Sentencing Factors Relating to the Offender: Difference between revisions

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==General Principles==
==General Principles==
{{seealso|Sentencing Factors Relating to the Offence}}
{{seealso|Sentencing Factors Relating to the Offence|Sentencing Factors Relating to the Criminal Proceedings}}
Section 718.2(a) provides that "a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender".
Section 718.2(a) provides that "a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender".


==Criminal Record==
Distinctions between offender must be relevant to the degree of responsibility before they can be factored into sentencing.<Ref>
{{seealso|Effect of Criminal Records in Sentencing|Notice of Increased Penalty#Proving Prior Record|Jump, Step and Gap Principles‎}}
{{CanLIIR|Gerbrandt|jjmwx|2021 ABCA 346 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|jjmwx|85}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Roberts|jbxxr|2020 ABCA 434 (CanLII)|Alta. L.R. (7th) 255}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{AtsL|jbxxr|42| to 47}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ford|hxwlv|2019 ABCA 87 (CanLII)|371 CCC (3d) 250}}{{TheCourtABCA}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Costello|hz7lh|2019 ABCA 104 (CanLII)|[2019] AJ No 334}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|hz7lh|8}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Miller|hvtt3|2018 ABCA 356 (CanLII)|2018] AJ No 1263}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (2:1){{atsL|hvtt3|13| to 17}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Fuller|hmvq6|2017 ABCA 361 (CanLII)|60 Alta LR (6th) 219}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|hmvq6|7| to 18}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Maier|gg85w|2015 ABCA 59 (CanLII)|599 AR 44}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (2:1){{AtL|gg85w|31| to 42}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Murphy|gfgh6|2014 ABCA 409 (CanLII)|317 CCC (3d) 314}}{{TheCourtABCA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Lausberg|fz80n|2013 ABCA 72 (CanLII)|544 AR 56}}{{perABCA|McDonald J}}{{atL|fz80n|23}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ayorech|fqjzl|2012 ABCA 82 (CanLII)|522 AR 306}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|fqjzl|12}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Virani|frdwp|2012 ABCA 155 (CanLII)|545 WAC 328}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|frdwp|16}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ramsay|fsl7t|2012 ABCA 257 (CanLII)|292 CCC (3d) 400}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{AtsL|fsl7t|15| to 34}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Resler|flrdq|2011 ABCA 167 (CanLII)|95 WCB (2d) 165}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atsL|flrdq|8| to 10}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Belcourt|2d2hg|2010 ABCA 319 (CanLII)|490 AR 224}}{{perABCA|Slatter JA}} (2:1){{AtL|2d2hg|8}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|B(TL)|1ql87|2007 ABCA 61 (CanLII)|218 CCC (3d) 11}}{{perABCA|Fraser CJ}}{{AtL|1ql87|25}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Gibbon|1t010|2007 ABCA 300 (CanLII)|417 AR 37}}{{perABCA|Costigan JA}}{{atL|1t010|12}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Diebel|1v8gg|2007 ABCA 418 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{AtsL|1v8gg|16| to 23}}<br>
</ref>
 
{{Reflist|2}}
 


==Age and Youthfulness==
==Age and Youthfulness==
Age is relevant to sentencing as a mitigating factor. A youthful person is seen as having a greater chance of reforming and maturing over time. The courts in certain cases recognize young adults as sometimes foolish, inexperienced, irresponsible, immature and have a "greater prospects for rehabilitation". This diminishes their level of responsibility and moral blameworthiness.<ref>eg see R v Kunzig, [http://canlii.ca/t/fpg46 2011 MBPC 81] (CanLII){{perMBPC|MJ Smith J}} at para 54<br>
Age is relevant to sentencing as a mitigating factor. A youthful person is seen as having a greater chance of reforming and maturing over time. The courts in certain cases recognize young adults as sometimes foolish, inexperienced, irresponsible, immature and have a "greater prospects for rehabilitation". This diminishes their level of responsibility and moral blameworthiness.<ref>eg see {{CanLIIRx|Kunzig|fpg46|2011 MBPC 81 (CanLII)}}{{perMBPC|MJ Smith J}}{{atL|fpg46|54}}<br>
R v Scott, [http://canlii.ca/t/ggl3g 2015 ABCA 99] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0) at para 13<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Scott|ggl3g|2015 ABCA 99 (CanLII)|599 AR 182}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0){{atL|ggl3g|13}}<br>
R v Jackson (2002), [http://canlii.ca/t/1db67 2002 CanLII 41524] (ON CA), 163 CCC (3d) 451 (Ont CA){{perONCA|Sharpe JA}} (3:0)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Jackson|1db67|2002 CanLII 41524 (ON CA)|163 CCC (3d) 451}}{{perONCA|Sharpe JA}} (3:0)<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Likewise, the principle of restraint is a prominent factor for young offenders.<ref> See: R v Demeter and Whitmore (1976), 32 CCC (2d) 379 (Ont. C.A.), [http://canlii.ca/t/hv0z8 1976 CanLII 1413] (ON CA){{perONCA|Dubin JA}}</ref>
Likewise, the principle of restraint is a prominent factor for young offenders.<ref> See: {{CanLIIRP|Demeter and Whitmore|hv0z8|1976 CanLII 1413 (ON CA)|32 CCC (2d) 379}}{{perONCA|Dubin JA}}</ref>


Youthfulness as a factor is of primary importance for first time offenders.<ref>
Youthfulness as a factor is of primary importance for first time offenders.<ref>
Demeter and Whitmore{{ibid}}<br>
{{ibid1|Demeter and Whitmore}}<br>
R v Ijam, [http://canlii.ca/t/1svv8 2007 ONCA 597] (CanLII){{perONCA|MacPherson JA}} at paras 55-6, 87 OR (3d) 81<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ijam|1svv8|2007 ONCA 597 (CanLII)|226 CCC (3d) 376}}{{perONCA|MacPherson JA}}{{atsL|1svv8|55| to 56}}, 87 OR (3d) 81<br>
R v Hussey (1990), [http://canlii.ca/t/fsxqn 1990 CanLII 6491] (NL CA), 83 Nfld & PEIR 161 (Nfld CA){{perNLCA|Gushue JA}} (3:0)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Hussey|fsxqn|1990 CanLII 6491 (NL CA)|, 83 Nfld & PEIR 161 (Nfld CA)}}{{perNLCA|Gushue JA}} (3:0)<br>
Scott at para 13<br>
{{supra1|Scott}}{{atL|ggl3g|13}}<br>
</ref> The factor becomes less important when the youthful offender has "considerable amount of experience in the criminal justice system, has been subject to various forms of probationary and correctional supervision, and has not only breached those conditions but has also re-offended".<ref>
</ref>
Scott at para 13<br>
The factor becomes less important when the youthful offender has "considerable amount of experience in the criminal justice system, has been subject to various forms of probationary and correctional supervision, and has not only breached those conditions but has also re-offended."<ref>
R v Quesnel (1984), 14 CCC (3d) 254 at p. 255, [http://canlii.ca/t/gb2c4 1984 CanLII 3475] (ON CA){{perONCA|Thorson JA}}<br>
{{supra1|Scott}}{{atL|ggl3g|13}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Quesnel|gb2c4|1984 CanLII 3475 (ON CA)|14 CCC (3d) 254}}{{perONCA|Thorson JA}}{{atp|255}} (CCC)<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Where not otherwise required, a judge sentencing of a youthful offender should put more weight on rehabilitation over general deterrence.<Ref>
Where not otherwise required, a judge sentencing of a youthful offender should put more weight on rehabilitation over general deterrence.<ref>
R v Turner (1970), 1 CCC (2d) 293 (ONCA), [http://canlii.ca/t/g1438 1970 CanLII 522] (ON CA){{perONCA|Haines J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Turner|g1438|1970 CanLII 522 (ON CA)|1 CCC (2d) 293 (ONCA)}}{{perONCA|Haines J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


The objectives for youthful first offenders should primarily be on rehabilitation and specific deterrence.<ref>
The objectives for youthful first offenders should primarily be on rehabilitation and specific deterrence.<ref>
R v Priest, [http://canlii.ca/t/6hxl 1996 CanLII 1381] (ON CA), [1996] O.J. No. 3369 (C.A.){{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}} (3:0)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Priest|6hxl|1996 CanLII 1381 (ON CA)|[1996] OJ No 3369 (CA)}}{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}} (3:0)<br>
R v Nassri, [http://canlii.ca/t/ghhb3 2015 ONCA 316] (CanLII){{perONCA|Sharpe JA}} (3:0), at para 30<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Nassri|ghhb3|2015 ONCA 316 (CanLII)|125 OR (3d) 578}}{{perONCA|Sharpe JA}} (3:0){{atL|ghhb3|30}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


The "length of a penitentiary sentence for a youthful offender should rarely be determined solely by the objectives of denunciation and general deterrence".<ref>
The "length of a penitentiary sentence for a youthful offender should rarely be determined solely by the objectives of denunciation and general deterrence."<ref>
R v Borde [http://canlii.ca/t/1c062 2003 CanLII 4187] (ON CA), (2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 417{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}} (3:0), at para 36<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Borde|1c062|2003 CanLII 4187 (ON CA)|63 OR (3d) 417}}{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}} (3:0){{atL|1c062|36}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


For an older accused, age can factor against rehabilitation and reform.<ref>
For an older accused, age can factor against rehabilitation and reform.<ref>
e.g. R v Wiens, [http://canlii.ca/t/fvz8j 2013 ABPC 15] (CanLII){{perABPC|Pharo J}} at para 32<br>
e.g. {{CanLIIRP|Wiens|fvz8j|2013 ABPC 15 (CanLII)|551 AR 195}}{{perABPC|Pharo J}}{{atL|fvz8j|32}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


At a certain age there is a recognized category of offender for which imprisonment would be considered "pointless or an unreasonable burden".<ref>
At a certain age there is a recognized category of offender for which imprisonment would be considered "pointless or an unreasonable burden."<ref>
R v Cromwell, [http://canlii.ca/t/1q355 2006 ABCA 365] (CanLII){{perABCA|O’Brien JA}}, at para 16<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Cromwell|1q355|2006 ABCA 365 (CanLII)|214 CCC (3d) 502}}{{perABCA|O’Brien JA}}{{atL|1q355|16}}<br>
R v Nezic, [1976] BCJ No 1154 (CA){{NOCANLII}} - 77 year old offender in poor health<br>
{{CanLIIR-N|Nezic|, [1976] BCJ No 1154 (CA)}} - 77 year old offender in poor health<br>
see also R v Schmitt, [http://canlii.ca/t/g65j1 2014 ABCA 105] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0)
see also {{CanLIIRx|Schmitt|g65j1|2014 ABCA 105 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0)
</ref>
</ref>
However, some cases have also pointed to advanced age being an inappropriate reason for sentence reduction as it should be dealt with during sentence administration.<ref>
However, some cases have also pointed to advanced age being an inappropriate reason for sentence reduction as it should be dealt with during sentence administration.<ref>
e.g. R v Bulleyment 1979 CarswellOnt 1325, 46 CCC (2d) 429, [http://canlii.ca/t/htvvq 1979 CanLII 2922] (ON CA){{perONCA|Martin JA}}<br>
e.g. {{CanLIIRP|Bulleyment|htvvq|1979 CanLII 2922 (ON CA)|46 CCC (2d) 429}}{{perONCA-H|Martin JA}}<br>
R v Odgers, [http://canlii.ca/t/1nvxg 2006 ABPC 163] (CanLII){{perABPC|JDB McDonald J}} at para 29<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Odgers|1nvxg|2006 ABPC 163 (CanLII)|400 AR 322}}{{perABPC|JDB McDonald J}}{{atL|1nvxg|29}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Advanced Age Offenders'''<Br>
; Maturity of Adults
An offender of advanced age can "in some circumstances" be considered a mitigating feature.<ref>
The naivete and immaturity are valid mitigating factors affecting culpability.<Ref>
R v Walker, [http://canlii.ca/t/gw3zb 2016 ABQB 695] (CanLII){{perABQB|Ackerl J}} at para 74<br>
{{CanLIIRP|McLean|gsr8m|2016 SKCA 93 (CanLII)|132 WCB (2d) 96}}{{perSKCA|Ottenbreit JA}}<Br>
</ref>
see also {{CanLIIRP|Vandenbosch|1t2r7|2007 MBCA 113 (CanLII)}}{{perMBCA|Chartier JA}}{{AtL|1t2r7|95}}<br>
This has been justified on the basis that prison time is tougher on older persons and that they will have less life expectancy after release.<Ref>
Walker{{ibid}} at para 74<Br>
''R v AR'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1npk9 1994 CanLII 4524] (MB CA), [1994] MJ No 89, 92 Man R (2d) 183 (CA){{perMBCA|Twaddle JA}}<Br>
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
; Advanced Age Offenders
 
An offender of advanced age can "in some circumstances" be considered a mitigating feature.<ref>
==Employment==
{{CanLIIRx|Walker|gw3zb|2016 ABQB 695 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Ackerl J}}{{atL|gw3zb|74}}<br>
In general, a good work history is mitigating as it indicates a prior good character.<ref>R v Johnston, [http://canlii.ca/t/fmqxj 2011 NLCA 56] (CanLII){{perNLCA|White JA}} (3:0) at para 21</ref>
 
