Adjournments: Difference between revisions
No edit summary |
m Text replacement - "\{\{fr\|([^\}\}]+)\}\}" to "fr:$1" |
||
(12 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown) | |||
Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
[[fr:Ajournements]] | |||
{{Currency2|January|2019}} | |||
{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderPreTrial}} | {{LevelZero}}{{HeaderPreTrial}} | ||
==General Principles== | ==General Principles== | ||
Line 7: | Line 9: | ||
; Powers of Clerk to Adjourn on Instructions | ; Powers of Clerk to Adjourn on Instructions | ||
A judge may direct a clerk to adjourn court to a subsequent day. | A judge may direct a clerk to adjourn court to a subsequent day. | ||
{{ | {{quotation3| | ||
474<br> | 474<br> | ||
{{removed|(1)}} | {{removed|(1)}} | ||
Line 14: | Line 16: | ||
<br> | <br> | ||
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 474; {{LegHistory90s|1994, c. 44}}, s. 31. | R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 474; {{LegHistory90s|1994, c. 44}}, s. 31. | ||
| | |{{CCCSec2|474}} | ||
|{{NoteUp|474|2}} | |{{NoteUp|474|2}} | ||
|[[Criminal Code and Related Definitions|"judge"]] (s. 2) | |||
}} | }} | ||
The procedure found in s. 474(2) cannot be extended to municipal or regulatory provisions whereby the clerk can adjourn a summary trial on behalf of the justice of the peace.<Ref> | The procedure found in s. 474(2) cannot be extended to municipal or regulatory provisions whereby the clerk can adjourn a summary trial on behalf of the justice of the peace.<Ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|1283499 ontario Inc|6m3g|2003 CanLII 33934 (ON CA)|176 CCC (3d) 522}}{{perONCA|Doherty JA}} | {{CanLIIRP|1283499 ontario Inc|6m3g|2003 CanLII 33934 (ON CA)|176 CCC (3d) 522}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Line 41: | Line 44: | ||
{{LegHistory90s|1991, c. 43}}, s. 9; | {{LegHistory90s|1991, c. 43}}, s. 9; | ||
{{LegHistory90s|1994, c. 44}}, s. 79; {{LegHistory90s|1997, c. 18}}, s. 112; {{LegHistory00s|2008, c. 18}}, s. 45. | {{LegHistory90s|1994, c. 44}}, s. 79; {{LegHistory90s|1997, c. 18}}, s. 112; {{LegHistory00s|2008, c. 18}}, s. 45. | ||
| | |{{CCCSec2|803}} | ||
|{{NoteUp|803|1}} | |{{NoteUp|803|1}} | ||
}} | }} | ||
Line 58: | Line 61: | ||
<br> | <br> | ||
R.S.C. {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.)}}, s. 137 | R.S.C. {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.)}}, s. 137 | ||
| | |{{CCCSec2|669.1}} | ||
|{{NoteUp|669.1|2}} | |{{NoteUp|669.1|2}} | ||
}} | }} | ||
Line 78: | Line 81: | ||
{{LegHistory90s|1994, c. 44}}, s. 53; {{LegHistory90s|1997, c. 18}}, s. 64; {{LegHistory00s|2002, c. 13}}, s. 28; {{LegHistory00s|2008, c. 18}}, s. 22. | {{LegHistory90s|1994, c. 44}}, s. 53; {{LegHistory90s|1997, c. 18}}, s. 64; {{LegHistory00s|2002, c. 13}}, s. 28; {{LegHistory00s|2008, c. 18}}, s. 22. | ||
{{Annotation}} | {{Annotation}} | ||
| | |{{CCCSec2|537}} | ||
|{{NoteUp|537|1}} | |{{NoteUp|537|1}} | ||
}} | }} | ||
Line 90: | Line 93: | ||
R.S.C. {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.)}}, s. 203 <br> | R.S.C. {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.)}}, s. 203 <br> | ||
{{Annotation}} | {{Annotation}} | ||
| | |{{CCCSec2|571}} | ||
|{{NoteUp|571}} | |{{NoteUp|571}} | ||
}} | }} | ||
Line 107: | Line 110: | ||
{{removed|(4), (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.4) and (5)}} | {{removed|(4), (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.4) and (5)}} | ||
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 606; R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.)}}, s. 125; {{LegHistory00s|2002, c. 13}}, s. 49; {{LegHistory10s|2015, c. 13}}, s. 21. | R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 606; R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.)}}, s. 125; {{LegHistory00s|2002, c. 13}}, s. 49; {{LegHistory10s|2015, c. 13}}, s. 21. | ||
| | |{{CCCSec2|606}} | ||
|{{NoteUp|606|3}} | |{{NoteUp|606|3}} | ||
}} | }} | ||
Line 123: | Line 126: | ||
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 645; R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.)}}, s. 133; {{LegHistory90s|1997, c. 18}}, s. 76; {{LegHistory00s|2001, c. 32}}, s. 43. | R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 645; R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.)}}, s. 133; {{LegHistory90s|1997, c. 18}}, s. 76; {{LegHistory00s|2001, c. 32}}, s. 43. | ||
{{Annotation}} | {{Annotation}} | ||
| | |{{CCCSec2|645}} | ||
|{{NoteUp|645|1|2|3}} | |{{NoteUp|645|1|2|3}} | ||
}} | }} | ||
Line 136: | Line 139: | ||
{{removed|(2)}} | {{removed|(2)}} | ||
