Confessions: Difference between revisions

From Criminal Law Notebook
m Text replacement - "\nR v ([A-Z][a-z]+) \(" to " ''R v $1'' ("
Tags: Mobile edit Mobile web edit
m Text replacement - "\{\{fr\|([^\}\}]+)\}\}" to "fr:$1"
 
(81 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
[[fr:Confessions]]
{{Currency2|July|2021}}
{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderAdmissions}}
{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderAdmissions}}
==General Principles==
==General Principles==
A confession is a written or oral statement by the accused to a person in authority that admits a factual element to the Crown's case. The law regarding confessions applies equally to ''inculpatory'' statements as well as ''exculpatory'' statements.  
A confession is a written or oral statement by the accused to a person in authority that admits a factual element to the Crown's case. The law regarding confessions applies equally to ''inculpatory'' statements as well as ''exculpatory'' statements. <Ref>
For inculpatory statements made to persons other than persons in authority, see [[Admissions]]
</ref>


Where a confession has been admitted as evidence in the Crown's case, the trier-of-fact may consider the statement as proof of facts found within it.<ref>
Where a confession has been admitted as evidence in the Crown's case, the trier-of-fact may consider the statement as proof of facts found within it.<ref>
''R v Lynch'', (1988), 30 O.A.C. 49 (Ont. C.A.) {{NOCANLII}}<br>  
{{CanLIIR-N|Lynch|, (1988), 30 OAC 49 (Ont. C.A.)}}<br>  
''R v Humphrey'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1bz2l 2003 CanLII 6855] (ON CA), (2003) 172 CCC (3d) 332 (Ont. C.A.){{perONCA|Moldaver JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Humphrey|1bz2l|2003 CanLII 6855 (ON CA)|172 CCC (3d) 332}}{{perONCA|Moldaver JA}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


; Voluntariness of Confessions
All confessions must be ''voluntary'' to be admissible. <ref>
All confessions must be ''voluntary'' to be admissible. <ref>
''R v Piche'', [1971] SCR 23 [http://canlii.ca/t/1xd32 1970 CanLII 82] (SCC){{perSCC|Hall J}}<br>  
{{CanLIIRP|Piche|1xd32|1970 CanLII 82 (SCC)|[1971] SCR 23}}{{perSCC|Hall J}}<br>  
''R v Boudreau'', [http://canlii.ca/t/22vrr 1949 CanLII 26] (SCC), [1949] SCR 262{{Plurality}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Boudreau|22vrr|1949 CanLII 26 (SCC)|[1949] SCR 262}}{{Plurality}}<br>
''Erven v The Queen'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1mktn 1978 CanLII 19] (SCC), [1979] 1 SCR 926{{perSCC|Dickson J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Erven v The Queen|1mktn|1978 CanLII 19 (SCC)|[1979] 1 SCR 926}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}}<br>
''Horvath v The Queen'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1mkv0 1979 CanLII 16] (SCC), [1979] 2 SCR 376{{Plurality}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Horvath v The Queen|1mkv0|1979 CanLII 16 (SCC)|[1979] 2 SCR 376}}{{Plurality}}<br>
</ref> This is the court's key concern.<ref>''R v Oickle'', [http://canlii.ca/t/525h 2000 SCC 38] (CanLII), [2000] 2 SCR 3{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}}, at 47</ref> When it is not voluntary is it not reliable and so is not admissible in evidence.<ref> see Horvath, at p. 408</ref>
</ref>  
This is the court's key concern.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Oickle|525h|2000 SCC 38 (CanLII)|[2000] 2 SCR 3}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}}{{AtL|525h|47}}</ref>  
When it is not voluntary is it not reliable and so is not admissible in evidence.<ref>  
see {{supra1|Horvath}}{{atp|408}}</ref>


