Automatism: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 07:04, 23 July 2024

This page was last substantively updated or reviewed January 2017. (Rev. # 95670)

< Criminal Law
< Defences

General Principles

The defence of "non-insane automatism" is a defence available at common law.

The law treats "almost all automatisms as the product of a mental disorder leading…to an NCR-MD verdict."^[1]

Automatism Defined

Automatism is "a state of impaired consciousness". This is in contrast with "unconsciousness, in which an individual, though capable of action, has no voluntary control over that action."^[2] The person engages in "involuntary behaviour" such that "a person who, though capable of action, is not conscious of what he is doing. It means an unconscious involuntary act where the mind does not go with what is being done." ^[3]

The term "automatism" refers to the involuntary conduct that is the "product of a mental state in which the conscious mind is disassociated from the part of the mind that controls action."^[4] Accordingly, automatism relates only to the actus reus of the offence as it affects the voluntariness of the accused's actions.^[5]

Effect of Finding

There are two types of automatism. There is mental disorder automatism and non-mental disorder automatism. The finding of the former leads to an Not Criminally Responsible finding. The latter leads to an acquittal.^[6]

An NCR verdict permits a "post-verdict dangerousness assessment of the accused" that allows the court to tailor disposition to the specifics of the case.^[7]

↑ R v Luedecke, 2008 ONCA 716 (CanLII), 236 CCC (3d) 317, per Doherty JA (overturning a verdict of non-insane automatism)
↑ R v Stone, 1999 CanLII 688 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 290, per Bastarache J, at para 156
↑ R v Rabey, 1977 CanLII 48 (ON CA), 37 CCC (2d) 461, per Martin JA at 155 to 156
↑ R v SH, 2014 ONCA 303 (CanLII), 310 CCC (3d) 455, per Watt JA, at para 63
Luedecke, supra, at para 54
↑ SH, supra, at para 63
R v Alexander, 2015 BCCA 484 (CanLII), 330 CCC (3d) 417, per Stromberg-Stein JA, at para 28 ("A defence of automatism amounts to a denial of the voluntariness component of the actus reus of the offence. A person who is unable to control whether to perform an act, or how to perform an act, cannot be said to have committed the act voluntarily. Conduct which is not voluntary cannot be criminal.")
↑ Alexander, ibid., at para 29
Luedecke, supra
↑ Luedecke, supra

Burden and Standard of Proof

The burden is on the accused to prove involuntariness on a balance of probabilities.^[1]

The accused has the evidentiary burden to adduce evidence to raise the issue for the court and the legal burden of proving the fact alleged.^[2]

The defence must provide confirming psychiatric evidence. It must establish more than the claim that involuntariness is "plausible."^[3]

↑ R v Stone, 1999 CanLII 688 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 290, per Bastarache J, at paras 171, 179 (“The foregoing leads me to the conclusion that the legal burden in cases involving claims of automatism must be on the defence to prove involuntariness on a balance of probabilities to the trier of fact.”)
↑ R v SH, 2014 ONCA 303 (CanLII), 310 CCC (3d) 455, per Watt JA, at para 65
Stone, supra, at paras 173, 182
↑ Stone, supra, at p. 187
R v Enns, 2016 ONSC 2229 (CanLII), per Fregeau J, at para 20

Requirement

In order to establish automatism, it is necessary for the defence to 1) claim that he acted involuntarily and 2) adduce expert evidence to support the involuntariness claim.^[1]

The judge must then take a two-step inquiry. First, the judge must "determine whether the accused person has established a proper evidentiary foundation for a defence of automatism."^[2] Second, the judge must determine which form of automatism should be left with the trier of fact."^[3]

↑ R v SH, 2014 ONCA 303 (CanLII), 310 CCC (3d) 455, per Watt JA, at para 69
R v Stone, 1999 CanLII 688 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 290, per Bastarache J, at paras 183 to 184
↑ R v Alexander, 2015 BCCA 484 (CanLII), 330 CCC (3d) 417, per Stromberg-Stein JA, at para 30
↑ Alexander, supra, at para 30

Evidentiary Burden

The evidentiary burden requires the admission of expert evidence that should be in the form of "psychiatric or psychological evidence."^[1] It should establish:^[2]

evidence of a documented medical history of automatistic-like dissociative states;
evidence of a bystander about the appearance of the accused before, during and after the alleged involuntary conduct (para 190); and
evidence of motive or absence of motive