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 474; {{LegHistory90s|1994, c. 44}}, s. 31. | R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 474; {{LegHistory90s|1994, c. 44}}, s. 31. | ||
| | |{{CCCSec2|474}} | ||
|{{NoteUp|474|1}} | |{{NoteUp|474|1}} | ||
}} | }} | ||
Line 150: | Line 153: | ||
R.S., c. C-34, s. 734. | R.S., c. C-34, s. 734. | ||
{{Annotation}} | {{Annotation}} | ||
| | |{{CCCSec2|799}} | ||
|{{NoteUp|799}} | |{{NoteUp|799}} | ||
}} | }} | ||
Line 165: | Line 168: | ||
It is a discretionary decision on whether to grant or refuse a request for an adjournment.<ref> | It is a discretionary decision on whether to grant or refuse a request for an adjournment.<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|White|287w8|2010 ABCA 66 (CanLII)|252 CCC (3d) 248}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0) {{atL|287w8|14}}<Br> | {{CanLIIRP|White|287w8|2010 ABCA 66 (CanLII)|252 CCC (3d) 248}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0) {{atL|287w8|14}}<Br> | ||
{{CanLIIRPC|Manhas v The Queen|1z46h|1980 CanLII 172 (SCC)|[1980] 1 SCR 59}}{{perSCC|Martland J}} | {{CanLIIRPC|Manhas v The Queen|1z46h|1980 CanLII 172 (SCC)|[1980] 1 SCR 59}}{{perSCC-H|Martland J}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
The discretion should be exercised judicially, giving proper reasons.<ref> | The discretion should be exercised judicially, giving proper reasons.<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|Barrette|1z6cp|1976 CanLII 180 (SCC)|[1977] 2 SCR 121}}{{perSCC|Pigeon J}} (6:3) at 124-125<br> | {{CanLIIRP|Barrette|1z6cp|1976 CanLII 180 (SCC)|[1977] 2 SCR 121}}{{perSCC|Pigeon J}} (6:3) at 124-125<br> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|Anderson|fxcwd|2013 ABCA 160 (CanLII)|553 AR 72}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0)<br> | {{CanLIIRP|Anderson|fxcwd|2013 ABCA 160 (CanLII)|553 AR 72}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0)<br> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|JCG|230fz|2004 CanLII 66281 (QC CA)|189 CCC (3d) 1 | {{CanLIIRP|JCG|230fz|2004 CanLII 66281 (QC CA)|189 CCC (3d) 1}}{{perQCCA|Dalphond JA}}{{atL|230fz|8}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Line 176: | Line 179: | ||
The decision is reviewable on the circumstances of the particular case, including the ability and quality of the accused.<ref> | The decision is reviewable on the circumstances of the particular case, including the ability and quality of the accused.<ref> | ||
{{supra1|White}}</ref> | {{supra1|White}}</ref> | ||
The question for the reviewing judge is whether sufficient weight was given to "all relevant considerations" | The question for the reviewing judge is whether sufficient weight was given to "all relevant considerations."<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRx|Gerlitz|gdt09|2014 ABQB 243 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Gates J}}{{atL|gdt09|21}} ("The test for appellate review is whether the trial judge has given sufficient weight to all relevant considerations")<br> | {{CanLIIRx|Gerlitz|gdt09|2014 ABQB 243 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Gates J}}{{atL|gdt09|21}} ("The test for appellate review is whether the trial judge has given sufficient weight to all relevant considerations")<br> | ||
{{supra1|JCG}}{{atL|230fz|9}}<br> | {{supra1|JCG}}{{atL|230fz|9}}<br> | ||
Line 188: | Line 191: | ||
The judge does not need to mention every factor considered.<ref> | The judge does not need to mention every factor considered.<ref> | ||
{{ | {{CanLIIRP|Beals|1z9np|1993 CanLII 5636 (NS CA)|126 NSR (2d) 130}}{{perNSCA|Hallett JA}}{{atsL|16| and 29}}<br> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|Tortora|2dpv9|2010 BCCA 547 (CanLII)|297 BCAC 128}}{{perBCCA|Bennett JA}} (3:0){{atL|2dpv9|23}}<br> | {{CanLIIRP|Tortora|2dpv9|2010 BCCA 547 (CanLII)|297 BCAC 128}}{{perBCCA|Bennett JA}} (3:0){{atL|2dpv9|23}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Line 204: | Line 207: | ||
Where the judge has grounds to believe that the request for an adjournment is a sham, the judge may refuse the adjournment.<ref> | Where the judge has grounds to believe that the request for an adjournment is a sham, the judge may refuse the adjournment.<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|Amos|frdtr|2012 ONCA 334 (CanLII)|292 OAC 298}}{{perONCA|Watt JA}} (3:0)</ref> | {{CanLIIRP|Amos|frdtr|2012 ONCA 334 (CanLII)|292 OAC 298}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}} (3:0)</ref> | ||
The trial judge should consider all circumstances, including:<Ref> | The trial judge should consider all circumstances, including:<Ref> | ||
Line 210: | Line 213: | ||