; Burden of Proof
This Crown must prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt in a ''voir dire''.<ref>
This Crown must prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt in a ''voir dire''.<ref>
R v Moore-McFarlane, [2001] OJ No 4646 (C.A.), [http://canlii.ca/t/1f3k2 2001 CanLII 6363] (ONCA){{perONCA|Charron JA}} at paras 65 and 67 <br>
{{CanLIIRP|Moore-McFarlane|1f3k2|2001 CanLII 6363 (ON CA)|[2001] OJ No 4646 (CA)}}{{perONCA|Charron JA}}{{atsL|1f3k2|65| and 67}}<br>
''R v Ahmed'', [2002] OJ No 4597 (C.A.), [http://canlii.ca/t/1cddl 2002 CanLII 695] (ONCA){{perONCA|Feldman JA}}{{at|22}}</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Ahmed|1cddl|2002 CanLII 695 (ON CA)|[2002] OJ No 4597 (CA)}}{{perONCA|Feldman JA}}{{atL|1cddl|22}}</ref>
 
; Vague Statements
The confession must be given sufficient context background to be admissible. If the statement is too vague and the context of the statement could have multiple meanings, it should not be admitted.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Ferris|1p6l5|1994 ABCA 20 (CanLII)|22 WCB (2d) 265}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (2:1) - no context of statement "I killed David", could have been "The police think I killed David, but I didn’t."
</ref>
However, vagueness on the exact wordings of the statement without loss of meaning is not sufficient.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Bennight|fr77r|2012 BCCA 190 (CanLII)|320 BCAC 195}}{{perBCCA|Bennett JA}}{{atL|fr77r|92}}<br>
{{CanLIIR-N|Kennealy| (1972), 6 CCC (2d) 390 (BCCA)}}{{atps|394-95}} (CCC)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Richards|1wnvp|1997 CanLII 12470 (BC CA)| BCAC 21, 6 CR (5th) 154 (CA)}}{{perBCCA|Braidwood JA}}{{atL|1wnvp|31}}<br>
</ref>


; Methods of Recording Statement
There is no requirement that the statement be recorded to be admissible as voluntary.<ref>
{{supra1|Moore-McFarlane}}{{atL|1f3k2|64}}</ref>
Where the statement was not recorded under suspicious circumstances, such as where recording facilities were readily available, the judge must determine "whether or not a sufficient substitute for an audio or video tape record has been provided ... to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt."<ref>
{{supra1|Moore-McFarlane}}{{atL|1f3k2|65}}</ref>
The "completeness, accuracy and reliability of the record have everything to do with the court's inquiry into and scrutiny of the circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement."<ref>
{{supra1|Moore-McFarlane}}{{atL|1f3k2|65}}<br>
adopted in see {{supra1|Ahmed}} <br>
{{CanLIIRP|Burke|2dq2z|2010 ONSC 6530 (CanLII)|[2010] OJ No 5219}}{{perONSC|Baltman J}}<br>
</ref>
However, where the recording was not done properly, the Crown will have a heavy onus to admit the statement.<ref>
{{supra1|Moore-McFarlane}}{{atL|1f3k2|67}} ("it is difficult to see how the Crown could discharge its heavy onus of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt where proper recording procedures are not followed.")</ref>
; Failure to Records
The issue of voluntariness of an unrecorded statement depends on the circumstances.<ref>
The issue of voluntariness of an unrecorded statement depends on the circumstances.<ref>
''R v Swank'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1jrzz 2005 CanLII 3326] (ON CA), (2005), 194 O.A.C. 155, [2005] OJ No 493 (C.A.){{perONCA|Doherty JA}}{{at|9}}</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Swank|1jrzz|2005 CanLII 3326 (ON CA)| OAC 155, [2005] OJ No 493 (CA)}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|1jrzz|9}}</ref>


There is no requirement that the statement be recorded to be admissible as voluntary.<ref>
{{reflist|2}}
{{supra1|Moore-McFarlane}}{{at|64}}</ref>


