Reasons for Delay (Morin Framework Only): Difference between revisions

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[[fr:Raisons_du_retard_(Morin_Framework_uniquement)]]
{{Currency2|January|2019}}
{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderDelay}}
{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderDelay}}


==General Principles==
==General Principles==
{{seealso|Right to a Trial Within a Reasonable Time|Morin Framework}}
{{seealso|Right to a Trial Within a Reasonable Time}}


It is "the ultimate responsibility of moving a case forward rests with the Crown". <Ref>R v Stephen, [http://canlii.ca/t/frpw9 2012 ONCA 411] (CanLII) at para 7</ref> However, the Crown is not to take responsibility for defence counsel's failings to properly represent the interests of their client.
It is "the ultimate responsibility of moving a case forward rests with the Crown."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Stephen|frpw9|2012 ONCA 411 (CanLII)|OJ No 2678}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|frpw9|7}}</ref>  
However, the Crown is not to take responsibility for defence counsel's failings to properly represent the interests of their client.


{{Reflist|2}}
{{Reflist|2}}
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The intake period refers to the period of time between the beginning of the investigation and the eventual swearing the Information and sending of disclosure to the Crown.
The intake period refers to the period of time between the beginning of the investigation and the eventual swearing the Information and sending of disclosure to the Crown.


This period can be divided into two types of delay:<Ref>R v A.(S.), [http://canlii.ca/t/fl3j5 2011 NUCJ 7] (CanLII)</ref>
This period can be divided into two types of delay:<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|A(S)|fl3j5|2011 NUCJ 7 (CanLII)}}{{perNUCJ|Sharkey J}}</ref>
# delay between the offence occurring and the reporting to police
# delay between the offence occurring and the reporting to police
# delay between the reporting of the offence and the police laying a charge
# delay between the reporting of the offence and the police laying a charge
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The intake period will vary on the type of charges investigated.  
The intake period will vary on the type of charges investigated.  


Drinking and driving cases typically have an intake period of roughly two months.<Ref>R v Meisner, [http://canlii.ca/t/6xjm 2003 CanLII 49317] (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 1948 (ONSC)</ref>
Drinking and driving cases typically have an intake period of roughly two months.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Meisner|6xjm|2003 CanLII 49317 (ONSC)|[2003] OJ No 1948 (ONSC)}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}</ref>


{{Reflist|2}}
{{Reflist|2}}
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It is generally expected that incomplete cases will be given priority over other matters in court.
It is generally expected that incomplete cases will be given priority over other matters in court.
Delays due to re-scheduling of trial time is treated as institutional delay or as part of the inherent time requirements. <Ref>  
Delays due to re-scheduling of trial time is treated as institutional delay or as part of the inherent time requirements. <ref>  
R v Lahiry, [http://canlii.ca/t/fntws 2011 ONSC 6780] (CanLII) per Code J. at para 67<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Lahiry|fntws|2011 ONSC 6780 (CanLII)|283 CCC (3d) 525}}{{perONSC|Code J}}{{atL|fntws|67}}<br>
R v Godin, [http://canlii.ca/t/23rhf 2009 SCC 26] (CanLII) per Cromwell JA<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Godin|23rhf|2009 SCC 26 (CanLII)|[2009] 2 SCR 3}}{{perSCC|Cromwell J}}<br>
R v Brace, [http://canlii.ca/t/2d17m 2010 ONCA 689] (CanLII), (2010), 261 CCC (3d) 455 at paras 14-16 (Ont. C.A.)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Brace|2d17m|2010 ONCA 689 (CanLII)|261 CCC (3d) 455}}{{perONCA|Juriansz JA}}{{atsL|2d17m|14| to 16}} (Ont. C.A.)<br>
R v Allen, [http://canlii.ca/t/6hzz 1996 CanLII 4011] (ON CA) at pp. 347-351<br>  
{{CanLIIRP|Allen|6hzz|1996 CanLII 4011 (ON CA)|110 CCC (3d) 331}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{Atps|347-351}}<br>  
R v Satkunanathan, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fbqh 2001 CanLII 24061] (ON CA), (2001), 152 CCC (3d) 321 at paras 43-5 and 54-5 (Ont. C.A.)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Satkunanathan|1fbqh|2001 CanLII 24061 (ON CA)|152 CCC (3d) 321}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atsL|1fbqh|43| to 45}} and {{atsL-np|1fbqh|54| to 55}} (Ont. C.A.)<br>
R v M. (R.) [http://canlii.ca/t/fgg 2003 CanLII 50092] (ON CA), (2003), 180 C.C.C (3d) 49 at paras 6-9 <br>
{{CanLIIRP|M(R)|fgg|2003 CanLII 50092 (ON CA)|180 C.C.C (3d) 49}}{{perONCA|MacPherson JA}}{{AtsL|fgg|6| to 9}}<br>
R v W. (A.J.), [http://canlii.ca/t/25nff 2009 ONCA 661] (CanLII), (2009), 257 OAC 11 at paras 29-43 (ONCA)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|W(AJ)|25nff|2009 ONCA 661 (CanLII)|257 OAC 11}}{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}}{{AtsL|25nff|29| to 43}}(ONCA)<br>
</ref> Gross underestimate of the time requirements for trial will be attributable to institutional delay.<ref>
</ref>  
R v Qureshi, [http://canlii.ca/t/1j6q5 2004 CanLII 40657] (ON CA) <br>
Gross underestimate of the time requirements for trial will be attributable to institutional delay.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Qureshi|1j6q5|2004 CanLII 40657 (ON CA)|190 CCC (3d) 453}}{{perONCA|Laskin JA}} <br>
</ref>
</ref>


Defence counsel are not expected to "hold themselves in a state of perpetual availability".<ref>
Defence counsel are not expected to "hold themselves in a state of perpetual availability."<ref>
Godin{{supra}} at para 23<br>
{{supra1|Godin}}{{atL|23rhf|23}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
{{Reflist|2}}
{{Reflist|2}}
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==Institutional or Systemic Delay==
==Institutional or Systemic Delay==
Institutional or systemic delays arise where the case is ready for trial but "trial a judge, courtroom or essential court staff may not be available and so the case cannot go on."<ref>
Institutional or systemic delays arise where the case is ready for trial but "trial a judge, courtroom or essential court staff may not be available and so the case cannot go on."<ref>
R v Morin [http://canlii.ca/t/1fsc6 1992 CanLII 89] (SCC), [1992] 1 SCR 771 per Sopinka J</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Morin|1fsc6|1992 CanLII 89 (SCC)|[1992] 1 SCR 771}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}</ref>
It "runs from the time the parties are ready for trial and continues until the system can accommodate the proceedings."<ref>
It "runs from the time the parties are ready for trial and continues until the system can accommodate the proceedings."<ref>
Morin{{ibid}}</ref>
{{ibid1|Morin}}</ref>


The Supreme Court in Morin suggested a "guideline of between 8 and 10 months for institutional delay in Provincial Courts."<ref>
The Supreme Court in Morin suggested a "guideline of between 8 and 10 months for institutional delay in Provincial Courts."<ref>
Morin{{ibid}}
{{ibid1|Morin}}
</ref>
</ref>


Delay required to hold judicial pre-trial conferences are attributable as institutional delay.<ref>
Delay required to hold judicial pre-trial conferences are attributable as institutional delay.<ref>
R v CRG, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ll35 2005 CanLII 32192] (ON CA), [2005] OJ 3764 (ONCA)<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|CRG|1ll35|2005 CanLII 32192 (ON CA)|[2005] OJ 3764 (ONCA)}}{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}}<Br>
</ref>
</ref>