{{supra1|White}}{{atL|287w8|16}}<br> | {{supra1|White}}{{atL|287w8|16}}<br> | ||
{{CanLIIRx|MacLean|fwx4z|2013 ABQB 166 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Ouellette J}}{{atL|fwx4z|14}}<br> | {{CanLIIRx|MacLean|fwx4z|2013 ABQB 166 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Ouellette J}}{{atL|fwx4z|14}}<br> | ||
{{CanLIIRP| | {{CanLIIRP|Beals|1z9np|1993 CanLII 5636 (NS CA)|352 APR 130}}{{perNSCA|Hallett JA}} (3:0) | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
* the gravity of the charges | * the gravity of the charges | ||
Line 220: | Line 223: | ||
* the public interest in the orderly and expeditious administration of justice<ref> | * the public interest in the orderly and expeditious administration of justice<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|JEB|1zg4q|1989 CanLII 1495 (NS CA)|52 CCC (3d) 224}}{{perNSCA-H|MacDonald JA}}<br> | {{CanLIIRP|JEB|1zg4q|1989 CanLII 1495 (NS CA)|52 CCC (3d) 224}}{{perNSCA-H|MacDonald JA}}<br> | ||
{{ | {{supra1|Beals}}{{atL|1z9n|18}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Line 295: | Line 298: | ||
{{supra1|Gerlitz}}{{atL|gdt09|24}}<br> | {{supra1|Gerlitz}}{{atL|gdt09|24}}<br> | ||
{{supra1|White}}{{atL|287w8|17}}<br> | {{supra1|White}}{{atL|287w8|17}}<br> | ||
{{ | {{supra1|Beals}} (3:0) ("As a general rule an accused should be refused an adjournment if he has not acted diligently and honestly in attempting to obtain counsel and it can be inferred from the circumstances that he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to do so for the purpose of delaying the proceedings")<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Line 383: | Line 386: | ||
Generally, an adjournment should not be denied where the circumstances were not his fault .<ref> | Generally, an adjournment should not be denied where the circumstances were not his fault .<ref> | ||
{{supra1|Beals}} ("As a general rule an accused should be refused an adjournment if he has not acted diligently and honestly in attempting to obtain counsel and it can be inferred from the circumstances that he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to do so for the purpose of delaying the proceedings")<br> | {{supra1|Beals}} ("As a general rule an accused should be refused an adjournment if he has not acted diligently and honestly in attempting to obtain counsel and it can be inferred from the circumstances that he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to do so for the purpose of delaying the proceedings")<br> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|Manhas|1z46h|1980 CanLII 172 (SCC)|17 CR (3d) 331}}{{perSCC|Martland J}}<br> | {{CanLIIRP|Manhas|1z46h|1980 CanLII 172 (SCC)|17 CR (3d) 331}}{{perSCC-H|Martland J}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Similarly, where it is exclusively the fault of counsel, the adjournment should be granted.<Ref> | Similarly, where it is exclusively the fault of counsel, the adjournment should be granted.<Ref> | ||
Line 391: | Line 394: | ||
; Standard of Review | ; Standard of Review | ||
The proper standard of review on appeal of this decision is one of whether the discretion was "exercised judicially", which requires asking "whether the trial judge has given sufficient weight to all relevant considerations" | The proper standard of review on appeal of this decision is one of whether the discretion was "exercised judicially", which requires asking "whether the trial judge has given sufficient weight to all relevant considerations."<ref> | ||
{{ibid1|Le(TD)}}{{atL|frj5d|37}}<br> | {{ibid1|Le(TD)}}{{atL|frj5d|37}}<br> | ||
{{ibid1|White}}{{atL|287w8|15}}<br> | {{ibid1|White}}{{atL|287w8|15}}<br> |
Latest revision as of 14:24, 14 July 2024
This page was last substantively updated or reviewed January 2019. (Rev. # 95388) |
- < Procedure and Practice
- < Pre-Trial and Trial Matters
General Principles
An adjournment is re-scheduling of a court proceeding, be it arraignment, plea, trial, sentencing, or otherwise.
The granting of an adjournments is at the discretion of the judge (e.g. see s.571 and 645; 669.1(2)), but in practice is a frequent occurrence.
- Powers of Clerk to Adjourn on Instructions
A judge may direct a clerk to adjourn court to a subsequent day.
474
[omitted (1)]
- Adjournment on instructions of judge
(2) A clerk of the court for the trial of criminal cases in any territorial division may, at any time, on the instructions of the presiding judge or another judge of the court, adjourn the court and the business of the court to a subsequent day.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 474; 1994, c. 44, s. 31.