The confession must be given sufficient context background to be admissible. If the statement is too vague and the context of the statement could have multiple meanings, it should not be admitted.<ref>
==Admission of Guilt==
''R v Ferris'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1p6l5 1994 ABCA 20] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} (2:1) - no context of statement "I killed David", could have been "The police think I killed David, but I didn’t."
An admission of guilt can encompass statements that are direct admissions of guilt or admission of fact that tends to prove guilt.<ref>
</ref> However, vagueness on the exact wordings of the statement without loss of meaning is not sufficient.<ref>
Ian Scott and Joseph Martino, "Salhany's Police Manual of Arrest, Seizure & Interrogation", 11th ed. at p. 203
''R v Bennight'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fr77r 2012 BCCA 190] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Bennett JA}}{{at|92}}<br>
''R v Kennealy'' (1972), 6 CCC (2d) 390 (BCCA){{NOCANLII}} at 394-95<br>
''R v Richards'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1wnvp 1997 CanLII 12470] (BC CA), (1997), 87 BCAC 21, 6 C.R. (5th) 154 (C.A.){{perBCCA|Braidwood JA}}{{at|31}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Where the statement was not recorded under suspicious circumstances, such as where recording facilities were readily available, the judge must determine "whether or not a sufficient substitute for an audio or video tape record has been provided ... to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt."<ref>
Such an admission can be by words or by conduct that could reasonably be taken as intending to be an assertion.<ref>
{{supra1|Moore-McFarlane}}{{at|65}}</ref>  The "completeness, accuracy and reliability of the record have everything to do with the court's inquiry into and scrutiny of the circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|St Lawrence|g18t9|1949 CanLII 100 (ON SC)|93 CCC 376}}{{perONSC|McRuer J}}<br>
{{supra1|Moore-McFarlane}}{{at|65}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Wray|1nfmf|1970 CanLII 2 (SCC)|[1971] SCR 272}}{{perSCC-H|Martland J}}<br>
adopted in see {{supra1|Ahmed}} <br>
{{CanLIIRP|Coons|23lw6|1980 CanLII 312 (BC CA)|51 CCC (2d) 388}}{{perBCCA|McFarlane JA}}<br>
''R v Burke'', [http://canlii.ca/t/2dq2z 2010 ONSC 6530] (CanLII) [2010] OJ No 5219{{perONSC|Baltman J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
The court in {{supra1|Moore-McFarlane}}, commented that "it is difficult to see how the Crown could discharge its heavy onus of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt where proper recording procedures are not followed." (at para 67).


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


==By the Accused==
==By the Accused==
The rules on confessions applies only to statements made by the accused.  
The rules on confessions apply only to statements made by the accused.  


This does not include statements by third parties in the presence of the accused. These statements are only admissible as adoptive admissions.<ref>
This does not include statements by third parties in the presence of the accused. These statements are only admissible as adoptive admissions.<ref>
See [[Admissions#Third Party Admissions]]<br>
See [[Admissions#Third Party Admissions]]<br>
''R v Thomas'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fwktq 2013 ONSC 1640] (CanLII){{perONSC|O'Marra J}} at para 11
{{CanLIIRx|Thomas|fwktq|2013 ONSC 1640 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|O'Marra J}}{{atL|fwktq|11}}
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}
==Persons in Authority==
==Persons in Authority==
A confession includes statements made merely in the ''presence'' of a person in authority as long as the accused was aware of their presence. <ref>R v Matchette (1946) 87 CCC 46 (NBCA){{NOCANLII}}<br>
A confession includes statements made merely in the ''presence'' of a person in authority as long as the accused was aware of their presence. <ref>
cf. ''R v AD'', [http://canlii.ca/t/5b15 2003 BCCA 106] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Finch CJ}} - admission to cellmate overheard by sheriffs <br>
{{CanLIIR-N|Matchette| (1946), 87 CCC 46 (NBCA)}}<br>
cf. {{CanLIIRP|AD|5b15|2003 BCCA 106 (CanLII)|173 CCC (3d) 177}}{{perBCCA|Finch CJ}} - admission to cellmate overheard by sheriffs <br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 61: Line 91:
==Voir Dire==
==Voir Dire==
A voir dire on the admissibility of a statement to a person in authority requires the judge to determine:<ref>
A voir dire on the admissibility of a statement to a person in authority requires the judge to determine:<ref>
''R v Gauthier'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1z6fj 1975 CanLII 193] (SCC), [1977] 1 SCR 441 (SCC){{perSCC|Pigeon J}}</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Gauthier|1z6fj|1975 CanLII 193 (SCC)|[1977] 1 SCR 441 (SCC)}}{{perSCC|Pigeon J}}</ref>
# whether there is some evidence that it was made; and  
# whether there is some evidence that it was made; and  
# whether it was given voluntarily.
# whether it was given voluntarily.