The failure of courts to identify "true availability of dates within the system" may risk the rights under s.11(d) to becomes "meaningless".<Ref>
The failure of courts to identify "true availability of dates within the system" may risk the rights under s.11(d) to becomes "meaningless."<ref>
R v Patrick Sikorski & Daniel Griffiths, [http://canlii.ca/t/fx0rc 2013 ONSC 1714] (CanLII) at para 97<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Patrick Sikorski & Daniel Griffiths|fx0rc|2013 ONSC 1714 (CanLII)|[2013] OJ No 1654}}{{perONSC|Nordheimer J}}{{atL|fx0rc|97}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Institutional Delay is Attributed to the Crown'''<br>
; Institutional Delay is Attributed to the Crown
Institutional delay is attributable to the Crown.<ref>
Institutional delay is attributable to the Crown.<ref>
R v Lahiry, [http://canlii.ca/t/fntws 2011 ONSC 6780] (CanLII) at para 25 to 37
{{CanLIIRP|Lahiry|fntws|2011 ONSC 6780 (CanLII)|283 CCC (3d) 525}}{{perONSC|Code J}}{{AtsL|fntws|25| to 37}}
</ref>
</ref>
This is because delays caused by lack of institutional resources should not be legitimized as acceptable reasons for delay.<ref>
This is because delays caused by lack of institutional resources should not be legitimized as acceptable reasons for delay.<ref>
R v Mills, [http://canlii.ca/t/1cxmx 1986 CanLII 17] (SCC), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, at p. 935 ("It is imperative, however, that in recognizing the need for such a criterion we do not simply legitimize current and future delays resulting from inadequate institutional resources.  For the criterion of institutional resources, more than any other, threatens to become a source of justification for prolonged and unacceptable delay.  There must, therefore, be some limit to which inadequate resources can be used to excuse delay and impair the interests of the individual.")
{{CanLIIRP|Mills|1cxmx|1986 CanLII 17 (SCC)|[1986] 1 SCR 863}}{{perSCC-H|McIntyre J}}{{atp|935}} ("It is imperative, however, that in recognizing the need for such a criterion we do not simply legitimize current and future delays resulting from inadequate institutional resources.  For the criterion of institutional resources, more than any other, threatens to become a source of justification for prolonged and unacceptable delay.  There must, therefore, be some limit to which inadequate resources can be used to excuse delay and impair the interests of the individual.")
</ref>
</ref>


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==Inherent Delays==
==Inherent Delays==
By contrast "inherent delay" are those that are necessary to move a case forward. The more complicated the case the longer the preparation time will be required. In addition, counsel "cannot be expected to devote their time exclusively to one case." The inherent delays are excusable. This is determined on a case by case basis. <ref>
By contrast "inherent delay" are those that are necessary to move a case forward. The more complicated the case the longer the preparation time will be required. In addition, counsel "cannot be expected to devote their time exclusively to one case." The inherent delays are excusable. This is determined on a case by case basis. <ref>
R v Richards, [http://canlii.ca/t/fvb3q 2012 SKCA 120] (CanLII) at para 33<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Richards|fvb3q|2012 SKCA 120 (CanLII)|2 WWR 637}}{{perSKCA|Richards JA}}{{atL|fvb3q|33}}<br>
R v Morin, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fsc6 1992 CanLII 89] (SCC), [1992] 1 SCR 771 at pp. 791-2<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Morin|1fsc6|1992 CanLII 89 (SCC)|[1992] 1 SCR 771}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}{{Atps|791-2}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Inherent time requirements are neutral periods that do not count against accused or the Crown.<ref>
Inherent time requirements are neutral periods that do not count against accused or the Crown.<ref>
R v MacDougall, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqpr 1998 CanLII 763] (SCC), [1998] 3 SCR 45 at para 44<br>
{{CanLIIRP|MacDougall|1fqpr|1998 CanLII 763 (SCC)|[1998] 3 SCR 45}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}{{atL|1fqpr|44}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Time spent scheduling, preparing and conducting pre-trial hearings are considered inherent time requirements.<Ref>
Time spent scheduling, preparing and conducting pre-trial hearings are considered inherent time requirements.<ref>
R v Nguyen, [http://canlii.ca/t/fwl92 2013 ONCA 169] (CanLII) at para 54, 59, 60<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Nguyen|fwl92|2013 ONCA 169 (CanLII)|2 CR (7th) 70}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{AtsL|fwl92|54|, 59, 60}}<Br>
</ref>
</ref>


While the accused is struggling to retain and keep counsel, the court and Crown are in a "holding pattern" and that time is attributed as inherent delay.<ref>
While the accused is struggling to retain and keep counsel, the court and Crown are in a "holding pattern" and that time is attributed as inherent delay.<ref>
R v Baron, [http://canlii.ca/t/h6ht0 2017 ONCA 772] (CanLII), at para 59<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Baron|h6ht0|2017 ONCA 772 (CanLII)|356 CCC (3d) 212}}{{perONCA|Trotter JA}}{{atL|h6ht0|59}}<Br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Complexity'''<br>
; Complexity
The more "complex case is, the longer it will take counsel to prepare, the longer it will take to assemble witnesses and evidence, and the longer the trial may take."<ref>
The more "complex case is, the longer it will take counsel to prepare, the longer it will take to assemble witnesses and evidence, and the longer the trial may take."<ref>
R v Lee, [http://canlii.ca/t/gj184 2015 SKCA 53] (CanLII) at para 53<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Lee|gj184|2015 SKCA 53 (CanLII)|323 CCC (3d) 313}}{{perSKCA|Whitmore JA}}{{atL|gj184|53}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Mis-estimating Requirements'''<Br>
; Mis-estimating Requirements
Where counsel mis-estimate the time it will take to prosecute the case resulting in an adjournment to finish the case will normally count as "inherent time requirement".<ref>
Where counsel mis-estimate the time it will take to prosecute the case resulting in an adjournment to finish the case will normally count as "inherent time requirement."<ref>
R v Allen (1996), 110 CCC (3d) 311 at p. 344 (ONCA){{NOCANLII}} aff'd at [1997] 3 SCR 700, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqxf 1997 CanLII 331] (SCC)<br>
{{CanLIIR-N|Allen|(1996), 110 CCC (3d) 311}}{{atp|344}} (ONCA) aff'd at [1997] 3 SCR 700, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqxf 1997 CanLII 331] (SCC){{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Multiple Accused'''<br>
; Multiple Accused
Where there are multiple co-accused or multiple charges the inherent time requirements will increase.<Ref>
Where there are multiple co-accused or multiple charges the inherent time requirements will increase.<ref>
Rusic{{supra}} at p. 703<br>
{{supra1|Rusic}}{{atp|703}}<br>
R v Faulds, [http://canlii.ca/t/6j2q 1996 CanLII 2579] (ON CA), (1996), 111 CCC (3d) 39 (ONCA)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Faulds|6j2q|1996 CanLII 2579 |111 CCC (3d) 39}}{{perONCA|Finlayson JA}}<br>
</ref>
 