The procedure found in s. 474(2) cannot be extended to municipal or regulatory provisions whereby the clerk can adjourn a summary trial on behalf of the justice of the peace.[1]
- ↑ R v 1283499 ontario Inc, 2003 CanLII 33934 (ON CA), 176 CCC (3d) 522, per Doherty JA
Jurisdiction to Adjourn a Matter
The statutory authority to adjourn a matter comes from different sections of the Code depending on the level of court and the class of offence charged.
Summary Offence Matters
- Provincial Court Judge power to adjourn summary trial
A provincial court judge dealing with a summary matter is governed by s. 803 found in Part XXVII [Pt. XXVII – Summary Convictions (ss. 785 to 840)]:
- Adjournment
803 (1) The summary conviction court may, in its discretion, before or during the trial, adjourn the trial to a time and place to be appointed and stated in the presence of the parties or their counsel or agents.
[omitted (2), (3) and (4)]
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 803; 1991, c. 43, s. 9; 1994, c. 44, s. 79; 1997, c. 18, s. 112; 2008, c. 18, s. 45.
This section permits the judge to adjourn a matter where the accused fails to appear without issuing a bench warrant.[1]
- Adjourn summary proceedings other than trial
General adjournments of summary offences is found in Part XX [Pt. XX – Procedure in Jury Trials and General Provisions (ss. 574 to 672)]:
669.1
[omitted (1) [Jurisdiction]]
- Adjournment
(2) Any court, judge or provincial court judge having jurisdiction to try an accused or a defendant, or any clerk or other proper officer of the court, or in the case of an offence punishable on summary conviction, any justice, may, at any time before or after the plea of the accused or defendant is taken, adjourn the proceedings.
R.S.C. 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 137
- ↑ R v Szoboszloi, 1970 CanLII 1083 (ON CA), 5 CCC 366, per Aylesworth JA
Indictable Matters
- Preliminary inquiry judge
A Preliminary Inquiry Judge may adjourn under s.537:
- Powers of justice
537 (1) A justice acting under this Part [Pt. XVIII – Procedure on Preliminary Inquiry (ss. 535 to 551)] may
- (a) adjourn an inquiry from time to time and change the place of hearing, where it appears to be desirable to do so by reason of the absence of a witness, the inability of a witness who is ill to attend at the place where the justice usually sits or for any other sufficient reason;
[omitted (1.01), (1.02), (1.1), (2), (3) and (4)]
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 537; 1991, c. 43, s. 9; 1994, c. 44, s. 53; 1997, c. 18, s. 64; 2002, c. 13, s. 28; 2008, c. 18, s. 22.
[annotation(s) added]
- Provincial Court Judge or Superior Court Justices with Indictable Matters Without Jury
A provincial court judge dealing with an indictable matter or superior court justice without jury is governed by s. 571:
- Adjournment of non-jury trial
571 A judge or provincial court judge acting under this Part [Pt. XIX – Indictable Offences – Trial Without a Jury (ss. 552 to 572)] may from time to time adjourn a trial until it is finally terminated.
R.S.C. 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 203
[annotation(s) added]
The term "judge" for the purpose of s. 571 — found in Part XIX [Pt. XIX – Indictable Offences – Trial Without a Jury (ss. 552 to 572)]—is defined in s. 552 as a superior court judge.[1]
- Superior Court Justices with Indictable Offences Triable by Jury
Adjournments of trials on indictable matters under Part XX [Pt. XX – Procedure in Jury Trials and General Provisions (ss. 574 to 672)]:
606
[omitted (1), (1.1), (1.2) and (2)]
- Allowing time
(3) An accused is not entitled as of right to have his trial postponed but the court may, if it considers that the accused should be allowed further time to plead, move to quash or prepare for his defence or for any other reason, adjourn the trial to a later time in the session or sittings of the court, or to the next of any subsequent session or sittings of the court, on such terms as the court considers proper.
[omitted (4), (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.4) and (5)]
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 606; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 125; 2002, c. 13, s. 49; 2015, c. 13, s. 21.
Any judge dealing with an indictable matter with a jury:
- Trial continuous
645 (1) The trial of an accused shall proceed continuously subject to adjournment by the court.
- Adjournment
(2) The judge may adjourn the trial from time to time in the same sittings.
- Formal adjournment unnecessary
(3) For the purpose of subsection (2) [authority to adjourn trial], no formal adjournment of trial or entry thereof is required.
[omitted (4) and (5)]
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 645; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 133; 1997, c. 18, s. 76; 2001, c. 32, s. 43.
[annotation(s) added]
- Clerk Authorized to Adjourn Jury Matter
- Adjournment when no jury summoned
474 (1) Where the competent authority has determined that a panel of jurors is not to be summoned for a term or sittings of the court for the trial of criminal cases in any territorial division, the clerk of the court may, on the day of the opening of the term or sittings, if a judge is not present to preside over the court, adjourn the court and the business of the court to a subsequent day.
[omitted (2)]
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 474; 1994, c. 44, s. 31.
