Interception of Private Communications: Difference between revisions

From Criminal Law Notebook
← Older edit
VisualWikitext
No edit summary
m Text replacement - "\{\{fr\|([^\}\}]+)\}\}" to "fr:$1"
 
(153 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
[[fr:écoutes_téléphoniques]]
{{Currency2|January|2023}}
{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderWiretaps}}
{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderWiretaps}}
==General Principles==
==General Principles==
Wiretaps are governed by Part VI of the Criminal Code.  
Wiretaps are governed by Part VI {{CCC}} (Invasion of Privacy (ss. 183 to 196.1)).


There are four categories of wiretap:
There are five categories of interception/wiretap:
* a general wiretap authorized under s. 185 and 186.
* [[Third-Party Intercept Authorizations]] (185 and 186)
* a wiretap with consent under s. 184.2
* [[One-Party Consent Intercept Authorizations|One-Party Consent (OPC) Intercept authorization]] (184.2)
* an emergency wiretap under s. 184.1, 184.4 and 188
* [[One-Party Consent Intercepts to Prevent Bodily Harm]] (184.1)
* video intercepts s. 487.01
* [[Third-Party Intercept to Prevent Imminent Harm]] (184.4)
* [[Emergency Intercepts]] (188)
* [[Video Surveillance]] (487.01) 
* [[Tracking Warrants]] (492.1(1) and 492.1(2))


The emergency wiretap (s. 184.1), exceptional circumstances wiretaps (s. 184.4), and video intercepts (s. 487.01) do not require full judicial authorization.  
; Eligible Applicants, Offences and Level of Court
Authorizations for a third-party intercept under s. 185 and 186 can only be authorized by a judge of a superior court.


A wilful interception of "a private communication" without authorization is a indictable offence under s. 184 with a maximum penalty of 5 years. This offence does not include situations where one of the parties consents (s.184(2)).
{| class="wikitable sortable"
! Type of Intercept !! Section !! Applicant !! [[Definition of Judicial Officers and Offices|Court]] !! Offences !! Notes
|-
| [[Third-Party Intercept Authorizations]] || 185 and 186 <br> || Designated Agent || Superior  ||s. 183 offences <br>("has been, or is being") || 90 day notice<Br>Investigative Necessity
|-
| [[One-Party Consent Intercept Authorizations|One-Party Consent (OPC) Intercept authorization]] ||184.2 || peace officer, public officer, Designated Agent || Provincial or Superior ||Any <br>("has been or will be committed") ||None
|-
| [[One-Party Consent Intercepts to Prevent Bodily Harm]]|| 184.1  || NA || NA ||Any || None
|-
| [[Third-Party Intercept to Prevent Imminent Harm]] ||184.4  || NA || NA  ||s. 183 offences <br>("has been, or is being") || Notice
|-
| [[Emergency Intercepts]]|| 188  || a designated peace officer|| Superior ||s. 183 offences <br>("has been, or is being") || Notice
|-
| [[Video Surveillance]] ||487.01  || Designated Agent || Superior ||s. 183 offences<br>("has been, or is being") || Investigative necessity<Ref>if there is no consent</ref>
|-
| [[Tracking Warrants]]|| 492.1(1) and 492.1(2) || peace officer or public officer ||JP, Provincial or Superior || Any || None
|} 


; Warrantless
The One-Party Consent Wiretap to Prevent Bodily Harm (s. 184.1) and Third-Party Wiretap to Prevent Serious Harm (s. 184.4) do not require judicial authorization.
; Section 8 of the Charter
An interception of a private communication under a Part VI authorization is a search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter.<ref>
An interception of a private communication under a Part VI authorization is a search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter.<ref>
R v Grant [http://canlii.ca/t/1f973 1999 CanLII 3694] (ON CA), (1999), 132 CCC (3d) 531 (S.C.C.){{perSCC|Charron J}} at 539
{{CanLIIRP|Grant|1f973|1999 CanLII 3694 (ON CA)|132 CCC (3d) 531}}{{perSCC|Charron J}}{{atp|539}} [CCC]
</ref>
</ref>


; Offence
A wilful interception of "a private communication" without authorization is an indictable offence under s. 184 with a maximum penalty of 5 years. This offence does not include situations where one of the parties consents (s.184(2)).
; Disclosure of Packet
The right to full answer and defence permits the accused to examine an edited version of the materials available to the authorizing judge to support the wiretap authorization.<ref>
The right to full answer and defence permits the accused to examine an edited version of the materials available to the authorizing judge to support the wiretap authorization.<ref>
R v Garofoli, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fss5 1990 CanLII 52] (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 1421{{perSCC|Sopinka J}} at para 1433, 1452</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Garofoli|1fss5|1990 CanLII 52 (SCC)|[1990] 2 SCR 1421}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}{{atps|1433, 1452}} [SCR]</ref>
 