; Judgement Under Reserve
The time in which a judgment is under reserve is generally considered an inherent time requirement.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|MacIsaac|ht1qm|2018 ONCA 650 (CanLII)|365 CCC (3d) 361}}{{perONCA|Huscroft JA}}{{atL|ht1qm|35}} ("Prior to Jordan, the time a judgment was under reserve was typically considered to be part of the inherent time requirements of a case")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ferguson|1ld3c|2005 CanLII 28538 (ON SC)|OTC 746}}{{perONSC|Durno J}}{{atL|1ld3c|213}} ("The inherent time requirements also include the time for the court to prepare its rulings and judgment.") leave refused [http://canlii.ca/t/21kwd 2008 ONCA 764 (CanLII)]{{TheCourtONCA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Schertzer|26c6f|2009 ONCA 742 (CanLII)|248 CCC (3d) 270}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|26c6f|114}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Lamacchia|fr6fx|2012 ONSC 2583 (CanLII)|258 CRR (2d) 370}}{{perONSC|Trotter J}}{{atL|fr6fx|7}} ("Generally speaking, the period of time a judge takes to prepare reasons should be considered to be part of the inherent time requirements of the case. Within reasonable limits, it is desirable that judges take the time that they need to prepare carefully reasoned decisions. Considered reasons enhance the quality of justice in the criminal process in many ways and must be encouraged")<Br>
</ref>
 
In exceptional circumstances, such as an 11 month delay for a decision on a directed verdict, would constitute unreasonable delay.<ref>
eg. {{CanLIIRP|Rahey|1ftp7|1987 CanLII 52 (SCC)|[1987] 1 SCR 588}}{{perSCC|Lamer J}}<Br>
 
</ref>
</ref>


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{{seealso|Right to a Trial Within a Reasonable Time#}}
{{seealso|Right to a Trial Within a Reasonable Time#}}
Where delay is largely "attributable to the accused" or defence counsel, a prima facie case of unreasonable delay cannot bemade out.<ref>
Where delay is largely "attributable to the accused" or defence counsel, a prima facie case of unreasonable delay cannot bemade out.<ref>
R v Morin, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fsc6 1992 CanLII 89], [1992] 1 SCR 77<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Morin|1fsc6|1992 CanLII 89|, [1992] 1 SCR 77}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}<br>
R v Kwok, [http://canlii.ca/t/58gl 2002 BCCA 177] (CanLII), (2002), 164 CCC (3d) 182</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Kwok|58gl|2002 BCCA 177 (CanLII)|164 CCC (3d) 182}}{{perBCCA|Braidwood JA}}</ref>


Defence counsel cannot be expected to be perpetually available.<ref>
Defence counsel cannot be expected to be perpetually available.<ref>
R v Godin, [http://canlii.ca/t/23rhf 2009 SCC 26] (CanLII)</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Godin|23rhf|2009 SCC 26 (CanLII)|[2009] 2 SCR 3}}{{perSCC|Cromwell J}}</ref>


The accused cannot use adjournment either requested or consented to by defence as weighing in favour of unreasonable delay.<Ref>
The accused cannot use adjournment either requested or consented to by defence as weighing in favour of unreasonable delay.<ref>
R v Heaslip (1983), 9 CCC (3d) 480 (Ont. C.A.) {{NOCANLII}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Heaslip|gbskj|1983 CanLII 3519|, 9 CCC (3d) 480}}{{perONCA-H|Martin JA}}<br>
R v Deloli (1985), 20 CCC (3d) 153 (Man. C.A.) {{NOCANLII}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Deloli|gdj4f|1985 CanLII 3482|, 20 CCC (3d) 153}}{{perMBCA|Matas JA}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Time taken for the accused to find counsel is usually treated as attributable to the accused.<ref>
Time taken for the accused to find counsel is usually treated as attributable to the accused.<ref>
R v Koruz (1992), [http://canlii.ca/t/1p6k6 1992 ABCA 144] (CanLII), 125 AR 161 at para 86, find accused counsel “should be treated as either a neutral factor or a delay attributable to Koruz.” )
{{CanLIIRP|Koruz|1p6k6|1992 ABCA 144 (CanLII)|125 AR 161}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (2:1){{atL|1p6k6|86}}, find accused counsel “should be treated as either a neutral factor or a delay attributable to Koruz.” )
</ref>
</ref>


Where delay is contributed to by the defence's use of the preliminary inquiry as a lengthy discovery it cannot be used towards unreasonable delay.<Ref>
Where delay is contributed to by the defence's use of the preliminary inquiry as a lengthy discovery it cannot be used towards unreasonable delay.<ref>
R v Bazinet, [http://canlii.ca/t/5hw8 2002 BCCA 536] (CanLII), (2002), 168 CCC (3d) 344 (BCCA) at para 21
{{CanLIIRP|Bazinet|5hw8|2002 BCCA 536 (CanLII)|168 CCC (3d) 344}}{{perBCCA|Low JA}} {{atL|5hw8|21}}
</ref>
</ref>


The Crown may show that some delay was attributable to the accused where there were earlier dates available for a defence application or where the delay is relating to providing disclosure but there was a delay in requesting disclosure. If established, the onus shifts to the defence to show that the earlier dates were not available to defence or that the earlier dates would not have sped things up, or that relevance did not become apparent until later.<ref>
The Crown may show that some delay was attributable to the accused where there were earlier dates available for a defence application or where the delay is relating to providing disclosure but there was a delay in requesting disclosure. If established, the onus shifts to the defence to show that the earlier dates were not available to defence or that the earlier dates would not have sped things up, or that relevance did not become apparent until later.<ref>
R v Innes, [http://canlii.ca/t/fl87m 2011 ONSC 2638] (CanLII), at para 32<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Innes|fl87m|2011 ONSC 2638 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Ellies J}}{{atL|fl87m|32}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Pre-trial motions advanced by the accused will often mean that the resultant delay will be attributable to the accused. This includes motions such as:
Pre-trial motions advanced by the accused will often mean that the resultant delay will be attributable to the accused. This includes motions such as:
* resisting extradition<Ref>
* resisting extradition<ref>
R v White, [http://canlii.ca/t/5s25 1997 CanLII 2426] (ON CA), (1997), 114 CCC (3d) 225 (ONCA)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|White|5s25|1997 CanLII 2426 |}}{{perONCA|Laskin and Charron JJA}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
* change of venue<Ref>
* change of venue<ref>
R v Conway{{supra}}
{{supra1|Conway}}
</ref>
</ref>
* challenge a search warrant<ref>
* challenge a search warrant<ref>
Morin{{supra}} at p 17 to 18<br>
{{supra1|Morin}}{{atps|17 to 18}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
* quashing the order of committal<ref>
* quashing the order of committal<ref>
Conway{{supra}}
{{supra1|Conway}}
</ref>
</ref>


Line 148: Line 168:


==Crown Caused Delay==
==Crown Caused Delay==
Any delay caused by the Crown is not excusable when calculating the total time of delay.<Ref>
Any delay caused by the Crown is not excusable when calculating the total time of delay.<ref>
R v Pusic, [http://canlii.ca/t/1w9j5 1996 CanLII 8215] (ON SC) at p. 704<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Pusic|1w9j5|1996 CanLII 8215 (ON SC)|30 OR (3d) 692}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}{{atp|704}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


There are two categories of crown delay: (1) delay caused by decisions at the core of prosecutorial discretion and (2) decisions concerning adjournments, disclosure, and change in manner of proceedings. Those of the first category are only reviewable for abuse of process and otherwise cannot be attributed against the crown. The second category is reviewable for crown caused delay.<Ref>  
There are two categories of crown delay: (1) delay caused by decisions at the core of prosecutorial discretion and (2) decisions concerning adjournments, disclosure, and change in manner of proceedings. Those of the first category are only reviewable for abuse of process and otherwise cannot be attributed against the crown. The second category is reviewable for crown caused delay.<ref>  
R v Ghavami, [http://canlii.ca/t/28jx6 2010 BCCA 126] (CanLII), (2010), 253 CCC (3d) 74 (BCCA)
{{CanLIIRP|Ghavami|28jx6|2010 BCCA 126 (CanLII)|253 CCC (3d) 74}}{{perBCCA|Donald JA and Huddart JA}}
</ref>
</ref>