Codified Reasons to Adjourn
- Non-Appearance of Prosecutor
Provincial court judge under Part XXII [Pt. XXII – Procuring Attendance (ss. 697 to 715.2)] may adjourn a matter due to non-appearance of the prosecutor:
- Non-appearance of prosecutor
799 Where, in proceedings to which this Part [Pt. XXII – Procuring Attendance (ss. 697 to 715.2)] applies, the defendant appears for the trial and the prosecutor, having had due notice, does not appear, the summary conviction court may dismiss the information or may adjourn the trial to some other time on such terms as it considers proper.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 734.
[annotation(s) added]
- Problems with Charging Document
Where the accused has been misled or prejudiced by any issues found in the indictment or information, the accused may adjourn a matter. (see s. 485, 547, and 601)
- Failure to Give Expert Notice
Where a party wishes to call an expert witness and did not give notice, the available remedy is an adjournment under s. 657.3 (5).
Discretion of the Judge
It is a discretionary decision on whether to grant or refuse a request for an adjournment.[1] The discretion should be exercised judicially, giving proper reasons.[2]
- Appellate Standard Review
The decision is reviewable on the circumstances of the particular case, including the ability and quality of the accused.[3] The question for the reviewing judge is whether sufficient weight was given to "all relevant considerations."[4]
This exercise of discretion is afforded considerable deference.[5]
The judge does not need to mention every factor considered.[6]
The trial judge is not in error for failure to give full reasons so long as the record shows evidence that permits the necessary inferences to justify the decision.[7]
Where the appeal concerns a refusal to adjourn for the accused to obtain counsel, the appellant must show that the refusal deprived the accused of full answer and defence which resulted in a miscarriage of justice.[8]
- Factors to Consider
A judge is typically not inclined to adjourn trial matters. The cost of resources to bring a matter to trial and the desire to bring a matter to a conclusion speaks to the judge's interest in having a matter proceed. This is balanced against the accused's right to a fair trial and right to be tried within a reasonable time.
Where the judge has grounds to believe that the request for an adjournment is a sham, the judge may refuse the adjournment.[9]
The trial judge should consider all circumstances, including:[10]
- the gravity of the charges
- the number of previous postponements
- the consequences to the Crown and accused by a postponement
- the accused criminal record as a reflection on his experience in the system[11]
- the public interest in the orderly and expeditious administration of justice[12]
- ↑
R v White, 2010 ABCA 66 (CanLII), 252 CCC (3d) 248, per curiam (3:0) , at para 14
Manhas v The Queen, 1980 CanLII 172 (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 59, per Martland J - ↑
R v Barrette, 1976 CanLII 180 (SCC), [1977] 2 SCR 121, per Pigeon J (6:3) at 124-125
R v Anderson, 2013 ABCA 160 (CanLII), 553 AR 72, per curiam (3:0)
R v JCG, 2004 CanLII 66281 (QC CA), 189 CCC (3d) 1, per Dalphond JA, at para 8 - ↑ White, supra
- ↑
R v Gerlitz, 2014 ABQB 243 (CanLII), per Gates J, at para 21 ("The test for appellate review is whether the trial judge has given sufficient weight to all relevant considerations")
JCG, supra, at para 9
White, supra, at para 15
- ↑
R v Toor, 2001 ABCA 88 (CanLII), 155 CCC (3d) 345, per Paperny JA (alone), at para 15 ("[t]he granting of adjournments and the exercise of judicial discretion are generally afforded a considerable degree of deference, and the law is well established in the area.")
R v Travis, 2012 ABQB 629 (CanLII), per Yamauchi J, at paras 61 to 63
- ↑
R v Beals, 1993 CanLII 5636 (NS CA), 126 NSR (2d) 130, per Hallett JA, at and 29 paras and 29{{{3}}}
R v Tortora, 2010 BCCA 547 (CanLII), 297 BCAC 128, per Bennett JA (3:0), at para 23
- ↑ EWB, supra ("On an appeal from a refusal it would appear that a court of appeal will not find the learned trial judge erred notwithstanding his reasons may not be fully articulated if the record discloses evidence from which it can be inferred that the absence of counsel was brought about by the accused for the purpose of delaying the proceedings.")
- ↑ Gerlitz, supra, at para 24
- ↑ R v Amos, 2012 ONCA 334 (CanLII), 292 OAC 298, per Watt JA (3:0)
- ↑
JCG, supra, at paras 12 to 13 ("...“the gravity of the charge, the number of previous postponements and the consequences of a postponement for the Crown and for the accused")
White, supra, at para 16
R v MacLean, 2013 ABQB 166 (CanLII), per Ouellette J, at para 14
R v Beals, 1993 CanLII 5636 (NS CA), 352 APR 130, per Hallett JA (3:0) - ↑ EWB, ibid.