The offender's "opportunity for employment" is an important factor to determine if there is a "reasonable prospect for rehabilitation". <ref>R v Hunt, [http://canlii.ca/t/fpvck 2012 NLCA 5] (CanLII){{perNLCA|Barry JA}} (3:0) at para 19</ref>
 
{{reflist|2}}
 
===Professionals===
 
'''Police Officers'''<br>
Offences committed by persons who are "sworn to uphold the law" such as police officers have a "special duty to be faithful to the justice system" and so sentences require the objectives of denunciation has heightened significance.<Ref>
R v Hansen, [http://canlii.ca/t/grx7v 2016 ONSC 3583] (CanLII){{perONSC|Braid J}}, at paras 28 to 29<Br>
R v Schertzer, [http://canlii.ca/t/gh86h 2015 ONCA 259] (CanLII){{perONCA|Benotto JA}}, at para 134 to 136 - re "special duty"<Br>
</ref>
 
Police officer offenders who commit a breach of trust will be subject to "severe sentences" absent exceptional mitigating factors.<Ref>
Hansen{{supra}} at para 28<Br>
R v Cook, [http://canlii.ca/t/2czk3 2010 ONSC 5016] (CanLII){{perONSC|Hill J}}<Br>
R v Rudge, [http://canlii.ca/t/g2lwx 2014 ONSC 241] (CanLII){{perONSC|Hambly J}}<Br>
R v Leblanc, [http://canlii.ca/t/1v2 2003 NBCA 75] (CanLII){{perNBCA|Drapeau CJ}}<Br>
</ref>
</ref>
 
This has been justified on the basis that prison time is tougher on older persons and that they will have less life expectancy after release.<ref>
A peace officer being sentenced to a period of incarceration is at risk from the general population and will inevitably serve much of the sentence in protective custody, which should warrant mitigating the punishment.<ref>
{{ibid1|Walker}}{{atL|gw3zb|74}}<Br>
Cook{{supra}} at para 43 ("Because an inmate who is known to be, or discoverable as, a former police officer is at risk from general population prisoners, such an offender will almost inevitably serve much or all of the sentence in protective custody. This reality, involving as it does more limited social contact and institutional amenities, ordinarily warrants consideration in mitigation of punishment.")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|AR|1npk9|1994 CanLII 4524 (MB CA)|[1994] MJ No 89, 92 Man R (2d) 183 (CA)}}{{perMBCA|Twaddle JA}}<Br>
Rudge{{supra}} at para 23<br>
</ref>
</ref>
{{reflist|2}}
===Effect on Employment and Status===
Loss of professional or social status is not generally a mitigating factor nor is the ability to do a particular job well a mitigating factor.<ref>
R v Ambrose, [http://canlii.ca/t/5rqs 2000 ABCA 264] (CanLII){{perABCA|Cote JA}} (2:1) at para 37</ref>
However, it has been said that the "ruin and humiliation" brought upon the accused and his family as well as the loss of professional status can provide denunciation and deterrence.<ref>R v Bunn, [http://canlii.ca/t/527l 2000 SCC 9] (CanLII), [2000] 1 SCR 183{{perSCC|Lamer J}} (5:3) at para 23</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


==Degree of Remorse and Attitude==
==Degree of Remorse and Attitude==
Remorse is a mitigating factor.<ref> R v Anderson [http://canlii.ca/t/2327s 1992 CanLII 6002] (BC C.A.), (1992), 74 CCC (3d) 523{{perBCCA|Southin JA and Taylor JA}}, at p. 535-536, 16 BCAC 14<br>
Remorse is a mitigating factor.<ref>  
R v Nash, [http://canlii.ca/t/29vmr 2009 NBCA 7] (CanLII), (2009), 240 CCC (3d) 421 (N.B.C.A.){{perNBCA|Robertson JA}} (3:0) at para 40<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Anderson|2327s|1992 CanLII 6002 (BC C.A.)|74 CCC (3d) 523}}{{perBCCA|Southin JA and Taylor JA}}{{atps|535-536}}, 16 BCAC 14<br>
R v Cormier, [http://canlii.ca/t/1lrhf 1999 CanLII 13118] (NB CA), (1999), 140 CCC (3d) 87 (N.B.C.A.){{perNBCA|Larlee JA}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Nash|29vmr|2009 NBCA 7 (CanLII)|240 CCC (3d) 421}}{{perNBCA|Robertson JA}} (3:0){{atL|29vmr|40}}<br>
</ref> Remorse is demonstrated by the acceptance of responsibility through word or action as well as demonstrated insight into the offender's actions. A lack of remorse, however, does not make for an aggravating factor, but simply does not allow for the mitigating effect of remorse.<ref>  
{{CanLIIRP|Cormier|1lrhf|1999 CanLII 13118 (NB CA)|140 CCC (3d) 87}}{{perNBCA|Larlee JA}}<Br>
See LaForme J.A. in R v Kakekagamick, [http://canlii.ca/t/1p52k 2006 CanLII 28549] (ON C.A.), [2006] 81 O.R. (3d) 664, 211 CCC (3d) 289 (C.A.){{perONCA|Laforme JA}} (3:0), at para 73 ("[his] failure to accept responsibility for his actions weighs against affording him significant consideration by way of mitigation")<br>
</ref>  
See also R v Kozy [http://canlii.ca/t/1p78m 1990 CanLII 2625] (ON CA), (1990), 58 CCC (3d) 500 (Ont.C.A.){{perONCA|Carthy JA}} (3:0) at pp. 505-506<br>  
Remorse is demonstrated by the acceptance of responsibility through word or action as well as demonstrated insight into the offender's actions. A lack of remorse, however, does not make for an aggravating factor, but simply does not allow for the mitigating effect of remorse.<ref>  
R v Anderson [http://canlii.ca/t/2327s 1992 CanLII 6002] (BC CA), (1992), 74 CCC (3d) 523 (BCCA){{perBCCA|Southin JA}} at pp. 535-536<br>  
See {{CanLIIRP|Kakekagamick|1p52k|2006 CanLII 28549 (ON CA)|[2006] 81 OR (3d) 664, 211 CCC (3d) 289}}{{perONCA|Laforme JA}} (3:0){{atL|1p52k|73}} ("[his] failure to accept responsibility for his actions weighs against affording him significant consideration by way of mitigation")<br>
R v Brown, [1993] O.J. No. 624 (C.A.){{NOCANLII}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Wowk|j60j9|2020 ABCA 119 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|j60j9|23}}<Br>
R v Valentini [http://canlii.ca/t/1f979 1999 CanLII 1885] (ON CA), (1999), 132 CCC (3d) 262 (Ont.C.A.){{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}} (3:0) at para 80-85<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Valentini|1f979|1999 CanLII 1885 (ON CA)|132 CCC (3d) 262, 43 OR (3d) 178}}{{atsL|1f979|82| to 83}}<br>
See also {{CanLIIRP|Kozy|1p78m|1990 CanLII 2625 (ON CA)|58 CCC (3d) 500}}{{perONCA|Carthy JA}} (3:0){{Atps|505-506}}<br>  
{{CanLIIRP|Anderson|2327s|1992 CanLII 6002 |}}{{perBCCA|Southin JA}}{{atps|535-536}}<br>  
{{CanLIIR-N|Brown|, [1993] OJ No 624 (CA)}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Valentini|1f979|1999 CanLII 1885 (ON CA)|132 CCC (3d) 262}}{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}} (3:0){{atsL|1f979|80| to 85}}<br>
</ref>  
</ref>  


The courts should have "restraint...for persons who spontaneously acknowledge their culpability, have genuine remorse and seek voluntarily to make reparations."<ref>
The courts should have "restraint...for persons who spontaneously acknowledge their culpability, have genuine remorse and seek voluntarily to make reparations."<ref>
R v Arcand [http://canlii.ca/t/2dnsp 2010 ABCA 363] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} at para 293</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Arcand|2dnsp|2010 ABCA 363 (CanLII)|264 CCC (3d) 134}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|2dnsp|293}}</ref>


A lack of remorse or acceptance of responsibility generally cannot be taken as an aggravating factor, but rather can only be taken as an absence of mitigating factors.<ref>
A lack of remorse or acceptance of responsibility generally cannot be taken as an aggravating factor, but rather can only be taken as an absence of mitigating factors.<ref>
R v Proulx, [http://canlii.ca/t/527b 2000 SCC 5] (CanLII), [2000] 1 SCR 61{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Proulx|527b|2000 SCC 5 (CanLII)|[2000] 1 SCR 61}}{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}}<br>
''R v KA'', [1999] O.J. No. 2640 (Ont. C.A.), [http://canlii.ca/t/1f9kj 1999 CanLII 3756] (ON CA){{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}} at para. 49<br>
{{CanLIIRP|KA|1f9kj|1999 CanLII 3756 (ON CA)|[1999] OJ No 2640}}{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}}{{atL|1f9kj|49}}<br>
R v Reid, [http://canlii.ca/t/h40rb 2017 ONCA 430] (CanLII), [2017] O.J. No. 2758{{perONCA|van Rensburg JA}} at para. 36<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Reid|h40rb|2017 ONCA 430 (CanLII)|[2017] OJ No 2758}}{{perONCA|van Rensburg JA}}{{atL|h40rb|36}}<br>
R v Cormier, [http://canlii.ca/t/1lrhf 1999 CanLII 13118] (NB CA), (1999), 140 CCC (3d) 87 (N.B.C.A.){{perNBCA|Larlee JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Cormier|1lrhf|1999 CanLII 13118 (NB CA)|140 CCC (3d) 87}}{{perNBCA|Larlee JA}}<br>
R v S.(E.), [http://canlii.ca/t/1nzl9 1997 CanLII 11513] (NB CA), (1997), 191 N.B.R. (2d) 3 (C.A.){{perNBCA|Ryan JA}} at para 6<br>
{{CanLIIRP|S(E)|1nzl9|1997 CanLII 11513 (NB CA)|191 NBR (2d) 3 (CA)}}{{perNBCA|Ryan JA}}{{atL|1nzl9|6}}<br>
R v Williams, [2007] OJ No. 1604, [http://canlii.ca/t/1r934 2007 CanLII 13949] (ON SC){{perONSC|Hill J}} at para 32<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Williams|1r934|2007 CanLII 13949 (ONSC)|[2007] OJ No 1604}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}{{atL|1r934|32}}<br>
Hawkins{{supra}} at para 31 to 34<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Hawkins|2fdkz|2011 NSCA 7 (CanLII)|265 CCC (3d) 513}}{{perNSCA|Beveridge JA}}{{atsL|2fdkz|31| to 34}}<br>
see also: R v Henry [http://canlii.ca/t/4v1h 2002 NSCA 33] (CanLII){{perNSCA|Roscoe JA}} at para 21<br>  
see also: {{CanLIIRP|Henry|4v1h|2002 NSCA 33 (CanLII)|164 CCC (3d) 167}}{{perNSCA|Roscoe JA}}{{atL|4v1h|21}}<br>  
R v Zeek, [http://canlii.ca/t/1g8gw 2004 BCCA 42] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Rowles JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Zeek|1g8gw|2004 BCCA 42 (CanLII)|193 BCAC 104}}{{perBCCA|Rowles JA}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
Only in exceptional circumstances can the lack of remorse be taken as aggravating.<Ref>
Only in exceptional circumstances can the lack of remorse be taken as aggravating.<ref>
R v Hawkins, [http://canlii.ca/t/2fdkz 2011 NSCA 7] (CanLII){{perNSCA|Beveridge JA}} at para 33<br>
{{supra1|Hawkins}}{{atL|2fdkz|33}}<br>
Valentini{{supra}}<br>
{{supra1|Valentini}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Remorse is a "one-way street" and can only have the effect of providing reduction to sentence.<ref>
Remorse is a "one-way street" and can only have the effect of providing reduction to sentence.<ref>
Hawkins{{supra}}
{{supra1|Hawkins}}
</ref>
 
An offender who "continues to maintain his innocence" cannot be found by that fact alone to lack "remorse or insight."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Yau|2fs0d|2011 ONSC 1009 (CanLII)|OJ No 720}}{{perONSC|MacDonnell J}}{{atL|2fs0d|27}}<br>
see, e.g. {{CanLIIRP|Valentini|1f979|1999 CanLII 1885 (ON CA)|132 CCC (3d) 262}}{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Giroux|1n06n|2006 CanLII 10736 (ON CA)|207 CCC (3d) 512}}{{perONCA|Blair JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|B(C)|1z164|2008 ONCA 486 (CanLII)|78 WCB (2d) 80}}{{perONCA|Gillese JA}} (3:0)<br>
</ref>
 
; Strong Case
Remorse has little importance when the case is so strong that "guilt is inevitable."<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Singh|hsm3k|2018 ONSC 3850 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Harris J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Faulds|6k6m|1994 CanLII 770 (ON CA)|, 20 OR (3d) 13}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|6k6m|14}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Daya|1t671|2007 ONCA 693 (CanLII)|227 CCC (3d) 367}}{{perONCA|Moldaver and LaForme JJA}}{{atL|1t671|15}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