Modern electronic surveillance has been singled out as a particularly powerful form of privacy intrusion.
But unregulated, it would destroy any sort of privacy and would threaten society.<ref>
R v Duarte, [1990] 1 SCR 30, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fszz 1990 CanLII 150] (SCC){{perSCC|LaForest J}} - Judge referring to electronic surveillance as "superbly" equipped to fight crime, but left unregulated would mean "privacy no longer had any meaning"<br>
R v Wong, [1990] 3 SCR 36, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fsq9 1990 CanLII 56] (SCC){{perSCC|LaForest J}} - LaForest J suggesting that electronic surveillance would "annihilate privacy"<br>
R v Wise, [1992] 1 SCR 527, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fsdl 1992 CanLII 125] (SCC){{perSCC|Cory J}} - LaForest J (dissenting) suggesting that surviellance was a "danger to individual autonomy and the organization of a free society”)
</ref>


; Vetting
The Crown and police have a positive obligation not to disseminate irrelevant private communications revealed within a wiretap.<Ref>
The Crown and police have a positive obligation not to disseminate irrelevant private communications revealed within a wiretap.<Ref>
R v Guess, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fngn 2000 BCCA 547] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Hall J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Guess|1fngn|2000 BCCA 547 (CanLII)|148 CCC (3d) 321}}{{perBCCA|Hall J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 34: Line 58:
===History===
===History===
The modern legislation protecting against the interception of private communications arose from the 1969 Ouimet report which resulted in the Protection of Privacy Act.<Ref>
The modern legislation protecting against the interception of private communications arose from the 1969 Ouimet report which resulted in the Protection of Privacy Act.<Ref>
R. Ouimet, Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, Towards Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1969) cited in detail at R v Nguyen, [http://canlii.ca/t/1hjsb 2001 ABPC 52] (CanLII){{perABPC| J}} at para 17<br>
R. Ouimet, Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, Towards Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1969) cited in detail at {{CanLIIRP|Nguyen|1hjsb|2001 ABPC 52 (CanLII)|294 AR 201}}{{perABPC|Stevenson ACJ}}{{atL|1hjsb|17}}<br>
R v Lyons (1984), 15 CCC (3d0 417 at p.453, [http://canlii.ca/t/1lpg0 1984 CanLII 30] (SCC), [1984] 2 SCR 633{{perSCC| J}} - comments on the origin of the wiretap provisions
{{CanLIIRP|Lyons|1lpg0|1984 CanLII 30 (SCC)|[1984] 2 SCR 633, 15 CCC (3d) 417}}{{perSCC|Estey J}}{{atp|453}} (CCC) - comments on the origin of the wiretap provisions
</ref>
 
; Constitutionality
It was found that the interception regime in Part VI of the Code is constitutional.<REf>
R v Finlay Grelette (1985) 23CCCC (3d) 38 at paras 63 to 64
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}
===Purpose===
===Purpose===
Part VI of the Code regulates the "power of the state to record communications that their originator expects will not be intercepted".<ref>
Modern electronic surveillance has been singled out as a particularly powerful form of privacy intrusion.
R v Duarte, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fszz 1990 CanLII 150] (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 30, (1990), 53 CCC (3d) 1 (SCC){{perSCC|La Forest J}}
But unregulated, it would destroy any sort of privacy and would threaten society.<ref>
R v Jones, [http://canlii.ca/t/hp63x 2017 SCC 60] (CanLII){{perSCC|Cote J}} at para 60<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Duarte|1fszz|1990 CanLII 150 (SCC)|[1990] 1 SCR 30}}{{perSCC|LaForest J}} - Judge referring to electronic surveillance as "superbly" equipped to fight crime, but left unregulated would mean "privacy no longer had any meaning"<br>
</ref> It avoids the "danger inherent in allowing the state, in its unfettered discretion, to record and transmit our words."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Wong|1fsq9|1990 CanLII 56 (SCC)|[1990] 3 SCR 36}}{{perSCC|LaForest J}} - Judge suggests that electronic surveillance would "annihilate privacy"<br>
Duarte{{supra}}
{{CanLIIRP|Wise|1fsdl|1992 CanLII 125 (SCC)|[1992] 1 SCR 527}}{{perSCC|LaForest J}} (dissenting) suggesting that surviellance was a "danger to individual autonomy and the organization of a free society”)
</ref>
 
Part VI of the Code regulates the "power of the state to record communications that their originator expects will not be intercepted."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Duarte|1fszz|1990 CanLII 150 (SCC)|[1990] 1 SCR 30}}{{perSCC|La Forest J}}
{{CanLIIRP|Jones|hp63x|2017 SCC 60 (CanLII)|[2017] 2 SCR 696}}{{perSCC|Cote J}}{{atL|hp63x|60}}<br>
</ref>  
It avoids the "danger inherent in allowing the state, in its unfettered discretion, to record and transmit our words."<ref>
{{supra1|Duarte}}
</ref>
</ref>