Where the Crown refuses disclosure and is subsequently ordered to disclose documents, the delay arising from the refusal is attributable to the Crown.<ref>
Where the Crown refuses disclosure and is subsequently ordered to disclose documents, the delay arising from the refusal is attributable to the Crown.<ref>
R v Innes, [http://canlii.ca/t/fl87m 2011 ONSC 2638] (CanLII) at para 31<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Innes|fl87m|2011 ONSC 2638 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Ellies J}}{{atL|fl87m|31}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 163: Line 183:


===Complexity of the Case===
===Complexity of the Case===
A particularly complex case that requires lengthy documentary evidence may tolerate longer delays that normal cases.<Ref>
A particularly complex case that requires lengthy documentary evidence may tolerate longer delays that normal cases.<ref>
R v Atkinson, [http://canlii.ca/t/g1g28 1991 CanLII 7113] (ON CA), (1991), 68 CCC (3d) 109 at p.127 (ONCA)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Atkinson|g1g28|1991 CanLII 7113 (ON CA)|68 CCC (3d) 109}}{{perONCA|Osborne JA}}{{atp|127}} (ONCA)<br>
</ref> The Crown must present "cogent evidence that proves the complexity of the case".<ref>
</ref>
R v Giorgio, [http://canlii.ca/t/1htq6 2004 CanLII 30094] (ON SC)
The Crown must present "cogent evidence that proves the complexity of the case."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Giorgio|1htq6|2004 CanLII 30094 (ON SC)|123 CRR (2d) 189}}{{perONSC|Trafford J}}
</ref>
</ref>


Insufficiency of resources alone is not an indicator of a high degree of complexity.<ref>
Insufficiency of resources alone is not an indicator of a high degree of complexity.<ref>
Moyer, Re, [http://canlii.ca/t/1wctd 1994 CanLII 7551] (ON SC)
{{CanLIIRPC|Moyer, Re|1wctd|1994 CanLII 7551 (ON SC)|95 CCC (3d) 174}}{{perONSC|Fedak J}}
</ref>
</ref>


The need for technical expertise to examine the computer does not necessarily make a case complex for The purpose of Morin analysis.<Ref>
The need for technical expertise to examine the computer does not necessarily make a case complex for The purpose of Morin analysis.<ref>
R v Charbonneau, [http://canlii.ca/t/gg34g 2015 BCPC 4] (CanLII) at para 108
{{CanLIIRx|Charbonneau|gg34g|2015 BCPC 4 (CanLII)}}{{perBCPC|Brecknell J}} {{atL|gg34g|108}}
</ref>
</ref>


Complexity remains an important factor under the transitional exception cases under the Jordan Framework.<ref>
Complexity remains an important factor under the transitional exception cases under the Jordan Framework.<ref>
R v Cody, [http://canlii.ca/t/h4bfk 2017 SCC 31] (CanLII), at paras. 70-71<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Cody|h4bfk|2017 SCC 31 (CanLII)|[2017] 1 SCR 659}}{{TheCourtSCC}}{{atsL|h4bfk|70| to 71}}<br>
R v Picard, [http://canlii.ca/t/h5smx 2017 ONCA 692] (CanLII) at para. 79<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Picard|h5smx|2017 ONCA 692 (CanLII)|354 CCC (3d) 212}}{{perONCA|Rouleau JA}}{{atL|h5smx|79}}<br>
R v Gopie, [http://canlii.ca/t/h69tn 2017 ONCA 728] (CanLII), at para. 119<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Gopie|h69tn|2017 ONCA 728 (CanLII)|356 CCC (3d) 36}}{{perONCA|Gillese JA}}{{atL|h69tn|119}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 186: Line 207:
====Child Pornography Offences====
====Child Pornography Offences====
The Police are permitted to triage their analysis of computers by conducting preliminary analysis and then holding off on full analysis until after it was clear there would be a contest of the charges. <ref>
The Police are permitted to triage their analysis of computers by conducting preliminary analysis and then holding off on full analysis until after it was clear there would be a contest of the charges. <ref>
R v Charbonneau,  [http://canlii.ca/t/gg34g 2015 BCPC 4] (CanLII) at para 128 to 130</ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Charbonneau|gg34g|2015 BCPC 4 (CanLII)}}{{perBCPC|Brecknell J}}{{atps|128 to 130}}</ref>


An intake period of 9 months for child pornography charges can be reasonable given that much of the investigation occurs after charges and the frequent need for breaks while categorizing the materials.<ref>
An intake period of 9 months for child pornography charges can be reasonable given that much of the investigation occurs after charges and the frequent need for breaks while categorizing the materials.<ref>
R v Stilwell, [http://canlii.ca/t/g84zj 2014 ONCA 563] (CanLII), at para 9<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Stilwell|g84zj|2014 ONCA 563 (CanLII)|313 CCC (3d) 257}}{{perONCA|Pepall JA}}{{atL|g84zj|9}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 196: Line 217:
===Delayed Disclosure===
===Delayed Disclosure===
Failure to make timely disclosure will cause delay attributable to the Crown.<ref>
Failure to make timely disclosure will cause delay attributable to the Crown.<ref>
R v Collins; R v Pelfrey, [1995] 2 SCR 1104, [http://canlii.ca/t/1frjq 1995 CanLII 114] (SCC) at p. 389<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Collins; R v Pelfrey|1frjq|1995 CanLII 114 (SCC)|[1995] 2 SCR 1104}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}{{atp|389}}<Br>
</ref>
</ref>


It is not necessary that the defence have the Crown expert report before being able to make election and plea.<ref>
It is not necessary that the defence have the Crown expert report before being able to make election and plea.<ref>
R v Crant, [http://canlii.ca/t/gf63x 2014 ONSC 6233] (CanLII)<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Crant|gf63x|2014 ONSC 6233 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Goldstein J}}<br>
R v Kovacs-Tatar, [http://canlii.ca/t/1j99g 2004 CanLII 42923] (ON CA) at para 47<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Kovacs-Tatar|1j99g|2004 CanLII 42923 (ON CA)|192 CCC (3d) 91}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|1j99g|47}}<Br>
R v Lahiry, [http://canlii.ca/t/fntws 2011 ONSC 6780] (CanLII), at para 114 ("Sophisticated forensic testing and ongoing investigative steps often take time and they cannot be allowed to hold the process hostage by preventing the setting of timely trial dates. It is only when the missing disclosure is truly material to "crucial steps" in the process, like election and plea, that it will justify delay at these early stages.")
{{CanLIIRP|Lahiry|fntws|2011 ONSC 6780 (CanLII)|283 CCC (3d) 525}}{{perONSC|Code J}}{{atL|fntws|114}} ("Sophisticated forensic testing and ongoing investigative steps often take time and they cannot be allowed to hold the process hostage by preventing the setting of timely trial dates. It is only when the missing disclosure is truly material to "crucial steps" in the process, like election and plea, that it will justify delay at these early stages.")
</ref>
</ref>
The use of trial confirmation hearings one or two months before trial can be used as delivery dates for remaining reports. If reports are not disclosed, it would entitled a defence adjournment at the cost of the Crown.<ref>
The use of trial confirmation hearings one or two months before trial can be used as delivery dates for remaining reports. If reports are not disclosed, it would be entitled a defence adjournment at the cost of the Crown.<ref>
Lahiry at para 114<br>
{{supra1|Lahiry}}{{atL|fntws|114}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