An offender who "continues to maintain his innocence" cannot be found by that fact alone to lack "remorse or insight".<ref>
; Misconduct Negating Remorse
R v Yau, [http://canlii.ca/t/2fs0d 2011 ONSC 1009] (CanLII){{perONSC|MacDonnell J}}, at para 27<br>
Where there is misconduct on the part of the accused during the course of proceedings, it will be "much more difficult to perceive the existence of remorse."<ref>
see, e.g. R v Valentini, [http://canlii.ca/t/1f979 1999 CanLII 1885] (ON CA), (1999), 132 CCC (3d) 262 (Ont. C.A.){{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Sawchyn|fp6pw|1981 ABCA 173 (CanLII)|124 DLR (3d) 600}}{{perABCA|Laycraft JA}}{{atL|fp6pw|34}}<br>
R v Giroux, [http://canlii.ca/t/1n06n 2006 CanLII 10736] (ON CA), (2006), 207 CCC (3d) 512 (Ont. C.A.){{perONCA|Blair JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Nyoni|hms13|2017 BCCA 360 (CanLII)}}{{perBCCA|Newbury JA}}{{atL|hms13|8}}<br>
R v B. (C.), [http://canlii.ca/t/1z164 2008 ONCA 486] (CanLII){{perONCA|Gillese JA}} (3:0)<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Misconduct Negating Remorse'''<Br>
; Mistake of Law
Where there is misconduct on the part of the accused during the course of proceedings, it will be "much more difficult to perceive the existence of remorse".<ref>
While not strictly a defence at trial, a mistake of law can be mitigating for sentence. Where the accused honestly but mistakenly believe in the lawfulness of their actions they are therefore less morally blameworthy.<ref>
R v Sawchyn (1981) [http://canlii.ca/t/fp6pw 1981 ABCA 173] (CanLII), 124 DLR (3d) 600 (Alta C.A.){{perABCA|Laycraft JA}} at para 34<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Suter|hsrlt|2018 SCC 34 (CanLII)|[2018] 2 SCR 496}}{{atL|hsrlt|64}} ("This is because offenders who honestly but mistakenly believe in the lawfulness of their actions are less morally blameworthy than offenders who — in committing the same offence — are unsure about the lawfulness of their actions, or know that their actions are unlawful.")<br>
R v Nyoni, [http://canlii.ca/t/hms13 2017 BCCA 360] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Newbury JA}} at para 8<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 152: Line 159:
===Shame and Embarrassment===
===Shame and Embarrassment===
The resultant shame and scorn suffered by an offender as a result of the offence should generally not warrant a lighter sentence.<ref>
The resultant shame and scorn suffered by an offender as a result of the offence should generally not warrant a lighter sentence.<ref>
R v Marchessault, [1984] J.Q. No. 686 (QCCA){{NOCANLII}}<br>
{{CanLIIR-N|Marchessault|, [1984] J.Q. No 686 (QCCA)}}<br>
R. c. Morency, [http://canlii.ca/t/fx1st 2012 QCCQ 4556] (CanLII){{perQCCQ|Morand J}}, at para 85<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Morency|fx1st|2012 QCCQ 4556 (CanLII)}}{{perQCCQ|Morand J}}{{atL|fx1st|85}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


When it comes to offences committed in the course of professional work, there should be little impact on sentence as the offender had "consciously chosen [to commit the offence while] they enjoyed a good reputation and a position of trust and status, which they abused to commit their crimes."<ref>
When it comes to offences committed in the course of professional work, there should be little impact on sentence as the offender had "consciously chosen [to commit the offence while] they enjoyed a good reputation and a position of trust and status, which they abused to commit their crimes."<ref>
Morency{{supra}} at para 86<br>
{{supra1|Morency}}{{atL|fx1st|86}}<br>
Quintin Vézina v. R., [http://canlii.ca/t/2c1g9 2010 QCCA 1457] (CanLII){{TheCourtQCCA}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRxC|Quintin Vézina v R|2c1g9|2010 QCCA 1457 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtQCCA}}<Br>
R v Jeannotte, [http://canlii.ca/t/1l2w4 2005 CanLII 22771] (QC CQ), [2005] R.J.Q. 2425{{perQCCQ|Provost J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Jeannotte|1l2w4|2005 CanLII 22771 (QC CQ)|[2005] R.J.Q. 2425}}{{perQCCQ|Provost J}}<br>
R v Flahiff, [http://canlii.ca/t/1kktw 1999 CanLII 10716] (QC CQ), [1999] R.J.Q. 884{{perQCCQ|Boisvert J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Flahiff|1kktw|1999 CanLII 10716 (QC CQ)|[1999] R.J.Q. 884}}{{perQCCQ|Boisvert J}}<br>
R. v Harris, [1984] J.Q. No. 102 (C.S.P.){{NOCANLII}}<br>
{{CanLIIR-N|Harris|, [1984] J.Q. No 102 (C.S.P.)}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 168: Line 175:
==Repayment and Restitution==
==Repayment and Restitution==
Where there has been "full restitution" made in a property offence, this might be a "special circumstance" justifying a conditional sentence where a jail sentence was otherwise appropriate.<ref>
Where there has been "full restitution" made in a property offence, this might be a "special circumstance" justifying a conditional sentence where a jail sentence was otherwise appropriate.<ref>
R v Bogart (2002), [http://canlii.ca/t/1cqs2 2002 CanLII 41073] (ON CA), 61 O.R. (3d) 75 (C.A.){{perONCA|Laskin JA}} ( “[r]ecognized that the payment of full restitution before sentencing ‘might’ be a ‘special’ circumstance justifying a conditional sentence where a prison sentence is otherwise appropriate.” )<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Bogart|1cqs2|2002 CanLII 41073 (ON CA)|61 OR (3d) 75}}{{perONCA|Laskin JA}} ( “[r]ecognized that the payment of full restitution before sentencing ‘might’ be a ‘special’ circumstance justifying a conditional sentence where a prison sentence is otherwise appropriate.” )<br>
</ref>
</ref>


It should still take "secondary role" to denunciation and deterrence in large scale frauds involving breach of trust.<ref>
It should still take "secondary role" to denunciation and deterrence in large scale frauds involving breach of trust.<ref>
R v Mathur, [http://canlii.ca/t/h3tl0 2017 ONCA 403] (CanLII){{perONCA|Trotter JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Mathur|h3tl0|2017 ONCA 403 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA|Trotter JA}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 178: Line 185:


==Character==
==Character==
A mitigating factor that may be considered is whether the offence is "out of character".
A mitigating factor that may be considered is whether the offence is "out of character."<ref>
{{CanLIIR|Shrivastava|j265q|2019 ABQB 663 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Antonio J}}{{atsL|j265q|72| to 93}}<Br>
{{CanLIIR|Misay|jgkks|2021 ABQB 485 (CanLII)}}{{atL|jgkks|127}}
</ref>


"Stressors" that "precipitated" the offence rendering the offence "out of character" will have a mitigating effect.<ref>
"Stressors" that "precipitated" the offence rendering the offence "out of character" will have a mitigating effect.<ref>
R v McIntosh, [http://canlii.ca/t/fr25j 2012 ONCJ 216] (CanLII){{perONCJ|Hearn J}} at para 38</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|McIntosh|fr25j|2012 ONCJ 216 (CanLII)|OJ No 1772}}{{perONCJ|Hearn J}}{{atL|fr25j|38}}</ref>
 
There is some criticism of the mitigating effect of character. All persons are obligated to "obey the law" and should not be used as "credit against punishment" for the commission of an offence.<Ref>
{{supra1|Misay}}{{atL|jgkks|128}} ("Justice Antonio also pointed out that obeying the law, an obligation we all bear, cannot be taken to earn credit against punishment for commission of a serious offence")<br>
{{supra1|Shrivastava}}{{atL|j265q|78}}
</ref>
It is also considered an "unprincipled" use of "personal history" evidence.<Ref>
{{supra1|Misay}}{{atL|jgkks|127}}
</ref>


Letters from members of the community and family of the offender can be put into evidence at sentencing. However, the weight may be limited where there is no indication that the writers knew about the circumstances of the offence or prior record.<ref>
Letters from members of the community and family of the offender can be put into evidence at sentencing. However, the weight may be limited where there is no indication that the writers knew about the circumstances of the offence or prior record.<ref>
e.g. R v Malt, [http://canlii.ca/t/gv7p2 2016 BCPC 322] (CanLII){{perBCPC|Harris J}} at para 10<br>
e.g. {{CanLIIRx|Malt|gv7p2|2016 BCPC 322 (CanLII)}}{{perBCPC|Harris J}}{{atL|gv7p2|10}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 191: Line 209:
==Risk to Re-Offend==
==Risk to Re-Offend==
The risk that the accused poses to re-offend is a valid factor for sentencing.<ref>
The risk that the accused poses to re-offend is a valid factor for sentencing.<ref>
e.g. R v Patton, [http://canlii.ca/t/fm16n 2011 ABCA 199] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}}, at para 10<br>
e.g. {{CanLIIRP|Patton|fm16n|2011 ABCA 199 (CanLII)|505 AR 394}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|fm16n|10}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


A greater the risk to re-offend the more consideration there will be upon a custodial sentence.<ref>
A greater the risk to re-offend the more consideration there will be upon a custodial sentence.<ref>
R v Carelse, [http://canlii.ca/t/fvz5h 2013 SKQB 15] (CanLII){{perSKQB|Danyliuk J}}, at para 28 to 30<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Carelse|fvz5h|2013 SKQB 15 (CanLII)|411 Sask R 263}}{{perSKQB|Danyliuk J}}{{atsL|fvz5h|28| to 30}}<br>
</ref>
 
In sexual abuse against children, the fact that an accused is unlikely to re-offend is not a significant consideration. The emphasis should be on general deterrence and denunciation.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|SCW|j3f8t|2019 BCCA 405 (CanLII)}}{{perBCCA|Goepel JA}}{{atL|j3f8t|26}} (" should further note that even if it could be said that the judge erred in not giving weight to the opinion, it would likely have had no impact on the sentence. The fact that an accused is unlikely to re‑offend is not a significant consideration in a case concerning sexual abuse against children when the emphasis is properly based on matters of general deterrence and denunciation")
</ref>
</ref>


Line 201: Line 223:


==Post Offence Conduct==
==Post Offence Conduct==
Efforts at rehabilitation and carerr advancement post-offence is a mitigating factor.<ref>
Efforts at rehabilitation and career advancement post-offence is a mitigating factor.<ref>
R v Thompson, [http://canlii.ca/t/2dr7g 1989 ABCA 212] (CanLII), (1989), 98 A.R. 348 (Alta. C.A.){{perABCA|Côté JA}} at para 4<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Thompson|2dr7g|1989 ABCA 212 (CanLII)|98 AR 348}}{{perABCA|Côté JA}}{{atL|2dr7g|4}}<br>
R v Spina (1997), 200 A.R. 133 (Alta. C.A.), [http://canlii.ca/t/2dfmq 1997 ABCA 235] (CanLII){{perABCA|Conrad JA}} at para 18<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Spina|2dfmq|1997 ABCA 235 (CanLII)| (1997), 200 AR 133}}{{perABCA|Conrad JA}}{{atL|2dfmq|18}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Rehabilitation, while the accused has fled to avoid sentencing, is ''not'' a mitigating factor.<ref>
Rehabilitation, while the accused has fled to avoid sentencing, is ''not'' a mitigating factor.<ref>
Thompson{{supra}}</ref>
{{supra1|Thompson}}</ref>


Post-offence bad behaviour is generally not an aggravating factor.<ref>
Post-offence bad behaviour is generally not an aggravating factor.<ref>
R v Klok, [http://canlii.ca/t/g6vqx 2014 ABPC 102] (CanLII){{perABPC|Allen J}}, at paras 79 to 88<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Klok|g6vqx|2014 ABPC 102 (CanLII)}}{{perABPC|Allen J}}{{atsL|g6vqx|79| to 88}}<br>
R v S.(B), [http://canlii.ca/t/1mcr7 1994 CanLII 3881] (SK CA), (1994), 125 Sask. R. 303(Sask. C.A.){{TheCourtSKCA}} at para 47<br>
{{CanLIIRP|S(B)|1mcr7|1994 CanLII 3881 (SK CA)|125 Sask R 303(Sask CA)}}{{TheCourtSKCA}}{{atL|1mcr7|47}}<br>
</ref> Criminal offences committed after the offence will not be aggravating.<ref>
</ref>  
Klok{{supra}}</ref>
Criminal offences committed after the offence will not be aggravating.<ref>
However, efforts in attempting to frustrate the investigation, such as telling a victim not to report the offence or attempting to commit further offences, can be used as aggravating.<Ref>
{{supra1|Klok}}</ref>
Klok{{supra}} at paras 87 to 88</ref>
However, efforts in attempting to frustrate the investigation, such as telling a victim not to report the offence or attempting to commit further offences, can be used as aggravating.<ref>
{{supra1|Klok}}{{atsL|g6vqx|87| to 88}}</ref>