↑ R v SH, 2014 ONCA 303 (CanLII), 310 CCC (3d) 455, per Watt JA, at para 70
R v Stone, 1999 CanLII 688 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 290, per Bastarache J, at para 192
↑ SH, supra, at para 71

Legal Character of Automatism (Mental Disorder vs Non-Mental Disorder)

See also: Not Criminally Responsible Due to Mental Disorder

Where the evidentiary burden has been made out to the satisfaction of the trier of fact, the judge must make a determination of the legal characterization of automatism.^[1] That is, the judge must then determine "whether mental disorder or non-mental disorder automatism should be left with the trier-of-fact."^[2]

In a jury trial, the judge must decide whether automatism should be put to the jury.^[3]

The law recognizes two classes of automatism. There is mental disorder automatism and non-mental disorder automatism.^[4] The former requires a "mental disorder" and the latter does not.^[5]

The analysis should begin from the premise that automatism originates from a mental disorder..^[6]

The courts should adopt a "holistic approach" to determine if the condition amounts to a disease of the mind.^[7] This will involve consideration of three factors:^[8]

internal cause factor;
continuing danger factor; and
other policy concerns.

It is only in the "rare" cases that the form of automatism will be a non-mental disorder in nature.^[9] The form of non-mental disorder automatism will usually occur when all the following are true:^[10]

the accused suffered a single incident of automatism;
it was triggered by a specific external event;
the trigger is unlikely to reoccur; and
the vent could have caused a dissociative state in a normal person.

The question of which form of automatism is available is a question of law and so can only be decided by the judge.^[11]

↑ R v SH, 2014 ONCA 303 (CanLII), 310 CCC (3d) 455, per Watt JA, at para 72
↑ R v Enns, 2016 ONSC 2229 (CanLII), per Fregeau J, at para 21 ("If the accused has laid a proper foundation for the defence of automatism and satisfied the evidentiary burden, the trial judge must then determine whether mental disorder or non-mental disorder automatism should be left with the trier of fact")
R v Luedecke, 2008 ONCA 716 (CanLII), per Doherty JA
Stone, supra, at p. 193
↑ SH, supra, at para 72
↑ SH, supra, at para 73
↑ SH, supra, at para 73
↑ SH, supra, at para 74
↑ R v Alexander, 2015 BCCA 484 (CanLII), 330 CCC (3d) 417, per Stromberg-Stein JA, at paras 36 to 38
↑ Alexander, supra, at para 38
Stone, supra, at p. 203
↑ Stone, supra, at p. 199
Alexander, supra, at para 36
↑ Alexander, supra, at para 37
Enns, supra, at para 63
↑ Alexander, supra, at paras 32 to 33

[1] R v Luedecke, 2008 ONCA 716 (CanLII), 236 CCC (3d) 317, per Doherty JA (overturning a verdict of non-insane automatism)

[2] R v Stone, 1999 CanLII 688 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 290, per Bastarache J, at para 156

[3] R v Rabey, 1977 CanLII 48 (ON CA), 37 CCC (2d) 461, per Martin JA at 155 to 156

[4] R v SH, 2014 ONCA 303 (CanLII), 310 CCC (3d) 455, per Watt JA, at para 63
Luedecke, supra, at para 54

[5] SH, supra, at para 63
R v Alexander, 2015 BCCA 484 (CanLII), 330 CCC (3d) 417, per Stromberg-Stein JA, at para 28 ("A defence of automatism amounts to a denial of the voluntariness component of the actus reus of the offence. A person who is unable to control whether to perform an act, or how to perform an act, cannot be said to have committed the act voluntarily. Conduct which is not voluntary cannot be criminal.")

[6] Alexander, ibid., at para 29
Luedecke, supra

[7] Luedecke, supra

[8] R v Stone, 1999 CanLII 688 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 290, per Bastarache J, at paras 171, 179 (“The foregoing leads me to the conclusion that the legal burden in cases involving claims of automatism must be on the defence to prove involuntariness on a balance of probabilities to the trier of fact.”)