These provisions aim to "strike a balance between the protection of privacy and the availability of effective law enforcement techniques".
These provisions aim to "strike a balance between the protection of privacy and the availability of effective law enforcement techniques".
<Ref>
<Ref>
R v Nguyen, [http://canlii.ca/t/1hjsb 2001 ABPC 52] (CanLII){{perABPC|Stevenson ACJ}} at para 17<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Nguyen|1hjsb|2001 ABPC 52 (CanLII)|294 AR 201}}{{perABPC|Stevenson ACJ}}{{atL|1hjsb|17}}<br>
Regina v Welsh and Iannuzzi (No. 6), [http://canlii.ca/t/g19w7 1977 CanLII 1215] (ON CA), (1977) 32 CCC (2d) 363{{perONCA| JA}} at p. 369<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Regina v Welsh and Iannuzzi (No. 6)|g19w7|1977 CanLII 1215 (ON CA)|32 CCC (2d) 363}}{{perONCA|Zuber JA}} (5:0){{atp|369}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Electronic surveillance has the potential to "annihilate" any expectation of privacy in our communications. Society should not expose us to permanent electronic surveillance.<ref>
Electronic surveillance has the potential to "annihilate" any expectation of privacy in our communications. Society should not expose us to permanent electronic surveillance.<ref>
Duarte{{supra}} at p. 11 (CCC)<br>
{{supra1|Duarte}}{{atp|11}} (CCC)<br>
see also United States v White, 201 US 745 (1971) at p.756 ("electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known")</ref>
see also ''United States v White'', 201 US 745 (1971){{atp|756}} ("electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known")</ref>


Surveillance is one of the "the greatest leveler[s] of human privacy ever known".<Ref>
Surveillance is one of the "the greatest leveler[s] of human privacy ever known".<Ref>
United States v White, 201 U.S. 745 (1971) at p. 756
''United States v White'', 201 U.S. 745 (1971){{atp|756}}
</ref>
</ref>


This provision has ''nothing'' to do with protecting persons from the risk that the recipient of the communication will divulge anything.<Ref>
This provision has ''nothing'' to do with protecting persons from the risk that the recipient of the communication will divulge anything.<Ref>
Duarte{{supra}} ("has nothing to do with protecting individuals from the threat that their interlocutors will divulge communications that are meant to be private")
{{supra1|Duarte}} ("has nothing to do with protecting individuals from the threat that their interlocutors will divulge communications that are meant to be private")
</ref>
 
{{reflist|2}}
 
==="Authorization"===
{{Quotation|
'''Definitions'''<br>
183 In this Part,<Br>
'''authorization''' means an authorization to intercept a private communication given under section 186 or subsection 184.2(3), 184.3(6) or 188(2); (autorisation)<br>
...<br>
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 183;
R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), ss. 7, 23, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), s. 213, c. 1 (4th Supp.), s. 13, c. 29 (4th Supp.), s. 17, c. 42 (4th Supp.), s. 1;
1991, c. 28, s. 12;
1992, c. 27, s. 90;
1993, c. 7, s. 5, c. 25, s. 94, c. 40, s. 1, c. 46, s. 4;
1995, c. 39, s. 140;
1996, c. 19, s. 66;
1997, c. 18, s. 7, c. 23, s. 3;
1998, c. 34, s. 8;
1999, c. 2, s. 47, c. 5, s. 4;
2000, c. 24, s. 43;
2001, c. 32, s. 4, c. 41, ss. 5, 31, 133;
2002, c. 22, s. 409;
2004, c. 15, s. 108;
2005, c. 32, s. 10, c. 43, s. 1;
2008, c. 6, s. 15;
2009, c. 2, s. 442, c. 22, s. 4, c. 28, s. 3;
2010, c. 3, s. 1, c. 14, s. 2;
2012, c. 1, s. 24;
2013, c. 8, s. 2, c. 9, s. 14, c. 13, s. 7;
2014, c. 17, s. 2, c. 25, s. 11, c. 31, s. 7, c. 32, s. 59;
2015, c. 20, s. 19.
|[{{CCCSec|183}} CCC]
}}
 
==Interception of Private Communications==
==="Private Communication"===
{{seealso|Reasonable Expectation of Privacy}}
Section 183 defines "private communication":
{{quotation|
183.<br>...<br>
"private communication" means any oral communication, or any telecommunication, that is made by an originator who is in Canada or is intended by the originator to be received by a person who is in Canada and that is made under circumstances in which it is reasonable for the originator to expect that it will not be intercepted by any person other than the person intended by the originator to receive it, and includes any radio-based telephone communication that is treated electronically or otherwise for the purpose of preventing intelligible reception by any person other than the person intended by the originator to receive it; (communication privée)
<br>...<br>
...2015, c. 20, s. 19.
|[{{CCCSec|183}} CCC]
}}
 