'''Failure to Assist in the Investigation'''<br>
; Failure to Assist in the Investigation
Where an accused fails or refuses to assist police in an investigation it can at best neutralize mitigating factors. It cannot be an aggravating factor.<ref>
Where an accused fails or refuses to assist police in an investigation it can at best neutralize mitigating factors. It cannot be an aggravating factor.<ref>
R v Gryba, [http://canlii.ca/t/gr50j 2016 SKQB 123] (CanLII){{perSKQB|Popescul CJ}} at para 35<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Gryba|gr50j|2016 SKQB 123 (CanLII)|SJ No 218}}{{perSKQB|Popescul CJ}}{{atL|gr50j|35}}<br>
R v Leroux, [http://canlii.ca/t/ghlc4 2015 SKCA 48] (CanLII){{perSKCA|Caldwell JA}} at para 62<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Leroux|ghlc4|2015 SKCA 48 (CanLII)|9 WWR 709}}{{perSKCA|Caldwell JA}}{{atL|ghlc4|62}}<br>
R  v Araya, [http://canlii.ca/t/gmdl1 2015 ONCA 854] (CanLII){{perONCA|Laskin JA}} at para 29<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Araya|gmdl1|2015 ONCA 854 (CanLII)|344 OAC 36}}{{perONCA|Laskin JA}}{{atL|gmdl1|29}}<br>
R v Gwyn, [http://canlii.ca/t/299lr 2009 ABPC 212] (CanLII){{perABPC|Fradsham J}} at para 16<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Gwyn|299lr|2009 ABPC 212 (CanLII)}}{{perABPC|Fradsham J}}{{atL|299lr|16}}<br>
R v Deren, [http://canlii.ca/t/gx02p 2017 ABCA 23] (CanLII){{perABCA|Rowbotham JA}} at para 5<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Deren|gx02p|2017 ABCA 23 (CanLII)}}{{perABCA|Rowbotham JA}}{{atL|gx02p|5}}<br>
</reF>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
; Correctional Records
 
The disciplinary records of a remanded accused should not generally be used as aggravating to the sentence.<Ref>
==Addiction and Substance Abuse==
{{CanLIIR|Clarke-McNeil|jn2s0|2022 NSSC 63 (CanLII)}}{{perNSSC|Campbell J}}
Substance abuse, by itself, is not ordinarily a mitigating factor.<ref>R v Ayorech, [http://canlii.ca/t/fqjzl 2012 ABCA 82] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} at para 10</ref>
Nor is a history of addiction a mitigating factor to sentence. However, it can suggest a lower level of moral culpability and otherwise good character but for the addiction. It is also helpful for the court to know about to determine whether rehabilitation is a possibility when crafting an appropriate sentence.
 
Gambling addiction is not generally a mitigating factor.<ref>
R v Holmes [http://canlii.ca/t/5s4c 1999 ABCA 228] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}}<br>
c.f. R v Wilson, [http://canlii.ca/t/frb00 2012 NSPC 40] (CanLII){{perNSPC|Ross J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
However, some courts have treated it as a reduction to moral culpability as it has the effect of reducing the accused's free will and power of control due to a mental disease.<ref>
But they can be used to rebut assertions of good character as a mitigating factor.<Ref>
R v Horvath, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mctn 1997 CanLII 9759] (SK CA), [1997] S.J. No. 385{{perSKCA|Bayda CJ}}<Br>
{{ibid1|Clarke-McNeil}}
</ref>
</ref>
An offender with issues with substance abuse may be subject to probationary terms requiring them to abstain absolutely from the possession or consumption of the substances. However, some courts will take the view that such restrictions can be counter-productive where there is no belief that they will comply with the conditions.<ref>
R v Warren, [http://canlii.ca/t/fstt4 2012 CanLII 54025] (NL PC){{perNLPC|Gorman J}} at para 58</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


==Mental Health==
==Offender's History of Trauma==
Mental health can be a mitigating factor to sentence even where it is not so severe to remove criminal responsibility.<ref>R v Peters [http://canlii.ca/t/1nc5q 2000 NFCA 55] (CanLII), (2000), 194 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 184 (NLCA){{perNLCA|Green JA}}, (“the mental illness of an offender will often be considered a mitigating factor in sentencing even though it is not of the sort that would establish a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder at the time of the commission of the offence.”)</ref>
The presence of relevant abuse in the offender's history is sometimes found to be mitigating. This is particularly notable in child sexual offences where the offender had a history of abuse upon themselves.<ref>
 
{{CanLIIRx|DKDB|g2g88|2013 BCSC 2321 (CanLII)}}{{perBCSC|Ballance J}}{{atsL|g2g8|13|}}, {{atsL-np|g2g8|54|}}<br>
Reduction of sentences due to psychiatric grounds fall into two categories. The mental illness contributed to or caused the commission of the offence or the effect of imprisonment or penalty would be disproportionately sever because of the offender's condition.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|BVT|gplqh|2016 BCPC 95 (CanLII)}}{{perBCPC|Brecknell J}}<br>
R v Belcourt, [http://canlii.ca/t/2d2hg 2010 ABCA 319] (CanLII){{perABCA|Slatter JA}} (2:1) at para 8<Br>
</ref>
 
An offender's emotional condition due to the personal circumstances of the accused should not be conflated with "mental health problems" that should accord some special treatment in sentence.<REf>
R v Lausberg, [http://canlii.ca/t/fz80n 2013 ABCA 72] (CanLII), 544 A.R. 56 (Alta. C.A.){{perABCA|McDonald JA}} - Sentencing judge erred by considering the emotional state as being a mental health problem<br>
</ref>
 
'''Causal Connection'''<br>
Mental disorders, such as schizophrenia, can be a mitigating factor even when there is no a direct causal connection between the offence and the illness. <ref>
R v Ayorech, [2012] A.J. No. 236, [http://canlii.ca/t/fqjzl 2012 ABCA 82] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}}{{at|10}} (“mental disorders, particularly schizophrenia, can significantly mitigate a sentence, even if the evidence does not disclose that the mental illness was the direct cause of the offence or that it was carried out during a period of delusions, hallucinations, or such.”)</ref>
This is also true where the offender was not suffering from delusions at the time.<ref>R v Resler, [http://canlii.ca/t/flrdq 2011 ABCA 167] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0)<br>
Ayorech{{ibid}}</ref> It is sufficient that the illness contributed in some way to the offence.<ref>Belcourt{{supra}}</ref> However, the offender's mental health condition is not a factor in sentencing where there is no connection at all between the offence and the condition.<ref>R v Shahnawaz, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fbgv 2000 CanLII 16973], (2000), 149 CCC 97 (Ont.CA){{perONCA|Charron JA}}</ref>
 
By contrast, a person who commits a crime of violence "while in a sane and sober condition, unaffected by mental impairment of any kind, has the highest level of responsibility, or moral culpability."<ref>
R v Hagendorf, 2000 CarswellOnt 5245 (S.C.){{NOCANLII}}{{perONSC|Durno J}} at para 50</ref>
 
'''Incarceration'''<br>
Treatment in the community is generally preferred over incarceration.<Ref>
R v Lundrigan, [http://canlii.ca/t/fs0sg 2012 NLCA 43] (CanLII), [2012] NJ No 231 (NLCA){{perNLCA|Rowe JA}} at para 20<br>
</ref> However, this is less so for serious offences.<ref>
see R v J.M., [2008] N.J. No. 262 (P.C.){{NOCANLII}}<br>
R v Taylor, [http://canlii.ca/t/fs56r 2012 CanLII 42053] (NL PC), [2012] N.J. No. 251 (P.C.){{perNLPC|Mennie J}}<br>
</ref>
 
Mental illness is often considered a basis to order treatment and supervision over punishment.<ref>
see R v Valiquette [http://canlii.ca/t/1phqx 1990 CanLII 3048] (QC CA), (1990), 60 CCC (3d) 325 (QCCA){{perQCCA|Rothman JA}} at 331 (“most people understand that the mentally ill require treatment and supervision, not punishment”)</ref>
 
'''Deterrence and Denunciation'''<br>
General deterrence should be given "very little, if any, weight" since it is not appropriate manner of making an example to others.<ref>
Belcourt{{supra}} at para 8
</ref>
 
Where mental health plays "a central role in the commission of the offence ... deterrence and punishment assume less importance".<ref>
R v Batisse, [http://canlii.ca/t/22cd6 2009 ONCA 114] (CanLII){{perONCA|Gillese JA}}<br>
</ref>
 
However, at times mental illness will be considered an aggravating factor that will increase sentence where it is necessary to protect the public from a dangerous persons who has committed a dangerous offence.<ref>R v Lockyer, [http://canlii.ca/t/1nc5p 2000 NLCA 59] (CanLII), [2000] NJ No 306 (NLCA){{perNLCA|Roberts JA}} (2:1)</ref>
Mental illness reduces the importance of denunciation and deterrence and increases the importance of treatment. This includes situations where rehabilitation or cure is impossible.<ref>R v Hiltermann, [1993] AJ No 609 (CA){{NOCANLII}} at paras 4-8</ref>
 
It is suggested it should be given little if any weight since the punishing of the offender will not make an example to others by way of general deterrence.<ref>
R v Newby, [http://canlii.ca/t/2dth0 1991 ABCA 307] (CanLII), (1991), 84 Alta. L.R. (2d) 127 (Alta. C.A.){{perABCA|Foisy JA}}<br>
R v Rhyno, [http://canlii.ca/t/2694m 2009 NSCA 108] (CanLII){{perNSCA|Oland JA}}<br>
R v Dickson, [http://canlii.ca/t/1tsdq 2007 BCCA 561] (CanLII), 228 CCC (3d) 450{{perBCCA|Finch CJ}} (3:0)<br>
</ref>
</ref>


The mental condition will attenuate the relative importance of deterrence and denunciation.<ref>
; Abuse by Victim
R v Tremblay, [http://canlii.ca/t/1p97b 2006 ABCA 252] (CanLII){{perABCA|Martin JA}} at para 7 <br>
The presence of long-term abuse by the victim can be mitigating.<REf>
R v Resler, [http://canlii.ca/t/flrdq 2011 ABCA 167] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0) at para 14<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Dunlap|1ms5v|1991 CanLII 2519 (NS CA)|101 N.S.R. (2d) 263}}{{perNSCA-H|Matthews JA}}<Br>
{{CanLIIR-N|Drake|, [1995] O.J. No. 4375 (Gen. Div.)}} online: Quicklaw (OJ) <Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Cormier|hv05h|1974 CanLII 1577 (NS CA)|9 NSR (2d) 687, 22 CCC (2d) 235}}{{perNSCA|Macdonald JA}}<Br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Degree of Responsibility'''<br>
This may be manifested as "battered woman syndrome".<Ref>
A mental illness diminishes the offender’s degree of responsibility.<ref>
R. v. Phillips, [1992] O.J. No. 2716 (Gen. Div.)<Br>
R v Ayorech [http://canlii.ca/t/fqjzl 2012 ABCA 82] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} at para 12<br>
R. v. Bennett, [1993] O.J. No. 1011 (Prov. Div.)<br>
R v Resler [http://canlii.ca/t/flrdq 2011 ABCA 167] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} at paras 9 - 10, 16<br>
R v Belcourt [http://canlii.ca/t/2d2hg 2010 ABCA 319] (CanLII){{perABCA|Slatter JA}} (2:1) at paras 7 - 8<br>  
R v Muldoon, [http://canlii.ca/t/1pzrv 2006 ABCA 321] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0) at paras 9 - 10</ref>
 
'''Impact of Jail'''<br>
Incarceration of persons with mental health issues can create a disproportionate impact upon them, which can be a mitigating factor.<ref>
Newby{{supra}}<br>
Ayorech{{supra}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


An Offenders mental illness can make a jail sentence more severe.<ref>Ayorech{{supra}} at 13  (“Ayorech’s mental disorders have left him vulnerable, such that Dr. Santana opined that he ‘was ill equipped to survive in the prison system.’")</ref>
There can be mitigation where the conduct was "impulsive" or an immediate reaction in response to a perceived (or real) wrong by the victim.<Ref>
 
{{CanLIIRP|Kipling|g9mpr|1992 CanLII 13189 (MB CA)|83 Man. R. (2d) 6}}{{perMBCA|Scott CJ}}<br>
'''Cognitive Deficits'''<br>
{{CanLIIRP|McLeod (L.S.)|1mqmq|1994 NSCA 151 (CanLII)|132 NSR (2d) 118}}{{perNSCA|Freeman JA}}<br>
Diminished intellectual capacity is not a mitigating factor warranting a lesser sentence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Whynot|1mptf|1996 NSCA 53 (CanLII)|147 NSR (2d) 111}}{{perNSCA|Pugsley JA}} <br>
R v H.(M.J.), [http://canlii.ca/t/1jjnk 2004 SKCA 171] (CanLII){{perSKCA|Richards JA}} (3:0)
</ref>
 
The cognitive deficit from Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) results in limited restraints as well as an appreciation of the immorality of their actions. This reduces the impact on deterrence and denunciation and increases the mitigation on sentence.<ref>
R v Ramsay [http://canlii.ca/t/fsl7t 2012 ABCA 257] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0)</ref>
 
Systemic failures to treat the offender's mental health are mitigating factors.<ref>
R v Adamo, [http://canlii.ca/t/g0ptp 2013 MBQB 225] (CanLII){{perMBQB|Suche J}}<br>
R v Ayorech{{supra}} <Br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 330: Line 286:


==Cultural Background==
==Cultural Background==
It has been observed that the purposes and principles of sentencing are "sufficiently broad and flexible to enable a sentencing court in appropriate cases to consider both the systemic and background factors that may have played a role in the commission of the offence and the values of the community from which the offender comes".<ref>
It has been observed that the purposes and principles of sentencing are "sufficiently broad and flexible to enable a sentencing court in appropriate cases to consider both the systemic and background factors that may have played a role in the commission of the offence and the values of the community from which the offender comes."<ref>
R v Borde, [http://canlii.ca/t/1c062 2003 CanLII 4187] (ON CA){{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Borde|1c062|2003 CanLII 4187 (ON CA)|172 CCC (3d) 225}}{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}}<Br>
R v Rage, [http://canlii.ca/t/hqqpx 2018 ONCA 211] (CanLII){{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0), at para 13<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Rage|hqqpx|2018 ONCA 211 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0){{atL|hqqpx|13}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Cultural and customary differences cannot be considered mitigating where it involves offences of violence or offences of a sexual nature.<ref>
There mere existence of cultural or customary differences between the accused's culture and Canadian norms cannot be used as an excuse or as mitigation.<ref>
R v Brown [http://canlii.ca/t/1p6kf 1992 CanLII 2829] (AB CA){{TheCourtABCA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|E(H)|gk339|2015 ONCA 531 (CanLII)|336 OAC 363}}{{perONCA|Benotto JA}}{{atL|gk339|33}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Brown|1p6kf|1992 CanLII 2829 (AB CA)|73 CCC (3d) 242}}{{TheCourtABCA}} re offences of violence or sexual violence<br>
</ref>
To do otherwise creates a problem that new immigrants will not recieve "true protection" of the law.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Teclesenbet|272df|2009 ABCA 389 (CanLII)|469 AR 193}}{{perABCA|McDonald JA}}{{atL|272df|9}}
</ref>
</ref>


However, a lack of facility with English has been treated as mitigating in certain circumstances.<ref>
A lack of facility with English has been treated as mitigating in certain circumstances.<ref>
R v Huang, [2005] O.J. No. 1855 (S.C.J.){{NOCANLII}}, at para 21<br>
{{CanLIIR-N|Huang|, [2005] OJ No 1855 (SCJ)}}{{at-|21}}<br>
R v Shaliwal, [2011] M.J. No. 213(Q.B.){{NOCANLII}}, at para 41<br>
{{CanLIIR-N|Shaliwal|, [2011] MJ No 213(Q.B.)}}{{at-|41}}<br>
R v Lim, [1990] O.J. No. 949 (H.C.J.){{NOCANLII}}{{perONSC|Doherty J}}<br>
{{CanLIIR-N|Lim|, [1990] OJ No 949 (H.C.J.)}}{{perONSC|Doherty J}}<br>
''R v JWS'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fvtb6 2013 NSPC 7] (CanLII){{perNSPC|Derrick J}} at para 41<br>
{{CanLIIRx|JWS|fvtb6|2013 NSPC 7 (CanLII)}}{{perNSPC|Derrick J}}{{atL|fvtb6|41}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 349: Line 309:


==Sympathy and Compassion==
==Sympathy and Compassion==
The court may allow for a degree of leniency for sympathetic or compassionate offenders.<Ref> R v Voutsis (1989), 47 CCC 451 (Sask. CA), [http://canlii.ca/t/g8dtx 1989 CanLII 4477] (SK CA){{perSKCA|Cameron JA}}</ref> This will occasionally be done where the accused can show that his "health is so precarious" that the offender may not survive if they are incarcerated. <ref>
The court may allow for a degree of leniency for sympathetic or compassionate offenders.<ref>
R v Michel 1996, 133 WAC 237 (BCCA), [http://canlii.ca/t/1wnsq 1996 CanLII 8363] (BC CA){{perBCCA|Proudfoot JA}}</ref> However, simply poor health or age is not usually a reason on its own.<ref>R v Shah, [http://canlii.ca/t/1dcv9 1994 CanLII 1290] (1994), 94 CCC 45 (BCCA){{perBCCA|Finch JA}} (2:1)<br>  
{{CanLIIRP|Voutsis|g8dtx|1989 CanLII 4477 (SK CA)|47 CCC 451 (Sask. CA)}}{{perSKCA|Cameron JA}}</ref>  
R v Maczynski (1997), 120 CCC 221, [http://canlii.ca/t/1dzbw 1997 CanLII 2491] (BCCA){{perBCCA|Lambert JA}}<br>  
This will occasionally be done where the accused can show that his "health is so precarious" that the offender may not survive if they are incarcerated. <ref>
R v FDM (1995), 29 WBC 148 (AltaCA){{NOCANLII}}</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Michel|1wnsq|1996 CanLII 8363 (BCCA)|133 WAC 237 (BCCA)}}{{perBCCA|Proudfoot JA}}</ref>  
However, simply poor health or age is not usually a reason on its own.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Shah|1dcv9|1994 CanLII 1290 (1994)|94 CCC 45}}{{perBCCA|Finch JA}} (2:1)<br>  
{{CanLIIRP|Maczynski|1dzbw|1997 CanLII 2491 (BCCA)|120 CCC 221}}{{perBCCA|Lambert JA}}<br>  
{{CanLIIR-N|FDM| (1995), 29 WBC 148 (AltaCA)}}</ref>


In some cases, sympathy for family members of the accused may be relevant. But it should not "override all other of the considerations for sentencing".<ref>
In some cases, sympathy for family members of the accused may be relevant. But it should not "override all other of the considerations for sentencing."<ref>
R v Schmitt, [http://canlii.ca/t/g65j1 2014 ABCA 105] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0) at para 11<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Schmitt|g65j1|2014 ABCA 105 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0){{atL|g65j1|11}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


==Effect on Family and Others==
==Criminal Record==
The effect of incarceration upon the accused family may sometimes be a factor.<ref>
{{seealso|Effect of Criminal Records in Sentencing|Notice of Increased Penalty#Proving Prior Record|Jump, Step and Gap Principles‎}}
R v Schmitt [http://canlii.ca/t/g65j1 2014 ABCA 105] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0)
</ref>


The impact on family cannot override other factors.<ref>
==Employment==
Schmitt{{ibid}}<br>
* [[Employment Status as a Factor of Sentencing]]
</ref>
 
{{reflist|2}}
 
==Effect on Immigration==
{{seealso|Immigration Consequences from a Conviction}}
Section 64 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act states:
{{quotation|
64(1) '''No appeal for inadmissibility'''<br>
No appeal may be made to the Immigration Appeal Division by a foreign national or their sponsor or by a permanent resident if the foreign national or permanent resident has been found to be inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality.
<br>
64(2) '''Serious criminality'''<br>
For the purpose of subsection (1), serious criminality must be with respect to a crime that was punished in Canada by a term of imprisonment of at least two years.
| [http://canlii.ca/t/7vwq#sec64 IRPA]
}}
 
'''Risk of Deportation as Factor'''<Br>
The risk of deportation can be a factor to consider sentencing. <ref>
R v Pham, [http://canlii.ca/t/fwhz1 2013 SCC 15] (CanLII){{perSCC|Wagner J}} (7:0)<br>
R v Hamilton [http://canlii.ca/t/1hmc9 2004 CanLII 5549] (ON CA), (2004), 72 OR (3d) 1 at para 156, 186 CCC (3d) 129 (CA){{perONCA|Doherty JA}} (3:0) at para 159<br>
R v Barkza, [http://canlii.ca/t/fn834 2011 ABCA 273] (CanLII){{perABCA|Rowbotham JA}} (3:0)<br>
R v Dhura , [http://canlii.ca/t/flp0l 2011 ABCA 165] (CanLII){{perABCA|Watson JA}} (3:0)<br>
R v Koc, [http://canlii.ca/t/1x3vx 2008 NLTD 97] (CanLII), [2008] N.J. No. 161 (N.L.S.C.T.D.){{perNLSC|Goulding J}}<br>
R v Melo (1975), 26 CCC (2d) 510, [http://canlii.ca/t/hv14t 1975 CanLII 1299] (ON CA), at p. 516 (Ont. C.A.){{perONCA|Arnup JA}}<br>
</ref> It must be weighed and considered with all other factors and circumstances of the case.<ref>
''R v BRC'', [2010] O.J. No. 3571 (Ont. C.A.){{NOCANLII}} at 6<br>
R v Melo (1975), 26 CCC (2d) 510, [http://canlii.ca/t/hv14t 1975 CanLII 1299] (ON CA){{perONCA|Arnup JA}} (3:0) at p. 516<Br>
Pham{{supra}} at paras 20 to 22<br>
</ref> However, it should not bring the sentence out of the appropriate range.<ref>
R v Morgan, [http://canlii.ca/t/21xb5 2008 NWTCA 12] (CanLII){{TheCourt}}<br>
R v Belenky, [http://canlii.ca/t/28w7c 2010 ABCA 98] (CanLII){{perABCA|McDonald JA}} (3:0) at para 20: ("the collateral consequence of deportation can be given at most very limited weight. It cannot by itself remove a sentence from what would otherwise be the appropriate range. At most it can serve to move the sentence a small amount, nothing more.") <br>
</ref> However, the factor is a discretionary one.<ref>
Pham{{supra}}
</ref>
 
Immigration consequences are not aggravating or mitigating factors since they do not inform gravity of the offence or responsibility of the offender. However, it is relevant to "individualization, parity, and rehabilitation".<ref>
Pham{{supra}}
</ref>
 
'''Suggested Approach'''<br>
The preferred approach is one where the sentencing judge must first determine a fit and proper sentence and only then consider immigration consequences.<Ref>
R v Lopez-Orellana, [http://canlii.ca/t/hq2nn 2018 ABCA 35] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0) at para 24
</ref>
 
The impact on the ability to get a VISA to places like the US may influence the court to consider an absolute discharge over a conditional discharge due to the treatment of probation to immigration.<Ref>R v Dzabic, [http://canlii.ca/t/218bd 2008 CanLII 53860] (ON SC){{perONSC|DiTomaso J}}</ref>
 
The effect of an offender's immigration status on the likelihood of day parole is not a factor in sentence.<ref>R v Razmara, [http://canlii.ca/t/fpkgt 2012 ONCA 13] (CanLII){{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0)</ref>
 
'''Sentence Must Remain in the Appropriate Range'''<Br>
The risk of deportation is a "legitimate consideration for a sentencing judge" however "cannot be used to justify an otherwise unfit sentence" even where the offender has "virtually no connection" with the other country.<ref>
R v Spencer, [http://canlii.ca/t/gmbhn 2015 NSCA 108] (CanLII){{perNSCA|MacDonald CJ}} at para 8<br>
</ref>
 
A difference of one day custody in sentence will usually have "inconsequential" impact on denunciation, retribution, or deterrence, however, may still have "enormous" consequences on immigration status, in which case a reduction would be warranted.<ref>
R v Kanthasamy, [http://canlii.ca/t/1jxhw 2005 BCCA 135] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Donald JA}} (3:0), at para 15<br>
</ref>
 
'''Children'''<br>
The judge may consider the impact of deportation on the offender's dependent children as mitigation.<ref>
R v Gaurino, [http://canlii.ca/t/h4qdv 2017 ONSC 4174] (CanLII){{perONSC|Warkentin J}}<br>
R v Jiang, [http://canlii.ca/t/h387d 2017 BCPC 111] (CanLII){{perBCPC|Rideout J}}<br>
R v Gomez, [http://canlii.ca/t/gx409 2017 BCPC 7] (CanLII){{perBCPC|Rideout J}} <br>
</ref>
 
'''Counsel's Failure to Raise Immigration Status'''<Br>
A failure of counsel to raise the issue of immigration effect can by grounds of appellate intervention.<Ref>
Pham{{supra}} at para 24<br>
R v Tmenov, [http://canlii.ca/t/h433s 2017 ONCA 454] (CanLII){{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0)<br>
R v Jamieson, [http://canlii.ca/t/fpf0n 2011 NSCA 122] (CanLII){{perNSCA|Saunders JA}}<br>
</ref>
 
{{reflist|2}}
 
==Other Collateral Consequences==
Collateral consequences upon the offender, including being victim of vigilante justice, forms part of the offender's personal circumstances and should be taken into account on sentencing.<ref>
R v Suter, [http://canlii.ca/t/hsrlt 2018 SCC 34] (CanLII){{perSCC|Moldaver J}} (6:1) at paras 45 to 59<Br>
R v Pham, [http://canlii.ca/t/fwhz1 2013 SCC 15] (CanLII), [2013] 1 S.C.R. 739{{perSCC|Wagner J}}, at para. 11
</ref>
 
Relevant collateral consequences include "any consequence arising from the commission of an offence, the conviction for an offence, or the sentence imposed for an offence, that impacts the offender."<Ref>
Suter{{supra}} at para 47<Br>
</ref>
 
The consequence does not need to "emanate from state misconduct" for it to be mitigating.<Ref>
Suter{{supra}} at para 56<br>
</ref>
 
An incarcerated offender who is attacked by fellow inmates can be taken as a collateral factor.<ref>
Suter{{supra}} at para 51<br>
R v MacFarlane, [http://canlii.ca/t/fpvx8 2012 ONCA 82] (CanLII), 288 O.A.C. 114{{TheCourtONCA}} at para 3<br>
</ref>
 
After mitigating effects arising from collateral consequences are applied the sentence must still conform with the principle of proportionality.<Ref>
Suter{{supra}} at para 56<br>
</ref>