- ↑
R v JEB, 1989 CanLII 1495 (NS CA), 52 CCC (3d) 224, per MacDonald JA
Beals, supra, at para 18
Adjournment to Obtain Counsel
When faced with a request to adjourn to obtain counsel, the trial judge should consider whether a fair trial requires counsel given the seriousness or complexity of the charges.[1]
The judge may also consider the "personality and skills" of the accused.[2]
The right to retain counsel requires that the accused to act honestly and diligently.[3]
Generally, a request should not be refused where the failure to have counsel for trial was not his fault, but rather the fault of defence counsel.[4]
The judge has discretion to adjourn a trial on request of the accused for reason that they are not represented by counsel. The judge must consider the accused constitutional right to a fair trial. The accused nevertheless has the right to represent himself. The right to be represented by counsel must be exercised "diligently and honestly", thus they may be refused if they have not acted honestly and diligently. The accused cannot be refused where the absence of counsel is not their fault.[5]
- Exercise of Discretion
The discretion to allow an adjournment must be based on reasons well-founded in the law.[6]
- Choice to Self-Rep Not Ground of Appeal
However, an accused who chooses not to have counsel cannot appeal a conviction on the grounds of not having effective representation.[7]
- Principles
When considering whether to allow an adjournment by a self-represented accused to seek counsel, the judge should consider principles including:[8]
- the right to counsel is not absolute;[9]
- each application for an adjournment must be decided on its own facts;
- generally, an accused should not be refused an adjournment if the fact that he is without counsel is not his fault, but that of his counsel;
- the right of an accused to retain counsel must be exercised honestly and diligently so as not to delay a scheduled trial; and
- the scope of review by an appeal court of the exercise of the discretionary power to adjourn a scheduled trial is relatively wide as the consequences of a refusal may be to deprive an accused of his right to be represented by counsel.
- Self-Represented Accused Request to Adjourn to Obtain Counsel
When faced with a request to adjourn to obtain counsel, the trial judge should consider whether a fair trial requires counsel given the seriousness or complexity of the charges.[10]
The judge may also consider the "personality and skills" of the accused.[11]
The right to retain counsel requires that the accused to act honestly and diligently.[12]
Generally, a request should not be refused where the failure to have counsel for trial was not his fault, but rather the fault of defence counsel.[13]
See a review of principles at White, supra, at para 17
- Constitutional Protections
Consideration should be on whether the accused was deprived of the right to a fair trial, their right to make full answer and defence, or whether there would be a miscarriage of justice.[14]
There is no constitutional right to state-funded trial counsel.[15]
- Factors
From these principles, the factors courts should consider include the following:[16]
- whether the accused has failed to exercise the right to counsel honestly and diligently;
- whether granting an adjournment would inordinately delay the trial;
- opportunity to obtain with counsel;
- efforts to cooperate with counsel[17]
- the ability of the accused to understand the documentary evidence
The Court should consider relevant the facts such as:[18]
- whether or not there have been prior adjournments due to the unavailability of counsel and the accused was warned well in advance of trial that the trial would be proceeding on the scheduled date with or without counsel...;
- the accused’s criminal record which reflects on the accused’s degree of familiarity with the criminal justice system and legal aid programmes...;
- whether the charge against the accused is simple or complex which fact impacts on the critical question whether or not the accused can get a fair trial without counsel...;
- the public interest in the orderly and expeditious administration of justice...;
- if the accused has been refused legal aid and when the refusal was communicated to the accused.
By one authority, the consideration of all the circumstances should focus on the following questions:[19]
- Has the accused failed to exercise the right to counsel honestly and diligently?
- Has the accused had an adequate opportunity to obtain counsel?
- Has the accused been warned that he or she will have to proceed with trial without counsel? Has the accused been made aware of the potential consequences of that?
- Has Legal Aid or private counsel withdrawn or refused to represent the accused? If so, when was the accused advised of this? Keeping in mind the principles in Cunningham[20], does the record disclose why counsel withdrew?
- Has the accused acted or failed to act so as to thwart the appointment of counsel? Has the accused acted in any other way to delay the proceedings?
- Is there evidence that the absence of counsel at trial is part of an orchestrated attempt by the accused to delay the proceedings?
- Would granting an adjournment inordinately delay the trial?
- How long has it been since the charges were laid? Is this the first scheduled date for trial? If not, how many times has the matter been postponed or adjourned since the charges were laid? Who was responsible for prior adjournments? Were any of the prior postponements due to unavailability of defence counsel?
- Is the accused in custody? If not, what are the terms of interim release?
- How serious is the offence with which the accused has been charged?
- How long of an adjournment is the accused requesting? Is it reasonable in the circumstances? Would a shorter adjournment suffice?
- When is the next available trial date? Would the accused and the Crown consent to a change in venue if that would facilitate an earlier trial date?
- Does the accused agree that the delay brought about by the requested adjournment will not count against the s. 11(b) of the Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time?
- Would granting an adjournment potentially affect trial fairness from the Crown’s perspective?
- Are there co-accused? Are they being tried separately? If so, when are their trials scheduled? If not, what is the co-accuseds’ position on an adjournment?
- What is the expected duration of the trial?
- How many witnesses is the Crown expected to call? What are their characteristics? Are any of them children? Elderly? Infirm? Experts? Will any of them require a translator?
- Was the Crown put to subpoenaing its witnesses? Is there a real risk a witness may fail or be unable, for any reason, to testify at an adjourned trial? Is there evidence that the accused may be seeking a tactical adjournment to see if that risk materialises?
- Where are the witnesses located? Will it be inordinately difficult for the Crown to arrange for witness attendance at a later trial date?