;"Private"
A communication is private where the originator has a reasonable expectation that the communication would "not be intercepted by any person other than the person intended by the originator to receive it".<Ref>
R c Kyling, [http://canlii.ca/t/24s1v 2009 QCCS 3311] (CanLII){{perQCCS| J}}<br>
</ref>
The intention of who is to receive the communication includes those who the originator had knowledge would receive it but may not desire them to receive it.<ref>
R v Goldman, [http://canlii.ca/t/1tx9c 1979 CanLII 60] (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 976{{perSCC|Mclntyre J}} </ref>
 
Where it is reasonable to expect that the communication may be listened to or recorded, then it is not a private communication.<ref>
R v Newall, [http://canlii.ca/t/23drc 1982 CanLII 276] (BC SC){{perSCC|Bouck J}}<br>
R v Davie, [http://canlii.ca/t/23lwr 1980 CanLII 323] (BC CA){{perSCC|Hutcheon J}}<br>
</ref>
 
Communication requires some exchange of information between persons and not simply all information capturable by the interception. <ref>
R v Balatoni, [http://canlii.ca/t/1h55g 2003 CanLII 13174] (ON SC){{perONSC|Dawson J}} at para 8
</ref> Consequently, sounds not intended to convey information does not constitute a communication.<ref>
Balatoni</ref>
 
;"Communications"
According to s. 183, a "communication" can be either "oral communication" or "telecommunication".
 
The following has been found not to be a "private communication":
* Electronic signals captured by a digital number recorder (DNR) <ref>
R v Fegan, [http://canlii.ca/t/g16wp 1993 CanLII 8607] (ON CA), (1993), 80 CCC (3d) 356{{perONCA|Finlayson JA}}<br>
c.f. R v Griffith (1989) 44 CCC (3d) 63 (Ont. Dis. Ct.), [http://canlii.ca/t/g91l1 1988 CanLII 7059] (ON SC){{perONSC|McDermid J}} <br></ref>
* communication of a paging device.<ref>
R v Lubovac (1990) 52 CCC (3d) 551 (ABCA), [http://canlii.ca/t/2drds 1989 ABCA 320] (CanLII){{perABCA|McClung JA}}<br>
</ref>
* a prayer to God as God does not meet the legal definition of a person.<ref>
Davie{{supra}}</ref>
* a cassette sent through the mail<ref>
R v Newall, [http://canlii.ca/t/23drc 1982 CanLII 276] (BC SC){{perBCSC|Bouck J}}</ref>
* prayers to God<ref>
Davie{{supra}}
</ref>
 
;"originator"
The "originator" refers to the person whose "remarks which the Crown seeks to adduce in evidence" and are protected under Part VI of the Code.<ref>
R v Goldman, [http://canlii.ca/t/1tx9c 1979 CanLII 60] (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 976{{perSCC|Mclntyre J}}
</ref>
 
{{reflist|2}}
 
==="Telecommunications"===
Section 35 of the Interpretation Act defines "telecommunications" as: "means the emission, transmission or reception of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds or intelligence of any nature by any wire, cable, radio, optical or other electromagnetic system, or by any similar technical system"
 
This definition was found to include technology such as Dialed number recorders.<ref>
R v Lee, [http://canlii.ca/t/1v9z2 2007 ABQB 767] (CanLII){{perABQB| J}}<br>
R v Croft, [http://canlii.ca/t/g1pvx 2013 ABQB 644] (CanLII){{perABQB| J}} at para 22</ref>
 
This term is also used in the offence of [[Child Luring (Offence)]], [[Agree or Arrange a Sexual Offence Against Child (Offence)]], and [[Telecommunication Offences (Offence)]].
 
'''Warrants Apply to Many Types of Communication'''<br>
 
{{quotation|
'''One application for authorization sufficient'''<Br>
184.6 For greater certainty, an application for an authorization under this Part may be made with respect to both private communications and radio-based telephone communications at the same time.
<Br>
1993, c. 40, s. 4.
|[{{CCCSec|184.6}} CCC]
}}
 
{{reflist|2}}
==="Interception"===
"Interception" means to "listen to, record or acquire a communication or acquire the substance, meaning or purport thereof;" (s. 183).<ref>
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 183; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), ss. 7, 23, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), s. 213, c. 1 (4th Supp.), s. 13, c. 29 (4th Supp.), s. 17, c. 42 (4th Supp.), s. 1; 1991, c. 28, s. 12; 1992, c. 27, s. 90; 1993, c. 7, s. 5, c. 25, s. 94, c. 40, s. 1, c. 46, s. 4; 1995, c. 39, s. 140; 1996, c. 19, s. 66; 1997, c. 18, s. 7, c. 23, s. 3; 1998, c. 34, s. 8; 1999, c. 2, s. 47, c. 5, s. 4; 2000, c. 24, s. 43; 2001, c. 32, s. 4, c. 41, ss. 5, 31, 133; 2002, c. 22, s. 409; 2004, c. 15, s. 108; 2005, c. 32, s. 10, c. 43, s. 1; 2008, c. 6, s. 15; 2009, c. 2, s. 442, c. 22, s. 4, c. 28, s. 3; 2010, c. 3, s. 1, c. 14, s. 2; 2012, c. 1, s. 24; 2013, c. 8, s. 2, c. 9, s. 14, c. 13, s. 7; 2014, c. 17, s. 2, c. 25, s. 11, c. 31, s. 7, c. 32, s. 59; 2015, c. 20, s. 19.
</ref>
 