[9] R v SH, 2014 ONCA 303 (CanLII), 310 CCC (3d) 455, per Watt JA, at para 65
Stone, supra, at paras 173, 182

[10] Stone, supra, at p. 187
R v Enns, 2016 ONSC 2229 (CanLII), per Fregeau J, at para 20

[11] R v SH, 2014 ONCA 303 (CanLII), 310 CCC (3d) 455, per Watt JA, at para 69
R v Stone, 1999 CanLII 688 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 290, per Bastarache J, at paras 183 to 184

[12] R v Alexander, 2015 BCCA 484 (CanLII), 330 CCC (3d) 417, per Stromberg-Stein JA, at para 30

[13] Alexander, supra, at para 30

[14] R v SH, 2014 ONCA 303 (CanLII), 310 CCC (3d) 455, per Watt JA, at para 70
R v Stone, 1999 CanLII 688 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 290, per Bastarache J, at para 192

[15] SH, supra, at para 71

[16] R v SH, 2014 ONCA 303 (CanLII), 310 CCC (3d) 455, per Watt JA, at para 72

[17] R v Enns, 2016 ONSC 2229 (CanLII), per Fregeau J, at para 21 ("If the accused has laid a proper foundation for the defence of automatism and satisfied the evidentiary burden, the trial judge must then determine whether mental disorder or non-mental disorder automatism should be left with the trier of fact")
R v Luedecke, 2008 ONCA 716 (CanLII), per Doherty JA
Stone, supra, at p. 193

[18] SH, supra, at para 72

[19] SH, supra, at para 73

[20] SH, supra, at para 73

[21] SH, supra, at para 74

[22] R v Alexander, 2015 BCCA 484 (CanLII), 330 CCC (3d) 417, per Stromberg-Stein JA, at paras 36 to 38