'''Vigilante Justice'''<Br>
==Medical Conditions and Substance Abuse==
Judges must avoid giving "too much weight to vigilante violence" at sentencing or else risk giving undue legitimacy to it in the judicial process.<ref>
* [[Health and Substance Abuse as a Sentencing Factor]]
Suter{{supra}} at para 58<Br>
</ref> Such violence should only be considered to a "limited extent".<ref>
Sutder{{Supra}} at para 59<Br></ref>


{{reflist|2}}
==Collateral Consequences==
* [[Collateral Consequences of Proceedings as a Sentencing Factor]]


==Aboriginal Background==
==Aboriginal Background==
Line 475: Line 340:


==During Proceedings==
==During Proceedings==
=== Guilty Plea ===
* [[Sentencing Factors Relating to the Criminal Proceedings]]
A guilty plea is a major mitigating factor.<ref>
R v Holder, [http://canlii.ca/t/1wd0k 1998 CanLII 14962] (ON SC), (1998), 21 C.R. (5th) 277 (Ont. S.C.J.){{perONSC|Hill J}} at 281-2<br>
R v Beier, [1995] O.J. No. 2552 (C.A.), [http://canlii.ca/t/6jlk 1995 CanLII 681] (ON CA){{TheCourtONCA}} at para 2<br>
R v Sawchyn, [http://canlii.ca/t/fp6pw 1981 ABCA 173] (CanLII), (1981), 60 CCC (2d) 200 (Alta. C.A.){{perABCA|Laycraft JA}} at 210
</ref>
 
'''Reasons for Mitigation'''<br>
A guilty plea is a mitigating factor in a number of respects:
*it is evidence of remorse <ref>R v Gardiner, [1982] 2 SCR 368, (1982) 68 CCC 477 (SCC), [http://canlii.ca/t/1lpcq 1982 CanLII 30] (SCC){{perSCC|Dickson J}} (4:3)<br>
R v Fegan, [http://canlii.ca/t/g16wp 1993 CanLII 8607] (ON CA), (1993), 80 CCC (3d) 356{{perONCA|Finlayson JA}} (3:0) at 360–61, 13 O.R. (3d) 88 (C.A.)<br>
R v Ticne, [http://canlii.ca/t/23cts 2009 BCCA 191] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Mackenzie JA}} (2:1), at para 23<br>
R v Wisniewski, (1975) 29 CRNS 342 (Ont.){{NOCANLII}}</ref>,
* it is a sign of greater chance at rehabilitation.<ref>
Holder{{supra}}<br>
R v Randhawa, [http://canlii.ca/t/1v965 2007 BCCA 598] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Hall JA}} at para 7<br>
</ref>
* it saves the justice system resources where a trial is not needed<Ref>R v Johnson and Tremayne, [1970] 4 CCC 64 (Ont. C.A.){{perONCA|Gale CJ}} at 67<br>
Randhawa{{ibid}} at para 7<br>
Ticne{{supra}} at para 23<br>
</ref> 
* it excuses victims from the stress of having to testify and reliving the horrors of the events;<ref>
R v Faulds et al., et al. [http://canlii.ca/t/6k6m 1994 CanLII 770] (ON CA), (1994), 20 O.R. (3d) 13 (C.A.){{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0) at p. 17<br>
R v Santos (J.) , (1993), 67 O.A.C. 270 (C.A.){{NOCANLII}} at 270-271<br>
Randhawa{{supra}} at para 7</ref>
* it spares victims and their family from the uncertainty of a trial.<ref>
Randhawa{{supra}} at para 7<br>
Ticne{{supra}} at para 23<br>
</ref>
 
Frequently a guilty plea is a product of negotiations with the Crown where another charge may be withdrawn or a lighter recommendation will be made in exchange for the guilty plea.<ref>
R v Roberts, [1998] O.J. No. 461 (C.A.), [http://canlii.ca/t/6gmz 1998 CanLII 2643] (ON CA){{TheCourtONCA}} at para 6</ref>
 
'''Not Guaranteed Mitigation'''<br>
The offender is not entitled to a sentence reduction simply for pleading guilty but rather it is within the discretion of the judge to account for a guilty plea in sentencing.
 
It does not require a "set standard of mitigation".<ref>
''R v FHL'', [http://canlii.ca/t/hq2qs 2018 ONCA 83] (CanLII){{perONCA|Epstein JA}} (3:0), at para 22
</ref>
The effect on sentence will vary depending on the circumstances.<Ref>
Holder{{supra}}<br>
Faulds{{supra}} at 14 and 17 ("[t]he effect of a guilty plea in setting the appropriate sentence will vary with the circumstances of each case. In some cases, a guilty plea is a demonstration of remorse and a positive first step towards rehabilitation. In other cases, a guilty plea is simply a recognition of the inevitable")<br>
R v Lake, [http://canlii.ca/t/1x15g 2008 ABCA 204] (CanLII), 429 A.R. 398{{perABCA|Watson JA}} at para 12 (“its significance as [a mitigating] factor is variable”)<br>
R v Carreira, [http://canlii.ca/t/gl89d 2015 ONCA 639] (CanLII){{perONCA|Epstein JA}} at para. 15<Br>
</ref>
 
The sentencing judge can consider whether the guilty plea was simply "a recognition of the inevitable" as revealed by the absence of a defence to the charges or compelling and uncontradicted evidence.<ref>
FHL{{supra}} at para 22 to 23<br>
</ref>
 
Where the victim still is forced to testify at the sentencing, the mitigation should not be based on conservation of judicial resources or giving a degree of finality to the complainant.<ref>
FHL{{supra}} at para 23 ("the appellant chose to test the Crown’s evidence relating to the more aggravating aspects of his case. As a result, [the victim] was made to relive the assaults in her testimony and to undergo cross-examination designed to impugn her credibility. The guilty plea, therefore, did not conserve judicial resources or provide a degree of finality to the complainant.")<Br>
</ref>
 
The amount of credit given for a guilty plea it not fixed as it can mitigate in several different ways. It has been suggested however that it can often lead to a reduction of sentence by one-third.<Ref>
R v Conlon, [http://canlii.ca/t/fmzb0 2011 ABPC 259] (CanLII){{perABPC|Daniel J}}
</ref>
 
'''Timing of Plea'''<br>
The timing of a guilty plea is important. An early guilty plea generally deserves "considerable weight" in sentencing.<ref>
R v Patterson, [1998] O.J. No. 937 (C.A.), [http://canlii.ca/t/6gr2 1998 CanLII 2154] (ON CA){{TheCourtONCA}} at para 1<br>
R v Pitkeathly, [http://canlii.ca/t/6k0z 1994 CanLII 222] (ON CA), (1994), 29 C.R. (4th) 182 (Ont. C.A.){{TheCourtONCA}} at 184-5<br>
R v T.(R.), [http://canlii.ca/t/1p793 1992 CanLII 2834] (ON CA), (1992), 17 C.R. (4th) 247 (Ont. C.A.){{perONCA|Doherty JA}} at 263 <br>
</ref>
It may entitle the accused to "substantial credit" in sentence.<REf>
R v Mann, [http://canlii.ca/t/29njl 2010 ONCA 342] (CanLII){{perONCA|MacPherson JA}} (3:0) at para 21<br>
</ref>
 
A guilty plea during trial may still deserve mitigation on sentence.<ref>
R v Garofoli et al. [http://canlii.ca/t/22kn2 1988 CanLII 3270] (ON CA), (1988), 41 CCC (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A.){{perONCA|Martin JA}} at 153 aff'd on other issue at [http://canlii.ca/t/1fss5 1990 CanLII 52] (SCC){{perSCC|Sopinka J}}<br>
</ref>
 
'''Lack of Guilty Plea Not Aggravating''' <br>
A lack of guilty plea is not an aggravating factor. However, related to a lack of a guilty plea, if the accused was convicted after trial where testimony of the accused was determined to be false, the judge may consider that as aggravating.<ref>R v Vickers, [http://canlii.ca/t/1wmcl 1998 CanLII 14982] (BC CA){{perBCCA|Esson JA}} (3:0)</ref>
 
{{reflist|2}}
 
===Conduct During Trial===
 
Though not the same as a guilty plea, the making of admissions during trial can be considered as a mitigating factor.<ref>
R v Davis, [http://canlii.ca/t/ftvp0 2012 ONSC 6486] (CanLII){{perONSC|Spies J}} at para 34<Br>
R v White, [2008] OJ No 4511 (ON SC), [http://canlii.ca/t/21hzx 2008 CanLII 58421] (ON SC){{perONSC|Spies J}} at para 21 ("Although not the same as a guilty pleas, I do find these significant admissions are a mitigating factor"<Br>
</ref>
 
A finding that the accused lied in his testimony cannot be used as an aggravating factor to sentence.<Ref>
R v Bradley, [http://canlii.ca/t/1w2bf 2008 ONCA 179] (CanLII), [2008] O.J. No. 955{{TheCourtONCA}}, at paras 15 and 16<br>
R v Kozy, [http://canlii.ca/t/1p78m 1990 CanLII 2625] (ON CA), [1990] O.J. No. 1586 (C.A.){{perONCA|Carthy JA}} at paras. 4-6<br>
R v Bani-Naiem, [http://canlii.ca/t/28wk5 2010 ONSC 1890] (CanLII), [2010] O.J. No. 1234{{perONSC|MacDonnell J}}, at para. 13<br>
</ref>
 
{{reflist|2}}
 
===Bail Conditions===
Strict bail conditions are not treated as equivalent to pre-trial detention, and so remand credit is not applicable for strict bail conditions.<ref>
R v Panday, [http://canlii.ca/t/1svfg 2007 ONCA 598] (CanLII){{perONCA|MacPherson JA}} (3:0)</ref>
The court may consider the bail conditions that the offender up to the date of sentencing.<ref>R v Downes, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mkm6 2006 CanLII 3957] (ON CA){{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}} (3:0) at 23</ref> If the individual was under house arrest conditions for bail, this may be accounted as a reason to reduce the sentence as the house arrest may have a punitive element to it.  This is a discretionary, however, and will usually needed to be justified by showing that the offender's circumstances were particularly tough beyond the average person.<ref>
R v Knockwood, [http://canlii.ca/t/26086 2009 NSCA 98] (CanLII){{perNSCA|Saunders JA}}</ref>
 
Restrictive bail conditions should be treated flexibly. The amount of credit, if any, is in the discretion of the trial judge to determine.<Ref>
Downes{{supra}} at para 36 (“a trial judge faced with an offender who has spent time on bail under house arrest should adopt a flexible approach, ... the amount of credit and the manner in which it is to be taken into account as a mitigating factor is a matter for the trial judge.”)
</ref>
 
In Ontario, the following guidelines are suggested:<ref>
Downes{{supra}} at para 37<br>
R v Ijam, [http://canlii.ca/t/1svv8 2007 ONCA 597] (CanLII){{perONCA|MacPherson JA}} (3:0) at para 63</ref>:
::*Time spent on stringent pre-sentence bail conditions, especially house arrest, is a relevant mitigating factor.
::*As such, the trial judge must consider the time spent on bail under house arrest in determining the length of sentence.
::*The failure of the trial judge to explain why time spent on bail under house arrest has not been taken into account is an error in principle.
::*The amount of credit to be given for time spent on bail under house arrest is within the discretion of the trial judge and there is no formula that the judge is required to apply.
::*The amount of credit will depend upon a number of factors including, the length of time spent on bail under house arrest; the stringency of the conditions; the impact on the offender’s liberty; the ability of the offender to carry on normal relationships, employment and activity.
::*Where the offender asks the trial judge to take pre-sentence bail conditions into account, the offender should supply the judge with information as to the impact of the conditions.  If there is a dispute as to the impact of the conditions, the onus is on the offender to establish those facts on a balance of probabilities in accordance with s. 724(3) of the Criminal Code.
 
{{reflist|2}}
 
===Delay===
Delay between the date of the offence and sentence is not usually a reason for mitigation. If the delay is due to flight of the accused from the jurisdiction he is not entitled to any benefit from the passage of time. <ref> R v Jansons, [http://canlii.ca/t/21jrg 2008 YKCA 15] (CanLII){{perYKCA|Kirkpatrick JA}}</ref>
 
Where the breach of s. 11(b) rights to a trial in a reasonable time is insufficient to warrant a stay of proceedings, the delay can still be a mitigating factor on sentence in limited circumstances.<ref>
R v McAulay, [http://canlii.ca/t/2dkzx 1987 ABCA 44] (CanLII){{perABCA|Kerans JA}}<br>
R v Bosley, [http://canlii.ca/t/1p797 1992 CanLII 2838] (ON CA), (1992), 18 CR (4th) 347{{perONCA|Doherty JA}} at p. 358<Br>
R v Leaver, [http://canlii.ca/t/232cf 1996 CanLII 10223] (ON CA), (1996), 3 CR (5th) 138 (ONCA){{TheCourtONCA}}<br>
R v Dwyer, [2000] OJ 3598 (ONSC){{NOCANLII}}<Br>
R v Spencer, [2003] OJ 10 (ONSC), [http://canlii.ca/t/1bsmz 2003 CanLII 36890] (ON SC){{perONSC|Mossip J}}<Br>
[[Right to a Trial Within a Reasonable Time]]<Br>
</ref> Courts are reluctant to give sentence credit for this reason, however.<Ref>
R v Glykis, [http://canlii.ca/t/6jmc 1995 CanLII 1277] (ON CA), (1995), 41 CR (4th) 310 (ONCA){{perONCA|Dubin CJ}} (3:0)<Br>
</ref>
 
Dated offences, such as historical [[Sexual Assault (Offence)|sexual assault]], do not warrant a significant reduction on penalty simply due to the time that has passed since the offence as the magnitude of the offence and degree of culpability remains the same.<ref>
R v Archibald [http://canlii.ca/t/frv7l 2012 ABCA 202] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0) at para 13
</ref>
 
On serious offences, the passage of time between the offence and sentence does not reduce the need for denunciation or deterrence.<ref>
R v Partridge, [http://canlii.ca/t/1m6lq 2005 NSCA 159] (CanLII){{perNSCA|Bateman JA}} (3:0)</ref>
 
Other factors in delay to consider include:<ref>R v Critton, [http://canlii.ca/t/1cl4t 2002 CanLII 3240] (ON SC), [2002] O.J. No. 2594 (ONSC){{perONSC|Hill J}} at para 76</ref>
# the effect of delay on sentencing is a case‑specific inquiry
# deliberate acts to evade detection by the authorities, whether flight or contribution to delayed complaint tend to weigh against assigning mitigating impact to the fact of delay
# reform and rehabilitation during the intervening period tend to eliminate the prospect of recidivism and to nullify the need for specific deterrence to be reflected in the court's disposition
# certain very serious crimes require sentences with measures of general deterrence and denunciation regardless of the offender's lengthy crime‑free existence subsequent to the crime(s)
# objectively speaking, taking into account delay, the court's disposition should not be seen as a reward or benefit eliminating or depreciating the concept of proportionate punishment.
 