;Identity of Intended Recipient
A communication that is directed to law enforcement under false assumption of identity is not usually an "intercept" where it is not "participant surveillance".
 
An online undercover police officer who impersonates a young person and communicates with the accused is not intercepting as there is no "surreptitious" recording of the conversation and no "interception" as between the accused and third party.<ref>
R v Mills, [http://canlii.ca/t/gxfxd 2017 NLCA 12] (CanLII){{perNLCA|Welsh JA}} pending appeal at SCC<bR>
R v Beairsto, [http://canlii.ca/t/hr8cq 2018 ABCA 118] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0)
</ref>
 
Telephone communications between the accused and the police who answers the phone at a drug house and assumes the identity of the homeowner are not covered by Part VI.<ref>
R v Singh, [http://canlii.ca/t/1dxvh 1998 CanLII 4819] (BC CA){{perBCCA|Hall JA}}<br>
R v McQueen (1979) 25 CCC (2d) 262 (SKQB), [http://canlii.ca/t/gbj5r 1975 CanLII 1373] (AB CA){{perABCA|McDermid JA}} (“The [wiretap provisions are] aimed at preventing a third party from intercepting the private communication between two people. It is not intended to apply to the case where there are only two persons involved and one receives a message by impersonation of fraud.”)<br>
see also R v Giles, [http://canlii.ca/t/1w8ms 2007 BCSC 1147] (CanLII){{perBCSC|MacKenzie JA}}, at para 31<br>
</ref>
 
;"Intercept" vs "Disclose"
The scheme of Part VI distinguishes between "interception" and "use or retention" of that communication, which is conceptually "different and distinct".<ref>
R v Jones, [2017] 2 SCR 696, [http://canlii.ca/t/hp63x 2017 SCC 60] (CanLII){{perSCC|Cote J}} at para 63<Br>
</ref>
 
;Timing of Capture
There is the suggestion that there does not need to be a direct temporal connection between the message seizure and the transmission of the message.<ref>
R v Telus Communications, [http://canlii.ca/t/fwq20 2013 SCC 16] (CanLII){{Plurality}} ''per'' plurality reasons at para 35 ("definition of “intercept” that the interception of a private communication be simultaneous or contemporaneous with the making of the communication itself")</ref>
 
However, text messages ''saved'' within the network of a service provider can be otained by a production order as it is not an "intercept".<ref>
Jones{{supra}}<br>
R v Belcourt, [http://canlii.ca/t/ggrxf 2015 BCCA 126] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Kirkpatrick JA}}<br>
R v Webster, [http://canlii.ca/t/gjn8s 2015 BCCA 286] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Chiasson JA}}<br>
R v Didechko, [http://canlii.ca/t/gll4w 2015 ABQB 642] (CanLII){{perABQB|Schutz J}}<br>
c.f. R v Hoelscher, [http://canlii.ca/t/gn6l6 2016 ABQB 44] (CanLII){{perABQB|Simpson J}}<br>
R v Croft, [http://canlii.ca/t/g1t5p 2013 ABQB 640] (CanLII){{perABCA|Burrows J}} <Br>
</ref>
It will generally be required where the message has not yet come into existence or have not yet been received by the recipient.<ref>
Jones{{ibid}}
</ref>
</ref>
;Devices Used to Intercept
The interception must be done by way of an "electromagnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device" (s.183).
Consequently, simply to use one's human senses without technological aids does not invoke Part VI.
<ref>
R v Beckner (1978), 43 CCC (2d) 356, [http://canlii.ca/t/htwbs 1978 CanLII 2511] (ON CA){{perONCA|Dubin JA}} -- officer overhears a conversation between accused and a friend<br>
R v Kopinsky, [http://canlii.ca/t/27t7j 1985 CanLII 1191] (AB QB){{perABQB|McFadyen J}}</ref>
{{quotation|
'''Definitions'''<br>
183 In this Part,
<Br>...<Br>
'''electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device''' means any device or apparatus that is used or is capable of being used to intercept a private communication, but does not include a hearing aid used to correct subnormal hearing of the user to not better than normal hearing; (dispositif électromagnétique, acoustique, mécanique ou autre)
<Br>...<Br>
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 183;
... 2000, c. 24, s. 43;
2001, c. 32, s. 4, c. 41, ss. 5, 31, 133;
2002, c. 22, s. 409;
2004, c. 15, s. 108;
2005, c. 32, s. 10, c. 43, s. 1;
2008, c. 6, s. 15;
2009, c. 2, s. 442, c. 22, s. 4, c. 28, s. 3;
2010, c. 3, s. 1, c. 14, s. 2;
2012, c. 1, s. 24;
2013, c. 8, s. 2, c. 9, s. 14, c. 13, s. 7;
2014, c. 17, s. 2, c. 25, s. 11, c. 31, s. 7, c. 32, s. 59;
2015, c. 20, s. 19.
|[{{CCCSec|183}} CCC]
}}
{{reflist|2}}
==="Offence"===
Within the provisions of the wiretap sections of the code, "offence" refers to a specific closed-list of offences. Those offences are listed within s. 2.<ref>
See [[Criminal Code and Related Definitions#Wiretap .22Offence.22|Criminal Code and Related Definitions]]
</ref> It will include any conspiracies, attempts or counselling to commit the offence, or any accessories after the fact.<ref>see s. 183 definition of "offence"</ref>
* See [[List of Designated Wiretap Eligible Offences]]