[23] Alexander, supra, at para 38
Stone, supra, at p. 203

[24] Stone, supra, at p. 199
Alexander, supra, at para 36

[25] Alexander, supra, at para 37
Enns, supra, at para 63

[26] Alexander, supra, at paras 32 to 33

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@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
+[[Fr:Automatisme]]
+{{Currency2|January|2017}}
 {{LevelZero}}{{HeaderDefences}}
 ==General Principles==
@@ Line 4: / Line 6: @@
 The law treats "almost all automatisms as the product of a mental disorder leading…to an NCR-MD verdict."<ref>
-R v Luedecke, [http://canlii.ca/t/217d9 2008 ONCA 716] (CanLII){{perONCA|Doherty JA}} - overturning a verdict of non-insane automatism
+{{CanLIIRP|Luedecke|217d9|2008 ONCA 716 (CanLII)|236 CCC (3d) 317}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}} (overturning a verdict of non-insane automatism)
 </ref>
-'''Automatism Defined'''<Br>
+; Automatism Defined
-Automatism is "a state of impaired consciousness". This is in contrast with "unconsciousness, in which an individual, though capable of action, has no voluntary control over that action".<ref>
+Automatism is "a state of impaired consciousness". This is in contrast with "unconsciousness, in which an individual, though capable of action, has no voluntary control over that action."<ref>
-R v Stone, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqn2 1999 CanLII 688] (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 290{{perSCC| Bastarache J}} at para 156</ref>
+{{CanLIIRP|Stone|1fqn2|1999 CanLII 688 (SCC)|[1999] 2 SCR 290}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}{{AtL|1fqn2|156}}</ref>
 The person engages in "involuntary behaviour" such that "a person who, though capable of action, is not conscious of what he is doing. It means an unconscious involuntary act where the mind does not go with what is being done."
 <ref>
-R v Rabey, [http://canlii.ca/t/1vlp1 1977 CanLII 48] (ON CA), (1977) 37 CCC 2d 461 at 155{{perONCA|Martin JA}} at 156 </ref>
+{{CanLIIRP|Rabey|1vlp1|1977 CanLII 48 (ON CA)|37 CCC (2d) 461}}{{perONCA-H|Martin JA}} at 155 to 156 </ref>
-The term "automatism" refers to the involuntary conduct that is the "product of a mental state in which the conscious mind is disassociated from the part of the mind that controls action".<ref>
+The term "automatism" refers to the involuntary conduct that is the "product of a mental state in which the conscious mind is disassociated from the part of the mind that controls action."<ref>
-R v SH, [http://canlii.ca/t/g6l0k 2014 ONCA 303] (CanLII){{perONCA|Watt JA}} at para 63<Br>
+{{CanLIIRP|SH|g6l0k|2014 ONCA 303 (CanLII)|310 CCC (3d) 455}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{AtL|g6l0k|63}}<br>
-R v Luedecke, [http://canlii.ca/t/217d9 2008 ONCA 716] (CanLII){{perONCA|Doherty JA}} at para 54<br>
+{{supra1|Luedecke}}{{atL|217d9|54}}<br>
-</ref> Accordingly, automatism relates only to the ''actus reus'' of the offence as it affects the voluntariness of the accused's actions.<ref>
+</ref>
-SH{{supra}} at para 63<Br>
+Accordingly, automatism relates only to the ''actus reus'' of the offence as it affects the voluntariness of the accused's actions.<ref>
-R v Alexander, [http://canlii.ca/t/gm91s 2015 BCCA 484] (CanLII){{perBCCA| Stromberg-Stein JA}} at para 28 ("A defence of automatism amounts to a denial of the voluntariness component of the ''actus reus'' of the offence. A person who is unable to control whether to perform an act, or how to perform an act, cannot be said to have committed the act voluntarily. Conduct which is not voluntary cannot be criminal.") </ref>
+{{supra1|SH}}{{atL|g6l0k|63}}<br>
+{{CanLIIRP|Alexander|gm91s|2015 BCCA 484 (CanLII)|330 CCC (3d) 417}}{{perBCCA|Stromberg-Stein JA}}{{atL|gm91s|28}} ("A defence of automatism amounts to a denial of the voluntariness component of the ''actus reus'' of the offence. A person who is unable to control whether to perform an act, or how to perform an act, cannot be said to have committed the act voluntarily. Conduct which is not voluntary cannot be criminal.") </ref>
-'''Effect of Finding'''<br>
+; Effect of Finding
-There are two types of automatism. There is mental disorder automatism and there is non-mental disorder automatism.  The finding of the former leads to an [[Not Criminally Responsible Due to Mental Disorder|Not Criminally Responsible]] finding. The latter leads to an acquittal.<REf>
+There are two types of automatism. There is mental disorder automatism and non-mental disorder automatism.  The finding of the former leads to an [[Not Criminally Responsible Due to Mental Disorder|Not Criminally Responsible]] finding. The latter leads to an acquittal.<ref>
-Alexander{{ibid}} at para 29<Br>
+{{ibid1|Alexander}}{{atL|gm91s|29}}<br>
-Luedecke{{supra}}<br>
+{{supra1|Luedecke}}<br>