When Crown protection of privilege results in delay is attributable to the Crown.<ref>
When Crown protection of privilege results in delay is attributable to the Crown.<ref>
R v Philips (1993) 80 CCC (3d) 167 (ONCA)<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Philips|gbfqt|1993 CanLII 14721 (ON CA)| (1993) 80 CCC (3d) 167}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}<Br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 215: Line 236:


===Other Circumstances===
===Other Circumstances===
Crown requests for an adjournment is a Crown delay.<Ref>
Crown requests for an adjournment is a Crown delay.<ref>
R v Collins{{supra}}<br>
{{supra1|Collins}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


The time accrued during which a Crown stay of proceedings under s. 579 of the Code has been invoked will be attributable to the Crown.<ref>
The time accrued during which a Crown stay of proceedings under s. 579 of the Code has been invoked will be attributable to the Crown.<ref>
R v Lanteigne, [http://canlii.ca/t/2dzp1 2010 NBCA 91] (CanLII) at para 13<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Lanteigne|2dzp1|2010 NBCA 91 (CanLII)|265 CCC (3d) 123}}{{perNBCA|Bell JA}}{{atL|2dzp1|13}}<br>
R v AS, [http://canlii.ca/t/20vxt 2008 CanLII 48150] (ON SC) at paras 20 to 22<br>
{{CanLIIRP|AS|20vxt|2008 CanLII 48150 (ON SC)|182 CRR 1}}{{perONSC|Belobaba J}}{{atsL|20vxt|20| to 22}}<br>
R v Condello (1997), 38 O.T.C. 362, 36 W.C.B. (2d) 48 at para 39<Br>
{{CanLIIR-N|Condello| (1997), 38 O.T.C. 362, 36 WCB (2d) 48}}{{at-|39}}<Br>
R v Randell, [http://canlii.ca/t/gmc45 2015 CanLII 79127] (NL SCTD) at para 115<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Randell|gmc45|2015 CanLII 79127 (NLSCTD)}}{{perNLSC|Murphy J}}{{atL|gmc45|115}}<br>
R v Durack, [1997] S.J. No. 518 (Sask. Q.B.) at para 18<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Durack|1nt61|1997 CanLII 11290 (SKQB)|[1997] S.J. No 518 (Sask. Q.B.)}}{{perSKQB|Pritchard J}}{{atL|1nt61|18}}<br>
R v Keevik, [http://canlii.ca/t/7ccv 1996 CanLII 3625] (NWT SC), [1996] N.W.T.J. No. 32 (Sup. Ct.) at para 12<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Keevik|7ccv|1996 CanLII 3625 (NWT SC)|[1996] NWTJ No 32 (Sup. Ct.)}}{{perNWTSC|Richard J}}{{atL|7ccv|12}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 232: Line 253:
==Classifying Delay==
==Classifying Delay==


Delay that is unrelated to defence does not presumptively or automatically attribute to the Crown.<Ref>
Delay that is unrelated to defence does not presumptively or automatically attribute to the Crown.<ref>
R v Biorac, [http://canlii.ca/t/1n5qh 2006 CanLII 14237] (ON CA), [2006] OJ No 1778 (ONCA)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Biorac|1n5qh|2006 CanLII 14237 (ON CA)|[2006] OJ No 1778 (ONCA)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Delay Caused by Unavailable Defence Counsel on Crown Adjournment'''<br>
; Delay Caused by Unavailable Defence Counsel on Crown Adjournment
Where Crown offers a trial date after the original adjourned trial date, additional delay after that offered date due to defence counsel's unavailability was found to be neutral.<Ref>
Where Crown offers a trial date after the original adjourned trial date, additional delay after that offered date due to defence counsel's unavailability was found to be neutral.<ref>
R v PA, [http://canlii.ca/t/231rr 2002 CanLII 53216] (ON CA), [2002] OJ 2490 (ONCA) per Catzman and Weiler JJA aff'd at SCC<br>
{{CanLIIRP|PA|231rr|2002 CanLII 53216 (ON CA)|[2002] OJ 2490 (ONCA)}}{{perONCA|Catzman and Zeiler JJA}} aff'd at SCC<br>
R v NNM, [http://canlii.ca/t/1n6mj 2006 CanLII 14957] (ON CA), [2006] OJ 1802 (ONCA) per Juriansz JA<br>
{{CanLIIRP|NNM|1n6mj|2006 CanLII 14957 (ON CA)|[2006] OJ 1802 (ONCA)}}{{perONCA|Juriansz JA}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Defence counsel's unavailability after a denied date due to Crown and Court's unavailability is not attributable to the Crown.<ref>
Defence counsel's unavailability after a denied date due to Crown and Court's unavailability is not attributable to the Crown.<ref>
R v Nikolovski, [http://canlii.ca/t/1js01 2005 CanLII 3328] (ON CA), [2005] OJ 494 (ONCA) per "The Court"<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Nikolovski|1js01|2005 CanLII 3328 (ON CA)|[2005] OJ 494 (ONCA)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}<br>
c.f. R v Rego, [http://canlii.ca/t/1lxnl 2005 CanLII 40718] (ON CA), [2005] OJ 4768 (ONCA)<br>
cf. {{CanLIIRP|Rego|1lxnl|2005 CanLII 40718 (ON CA)|[2005] OJ 4768 (ONCA)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}<br>
and R v Lof, [2004] OJ 4963 (ONCJ){{NOCANLII}}<br>
and {{CanLIIR-N|Lof|, [2004] OJ 4963 (ONCJ)}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Unforeseen Crown Adjournments'''<br>
; Unforeseen Crown Adjournments
Crown adjournment for unforeseen factors can be considered neutral.<ref>
Crown adjournment for unforeseen factors can be considered neutral.<ref>
R v Meisner, [http://canlii.ca/t/1htns 2004 CanLII 30221] (ON CA), [2004] OJ 3812 (ONCA)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Meisner|1htns|2004 CanLII 30221 (ON CA)|[2004] OJ 3812 (ONCA)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}<br>
R v Bell [2005] O.J. No. 4755 (SCJ){{NOCANLII}}<Br>
{{CanLIIR-N|Bell|, [2005] OJ No 4755 (SCJ)}}<Br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Delays Cause by Defence Pre-Trial Motions'''<br>
; Delays Cause by Defence Pre-Trial Motions
The delays necessary to hear defence motions are neutral.<ref>
The delays necessary to hear defence motions are neutral.<ref>
R v Hape, [http://canlii.ca/t/1l8gv 2005 CanLII 26591] (ON CA), [2005] OJ 3188 (ONCA)<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Hape|1l8gv|2005 CanLII 26591 (ON CA)|[2005] OJ 3188 (ONCA)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}<Br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Delay Caused by Conflict of Interest'''<Br>
; Delay Caused by Conflict of Interest
Delay caused by the judge recusing himself as he had previously represented the accused when he was a lawyer was considered neutral.<ref>
Delay caused by the judge recusing himself as he had previously represented the accused when he was a lawyer was considered neutral.<ref>
R v Meisner, [http://canlii.ca/t/1htns 2004 CanLII 30221] (ON CA), [2004] OJ 3812 (ONCA) at para 12<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Meisner|1htns|2004 CanLII 30221 (ON CA)|[2004] OJ 3812 (ONCA)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|1htns|12}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Caused by Co-accused'''<br>
; Caused by Co-accused
Delay caused by the inaction of a co-accused will generally be seen as neutral.<Ref>
Delay caused by the inaction of a co-accused will generally be seen as neutral.<ref>
R v Farewell, [http://canlii.ca/t/1vdjt 2008 BCCA 9] (CanLII) at para 89<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Farewell|1vdjt|2008 BCCA 9 (CanLII)|229 CCC (3d) 17}}{{perBCCA|Thackray JA}}{{atL|1vdjt|89}}<br>
</ref> However, delay caused by the Crown assisting one party to the detriment of another may be attributed to the crown.<ref>
</ref>  
R v Sandhu, [http://canlii.ca/t/fxrk6 2013 BCSC 963] (CanLII) at para 69 to 76<br>
However, delay caused by the Crown assisting one party to the detriment of another may be attributed to the crown.<ref>
R v Topol, [http://canlii.ca/t/1vrd8 2008 ONCA 113] (CanLII), [2008] OJ 535 (ONCA)<br>
{{CanLIIR-N|Sandhu|2013 BCSC 963}}{{ats-|69 to 76}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Topol|1vrd8|2008 ONCA 113 (CanLII)|[2008] OJ 535 (ONCA)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Delay for a Re-Trial'''<br>
; Delay for a Re-Trial
A retrial should be scheduled "without further delay". Only a "short period" of delay will be expected. Anything longer may open the possibility of a s. 11(b) Charter delay.<ref>
A retrial should be scheduled "without further delay". Only a "short period" of delay will be expected. Anything longer may open the possibility of a s. 11(b) Charter delay.<ref>
R v Brace, [http://canlii.ca/t/2d17m 2010 ONCA 689] (CanLII), at para 15<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Brace|2d17m|2010 ONCA 689 (CanLII)|261 CCC (3d) 455}}{{perONCA|Juriansz JA}}{{atL|2d17m|15}}<br>
see also [[Mistrials]]<br>
see also [[Mistrials]]<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Delay by Crown Attempting to Assist in Obtaining 3rd Party Records'''<br>
; Delay by Crown Attempting to Assist in Obtaining 3rd Party Records
Where the Crown agrees to obtain materials that are third party records, the delay that results from their participation is either neutral or inherent time.<ref>
Where the Crown agrees to obtain materials that are third party records, the delay that results from their participation is either neutral or inherent time.<ref>
NNM{{supra}}<br>
{{supra1|NNM}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Factors "Outside" of Court Proceedings'''<br>
; Factors "Outside" of Court Proceedings
Delay due to "weather conditions or infrastructure problems; illnesses of key witnesses, parties or the court; interference by outside agencies not caused by the state; or conflicting court obligations by the accused person" are all treated as neutral unless there is some unusual situation.<Ref>
Delay due to "weather conditions or infrastructure problems; illnesses of key witnesses, parties or the court; interference by outside agencies not caused by the state; or conflicting court obligations by the accused person" are all treated as neutral unless there is some unusual situation.<ref>
R v CD, [http://canlii.ca/t/gf93w 2014 ABCA 333] (CanLII), at para 31<br>
{{CanLIIRP|CD|gf93w|2014 ABCA 333 (CanLII)|316 CCC (3d) 457}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|gf93w|31}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Delay Caused by Missing or Absconding Accused'''<br>
; Delay Caused by Missing or Absconding Accused
There is no obligation on the part of the accused to voluntarily return to the jurisdiction to face prosecution. Refusal to return does not waive the delay in prosecution.<ref>
There is no obligation on the part of the accused to voluntarily return to the jurisdiction to face prosecution. Refusal to return does not waive the delay in prosecution.<ref>
R v MacIntosh, [http://canlii.ca/t/fp7rc 2011 NSCA 111] (CanLII) Crown appeal dismissed by SCC
{{CanLIIRP|MacIntosh|fp7rc|2011 NSCA 111 (CanLII)|281 CCC (3d) 291}}{{perNSCA|Beveridge JA}} Crown appeal dismissed by SCC
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}