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


==Misc Wiretap Terms==
==Misc Wiretap Terms==
{{quotation|
{{quotation3|
'''Definitions'''<br>
; Definitions
183 In this Part,
183 In this Part {{AnnSec|Part VI}},<Br>
<br>...<br>
'''"authorization"''' means an authorization to intercept a private communication given under subsection 184.‍2(3) {{AnnSec1|184.2(3)}}, section 186 {{AnnSec1|186}} or subsection 188(2) {{AnnSec1|188(2)}}; (autorisation)
'''police officer''' means any officer, constable or other person employed for the preservation and maintenance of the public peace; (policier)
{{ellipsis}}
<br>...<br>
'''"police officer"''' means any officer, constable or other person employed for the preservation and maintenance of the public peace; (policier)<br>
'''public switched telephone network''' means a telecommunication facility the primary purpose of which is to provide a land line-based telephone service to the public for compensation; (réseau téléphonique public commuté)
{{ellipsis}}
<Br>
'''"public switched telephone network"''' means a telecommunication facility the primary purpose of which is to provide a land line-based telephone service to the public for compensation; (réseau téléphonique public commuté)<Br>
'''radio-based telephone communication''' means any radiocommunication within the meaning of the Radiocommunication Act that is made over apparatus that is used primarily for connection to a public switched telephone network; (communication radiotéléphonique)
'''"radio-based telephone communication"''' means any radiocommunication within the meaning of the Radiocommunication Act that is made over apparatus that is used primarily for connection to a public switched telephone network; (communication radiotéléphonique)<br>
<br>
'''"sell"''' includes offer for sale, expose for sale, have in possession for sale or distribute or advertise for sale; (vendre)<br>
'''sell''' includes offer for sale, expose for sale, have in possession for sale or distribute or advertise for sale; (vendre)
'''"solicitor"''' means, in the Province of Quebec, an advocate or a notary and, in any other province, a barrister or solicitor. (avocat)<br>
solicitor means, in the Province of Quebec, an advocate or a notary and, in any other province, a barrister or solicitor. (avocat)
{{History-S183}}
<br>
|{{CCCSec2|183}}
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 183; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), ss. 7, 23, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), s. 213, c. 1 (4th Supp.), s. 13, c. 29 (4th Supp.), s. 17, c. 42 (4th Supp.), s. 1; 1991, c. 28, s. 12; 1992, c. 27, s. 90; 1993, c. 7, s. 5, c. 25, s. 94, c. 40, s. 1, c. 46, s. 4; 1995, c. 39, s. 140; 1996, c. 19, s. 66; 1997, c. 18, s. 7, c. 23, s. 3; 1998, c. 34, s. 8; 1999, c. 2, s. 47, c. 5, s. 4; 2000, c. 24, s. 43; 2001, c. 32, s. 4, c. 41, ss. 5, 31, 133; 2002, c. 22, s. 409; 2004, c. 15, s. 108; 2005, c. 32, s. 10, c. 43, s. 1; 2008, c. 6, s. 15; 2009, c. 2, s. 442, c. 22, s. 4, c. 28, s. 3; 2010, c. 3, s. 1, c. 14, s. 2; 2012, c. 1, s. 24; 2013, c. 8, s. 2, c. 9, s. 14, c. 13, s. 7;
|{{NoteUp|183}}
2014, c. 17, s. 2, c. 25, s. 11, c. 31, s. 7, c. 32, s. 59; 2015, c. 20, s. 19.
|{{Terms-
|[{{CCCSec|183}} CCC]
|"private communication" (s. 183)
}}
}}
{{quotation|
'''Interception to prevent bodily harm'''<br>
184.1 (1) ...<Br>
'''Definition of agent of the state'''<br>
(4) For the purposes of this section, agent of the state means
:(a) a peace officer; and
:(b) a person acting under the authority of, or in cooperation with, a peace officer.
<br>
1993, c. 40, s. 4.
|[{{CCCSec|184.1}} CCC]
}}
}}