{{reflist|2}}
 
===Pre-trial Custody===
 
{{quotation|
719.<br>...<br>
'''Determination of sentence'''<br>
:(3) In determining the sentence to be imposed on a person convicted of an offence, a court may take into account any time spent in custody by the person as a result of the offence but the court shall limit any credit for that time to a maximum of one day for each day spent in custody.<br>
 
:(3.1) Despite subsection (3), if the circumstances justify it, the maximum is one and one-half days for each day spent in custody unless the reason for detaining the person in custody was stated in the record under subsection 515(9.1) or the person was detained in custody under subsection 524(4) or (8).<br>
 
'''Reasons'''
:(3.2) The court shall give reasons for any credit granted and shall cause those reasons to be stated in the record.
|[http://canlii.ca/t/7vf2#sec719 CCC]
}}
 
Section 719(3.1) consists of amendments from 2010 where the practice of giving 2:1 credits was significantly limited. Certain judges have given 1.5:1 credit where warranted for loss of remission.<ref>
R v Johnson, [http://canlii.ca/t/2fwtz 2011 ONCJ 77] (CanLII){{perONCJ|M Green J}}<br>
R v Dann, [http://canlii.ca/t/fl7lk 2011 NSPC 22] (CanLII){{perNSPC|Derrick J}}
</ref>
The judge cannot deny pre-trial custody credit to a sentence simply because of the nature his record.<ref> R v Crawford, [http://canlii.ca/t/2ct0w 2010 ABCA 290] (CanLII){{perABCA|Rowbotham JA}} (3:0)</ref>
 
{{reflist|2}}
 
===Civil Liability===
 
Where the offender is likely to face substantial civil liability and he is not otherwise impecunious, then this should be a factor in sentence.<ref>R v Stone, [http://canlii.ca/t/4z2g 2001 BCCA 728] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Mackenzie JA}} (3:0) at paras 32-35<br>
R v Sadler, [http://canlii.ca/t/25j6c 2009 BCCA 386] (CanLII){{TheCourtBCCA}} (3:0) at paras 23-29<br>
</ref>
 
{{reflist|2}}

Latest revision as of 14:40, 14 July 2024

This page was last substantively updated or reviewed January 2023. (Rev. # 95524)

General Principles

See also: Sentencing Factors Relating to the Offence and Sentencing Factors Relating to the Criminal Proceedings

Section 718.2(a) provides that "a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender".

Distinctions between offender must be relevant to the degree of responsibility before they can be factored into sentencing.[1]

  1. ↑ R v Gerbrandt, 2021 ABCA 346 (CanLII), per curiam, at para 85
    R v Roberts, 2020 ABCA 434 (CanLII), Alta. L.R. (7th) 255, per curiam, at paras 42 to 47
    R v Ford, 2019 ABCA 87 (CanLII), 371 CCC (3d) 250, per curiam
    R v Costello, 2019 ABCA 104 (CanLII), [2019] AJ No 334, per curiam, at para 8
    R v Miller, 2018 ABCA 356 (CanLII), 2018] AJ No 1263, per curiam (2:1), at paras 13 to 17
    R v Fuller, 2017 ABCA 361 (CanLII), 60 Alta LR (6th) 219, per curiam, at para 7
    R v Maier, 2015 ABCA 59 (CanLII), 599 AR 44, per curiam (2:1), at para 31
    R v Murphy, 2014 ABCA 409 (CanLII), 317 CCC (3d) 314, per curiam
    R v Lausberg, 2013 ABCA 72 (CanLII), 544 AR 56, per McDonald J, at para 23
    R v Ayorech, 2012 ABCA 82 (CanLII), 522 AR 306, per curiam, at para 12
    R v Virani, 2012 ABCA 155 (CanLII), 545 WAC 328, per curiam, at para 16
    R v Ramsay, 2012 ABCA 257 (CanLII), 292 CCC (3d) 400, per curiam, at paras 15 to 34
    R v Resler, 2011 ABCA 167 (CanLII), 95 WCB (2d) 165, per curiam, at paras 8 to 10
    R v Belcourt, 2010 ABCA 319 (CanLII), 490 AR 224, per Slatter JA (2:1), at para 8
    R v B(TL), 2007 ABCA 61 (CanLII), 218 CCC (3d) 11, per Fraser CJ, at para 25
    R v Gibbon, 2007 ABCA 300 (CanLII), 417 AR 37, per Costigan JA, at para 12
    R v Diebel, 2007 ABCA 418 (CanLII), per curiam, at paras 16 to 23


Age and Youthfulness

Age is relevant to sentencing as a mitigating factor. A youthful person is seen as having a greater chance of reforming and maturing over time. The courts in certain cases recognize young adults as sometimes foolish, inexperienced, irresponsible, immature and have a "greater prospects for rehabilitation". This diminishes their level of responsibility and moral blameworthiness.[1]

Likewise, the principle of restraint is a prominent factor for young offenders.[2]

Youthfulness as a factor is of primary importance for first time offenders.[3] The factor becomes less important when the youthful offender has "considerable amount of experience in the criminal justice system, has been subject to various forms of probationary and correctional supervision, and has not only breached those conditions but has also re-offended."[4]

Where not otherwise required, a judge sentencing of a youthful offender should put more weight on rehabilitation over general deterrence.[5]

The objectives for youthful first offenders should primarily be on rehabilitation and specific deterrence.[6]

The "length of a penitentiary sentence for a youthful offender should rarely be determined solely by the objectives of denunciation and general deterrence."[7]

For an older accused, age can factor against rehabilitation and reform.[8]

At a certain age there is a recognized category of offender for which imprisonment would be considered "pointless or an unreasonable burden."[9] However, some cases have also pointed to advanced age being an inappropriate reason for sentence reduction as it should be dealt with during sentence administration.[10]

Maturity of Adults

The naivete and immaturity are valid mitigating factors affecting culpability.[11]

Advanced Age Offenders

An offender of advanced age can "in some circumstances" be considered a mitigating feature.[12] This has been justified on the basis that prison time is tougher on older persons and that they will have less life expectancy after release.[13]

  1. ↑ eg see R v Kunzig, 2011 MBPC 81 (CanLII), per MJ Smith J, at para 54
    R v Scott, 2015 ABCA 99 (CanLII), 599 AR 182, per curiam (3:0), at para 13
    R v Jackson, 2002 CanLII 41524 (ON CA), 163 CCC (3d) 451, per Sharpe JA (3:0)
  2. ↑ See: R v Demeter and Whitmore, 1976 CanLII 1413 (ON CA), 32 CCC (2d) 379, per Dubin JA
  3. ↑ Demeter and Whitmore, ibid.
    R v Ijam, 2007 ONCA 597 (CanLII), 226 CCC (3d) 376, per MacPherson JA, at paras 55 to 56, 87 OR (3d) 81
    R v Hussey, 1990 CanLII 6491 (NL CA), , 83 Nfld & PEIR 161 (Nfld CA), per Gushue JA (3:0)
    Scott, supra, at para 13
  4. ↑ Scott, supra, at para 13
    R v Quesnel, 1984 CanLII 3475 (ON CA), 14 CCC (3d) 254, per Thorson JA, at p. 255 (CCC)
  5. ↑ R v Turner, 1970 CanLII 522 (ON CA), 1 CCC (2d) 293 (ONCA), per Haines J
  6. ↑ R v Priest, 1996 CanLII 1381 (ON CA), [1996] OJ No 3369 (CA), per Rosenberg JA (3:0)
    R v Nassri, 2015 ONCA 316 (CanLII), 125 OR (3d) 578, per Sharpe JA (3:0), at para 30
  7. ↑ R v Borde, 2003 CanLII 4187 (ON CA), 63 OR (3d) 417, per Rosenberg JA (3:0), at para 36
  8. ↑ e.g. R v Wiens, 2013 ABPC 15 (CanLII), 551 AR 195, per Pharo J, at para 32
  9. ↑ R v Cromwell, 2006 ABCA 365 (CanLII), 214 CCC (3d) 502, per O’Brien JA, at para 16
    R v Nezic, [1976] BCJ No 1154 (CA)(*no CanLII links) - 77 year old offender in poor health
    see also R v Schmitt, 2014 ABCA 105 (CanLII), per curiam (3:0)
  10. ↑ e.g. R v Bulleyment, 1979 CanLII 2922 (ON CA), 46 CCC (2d) 429, per Martin JA
    R v Odgers, 2006 ABPC 163 (CanLII), 400 AR 322, per JDB McDonald J, at para 29
  11. ↑ R v McLean, 2016 SKCA 93 (CanLII), 132 WCB (2d) 96, per Ottenbreit JA
    see also R v Vandenbosch, 2007 MBCA 113 (CanLII), per Chartier JA, at para 95
  12. ↑ R v Walker, 2016 ABQB 695 (CanLII), per Ackerl J, at para 74
  13. ↑ Walker, ibid., at para 74
    R v AR, 1994 CanLII 4524 (MB CA), [1994] MJ No 89, 92 Man R (2d) 183 (CA), per Twaddle JA

Degree of Remorse and Attitude

Remorse is a mitigating factor.[1] Remorse is demonstrated by the acceptance of responsibility through word or action as well as demonstrated insight into the offender's actions. A lack of remorse, however, does not make for an aggravating factor, but simply does not allow for the mitigating effect of remorse.[2]

The courts should have "restraint...for persons who spontaneously acknowledge their culpability, have genuine remorse and seek voluntarily to make reparations."[3]

A lack of remorse or acceptance of responsibility generally cannot be taken as an aggravating factor, but rather can only be taken as an absence of mitigating factors.[4] Only in exceptional circumstances can the lack of remorse be taken as aggravating.[5]

Remorse is a "one-way street" and can only have the effect of providing reduction to sentence.[6]

An offender who "continues to maintain his innocence" cannot be found by that fact alone to lack "remorse or insight."[7]

Strong Case

Remorse has little importance when the case is so strong that "guilt is inevitable."[8]

Misconduct Negating Remorse

Where there is misconduct on the part of the accused during the course of proceedings, it will be "much more difficult to perceive the existence of remorse."[9]

Mistake of Law

While not strictly a defence at trial, a mistake of law can be mitigating for sentence. Where the accused honestly but mistakenly believe in the lawfulness of their actions they are therefore less morally blameworthy.[10]