Latest revision as of 14:41, 14 July 2024

This page was last substantively updated or reviewed January 2019. (Rev. # 95592)

General Principles

See also: Right to a Trial Within a Reasonable Time

It is "the ultimate responsibility of moving a case forward rests with the Crown."[1] However, the Crown is not to take responsibility for defence counsel's failings to properly represent the interests of their client.

  1. R v Stephen, 2012 ONCA 411 (CanLII), OJ No 2678, per curiam, at para 7

Intake Period / Pre-Charge Delay

The intake period refers to the period of time between the beginning of the investigation and the eventual swearing the Information and sending of disclosure to the Crown.

This period can be divided into two types of delay:[1]

  1. delay between the offence occurring and the reporting to police
  2. delay between the reporting of the offence and the police laying a charge

The intake period will vary on the type of charges investigated.

Drinking and driving cases typically have an intake period of roughly two months.[2]

  1. R v A(S), 2011 NUCJ 7 (CanLII), per Sharkey J
  2. R v Meisner, 2003 CanLII 49317 (ONSC), [2003] OJ No 1948 (ONSC), per Hill J

Re-Scheduling of trial time

This period of time concerns delay resulting from the inability to finish the trial during the initial time booked.

It is generally expected that incomplete cases will be given priority over other matters in court. Delays due to re-scheduling of trial time is treated as institutional delay or as part of the inherent time requirements. [1] Gross underestimate of the time requirements for trial will be attributable to institutional delay.[2]

Defence counsel are not expected to "hold themselves in a state of perpetual availability."[3]

  1. R v Lahiry, 2011 ONSC 6780 (CanLII), 283 CCC (3d) 525, per Code J, at para 67
    R v Godin, 2009 SCC 26 (CanLII), [2009] 2 SCR 3, per Cromwell J
    R v Brace, 2010 ONCA 689 (CanLII), 261 CCC (3d) 455, per Juriansz JA, at paras 14 to 16 (Ont. C.A.)
    R v Allen, 1996 CanLII 4011 (ON CA), 110 CCC (3d) 331, per Doherty JA, at pp. 347-351
    R v Satkunanathan, 2001 CanLII 24061 (ON CA), 152 CCC (3d) 321, per curiam, at paras 43 to 45 and 54 to 55 (Ont. C.A.)
    R v M(R), 2003 CanLII 50092 (ON CA), 180 C.C.C (3d) 49, per MacPherson JA, at paras 6 to 9
    R v W(AJ), 2009 ONCA 661 (CanLII), 257 OAC 11, per Rosenberg JA, at paras 29 to 43(ONCA)
  2. R v Qureshi, 2004 CanLII 40657 (ON CA), 190 CCC (3d) 453, per Laskin JA
  3. Godin, supra, at para 23

Institutional or Systemic Delay

Institutional or systemic delays arise where the case is ready for trial but "trial a judge, courtroom or essential court staff may not be available and so the case cannot go on."[1] It "runs from the time the parties are ready for trial and continues until the system can accommodate the proceedings."[2]

The Supreme Court in Morin suggested a "guideline of between 8 and 10 months for institutional delay in Provincial Courts."[3]

Delay required to hold judicial pre-trial conferences are attributable as institutional delay.[4]

The failure of courts to identify "true availability of dates within the system" may risk the rights under s.11(d) to becomes "meaningless."[5]

Institutional Delay is Attributed to the Crown

Institutional delay is attributable to the Crown.[6] This is because delays caused by lack of institutional resources should not be legitimized as acceptable reasons for delay.[7]

  1. R v Morin, 1992 CanLII 89 (SCC), [1992] 1 SCR 771, per Sopinka J
  2. Morin, ibid.
  3. Morin, ibid.
  4. R v CRG, 2005 CanLII 32192 (ON CA), [2005] OJ 3764 (ONCA), per Rosenberg JA
  5. R v Patrick Sikorski & Daniel Griffiths, 2013 ONSC 1714 (CanLII), [2013] OJ No 1654, per Nordheimer J, at para 97
  6. R v Lahiry, 2011 ONSC 6780 (CanLII), 283 CCC (3d) 525, per Code J, at paras 25 to 37
  7. R v Mills, 1986 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1986] 1 SCR 863, per McIntyre J, at p. 935 ("It is imperative, however, that in recognizing the need for such a criterion we do not simply legitimize current and future delays resulting from inadequate institutional resources. For the criterion of institutional resources, more than any other, threatens to become a source of justification for prolonged and unacceptable delay. There must, therefore, be some limit to which inadequate resources can be used to excuse delay and impair the interests of the individual.")