The voir dire should generally be held as part of the Crown's case regardless of whether the statement is only to be used for cross-examination. There are circumstances where the voluntariness can be proven at the time of cross-examination of the accused.<ref>
The voir dire should generally be held as part of the Crown's case regardless of whether the statement is only to be used for cross-examination. There are circumstances where the voluntariness can be proven at the time of cross-examination of the accused.<ref>
e.g. ''R v Drake'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g7c6d 1970 CanLII 577] (SK QB), [1971] 1 CCC (2d) 396{{perSKQB|MacPherson J}}
e.g. {{CanLIIRP|Drake|g7c6d|1970 CanLII 577 (SK QB)|[1971] 1 CCC (2d) 396}}{{perSKQB|MacPherson J}}
</ref>
</ref>


Where the accused denies the statement, the voir dire is ''not'' to determine whether the statement was actually made beyond a reasonable doubt. The issue of whether the statement was made for the purpose of trial is determined after the voir dire.<ref>
Where the accused denies the statement, the voir dire is ''not'' to determine whether the statement was actually made beyond a reasonable doubt. The issue of whether the statement was made for the purpose of trial is determined after the voir dire.<ref>
''R v Mohamed'', [http://canlii.ca/t/frjk3 2012 ONSC 1784] (CanLII){{perONSC|Pattillo J}} at para 13
{{CanLIIRx|Mohamed|frjk3|2012 ONSC 1784 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Pattillo J}}{{atL|frjk3|13}}
</ref>
</ref>


In the voir dire, the judge only needs to have "some credible evidence" that the statement was made.<ref>
In the voir dire, the judge only needs to have "some credible evidence" that the statement was made.<ref>
''R v Lapointe'', (1983), 9 CCC (3d) 366 (Ont. C.A.), [http://canlii.ca/t/gccb2 1983 CanLII 3558] (ON CA), {{perONCA|Lacourciere JA}}{{at|39}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Lapointe|gccb2|1983 CanLII 3558 (ON CA)|9 CCC (3d) 366}}{{perONCA|Lacourciere JA}}{{atL|gccb2|39}}<br>
Mohamed at para 13</ref>
{{supra1|Mohamed}}{{atL|frjk3|13}}</ref>


There is no need to have a voir dire for the admission where the statement of the accused is part of the offence (e.g. uttering threats, perjury, refusal).
There is no need to have a voir dire for the admission where the statement of the accused is part of the offence (e.g. uttering threats, perjury, refusal).
Line 84: Line 114:
===Suspect Statements Made Before Arrest or Detention===
===Suspect Statements Made Before Arrest or Detention===
When a suspect is invited to give a formal statement to police the statement is admissible as long as it is given [[Voluntariness|voluntarily]] and not while detained or charged.<ref>
When a suspect is invited to give a formal statement to police the statement is admissible as long as it is given [[Voluntariness|voluntarily]] and not while detained or charged.<ref>
e.g. ''R v Kynoch'', [http://canlii.ca/t/5glm 2002 ABQB 930] (CanLII){{perABQB|Moen J}}<br>
e.g. {{CanLIIRx|Kynoch|5glm|2002 ABQB 930 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Moen J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
If the suspect is detained or charged then they are entitled to have [[Right to Counsel|access to counsel]].
If the suspect is detained or charged then they are entitled to have [[Right to Counsel|access to counsel]].
Line 94: Line 124:


===Statements Made Upon Arrest===
===Statements Made Upon Arrest===
Exculpatory statements of the accused upon arrest are admissible as an exception to prohibiting self-serving evidence when tendered by the Crown. <ref>Sopinka on Evidence at p. 319 para (f) and ''R v Knox'' (1968), 2 CCC (2d) 348, [http://canlii.ca/t/gd1lf 1967 CanLII 692] (BC CA){{perBCCA|Branca JA}} at p. 360 (CCC) <br> see also ''R v Keller'', (1977) 36 CCC (2d) 9{{NOCANLII}} </ref> However, it has been held that such exculpatory statements can be admitted by the accused’s testimony. <ref> ''The King v Hughes'', [1942] SCR 517, [http://canlii.ca/t/21v41 1942 CanLII 22] (SCC){{perSCC|Duff CJ}}<br>
Exculpatory statements of the accused upon arrest are admissible as an exception to prohibiting self-serving evidence when tendered by the Crown. <ref>
Sopinka, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2nd Ed.{{Atp|319}} para (f) and {{CanLIIRP|Knox|gd1lf|1967 CanLII 692 (BC CA)|2 CCC (2d) 348}}{{perBCCA|Branca JA}}{{atp|360}} (CCC) <br>
see also {{CanLIIR-N|Keller|, 36 CCC (2d) 9}} </ref>  
However, it has been held that such exculpatory statements can be admitted by the accused’s testimony. <ref>  
{{CanLIIRPC|The King v Hughes|21v41|1942 CanLII 22 (SCC)|[1942] SCR 517}}{{perSCC|Duff CJ}}<br>
{{supra1|Lucas}}<br>
{{supra1|Lucas}}<br>
''R v Edgar'', [http://canlii.ca/t/2br4d 2010 ONCA 529] (CanLII){{perONCA|Sharpe JA}}{{at|24}}</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Edgar|2br4d|2010 ONCA 529 (CanLII)|260 CCC (3d) 1}}{{perONCA|Sharpe JA}}{{atL|2br4d|24}}</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}
Line 102: Line 136:
==Derived Confessions==
==Derived Confessions==
Confessions that follow an inadmissible involuntary confession may also be excluded from evidence as a derived confession. <ref>
Confessions that follow an inadmissible involuntary confession may also be excluded from evidence as a derived confession. <ref>
R v I (L.R.) and T. (E.), [http://canlii.ca/t/1frxz 1993 CanLII 51] (SCC), [1993] 4 SCR 504{{perSCC|Sopinka J}}, at p. 526<br>  
{{CanLIIRP|I(LR) and T(E)|1frxz|1993 CanLII 51 (SCC)|[1993] 4 SCR 504}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}{{atp|526}}<br>  
''R v Hobbins'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1txfp 1982 CanLII 46] (SCC), [1982] 1 SCR 553{{perSCC|Laskin CJ}}, at p. 558</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Hobbins|1txfp|1982 CanLII 46 (SCC)|[1982] 1 SCR 553}}{{perSCC|Laskin CJ}}{{atp|558}}</ref>


The judge must consider the connection between the statements and the influence the improper conduct had on the derived confession, taking into account all relevant circumstances including:<ref>
The judge must consider the connection between the statements and the influence the improper conduct had on the derived confession, taking into account all relevant circumstances including:<ref>
''R v MD'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fv058 2012 ONCA 841] (CanLII){{perONCA|Watt JA}}{{at|54}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|MD|fv058|2012 ONCA 841 (CanLII)|293 CCC (3d) 79}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{atL|fv058|54}}<br>
T(E) at p. 526<br>
{{supra1|T(E)}}{{atp|526}}<br>
Hobbins at p.558<br>
Hobbins{{atp|558}}<br>
R v G. (B.), [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqlt 1999 CanLII 690] (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 475{{perSCC|Bastarache  J}}{{at|21}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|G(B)|1fqlt|1999 CanLII 690 (SCC)|[1999] 2 SCR 475}}{{perSCC|Bastarache  J}}{{atL|1fqlt|21}}<br>
''R v Foster'', [http://canlii.ca/t/h6gc5 2017 ONCA 751] (CanLII){{TheCourtONCA}}{{at|11}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Foster|h6gc5|2017 ONCA 751 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|h6gc5|11}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
# the time span between the statements;
# the time span between the statements;
Line 118: Line 152:
# other similarities between the two sets of circumstances.
# other similarities between the two sets of circumstances.


