, the respective importance of prevention, deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation will vary according to the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the offender. No one would suggest that any of these functional considerations should be excluded from the legitimate purview of legislative or judicial decisions regarding sentencing.")
  6. ↑ R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 (CanLII), per Wagner CJ and Rowe J, at para 104

Denunciation and Deterrence (s. 718(a), (b))

Separation from Society - 718(c)

A sentencing judge must take into account "the exigencies of the case" before determining whether total deprivation of liberty is necessary.[1]

Mental Health

Where a person with mental illness poses a risk to the public the court may need to resort to separating the offender from society, rather than focus on treatment.[2]

Treatment in the community is generally preferred over incarceration.[3] However, this is less so for serious offences.[4]

  1. ↑ R v Creighton, [1997] OJ No 2220(*no CanLII links) , at para 6
    R v Shahcheraghi, 2017 ONSC 574 (CanLII), per MOrgan J, at para 19
  2. ↑ see R v Desjardins-Paquette, 2012 ONCA 674 (CanLII), per curiam
    R v Virani, 2012 ABCA 155 (CanLII), [2012] AJ No 507 (CA), per curiam (3:0), at para 16
  3. ↑ R v Lundrigan, 2012 NLCA 43 (CanLII), [2012] NJ No 231 (NLCA), per Rowe JA (3:0), at para 20
  4. ↑ see R v JM, [2008] NJ No 262 (P.C.) (*no CanLII links)
    R v Taylor, 2012 CanLII 42053 (NL PC), [2012] NJ No 251 (P.C.), per Mennie J

Rehabilitation - s.718(d)

Section 718(d) sets out the objective of "assist[ing] in rehabilitating offenders."[1] Rehabilitation can be seen to achieve the objective of protecting the public as it assists in preventing further offences.[2]

Rehabilitation Protects the Public

Where there is a "strong chance" of "complete rehabilitation" for a young offender, the imposition of a suspended sentence is a suitable method to protect the public.[3]

Rehabilitation Mitigates Sentence

An offender's "positive potential for rehabilitation" should be to the benefit of the accused on sentence.[4]

In certain cases, where there is a realistic possibility of rehabilitation, the courts may opt not to impose a jail sentence where it would otherwise be appropriate.[5]

Rehabilitation Requires Acceptance of Responsibility

Effective rehabilitation has been seen by some courts as requiring an acceptance of responsibility, likely by way of a guilty plea, and an understanding of the harm done.[6]

Rehabilitation Always a Factor

No sentence should deprive the offender of any hope of rehabilitation.[7]

  1. ↑ see also R v Gill, 2006 BCCA 127 (CanLII), 206 CCC (3d) 525, per Mackenzie JA (2:1)
  2. ↑ R v Simmons, Allen and Bezzo, 1973 CanLII 1522 (ON CA), 13 CCC 65, per Brooke JA
  3. ↑ R v Thompson, 1983 CanLII 5099 (NS CA), 58 NSR (2d) 21, per Hart JA at 24
  4. ↑ R v Gouliaeff, 2012 ONCA 690 (CanLII), per curiam (3:0), at para 12
  5. ↑ R v Preston, 1990 CanLII 576 (BC CA), 79 CR (3d) 61, per curiam (5:0)
  6. ↑ See R v Lee, 2011 NSPC 81 (CanLII), 979 APR 163, per Derrick J, at para 83
    R v Seguin, [1997] OJ No 5439 at 18 (*no CanLII links)
  7. ↑ R v Johnson, 2012 ONCA 339 (CanLII), 285 CCC (3d) 120, per Blair JA, at paras 15 to 25
    R v Parry, 2012 ONCA 171 (CanLII), 289 OAC 201, per Armstrong JA, at paras 17 to 19

Specific Offence Objectives - 718.01 and 718.02

In 2005 and 2009, sections 718.01 and 718.02 were added:

Objectives — offences against children

718.01 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of eighteen years, it shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct.
2005, c. 32, s. 24.

– CCC (CanLII), (DOJ)

Objectives — offence against peace officer or other justice system participant

718.02 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence under subsection 270(1) [assault peace officer], section 270.01 [assault peace officer with weapon or causing bodily harm] or 270.02 [aggravated assault of peace officer] or paragraph 423.1(1)(b) [impeding justice system participant in their duties], the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.
2009, c. 22, s. 18.
[annotation(s) added]

– CCC (CanLII), (DOJ)

Objectives — offence against certain animals

718.03 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence under subsection 445.01(1) [killing or injuring certain animals], the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.

2015, c. 34, s. 4.
[annotation(s) added]

– CCC (CanLII), (DOJ)

Objectives — offence against vulnerable person

718.04 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person who is vulnerable because of personal circumstances — including because the person is Aboriginal and female — the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.

2019, c. 25, s. 292.1

– CCC (CanLII), (DOJ)

Non-Criminal Code Offences

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