Inherent Delays

By contrast "inherent delay" are those that are necessary to move a case forward. The more complicated the case the longer the preparation time will be required. In addition, counsel "cannot be expected to devote their time exclusively to one case." The inherent delays are excusable. This is determined on a case by case basis. [1]

Inherent time requirements are neutral periods that do not count against accused or the Crown.[2]

Time spent scheduling, preparing and conducting pre-trial hearings are considered inherent time requirements.[3]

While the accused is struggling to retain and keep counsel, the court and Crown are in a "holding pattern" and that time is attributed as inherent delay.[4]

Complexity

The more "complex case is, the longer it will take counsel to prepare, the longer it will take to assemble witnesses and evidence, and the longer the trial may take."[5]

Mis-estimating Requirements

Where counsel mis-estimate the time it will take to prosecute the case resulting in an adjournment to finish the case will normally count as "inherent time requirement."[6]

Multiple Accused

Where there are multiple co-accused or multiple charges the inherent time requirements will increase.[7]

Judgement Under Reserve

The time in which a judgment is under reserve is generally considered an inherent time requirement.[8]

In exceptional circumstances, such as an 11 month delay for a decision on a directed verdict, would constitute unreasonable delay.[9]

  1. R v Richards, 2012 SKCA 120 (CanLII), 2 WWR 637, per Richards JA, at para 33
    R v Morin, 1992 CanLII 89 (SCC), [1992] 1 SCR 771, per Sopinka J, at pp. 791-2
  2. R v MacDougall, 1998 CanLII 763 (SCC), [1998] 3 SCR 45, per McLachlin J, at para 44
  3. R v Nguyen, 2013 ONCA 169 (CanLII), 2 CR (7th) 70, per Watt JA, at paras 54, 59, 60
  4. R v Baron, 2017 ONCA 772 (CanLII), 356 CCC (3d) 212, per Trotter JA, at para 59
  5. R v Lee, 2015 SKCA 53 (CanLII), 323 CCC (3d) 313, per Whitmore JA, at para 53
  6. R v Allen(1996), 110 CCC (3d) 311(*no CanLII links) , at p. 344 (ONCA) aff'd at [1997] 3 SCR 700, 1997 CanLII 331 (SCC), per Sopinka J
  7. Rusic, supra, at p. 703
    R v Faulds, 1996 CanLII 2579 , 111 CCC (3d) 39, per Finlayson JA
  8. R v MacIsaac, 2018 ONCA 650 (CanLII), 365 CCC (3d) 361, per Huscroft JA, at para 35 ("Prior to Jordan, the time a judgment was under reserve was typically considered to be part of the inherent time requirements of a case")
    R v Ferguson, 2005 CanLII 28538 (ON SC), OTC 746, per Durno J, at para 213 ("The inherent time requirements also include the time for the court to prepare its rulings and judgment.") leave refused 2008 ONCA 764 (CanLII), per curiam
    R v Schertzer, 2009 ONCA 742 (CanLII), 248 CCC (3d) 270, per curiam, at para 114
    R v Lamacchia, 2012 ONSC 2583 (CanLII), 258 CRR (2d) 370, per Trotter J, at para 7 ("Generally speaking, the period of time a judge takes to prepare reasons should be considered to be part of the inherent time requirements of the case. Within reasonable limits, it is desirable that judges take the time that they need to prepare carefully reasoned decisions. Considered reasons enhance the quality of justice in the criminal process in many ways and must be encouraged")
  9. eg. R v Rahey, 1987 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 588, per Lamer J

Accused Caused Delay

See also: Right to a Trial Within a Reasonable Time#

Where delay is largely "attributable to the accused" or defence counsel, a prima facie case of unreasonable delay cannot bemade out.[1]

Defence counsel cannot be expected to be perpetually available.[2]

The accused cannot use adjournment either requested or consented to by defence as weighing in favour of unreasonable delay.[3]

Time taken for the accused to find counsel is usually treated as attributable to the accused.[4]

Where delay is contributed to by the defence's use of the preliminary inquiry as a lengthy discovery it cannot be used towards unreasonable delay.[5]

The Crown may show that some delay was attributable to the accused where there were earlier dates available for a defence application or where the delay is relating to providing disclosure but there was a delay in requesting disclosure. If established, the onus shifts to the defence to show that the earlier dates were not available to defence or that the earlier dates would not have sped things up, or that relevance did not become apparent until later.[6]

Pre-trial motions advanced by the accused will often mean that the resultant delay will be attributable to the accused. This includes motions such as:

  • resisting extradition[7]
  • change of venue[8]
  • challenge a search warrant[9]
  • quashing the order of committal[10]
  1. R v Morin, 1992 CanLII 89, , [1992] 1 SCR 77, per Sopinka J
    R v Kwok, 2002 BCCA 177 (CanLII), 164 CCC (3d) 182, per Braidwood JA
  2. R v Godin, 2009 SCC 26 (CanLII), [2009] 2 SCR 3, per Cromwell J
  3. R v Heaslip, 1983 CanLII 3519, , 9 CCC (3d) 480, per Martin JA
    R v Deloli, 1985 CanLII 3482, , 20 CCC (3d) 153, per Matas JA
  4. R v Koruz, 1992 ABCA 144 (CanLII), 125 AR 161, per curiam (2:1), at para 86, find accused counsel “should be treated as either a neutral factor or a delay attributable to Koruz.” )
  5. R v Bazinet, 2002 BCCA 536 (CanLII), 168 CCC (3d) 344, per Low JA , at para 21
  6. R v Innes, 2011 ONSC 2638 (CanLII), per Ellies J, at para 32
  7. R v White, 1997 CanLII 2426 , per Laskin and Charron JJA
  8. Conway, supra
  9. Morin, supra, at pp. 17 to 18
  10. Conway, supra

Crown Caused Delay

Any delay caused by the Crown is not excusable when calculating the total time of delay.[1]

There are two categories of crown delay: (1) delay caused by decisions at the core of prosecutorial discretion and (2) decisions concerning adjournments, disclosure, and change in manner of proceedings. Those of the first category are only reviewable for abuse of process and otherwise cannot be attributed against the crown. The second category is reviewable for crown caused delay.[2]

Where the Crown refuses disclosure and is subsequently ordered to disclose documents, the delay arising from the refusal is attributable to the Crown.[3]

  1. R v Pusic, 1996 CanLII 8215 (ON SC), 30 OR (3d) 692, per Hill J, at p. 704
  2. R v Ghavami, 2010 BCCA 126 (CanLII), 253 CCC (3d) 74, per Donald JA and Huddart JA
  3. R v Innes, 2011 ONSC 2638 (CanLII), per Ellies J, at para 31

Complexity of the Case

A particularly complex case that requires lengthy documentary evidence may tolerate longer delays that normal cases.[1] The Crown must present "cogent evidence that proves the complexity of the case."[2]

Insufficiency of resources alone is not an indicator of a high degree of complexity.[3]

The need for technical expertise to examine the computer does not necessarily make a case complex for The purpose of Morin analysis.[4]

Complexity remains an important factor under the transitional exception cases under the Jordan Framework.[5]