 </ref>
 An NCR verdict permits a "post-verdict dangerousness assessment of the accused" that allows the court to tailor disposition to the specifics of the case.<ref>
-Luedecke{{supra}}
+{{supra1|Luedecke}}
 </ref>
 {{reflist|2}}
 ===Burden and Standard of Proof===
-The burden is on the accused to prove involuntariness on a balance of probabilities.<Ref>R v Stone, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqn2 1999 CanLII 688] (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 290{{perSCC| Bastarache J}} at para 171, 179 (“The foregoing leads me to the conclusion that the legal burden in cases involving claims of automatism must be on the defence to prove involuntariness on a balance of probabilities to the trier of fact.”)</ref>
+The burden is on the accused to prove involuntariness on a balance of probabilities.<ref>
+{{CanLIIRP|Stone|1fqn2|1999 CanLII 688 (SCC)|[1999] 2 SCR 290}}{{perSCC| Bastarache J}}{{atsL|1fqn2|171|}}, {{atsL-np|1fqn2|179|}} (“The foregoing leads me to the conclusion that the legal burden in cases involving claims of automatism must be on the defence to prove involuntariness on a balance of probabilities to the trier of fact.”)</ref>
-The accused has the evidentary burden to adduce evidence to raise the issue for the court and the legal burden of proving the fact alleged.<ref>
+The accused has the evidentiary burden to adduce evidence to raise the issue for the court and the legal burden of proving the fact alleged.<ref>
-R v SH, [http://canlii.ca/t/g6l0k 2014 ONCA 303] (CanLII){{perONCA|Watt JA}}, at para 65<br>
+{{CanLIIRP|SH|g6l0k|2014 ONCA 303 (CanLII)|310 CCC (3d) 455}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{atL|g6l0k|65}}<br>
-Stone{{supra}} at paras 173, 182</ref>
+{{supra1|Stone}}{{atsL|1fqn2|173|}}, {{atsL-np|1fqn2|182|}}</ref>
-The defence must provide confirming psychiatric evidence. It must establish more than the claim that involuntariness is "plausible".<ref>
+The defence must provide confirming psychiatric evidence. It must establish more than the claim that involuntariness is "plausible."<ref>
-Stone at p. 187<br>
+{{supra1|Stone}}{{atp|187}}<br>
-R v Enns, [http://CanLII.ca/t/gp32d 2016 ONSC 2229] (CanLII){{perONSC| Fregeau J}} at para 20<br>
+{{CanLIIRx|Enns|gp32d|2016 ONSC 2229 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Fregeau J}}{{atL|gp32d|20}}<br>
 </ref>
@@ Line 47: / Line 51: @@
 ==Requirement==
-In order to establish automatism it is necessary for the defence to 1) claim that he acted involunarty and 2) adduce expert evidence to support the involuntariness claim.<ref>
+In order to establish automatism, it is necessary for the defence to 1) claim that he acted involuntarily and 2) adduce expert evidence to support the involuntariness claim.<ref>
-''R v SH'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g6l0k 2014 ONCA 303] (CanLII){{perONCA|Watt JA}}, at para 69<br>
+{{CanLIIRP|SH|g6l0k|2014 ONCA 303 (CanLII)|310 CCC (3d) 455}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{atL|g6l0k|69}}<br>
-R v Stone, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqn2 1999 CanLII 688] (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 290{{perSCC| Bastarache J}}, at paras 183 to 184<Br>
+{{CanLIIRP|Stone|1fqn2|1999 CanLII 688 (SCC)|[1999] 2 SCR 290}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}{{atsL|1fqn2|183| to 184}}<br>
 </ref>
-The judge must then take a two-step inquiry. First, the judge must "determine whether the accused person has established a proper evidentiary foundation for a defence of automatism".<ref>
+The judge must then take a two-step inquiry. First, the judge must "determine whether the accused person has established a proper evidentiary foundation for a defence of automatism."<ref>
-Alexander{{supra}} at para 30<Br>
+{{CanLIIRP|Alexander|gm91s|2015 BCCA 484 (CanLII)|330 CCC (3d) 417}}{{perBCCA| Stromberg-Stein JA}}{{atL|gm91s|30}}<br>
-</ref>Second, the judge must determine which form of automatism should be left with the trier of fact".<ref>
+</ref>
-Alexander{{supra}} at para 30<Br>
+Second, the judge must determine which form of automatism should be left with the trier of fact."<ref>
+{{supra1|Alexander}}{{atL|gm91s|30}}<br>
 </ref>
@@ Line 61: / Line 66: @@
 ===Evidentiary Burden===
-The evidentiary burden requires the admission of expert evidence that should be in the form of "psychiatric or psychological evidence".<ref>R v SH, [http://canlii.ca/t/g6l0k 2014 ONCA 303] (CanLII){{perONCA|Watt JA}} at para 70<br>
+The evidentiary burden requires the admission of expert evidence that should be in the form of "psychiatric or psychological evidence."<ref>
-R v Stone [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqn2 1999 CanLII 688] (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 290{{perSCC| Bastarache J}} at para 192</ref> It should establish:<ref>