==Topics==
==Topics==
* [[Definition of Interception of Private Communications]]
* [[Intercept of Private Communications (Offence)]]
* [[Intercept of Private Communications (Offence)]]
* [[Third Party Wiretaps]] (s. 185 and 186)
* [[Third Party Wiretaps]] (s. 185 and 186)
** [[List of Designated Wiretap Eligible Offences]]
* [[Consent Wiretaps]]
* [[Consent Wiretaps]]
* [[Warrantless Wiretaps]]
* [[Video Surveillance]]
* [[Warrantless Wiretaps]] (intercept for safety or emergency)
* [[Admitting Wiretap Evidence]]
* [[Admitting Wiretap Evidence]]
* [[Sealing and Unsealing Judicial Authorizations]]
* [[Sealing and Unsealing Judicial Authorizations]]

Latest revision as of 14:23, 14 July 2024

This page was last substantively updated or reviewed January 2023. (Rev. # 95328)

General Principles

Wiretaps are governed by Part VI of the Criminal Code (Invasion of Privacy (ss. 183 to 196.1)).

There are five categories of interception/wiretap:

Eligible Applicants, Offences and Level of Court

Authorizations for a third-party intercept under s. 185 and 186 can only be authorized by a judge of a superior court.

Type of Intercept Section Applicant Court Offences Notes
Third-Party Intercept Authorizations 185 and 186
Designated Agent Superior s. 183 offences
("has been, or is being")		 90 day notice
Investigative Necessity
One-Party Consent (OPC) Intercept authorization 184.2 peace officer, public officer, Designated Agent Provincial or Superior Any
("has been or will be committed")		 None
One-Party Consent Intercepts to Prevent Bodily Harm 184.1 NA NA Any None
Third-Party Intercept to Prevent Imminent Harm 184.4 NA NA s. 183 offences
("has been, or is being")		 Notice
Emergency Intercepts 188 a designated peace officer Superior s. 183 offences
("has been, or is being")		 Notice
Video Surveillance 487.01 Designated Agent Superior s. 183 offences
("has been, or is being")		 Investigative necessity[1]
Tracking Warrants 492.1(1) and 492.1(2) peace officer or public officer JP, Provincial or Superior Any None
Warrantless

The One-Party Consent Wiretap to Prevent Bodily Harm (s. 184.1) and Third-Party Wiretap to Prevent Serious Harm (s. 184.4) do not require judicial authorization.

Section 8 of the Charter

An interception of a private communication under a Part VI authorization is a search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter.[2]

Offence

A wilful interception of "a private communication" without authorization is an indictable offence under s. 184 with a maximum penalty of 5 years. This offence does not include situations where one of the parties consents (s.184(2)).

Disclosure of Packet

The right to full answer and defence permits the accused to examine an edited version of the materials available to the authorizing judge to support the wiretap authorization.[3]

Vetting

The Crown and police have a positive obligation not to disseminate irrelevant private communications revealed within a wiretap.[4]

  1. ↑ if there is no consent
  2. ↑ R v Grant, 1999 CanLII 3694 (ON CA), 132 CCC (3d) 531, per Charron J, at p. 539 [CCC]
  3. ↑ R v Garofoli, 1990 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 1421, per Sopinka J, at pp. 1433, 1452 [SCR]
  4. ↑ R v Guess, 2000 BCCA 547 (CanLII), 148 CCC (3d) 321, per Hall J

History

The modern legislation protecting against the interception of private communications arose from the 1969 Ouimet report which resulted in the Protection of Privacy Act.[1]

Constitutionality

It was found that the interception regime in Part VI of the Code is constitutional.[2]

  1. ↑ R. Ouimet, Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, Towards Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1969) cited in detail at R v Nguyen, 2001 ABPC 52 (CanLII), 294 AR 201, per Stevenson ACJ, at para 17
    R v Lyons, 1984 CanLII 30 (SCC), [1984] 2 SCR 633, 15 CCC (3d) 417, per Estey J, at p. 453 (CCC) - comments on the origin of the wiretap provisions
  2. ↑ R v Finlay Grelette (1985) 23CCCC (3d) 38 at paras 63 to 64

Purpose

Modern electronic surveillance has been singled out as a particularly powerful form of privacy intrusion. But unregulated, it would destroy any sort of privacy and would threaten society.[1]

Part VI of the Code regulates the "power of the state to record communications that their originator expects will not be intercepted."[2] It avoids the "danger inherent in allowing the state, in its unfettered discretion, to record and transmit our words."[3]

These provisions aim to "strike a balance between the protection of privacy and the availability of effective law enforcement techniques". [4]