The derived statement will be involuntary if "the tainting features that disqualified the first continue to be present" or if "the fact that the first statement was made was a substantial factor that contributed to the making of the second statement".<ref>MD at para 55<br>
The derived statement will be involuntary if "the tainting features that disqualified the first continue to be present" or if "the fact that the first statement was made was a substantial factor that contributed to the making of the second statement."<ref>
T. (E.){{supra}}, at p. 526<br>  
{{supra1|MD}}{{atL|fv058|55}}<br>
G. (B.){{supra}}, at paras 21 and 23<br>
{{supra1|T(E)}}{{atp|526}}<br>  
</ref> All of this is to the view of whether the derived statement was contaminated by the first statement.<ref>MD{{supra}} at para 55 and G(B){{supra}}{{at|23}}</ref>
{{supra1|G(B)}}{{atsL|1fqlt|21 and 23}}<br>
</ref>
All of this is to the view of whether the derived statement was contaminated by the first statement.<ref>
{{supra1|MD}}{{atL|fv058|55}} and {{supra1|G(B)}}{{atL|1fqlt|23}}</ref>


Connection between statements includes a temporal, contextual and causal connection.<ref>
Connection between statements includes a temporal, contextual and causal connection.<ref>
{{supra1|MD}}{{at|56}}<br>
{{supra1|MD}}{{atL|fv058|56}}<br>
''R v Plaha'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1hq89 2004 CanLII 21043] (ON CA){{perONCA|Doherty JA}}{{at|46}}</ref>  
{{CanLIIRP|Plaha|1hq89|2004 CanLII 21043 (ON CA)|188 CCC (3d) 289}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|1hq89|46}}</ref>  


Contamination is not limited to involuntariness but also to Charter breaches such as the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter. In such cases, the admissibility is based on s. 24(2) of the Charter.<ref>
Contamination is not limited to involuntariness but also to Charter breaches such as the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter. In such cases, the admissibility is based on s. 24(2) of the Charter.<ref>
''R v Wittwer'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1x3lx 2008 SCC 33] (CanLII), [2008] 2 SCR 235{{perSCC|Fish J}}{{at|21}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Wittwer|1x3lx|2008 SCC 33 (CanLII)|[2008] 2 SCR 235}}{{perSCC-H|Fish J}}{{atL|1x3lx|21}}<br>
Plaha, at paras 42-45<br>
{{supra1|Plaha}}{{atsL|1hq89|42| to 45}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


A secondary caution or warning can be a major factor in eliminating any contamination that a previous involuntary statement would have on a subsequent derived statement.<ref>
A secondary caution or warning can be a major factor in eliminating any contamination that a previous involuntary statement would have on a subsequent derived statement.<ref>
''R v Whittle'', (1992), 78 CCC (3d) 49 (Ont. C.A.), [http://canlii.ca/t/g9vg7 1992 CanLII 12777] (ON CA){{perONCA|Goodman JA}} appealed on other grounds<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Whittle|g9vg7|1992 CanLII 12777 (ON CA)|78 CCC (3d) 49}}{{perONCA|Goodman JA}} appealed on other grounds<br>
''R v Lehman'', [http://canlii.ca/t/5r0j 2000 ABPC 43] (CanLII){{perABPC|Allen J}} at para 62
{{CanLIIRP|Lehman|5r0j|2000 ABPC 43 (CanLII)|260 AR 92}}{{perABPC|Allen J}}{{atL|5r0j|62}}
</ref>
</ref>