+{{CanLIIRP|SH|g6l0k|2014 ONCA 303 (CanLII)|310 CCC (3d) 455}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{atL|g6l0k|70}}<br>
-SH{{supra}} at para 71</ref>
+{{CanLIIRP|Stone|1fqn2|1999 CanLII 688 (SCC)|[1999] 2 SCR 290}}{{perSCC-H|Bastarache J}}{{atL|1fqn2|192}}</ref>
+It should establish:<ref>
+{{supra1|SH}}{{atL|g6l0k|71}}</ref>
 # evidence of a documented medical history of automatistic-like dissociative states;
 # evidence of a bystander about the appearance of the accused before, during and after the alleged involuntary conduct (para 190); and
@@ Line 73: / Line 80: @@
 {{seealso|Not Criminally Responsible Due to Mental Disorder}}
 Where the evidentiary burden has been made out to the satisfaction of the trier of fact, the judge must make a determination of the legal characterization of automatism.<ref>
-R v SH, [http://canlii.ca/t/g6l0k 2014 ONCA 303] (CanLII){{perONCA|Watt JA}} at para 72</ref>
+{{CanLIIRP|SH|g6l0k|2014 ONCA 303 (CanLII)|310 CCC (3d) 455}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{atL|g6l0k|72}}</ref>
-That is, the judge must then determine "whether mental disorder or non-mental disorder automatism should be left with the trier-of-fact".<ref>
+That is, the judge must then determine "whether mental disorder or non-mental disorder automatism should be left with the trier-of-fact."<ref>
-R v Enns, [http://CanLII.ca/t/gp32d 2016 ONSC 2229] (CanLII){{perONSC| Fregeau J}} at para 21<br>
+{{CanLIIRx|Enns|gp32d|2016 ONSC 2229 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Fregeau J}}{{atL|gp32d|21}} ("If the accused has laid a proper foundation for the defence of automatism and satisfied the evidentiary burden, the trial judge must then determine whether mental disorder or non-mental disorder automatism should be left with the trier of fact")<br>
-Stone at p. 193<Br>
+{{CanLIIRP|Luedecke|217d9|2008 ONCA 716 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}<br>
+{{supra1|Stone}}{{atp|193}}<br>
 </ref>
 In a jury trial, the judge must decide whether automatism should be put to the jury.<ref>
-SH{{supra}} at para 72</ref>
+{{supra1|SH}}{{atL|g6l0k|72}}</ref>
 The law recognizes two classes of automatism. There is mental disorder automatism and non-mental disorder automatism.<ref>
-SH{{supra}}, at para 73</ref> The former requires a "mental disorder" and the latter does not.<ref>
+{{supra1|SH}}{{atL|g6l0k|73}}</ref>
-SH{{supra}} at para 73</ref>
+The former requires a "mental disorder" and the latter does not.<ref>
+{{supra1|SH}}{{atL|g6l0k|73}}</ref>
 The analysis should begin from the premise that automatism originates from a mental disorder..<ref>
-SH{{supra}} at para 74</ref>
+{{supra1|SH}}{{atL|g6l0k|74}}</ref>
-The courts should adopt a "holistic approach" to determine if the condition amounts to a disease of the mind.<Ref>
+The courts should adopt a "holistic approach" to determine if the condition amounts to a disease of the mind.<ref>
-R v Alexander, [http://canlii.ca/t/gm91s 2015 BCCA 484] (CanLII){{perBCCA| Stromberg-Stein JA}} at para 36 to 38<Br>
+{{CanLIIRP|Alexander|gm91s|2015 BCCA 484 (CanLII)|330 CCC (3d) 417}}{{perBCCA| Stromberg-Stein JA}}{{atsL|gm91s|36| to 38}}<br>
-</ref> This will involve consideration of three factors:<ref>Alexander{{supra}} at para 38<Br>
+</ref>
-Stone{{supra}} at para 203
+This will involve consideration of three factors:<ref>
+{{supra1|Alexander}}{{atL|gm91s|38}}<br>
+{{supra1|Stone}}{{atp|203}}
 </ref>
 # internal cause factor;
@@ Line 98: / Line 109: @@
 # other policy concerns.
-It is only in the "rare" cases that the form of automatism will be a non-mental disorder in nature.<Ref>
+It is only in the "rare" cases that the form of automatism will be a non-mental disorder in nature.<ref>
-Stone{{supra}} at para 199<Br>
+{{supra1|Stone}}{{atp|199}}<br>
-Alexander{{supra}} at para 36<Br>
+{{supra1|Alexander}}{{atL|gm91s|36}}<br>
-</ref> The form of non-mental disorder automatism will usually occur when all the following are true:<ref> Alexander{{supra}} at para 37<Br>Luedecke{{supra}} at para 63<Br>
+</ref>
+The form of non-mental disorder automatism will usually occur when all the following are true:<ref>
+{{supra1|Alexander}}{{atL|gm91s|37}}<br>
+{{supra1|Enns}}{{atL|217d9|63}}<br>
 </ref>
 # the accused suffered a single incident of automatism;
@@ Line 108: / Line 122: @@
 # the vent could have caused a dissociative state in a normal person.
-The question of which form of automatism is available is a question of law and so can only be decided by the judge.<REf>
+The question of which form of automatism is available is a question of law and so can only be decided by the judge.<ref>
-Alexander{{supra}} at para 32 to 33<Br>
+{{supra1|Alexander}}{{atsL|gm91s|32| to 33}}<br>
 </ref>
 {{reflist|2}}