  1. R v Atkinson, 1991 CanLII 7113 (ON CA), 68 CCC (3d) 109, per Osborne JA, at p. 127 (ONCA)
  2. R v Giorgio, 2004 CanLII 30094 (ON SC), 123 CRR (2d) 189, per Trafford J
  3. Moyer, Re, 1994 CanLII 7551 (ON SC), 95 CCC (3d) 174, per Fedak J
  4. R v Charbonneau, 2015 BCPC 4 (CanLII), per Brecknell J , at para 108
  5. R v Cody, 2017 SCC 31 (CanLII), [2017] 1 SCR 659, per curiam, at paras 70 to 71
    R v Picard, 2017 ONCA 692 (CanLII), 354 CCC (3d) 212, per Rouleau JA, at para 79
    R v Gopie, 2017 ONCA 728 (CanLII), 356 CCC (3d) 36, per Gillese JA, at para 119

Child Pornography Offences

The Police are permitted to triage their analysis of computers by conducting preliminary analysis and then holding off on full analysis until after it was clear there would be a contest of the charges. [1]

An intake period of 9 months for child pornography charges can be reasonable given that much of the investigation occurs after charges and the frequent need for breaks while categorizing the materials.[2]

  1. R v Charbonneau, 2015 BCPC 4 (CanLII), per Brecknell J, at pp. 128 to 130
  2. R v Stilwell, 2014 ONCA 563 (CanLII), 313 CCC (3d) 257, per Pepall JA, at para 9

Delayed Disclosure

Failure to make timely disclosure will cause delay attributable to the Crown.[1]

It is not necessary that the defence have the Crown expert report before being able to make election and plea.[2] The use of trial confirmation hearings one or two months before trial can be used as delivery dates for remaining reports. If reports are not disclosed, it would be entitled a defence adjournment at the cost of the Crown.[3]

When Crown protection of privilege results in delay is attributable to the Crown.[4]

  1. R v Collins; R v Pelfrey, 1995 CanLII 114 (SCC), [1995] 2 SCR 1104, per Sopinka J, at p. 389
  2. R v Crant, 2014 ONSC 6233 (CanLII), per Goldstein J
    R v Kovacs-Tatar, 2004 CanLII 42923 (ON CA), 192 CCC (3d) 91, per curiam, at para 47
    R v Lahiry, 2011 ONSC 6780 (CanLII), 283 CCC (3d) 525, per Code J, at para 114 ("Sophisticated forensic testing and ongoing investigative steps often take time and they cannot be allowed to hold the process hostage by preventing the setting of timely trial dates. It is only when the missing disclosure is truly material to "crucial steps" in the process, like election and plea, that it will justify delay at these early stages.")
  3. Lahiry, supra, at para 114
  4. R v Philips, 1993 CanLII 14721 (ON CA), (1993) 80 CCC (3d) 167, per Doherty JA

Other Circumstances

Crown requests for an adjournment is a Crown delay.[1]

The time accrued during which a Crown stay of proceedings under s. 579 of the Code has been invoked will be attributable to the Crown.[2]

  1. Collins, supra
  2. R v Lanteigne, 2010 NBCA 91 (CanLII), 265 CCC (3d) 123, per Bell JA, at para 13
    R v AS, 2008 CanLII 48150 (ON SC), 182 CRR 1, per Belobaba J, at paras 20 to 22
    R v Condello (1997), 38 O.T.C. 362, 36 WCB (2d) 48(*no CanLII links) , at para 39
    R v Randell, 2015 CanLII 79127 (NLSCTD), per Murphy J, at para 115
    R v Durack, 1997 CanLII 11290 (SKQB), [1997] S.J. No 518 (Sask. Q.B.), per Pritchard J, at para 18
    R v Keevik, 1996 CanLII 3625 (NWT SC), [1996] NWTJ No 32 (Sup. Ct.), per Richard J, at para 12

Classifying Delay

Delay that is unrelated to defence does not presumptively or automatically attribute to the Crown.[1]

Delay Caused by Unavailable Defence Counsel on Crown Adjournment

Where Crown offers a trial date after the original adjourned trial date, additional delay after that offered date due to defence counsel's unavailability was found to be neutral.[2]

Defence counsel's unavailability after a denied date due to Crown and Court's unavailability is not attributable to the Crown.[3]

Unforeseen Crown Adjournments

Crown adjournment for unforeseen factors can be considered neutral.[4]

Delays Cause by Defence Pre-Trial Motions

The delays necessary to hear defence motions are neutral.[5]

Delay Caused by Conflict of Interest

Delay caused by the judge recusing himself as he had previously represented the accused when he was a lawyer was considered neutral.[6]

Caused by Co-accused

Delay caused by the inaction of a co-accused will generally be seen as neutral.[7] However, delay caused by the Crown assisting one party to the detriment of another may be attributed to the crown.[8]

Delay for a Re-Trial

A retrial should be scheduled "without further delay". Only a "short period" of delay will be expected. Anything longer may open the possibility of a s. 11(b) Charter delay.[9]

Delay by Crown Attempting to Assist in Obtaining 3rd Party Records

Where the Crown agrees to obtain materials that are third party records, the delay that results from their participation is either neutral or inherent time.[10]

Factors "Outside" of Court Proceedings

Delay due to "weather conditions or infrastructure problems; illnesses of key witnesses, parties or the court; interference by outside agencies not caused by the state; or conflicting court obligations by the accused person" are all treated as neutral unless there is some unusual situation.[11]

Delay Caused by Missing or Absconding Accused

There is no obligation on the part of the accused to voluntarily return to the jurisdiction to face prosecution. Refusal to return does not waive the delay in prosecution.[12]

  1. R v Biorac, 2006 CanLII 14237 (ON CA), [2006] OJ No 1778 (ONCA), per curiam
  2. R v PA, 2002 CanLII 53216 (ON CA), [2002] OJ 2490 (ONCA), per Catzman and Zeiler JJA aff'd at SCC
    R v NNM, 2006 CanLII 14957 (ON CA), [2006] OJ 1802 (ONCA), per Juriansz JA
  3. R v Nikolovski, 2005 CanLII 3328 (ON CA), [2005] OJ 494 (ONCA), per curiam
    cf. R v Rego, 2005 CanLII 40718 (ON CA), [2005] OJ 4768 (ONCA), per curiam
    and R v Lof, [2004] OJ 4963 (ONCJ)(*no CanLII links)
  4. R v Meisner, 2004 CanLII 30221 (ON CA), [2004] OJ 3812 (ONCA), per curiam
    R v Bell, [2005] OJ No 4755 (SCJ)(*no CanLII links)
  5. R v Hape, 2005 CanLII 26591 (ON CA), [2005] OJ 3188 (ONCA), per curiam
  6. R v Meisner, 2004 CanLII 30221 (ON CA), [2004] OJ 3812 (ONCA), per curiam, at para 12
  7. R v Farewell, 2008 BCCA 9 (CanLII), 229 CCC (3d) 17, per Thackray JA, at para 89
  8. R v Sandhu2013 BCSC 963(*no CanLII links) , at paras 69 to 76
    R v Topol, 2008 ONCA 113 (CanLII), [2008] OJ 535 (ONCA), per curiam
  9. R v Brace, 2010 ONCA 689 (CanLII), 261 CCC (3d) 455, per Juriansz JA, at para 15
    see also Mistrials
  10. NNM, supra
  11. R v CD, 2014 ABCA 333 (CanLII), 316 CCC (3d) 457, per curiam, at para 31
  12. R v MacIntosh, 2011 NSCA 111 (CanLII), 281 CCC (3d) 291, per Beveridge JA Crown appeal dismissed by SCC