- Is there a real risk that physical evidence may be lost or destroyed before trial if the matter were adjourned?
- What, if anything, can be done to address or mitigate the consequences of an adjournment?
- Is the accused reasonably capable of making full answer and defence to the charges without the assistance of legal counsel?
- What is the accused’s level of education and intellectual sophistication? Is the accused in good physical and mental health? What is the accused’s employment background? What level of family or other support is available to the accused?
- Is the accused’s criminal record such that it indicates the accused would be familiar with the criminal justice system and the criminal trial process?
- Was there a preliminary hearing? If so, what does the transcript indicate about the issues that will arise?
- Was the matter case managed such that the legal issues have been narrowed before trial? Is there an agreed statement of facts?
- Will the trial be lengthy, complex or legally complicated? Is the matter likely to give rise to complex or unusual points of law or of evidence or complicated defence strategies?
- Is the accused facing multiple charges or charges with multiple lesser-included offences?
- Is the accused in jeopardy of serving a significant incarceral term if convicted?
- Diligence
The accused has an obligation to acts "diligently and honestly" in attempting to obtain counsel.[21] Generally, an adjournment should not be denied where the circumstances were not his fault .[22] Similarly, where it is exclusively the fault of counsel, the adjournment should be granted.[23]
- Standard of Review
The proper standard of review on appeal of this decision is one of whether the discretion was "exercised judicially", which requires asking "whether the trial judge has given sufficient weight to all relevant considerations."[24] An appeal should not be granted for refusing an adjournment unless it can be shown that the right to full answer and defence was impacted such that there was an error in principle and amounted to a miscarriage of justice.[25]
- ↑
Gerlitz, supra, at para 24
- ↑
Gerlitz, supra, at para 24
White, supra, at para 16
R v Hodgson, 2004 ABCA 183 (CanLII), 348 AR 383, per curiam (3:0), at para 4 - ↑
Gerlitz, supra, at para 24
White, supra, at para 17
R v EWB, 1993 CanLII 5636 (NS CA), 352 APR 130, per Hallett JA (3:0) ("As a general rule an accused should be refused an adjournment if he has not acted diligently and honestly in attempting to obtain counsel and it can be inferred from the circumstances that he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to do so for the purpose of delaying the proceedings")
- ↑
EWB, ibid. ("As a general rule an accused should not be refused an adjournment if the fact that he is without counsel on the scheduled trial dates is not his fault but that of his counsel and he had no complicity in the matter.")
- ↑
R v Halnuck, 1996 CanLII 5275 (NS CA), 107 CCC (3d) 401, per Clarke CJ
R v Beals, 1993 CanLII 5636 (NS CA), (1993) 126 NSR (2d) 130 (CA), per Hallett JA
R v Marzocchi, 2006 CanLII 13096 (ON CA), 69 WCB (2d) 410, per curiam
R v Bitternose, 2009 SKCA 54 (CanLII), 244 CCC (3d) 218, per Wilkinson JA
R v Bissonette, 2003 ABCA 93 (CanLII), per Conrad JA
- ↑
Beals, supra
R v Barrette, 1976 CanLII 180 (SCC), [1977] 2 SCR 121, per Pigeon J - ↑ R v Harris, 2009 SKCA 96 (CanLII), 331 Sask R 283, per Richards JA, at para 27
- ↑
R v Le (TD), 2011 MBCA 83 (CanLII), 275 CCC (3d) 427, per Scott CJ, at para 36
R v White, 2010 ABCA 66 (CanLII), 252 CCC (3d) 248, per curiam, at para 17
Beals, supra - ↑
see also R v McCallen, 1999 CanLII 3685 (ON CA), 131 CCC (3d) 518, per O'Connor JA, at para 40
Beals, supra ("The right to counsel at trial is not absolute")
- ↑
Gerlitz, supra, at para 24
- ↑
Gerlitz, supra, at para 24
White, supra, at para 16
R v Hodgson, 2004 ABCA 183 (CanLII), 348 AR 383, per curiam (3:0), at para 4 - ↑
Gerlitz, supra, at para 24
White, supra, at para 17
Beals, supra (3:0) ("As a general rule an accused should be refused an adjournment if he has not acted diligently and honestly in attempting to obtain counsel and it can be inferred from the circumstances that he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to do so for the purpose of delaying the proceedings")
- ↑
EWB, ibid. ("As a general rule an accused should not be refused an adjournment if the fact that he is without counsel on the scheduled trial dates is not his fault but that of his counsel and he had no complicity in the matter.")
- ↑ Rak, infra, at para 7 (in upholding refusal the SKCA said "We are all of the view the appellants were not deprived of their right to a fair trial or their right to make full answer in defence and there was no miscarriage of justice.")