Electronic surveillance has the potential to "annihilate" any expectation of privacy in our communications. Society should not expose us to permanent electronic surveillance.[5]

Surveillance is one of the "the greatest leveler[s] of human privacy ever known".[6]

This provision has nothing to do with protecting persons from the risk that the recipient of the communication will divulge anything.[7]

  1. ↑ R v Duarte, 1990 CanLII 150 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 30, per LaForest J - Judge referring to electronic surveillance as "superbly" equipped to fight crime, but left unregulated would mean "privacy no longer had any meaning"
    R v Wong, 1990 CanLII 56 (SCC), [1990] 3 SCR 36, per LaForest J - Judge suggests that electronic surveillance would "annihilate privacy"
    R v Wise, 1992 CanLII 125 (SCC), [1992] 1 SCR 527, per LaForest J (dissenting) suggesting that surviellance was a "danger to individual autonomy and the organization of a free society”)
  2. ↑ R v Duarte, 1990 CanLII 150 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 30, per La Forest J R v Jones, 2017 SCC 60 (CanLII), [2017] 2 SCR 696, per Cote J, at para 60
  3. ↑ Duarte, supra
  4. ↑ R v Nguyen, 2001 ABPC 52 (CanLII), 294 AR 201, per Stevenson ACJ, at para 17
    Regina v Welsh and Iannuzzi (No. 6), 1977 CanLII 1215 (ON CA), 32 CCC (2d) 363, per Zuber JA (5:0), at p. 369
  5. ↑ Duarte, supra, at p. 11 (CCC)
    see also United States v White, 201 US 745 (1971), at p. 756 ("electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known")
  6. ↑ United States v White, 201 U.S. 745 (1971), at p. 756
  7. ↑ Duarte, supra ("has nothing to do with protecting individuals from the threat that their interlocutors will divulge communications that are meant to be private")

Misc Wiretap Terms

Definitions

183 In this Part [Pt. VI – Invasion of Privacy (ss. 183 to 196.1)],
"authorization" means an authorization to intercept a private communication given under subsection 184.‍2(3) [one-party consent wiretap – judge must be satisfied], section 186 [authorization of wiretap] or subsection 188(2) [emergency wiretaps – granting authorization]; (autorisation) ...
 "police officer" means any officer, constable or other person employed for the preservation and maintenance of the public peace; (policier)
...
 "public switched telephone network" means a telecommunication facility the primary purpose of which is to provide a land line-based telephone service to the public for compensation; (réseau téléphonique public commuté)
"radio-based telephone communication" means any radiocommunication within the meaning of the Radiocommunication Act that is made over apparatus that is used primarily for connection to a public switched telephone network; (communication radiotéléphonique)
"sell" includes offer for sale, expose for sale, have in possession for sale or distribute or advertise for sale; (vendre)
"solicitor" means, in the Province of Quebec, an advocate or a notary and, in any other province, a barrister or solicitor. (avocat)
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 183; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), ss. 7, 23, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), s. 213, c. 1 (4th Supp.), s. 13, c. 29 (4th Supp.), s. 17, c. 42 (4th Supp.), s. 1; 1991, c. 28, s. 12; 1992, c. 27, s. 90; 1993, c. 7, s. 5, c. 25, s. 94, c. 40, s. 1, c. 46, s. 4; 1995, c. 39, s. 140; 1996, c. 19, s. 66; 1997, c. 18, s. 7, c. 23, s. 3; 1998, c. 34, s. 8; 1999, c. 2, s. 47, c. 5, s. 4; 2000, c. 24, s. 43; 2001, c. 32, s. 4, c. 41, ss. 5, 31, 133; 2002, c. 22, s. 409; 2004, c. 15, s. 108; 2005, c. 32, s. 10, c. 43, s. 1; 2008, c. 6, s. 15; 2009, c. 2, s. 442, c. 22, s. 4, c. 28, s. 3; 2010, c. 3, s. 1, c. 14, s. 2; 2012, c. 1, s. 24; 2013, c. 8, s. 2, c. 9, s. 14, c. 13, s. 7; 2014, c. 17, s. 2, c. 25, s. 11, c. 31, s. 7, c. 32, s. 59; 2015, c. 20, s. 19; 2017, c. 7, s. 56; 2018, c. 12, s. 114, c. 16, s. 210, c. 26, s. 23, c. 29, s. 15; 2019, c. 13, s. 150; 2019, c. 16, s. 122; 2019, c. 25, s. 63.1; 2020, c. 1, s. 36; 2022, c. 17, s. 5; 2023, c. 14, s. 2.

– CCC (CanLII), (DOJ)

Note up: 183


Defined terms: "private communication" (s. 183)

Topics

v • e
 
Types of Warrants
Warrants
Interceptions/Wiretaps
Retrieved from "https://criminalnotebook.ca/index.php?title=Interception_of_Private_Communications&oldid=95328"