Statements Against Interest Exception: Difference between revisions
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[[fr:Exception_relative_aux_déclarations_contre_les_intérêts]] | |||
{{Currency2|January|2016}} | |||
{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderHearsay}} | {{LevelZero}}{{HeaderHearsay}} | ||
==General Principles== | ==General Principles== | ||
{{seealso|Traditional Exceptions to Hearsay}} | {{seealso|Traditional Exceptions to Hearsay}} | ||
The exception to hearsay includes admission that "in the broad sense refers to any statement made by a declarant and tendered as | The exception to hearsay includes admission that "in the broad sense refers to any statement made by a declarant and tendered as evidence at trial by the opposing party."<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|Violette|25xs9|2008 BCSC 422 (CanLII)|[2008] BCJ No 2781}}{{perBCSC|Romilly J}}{{atsL|25xs9|63| to 65}} - in context of [[Wiretaps]]<br> | {{CanLIIRP|Violette|25xs9|2008 BCSC 422 (CanLII)|[2008] BCJ No 2781}}{{perBCSC|Romilly J}}{{atsL|25xs9|63| to 65}} - in context of [[Wiretaps]]<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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; Statements by Accused | ; Statements by Accused | ||
A statement made by the accused is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule where the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect.<ref> | A statement made by the accused is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule where the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect.<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|Terry|1fr9t|1996 CanLII 199 (SCC)|[1996] 2 SCR 207}}{{perSCC|McLachlin J}}{{atL|1fr9t|28}} (“an admission against interest made by the accused is admissible as a recognized exception to the hearsay rule, provided that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.”)<br> | {{CanLIIRP|Terry|1fr9t|1996 CanLII 199 (SCC)|[1996] 2 SCR 207}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}{{atL|1fr9t|28}} (“an admission against interest made by the accused is admissible as a recognized exception to the hearsay rule, provided that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.”)<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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There is some debate on whether an admission by the accused is hearsay at all.<ref> | There is some debate on whether an admission by the accused is hearsay at all.<ref> | ||
e.g. {{CanLIIRP|Evans|1frzq|1993 CanLII 86 (SCC)|[1993] 3 SCR 653}}{{perSCC|Sopinka J}}{{atL|1frzq|24}}<br> | e.g. {{CanLIIRP|Evans|1frzq|1993 CanLII 86 (SCC)|[1993] 3 SCR 653}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}{{atL|1frzq|24}}<br> | ||
{{supra1|Ciancio}}{{atsL|1rp5c|15| to 36}}<br> | {{supra1|Ciancio}}{{atsL|1rp5c|15| to 36}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
These statements can be admitted without analysis of necessity and reliability.<ref> | These statements can be admitted without analysis of necessity and reliability.<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|Foreman|1chv3|2002 CanLII 6305 (ON CA)|169 CCC (3d) 489}}{{perONCA|Doherty JA}}{{atp|502}}<br> | {{CanLIIRP|Foreman|1chv3|2002 CanLII 6305 (ON CA)|169 CCC (3d) 489}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atp|502}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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A statement of a third party admitting to the murder cannot be used in the murder trial of another person. The defence would have to call that third party as a witness.<ref> | A statement of a third party admitting to the murder cannot be used in the murder trial of another person. The defence would have to call that third party as a witness.<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|Yu|1fncf|2000 BCCA 626 (CanLII)|150 CCC (3d) 217}}{{perBCCA| Mackenzie JA}} | {{CanLIIRP|Yu|1fncf|2000 BCCA 626 (CanLII)|150 CCC (3d) 217}}{{perBCCA| Mackenzie JA}} | ||
</ref> | |||
A third-party statement is inadmissible against the accused regardless of whether it is inculpatory or exculpatory.<ref> | |||
see, R. v. Parberry (2005), 2005 CanLII 40137 (ON CA) , 202 C.C.C. (3d) 337 (Ont. C.A.)<br> | |||
R. v. C. (B.) (1993), 1993 CanLII 8564 | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Latest revision as of 19:42, 7 September 2024
| This page was last substantively updated or reviewed January 2016. (Rev. # 96409) |
General Principles
The exception to hearsay includes admission that "in the broad sense refers to any statement made by a declarant and tendered as evidence at trial by the opposing party."[1]
- Statements by Accused
A statement made by the accused is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule where the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect.[2]
Where a statement fits into the category of admission against interest, it becomes preemptively admissible.[3]
There is some debate on whether an admission by the accused is hearsay at all.[4]
These statements can be admitted without analysis of necessity and reliability.[5]
Statements by the accused addressed to his wife will be admissible against him.[6]
- Statements by a Third Party
A statement can only be binding against the party who made them. Thus, a out-of-court statement can only be admissible in a trial against the person who made them.[7]
A statement of a third party admitting to the murder cannot be used in the murder trial of another person. The defence would have to call that third party as a witness.[8]
A third-party statement is inadmissible against the accused regardless of whether it is inculpatory or exculpatory.[9]
- Statements by Co-Accused
Out-of-Court statements made by the co-accused are hearsay and cannot be used as corroborative evidence at trial of the accused.[10] Should the evidence be accepted as against the co-accused, limiting instructions are required to prevent its use against the accused.[11]
- Corporate Accused
Statements made by an agent of an organization that is within his scope of authority to a third person is admissible against their interests where the statement is part of a communciation which the agent is authorized to have with the third party.[12]
- ↑
R v Violette, 2008 BCSC 422 (CanLII), [2008] BCJ No 2781, per Romilly J, at paras 63 to 65 - in context of Wiretaps
- ↑
R v Terry, 1996 CanLII 199 (SCC), [1996] 2 SCR 207, per McLachlin J, at para 28 (“an admission against interest made by the accused is admissible as a recognized exception to the hearsay rule, provided that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.”)
- ↑
R v Ciancio, 2007 BCSC 777 (CanLII), per Singh J, at para 24 citing Sopinka on Evidence
- ↑
e.g. R v Evans, 1993 CanLII 86 (SCC), [1993] 3 SCR 653, per Sopinka J, at para 24
Ciancio, supra, at paras 15 to 36
- ↑
R v Foreman, 2002 CanLII 6305 (ON CA), 169 CCC (3d) 489, per Doherty JA, at p. 502
- ↑ R v RRW (No. 2), 2010 NLTD 137 (CanLII), per Goodridge J
- ↑
R v Abu-Sharife, 2006 BCSC 902 (CanLII), per Shabbits J, at para 29
- ↑ R v Yu, 2000 BCCA 626 (CanLII), 150 CCC (3d) 217, per Mackenzie JA
- ↑
see, R. v. Parberry (2005), 2005 CanLII 40137 (ON CA) , 202 C.C.C. (3d) 337 (Ont. C.A.)
R. v. C. (B.) (1993), 1993 CanLII 8564 - ↑
R v Rhyno, 2011 NSCA 120 (CanLII), per curiam, at para 5
- ↑
Rhyno, ibid., at para 7
Ward, supra, at paras 32-38
- ↑
R v Strand Electric Ltd, 1968 CanLII 421 (ON CA), , [1969] 1 OR 1990, OJ 1291 (ONCA), per MacKay JA
R v Petro Canada, 2009 ONCJ 179 (CanLII), 82 WCB (2d) 729, per Manno J
R v Dana Canada Corp, 2008 ONCJ 644 (CanLII), [2008] OJ 4487 (ONCJ), per D Harris J
R v Syncrude, 2010 ABPC 123 (CanLII), 491 AR 270, per Tjosvold J