- ↑
R v Prosper, 1992 CanLII 2476 (NS CA), 113 NSR (2d) 156 (NSCA), per Chipman JA
Beals, supra - ↑
R v Hayter, 2018 SKCA 65 (CanLII), 365 CCC (3d) 413, per Caldwell JA
R v Rak, 1999 CanLII 12229 (SK CA), 172 Sask R 301 (CA), per Lane JA, at para 7 ("The appellants had ample opportunity to obtain counsel and their refusal to cooperate with counsel led to a refusal of Legal Aid. The failure to have counsel did not result in an unfair trial. Gregory Rak handled the defence rather adroitly on his own and his father’s behalf and was effective in his cross-examination. He demonstrated a clear ability to understand the documentary evidence. As well the trial judge was extremely helpful to the appellants throughout the course of the trial.") - ↑ Rak, supra
- ↑
Beals, supra
R v White, 2010 ABCA 66 (CanLII), 252 CCC (3d) 248, per curiam
R v Tortora, 2010 BCCA 547 (CanLII), 265 CCC (3d) 264, per Bennett JA
R v Le (T.D.), 2011 MBCA 83 (CanLII), 275 CCC (3d) 427, per Scott CJ
R v Bitternose, 2009 SKCA 54 (CanLII), 244 CCC (3d) 218, per Wilkinson JA
- ↑ Hayter, supra, at para 30
- ↑ 2010 SCC 10, [2010] 1 SCR 331
- ↑ R v Richard and Sassano (1992), 55 OAC 43(*no CanLII links)
- ↑
Beals, supra ("As a general rule an accused should be refused an adjournment if he has not acted diligently and honestly in attempting to obtain counsel and it can be inferred from the circumstances that he failed to avail himself of the opportunity to do so for the purpose of delaying the proceedings")
R v Manhas, 1980 CanLII 172 (SCC), 17 CR (3d) 331, per Martland J
- ↑ Beals, supra ("As a general rule an accused should not be refused an adjournment if the fact that he is without counsel on the scheduled trial dates is not his fault but that of his counsel and he had no complicity in the matter") Barrette, supra
- ↑
Le(TD), ibid., at para 37
White, ibid., at para 15
Rak, supra, at para 2 ("The standard of review of the exercise of a trial judge’s discretion in refusing an adjournment may be reviewed by an appellate court “if it is based upon reasons that are not well-founded in law and results in a deprivation of the accused’s right to make full answer in defence” ... the right to make full answer in defence “must be weighed conscientiously and delicately along with the public interest in the orderly administration of justice”.") - ↑ Beals, supra ("The scope of review by an appeal court of a refusal, notwithstanding it involves the review of the exercise of a discretionary power, is wide as the consequences of a refusal are to deprive an accused of his right to be represented by counsel. On appeal the appellant must show that in refusing the adjournment the trial judge deprived the appellant of his right to make full answer and defence and thus made an error in principle which constituted a miscarriage of justice (Barrette v R. and Manhas v R., supra).")
Other Reasons for Adjournment
Lack of Preparation
It is often expected that an adjournment will be granted where there is late arriving evidence.[1]
Where a lawyer fails to properly prepare, an adjournment is not required as there is a breach of their duty to the court and client.[2]
- ↑ R v Johnston, 1991 CanLII 7056 (ON CA), (1991), 47 OAC 66, 5 C.R.(4th) 185, 64 CCC (3d) 233, per Finlayson JA
- ↑ R v ERS, 1994 ABCA 176 (CanLII), 149 AR 285, per curiam
Missing witnesses
In order to adjourn a trial matter on the grounds of missing witnesses, the applicant must establish:[1]
- that the absent witnesses are material in the case;
- that the party applying has not been guilty of laches or neglect in arranging for the attendance of the witnesses; and
- that there is a reasonable expectation that the witnesses will attend court on the date sought by the party applying for the adjournment.
The judge may also consider other relevant circumstances.[2]
- ↑
R v LeBlanc, 2005 NSCA 37 (CanLII), 729 APR 235, per MacDonald CJ -- no adjournment for crown in failing to subpoena witnesses
R v Rose (D.A.), 1995 CanLII 4458, 140 NSR (2d) 151 (SC), per Glube CJ
R v AT, 1991 CanLII 6104 (AB QB), 69 CCC (3d) 107, per Mcdonald J - factors to consider
R v Shergill, 2009 BCCA 55 (CanLII), 269 BCAC 1, per Hall JA -- judge should have granted the crown adjournment for missing witness
R v MacDonald, 1998 CanLII 18016 (NL CA), 132 CCC (3d) 205, per Cameron JA -- short adjournment for crown for missing witness
Darville v the Queen, 1956 CanLII 463 (SCC), 116 CCC 113 (SCC), per Taschereau J, at paras 13 to 14
- ↑
R v Dang, 2005 ABCA 441 (CanLII), 380 AR 367, per Costigan JA -- consequences of delay by adjournment
Late Disclosure
A failure for the judge to grant a request for adjournment due to late disclosure can amount to an abuse of process requiring a new trial.[1] Before ordering a new trial for refusing to adjourn on account of late disclosure, the court should consider:[2]
- the Crown’s assurance that disclosure was complete,
- the timing and volume of disclosure,
- the seriousness of the charges,
- the requirements of a proper review procedure, and
- the co-operative approach of defence counsel
- ↑
R v Chu, 2016 SKCA 156 (CanLII), 344 CCC (3d) 51, per Jackson JA, at para 82
- ↑
Chu, ibid., at para 82