  1. ↑ R v Anderson, 1992 CanLII 6002 (BC C.A.), 74 CCC (3d) 523, per Southin JA and Taylor JA, at pp. 535-536, 16 BCAC 14
    R v Nash, 2009 NBCA 7 (CanLII), 240 CCC (3d) 421, per Robertson JA (3:0), at para 40
    R v Cormier, 1999 CanLII 13118 (NB CA), 140 CCC (3d) 87, per Larlee JA
  2. ↑ See R v Kakekagamick, 2006 CanLII 28549 (ON CA), [2006] 81 OR (3d) 664, 211 CCC (3d) 289, per Laforme JA (3:0), at para 73 ("[his] failure to accept responsibility for his actions weighs against affording him significant consideration by way of mitigation")
    R v Wowk, 2020 ABCA 119 (CanLII), per curiam, at para 23
    R v Valentini, 1999 CanLII 1885 (ON CA), 132 CCC (3d) 262, 43 OR (3d) 178, at paras 82 to 83
    See also R v Kozy, 1990 CanLII 2625 (ON CA), 58 CCC (3d) 500, per Carthy JA (3:0), at pp. 505-506
    R v Anderson, 1992 CanLII 6002 , per Southin JA, at pp. 535-536
    R v Brown, [1993] OJ No 624 (CA)(*no CanLII links)
    R v Valentini, 1999 CanLII 1885 (ON CA), 132 CCC (3d) 262, per Rosenberg JA (3:0), at paras 80 to 85
  3. ↑ R v Arcand, 2010 ABCA 363 (CanLII), 264 CCC (3d) 134, per curiam, at para 293
  4. ↑ R v Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 (CanLII), [2000] 1 SCR 61, per Lamer CJ
    R v KA, 1999 CanLII 3756 (ON CA), [1999] OJ No 2640, per Rosenberg JA, at para 49
    R v Reid, 2017 ONCA 430 (CanLII), [2017] OJ No 2758, per van Rensburg JA, at para 36
    R v Cormier, 1999 CanLII 13118 (NB CA), 140 CCC (3d) 87, per Larlee JA
    R v S(E), 1997 CanLII 11513 (NB CA), 191 NBR (2d) 3 (CA), per Ryan JA, at para 6
    R v Williams, 2007 CanLII 13949 (ONSC), [2007] OJ No 1604, per Hill J, at para 32
    R v Hawkins, 2011 NSCA 7 (CanLII), 265 CCC (3d) 513, per Beveridge JA, at paras 31 to 34
    see also: R v Henry, 2002 NSCA 33 (CanLII), 164 CCC (3d) 167, per Roscoe JA, at para 21
    R v Zeek, 2004 BCCA 42 (CanLII), 193 BCAC 104, per Rowles JA
  5. ↑ Hawkins, supra, at para 33
    Valentini, supra
  6. ↑ Hawkins, supra
  7. ↑ R v Yau, 2011 ONSC 1009 (CanLII), OJ No 720, per MacDonnell J, at para 27
    see, e.g. R v Valentini, 1999 CanLII 1885 (ON CA), 132 CCC (3d) 262, per Rosenberg JA
    R v Giroux, 2006 CanLII 10736 (ON CA), 207 CCC (3d) 512, per Blair JA
    R v B(C), 2008 ONCA 486 (CanLII), 78 WCB (2d) 80, per Gillese JA (3:0)
  8. ↑ R v Singh, 2018 ONSC 3850 (CanLII), per Harris J
    R v Faulds, 1994 CanLII 770 (ON CA), , 20 OR (3d) 13, per curiam, at para 14
    R v Daya, 2007 ONCA 693 (CanLII), 227 CCC (3d) 367, per Moldaver and LaForme JJA, at para 15
  9. ↑ R v Sawchyn, 1981 ABCA 173 (CanLII), 124 DLR (3d) 600, per Laycraft JA, at para 34
    R v Nyoni, 2017 BCCA 360 (CanLII), per Newbury JA, at para 8
  10. ↑ R v Suter, 2018 SCC 34 (CanLII), [2018] 2 SCR 496, at para 64 ("This is because offenders who honestly but mistakenly believe in the lawfulness of their actions are less morally blameworthy than offenders who — in committing the same offence — are unsure about the lawfulness of their actions, or know that their actions are unlawful.")

Shame and Embarrassment

The resultant shame and scorn suffered by an offender as a result of the offence should generally not warrant a lighter sentence.[1]

When it comes to offences committed in the course of professional work, there should be little impact on sentence as the offender had "consciously chosen [to commit the offence while] they enjoyed a good reputation and a position of trust and status, which they abused to commit their crimes."[2]

  1. ↑ R v Marchessault, [1984] J.Q. No 686 (QCCA)(*no CanLII links)
    R v Morency, 2012 QCCQ 4556 (CanLII), per Morand J, at para 85
  2. ↑ Morency, supra, at para 86
    Quintin Vézina v R, 2010 QCCA 1457 (CanLII), per curiam
    R v Jeannotte, 2005 CanLII 22771 (QC CQ), [2005] R.J.Q. 2425, per Provost J
    R v Flahiff, 1999 CanLII 10716 (QC CQ), [1999] R.J.Q. 884, per Boisvert J
    R v Harris, [1984] J.Q. No 102 (C.S.P.)(*no CanLII links)

Repayment and Restitution

Where there has been "full restitution" made in a property offence, this might be a "special circumstance" justifying a conditional sentence where a jail sentence was otherwise appropriate.[1]

It should still take "secondary role" to denunciation and deterrence in large scale frauds involving breach of trust.[2]

  1. ↑ R v Bogart, 2002 CanLII 41073 (ON CA), 61 OR (3d) 75, per Laskin JA ( “[r]ecognized that the payment of full restitution before sentencing ‘might’ be a ‘special’ circumstance justifying a conditional sentence where a prison sentence is otherwise appropriate.” )
  2. ↑ R v Mathur, 2017 ONCA 403 (CanLII), per Trotter JA

Character

A mitigating factor that may be considered is whether the offence is "out of character."[1]

"Stressors" that "precipitated" the offence rendering the offence "out of character" will have a mitigating effect.[2]

There is some criticism of the mitigating effect of character. All persons are obligated to "obey the law" and should not be used as "credit against punishment" for the commission of an offence.[3] It is also considered an "unprincipled" use of "personal history" evidence.[4]

Letters from members of the community and family of the offender can be put into evidence at sentencing. However, the weight may be limited where there is no indication that the writers knew about the circumstances of the offence or prior record.[5]

  1. ↑ R v Shrivastava, 2019 ABQB 663 (CanLII), per Antonio J, at paras 72 to 93
    R v Misay, 2021 ABQB 485 (CanLII), at para 127
  2. ↑ R v McIntosh, 2012 ONCJ 216 (CanLII), OJ No 1772, per Hearn J, at para 38
  3. ↑ Misay, supra, at para 128 ("Justice Antonio also pointed out that obeying the law, an obligation we all bear, cannot be taken to earn credit against punishment for commission of a serious offence")
    Shrivastava, supra, at para 78
  4. ↑ Misay, supra, at para 127
  5. ↑ e.g. R v Malt, 2016 BCPC 322 (CanLII), per Harris J, at para 10

Risk to Re-Offend

The risk that the accused poses to re-offend is a valid factor for sentencing.[1]

A greater the risk to re-offend the more consideration there will be upon a custodial sentence.[2]

In sexual abuse against children, the fact that an accused is unlikely to re-offend is not a significant consideration. The emphasis should be on general deterrence and denunciation.[3]

  1. ↑ e.g. R v Patton, 2011 ABCA 199 (CanLII), 505 AR 394, per curiam, at para 10
  2. ↑ R v Carelse, 2013 SKQB 15 (CanLII), 411 Sask R 263, per Danyliuk J, at paras 28 to 30
  3. ↑ R v SCW, 2019 BCCA 405 (CanLII), per Goepel JA, at para 26 (" should further note that even if it could be said that the judge erred in not giving weight to the opinion, it would likely have had no impact on the sentence. The fact that an accused is unlikely to re‑offend is not a significant consideration in a case concerning sexual abuse against children when the emphasis is properly based on matters of general deterrence and denunciation")

Post Offence Conduct

Efforts at rehabilitation and career advancement post-offence is a mitigating factor.[1]

Rehabilitation, while the accused has fled to avoid sentencing, is not a mitigating factor.[2]

Post-offence bad behaviour is generally not an aggravating factor.[3] Criminal offences committed after the offence will not be aggravating.[4] However, efforts in attempting to frustrate the investigation, such as telling a victim not to report the offence or attempting to commit further offences, can be used as aggravating.[5]

Failure to Assist in the Investigation

Where an accused fails or refuses to assist police in an investigation it can at best neutralize mitigating factors. It cannot be an aggravating factor.[6]

Correctional Records

The disciplinary records of a remanded accused should not generally be used as aggravating to the sentence.[7] But they can be used to rebut assertions of good character as a mitigating factor.[8]

  1. ↑ R v Thompson, 1989 ABCA 212 (CanLII), 98 AR 348, per Côté JA, at para 4
    R v Spina, 1997 ABCA 235 (CanLII), (1997), 200 AR 133, per Conrad JA, at para 18
  2. ↑ Thompson, supra
  3. ↑ R v Klok, 2014 ABPC 102 (CanLII), per Allen J, at paras 79 to 88
    R v S(B), 1994 CanLII 3881 (SK CA), 125 Sask R 303(Sask CA), per curiam, at para 47
  4. ↑ Klok, supra
  5. ↑ Klok, supra, at paras 87 to 88
  6. ↑ R v Gryba, 2016 SKQB 123 (CanLII), SJ No 218, per Popescul CJ, at para 35
    R v Leroux, 2015 SKCA 48 (CanLII), 9 WWR 709, per Caldwell JA, at para 62
    R v Araya, 2015 ONCA 854 (CanLII), 344 OAC 36, per Laskin JA, at para 29
    R v Gwyn, 2009 ABPC 212 (CanLII), per Fradsham J, at para 16
    R v Deren, 2017 ABCA 23 (CanLII), per Rowbotham JA, at para 5
  7. ↑ R v Clarke-McNeil, 2022 NSSC 63 (CanLII), per Campbell J
  8. ↑ Clarke-McNeil, ibid.

Offender's History of Trauma

The presence of relevant abuse in the offender's history is sometimes found to be mitigating. This is particularly notable in child sexual offences where the offender had a history of abuse upon themselves.[1]

Abuse by Victim

The presence of long-term abuse by the victim can be mitigating.[2]

This may be manifested as "battered woman syndrome".[3]

There can be mitigation where the conduct was "impulsive" or an immediate reaction in response to a perceived (or real) wrong by the victim.[4]

  1. ↑ R v DKDB, 2013 BCSC 2321 (CanLII), per Ballance J, at paras 13, 54
    R v BVT, 2016 BCPC 95 (CanLII), per Brecknell J
  2. ↑ R v Dunlap, 1991 CanLII 2519 (NS CA), 101 N.S.R. (2d) 263, per Matthews JA
    R v Drake, [1995] O.J. No. 4375 (Gen. Div.)(*no CanLII links) online: Quicklaw (OJ)
    R v Cormier, 1974 CanLII 1577 (NS CA), 9 NSR (2d) 687, 22 CCC (2d) 235, per Macdonald JA
  3. ↑ R. v. Phillips, [1992] O.J. No. 2716 (Gen. Div.)
    R. v. Bennett, [1993] O.J. No. 1011 (Prov. Div.)
  4. ↑ R v Kipling, 1992 CanLII 13189 (MB CA), 83 Man. R. (2d) 6, per Scott CJ
    R v McLeod (L.S.), 1994 NSCA 151 (CanLII), 132 NSR (2d) 118, per Freeman JA
    R v Whynot, 1996 NSCA 53 (CanLII), 147 NSR (2d) 111, per Pugsley JA

Cultural Background

It has been observed that the purposes and principles of sentencing are "sufficiently broad and flexible to enable a sentencing court in appropriate cases to consider both the systemic and background factors that may have played a role in the commission of the offence and the values of the community from which the offender comes."[1]

There mere existence of cultural or customary differences between the accused's culture and Canadian norms cannot be used as an excuse or as mitigation.[2] To do otherwise creates a problem that new immigrants will not recieve "true protection" of the law.[3]

A lack of facility with English has been treated as mitigating in certain circumstances.[4]

  1. ↑ R v Borde, 2003 CanLII 4187 (ON CA), 172 CCC (3d) 225, per Rosenberg JA
    R v Rage, 2018 ONCA 211 (CanLII), per curiam (3:0), at para 13
  2. ↑ R v E(H), 2015 ONCA 531 (CanLII), 336 OAC 363, per Benotto JA, at para 33
    R v Brown, 1992 CanLII 2829 (AB CA), 73 CCC (3d) 242, per curiam re offences of violence or sexual violence
  3. ↑ R v Teclesenbet, 2009 ABCA 389 (CanLII), 469 AR 193, per McDonald JA, at para 9
  4. ↑ R v Huang, [2005] OJ No 1855 (SCJ)(*no CanLII links) , at para 21
    R v Shaliwal, [2011] MJ No 213(Q.B.)(*no CanLII links) , at para 41
    R v Lim, [1990] OJ No 949 (H.C.J.)(*no CanLII links) , per Doherty J
    R v JWS, 2013 NSPC 7 (CanLII), per Derrick J, at para 41

Sympathy and Compassion

The court may allow for a degree of leniency for sympathetic or compassionate offenders.[1] This will occasionally be done where the accused can show that his "health is so precarious" that the offender may not survive if they are incarcerated. [2] However, simply poor health or age is not usually a reason on its own.[3]

In some cases, sympathy for family members of the accused may be relevant. But it should not "override all other of the considerations for sentencing."[4]

  1. ↑ R v Voutsis, 1989 CanLII 4477 (SK CA), 47 CCC 451 (Sask. CA), per Cameron JA
  2. ↑ R v Michel, 1996 CanLII 8363 (BCCA), 133 WAC 237 (BCCA), per Proudfoot JA
  3. ↑ R v Shah, 1994 CanLII 1290 (1994), 94 CCC 45, per Finch JA (2:1)
    R v Maczynski, 1997 CanLII 2491 (BCCA), 120 CCC 221, per Lambert JA
    R v FDM (1995), 29 WBC 148 (AltaCA)(*no CanLII links)
  4. ↑ R v Schmitt, 2014 ABCA 105 (CanLII), per curiam (3:0), at para 11

Criminal Record

See also: Effect of Criminal Records in Sentencing, Notice of Increased Penalty#Proving Prior Record, and Jump, Step and Gap Principles‎

Employment

Medical Conditions and Substance Abuse

Collateral Consequences

Aboriginal Background

See Aboriginal Sentencing Principles and Factors

During Proceedings

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