Line 141: Line 178:
==Admission of a Confession as Part of Crown's Case or for Cross-Examination==
==Admission of a Confession as Part of Crown's Case or for Cross-Examination==
A confession that is found to be admissible may be used by the Crown to be admitted as part of its case for the truth of its contents as a hearsay exception or it may be held for cross-examination purposes.<ref>
A confession that is found to be admissible may be used by the Crown to be admitted as part of its case for the truth of its contents as a hearsay exception or it may be held for cross-examination purposes.<ref>
''R v Krause'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftr1 1986 CanLII 39] (SCC), [1986] 2 SCR 466{{perSCC|McIntyre J}} - court had no problem with crown holding back statement for cross</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Krause|1ftr1|1986 CanLII 39 (SCC)|[1986] 2 SCR 466}}{{perSCC-H|McIntyre J}} - court had no problem with crown holding back statement for cross</ref>


If the Crown introduces the as part of its case, the parts favourable to the defence also become admissible.<ref>
If the Crown introduces the as part of its case, the parts favourable to the defence also become admissible.<ref>
''R v Jackson'' (1980) 57 CCC (2d) 154 (ONCA), [http://canlii.ca/t/gb1bz 1980 CanLII 2945] (ON CA){{perSCC|Martin JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Jackson|gb1bz|1980 CanLII 2945 (ON CA)|57 CCC (2d) 154 (ONCA)}}{{perSCC-H|Martin JA}}<br>
''R v Lynch'', (1988), 30 O.A.C. 49 (Ont. C.A.) {{NOCANLII}} ("...[the confession] became evidence for the accused as well as against him and that it was open to the jury to consider those statements as proof of the facts contained therein.")
{{CanLIIR-N|Lynch| (1988), 30 OAC 49 (Ont. C.A.)}} ("...[the confession] became evidence for the accused as well as against him and that it was open to the jury to consider those statements as proof of the facts contained therein.")
''R v Allison'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1d8m9 1991 CanLII 492] (BC CA), (1991) 68 CCC (3d) 375 (BCCA){{perBCCA|McEachern JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Allison|1d8m9|1991 CanLII 492 (BC CA)|68 CCC (3d) 375}}{{perBCCA|McEachern JA}}<br>
''R v Ziegler'', [http://canlii.ca/t/2f374 2010 BCCA 504] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Hinkson JA}} - If a "portion of the statement by and accused is led by the crown, the accused has the right to elicit other parts of the statement that were not adduced by the Crown, so long as they are all part of the same statement".<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ziegler|2f374|2010 BCCA 504 (CanLII)|297 BCAC 47}}{{perBCCA|Hinkson JA}} - If a "portion of the statement by and accused is led by the crown, the accused has the right to elicit other parts of the statement that were not adduced by the Crown, so long as they are all part of the same statement."<br>
</ref>
</ref>
The trier-of-fact, however, determines what part of the statement to accept as fact.<ref>
The trier-of-fact, however, determines what part of the statement to accept as fact.<ref>
''R v Humphrey'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1bz2l 2003 CanLII 6855] (ON CA){{perONCA|Moldaver JA}}{{at|19}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Humphrey|1bz2l|2003 CanLII 6855 (ON CA)|172 CCC (3d) 332}}{{perONCA|Moldaver JA}}{{atL|1bz2l|19}}<br>
''The King v Hughes'', [http://canlii.ca/t/21v41 1942 CanLII 22] (SCC), [1942] SCR 517{{perSCC|Duff CJ}} citing {{supra1|Higgins}}
{{CanLIIRPC|The King v Hughes|21v41|1942 CanLII 22 (SCC)|[1942] SCR 517}}{{perSCC|Duff CJ}} citing {{supra1|Higgins}}
</ref>
</ref>
When the statement is put in as part of the Crown's case, the Court must consider the statement as if he had testified.<ref>
When the statement is put in as part of the Crown's case, the Court must consider the statement as if he had testified.<ref>
''R v Wood'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g6brs 2014 MBQB 49] (CanLII){{perMBQB|Greenberg J}}{{at|29}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Wood|g6brs|2014 MBQB 49 (CanLII)}}{{perMBQB|Greenberg J}}{{atL|g6brs|29}}<br>
''R v BD'', [http://canlii.ca/t/2fbx2 2011 ONCA 51] (CanLII), (2011), 273 O.A.C. 241{{perONCA|Blair J}}{{at|114}}
{{CanLIIRP|BD|2fbx2|2011 ONCA 51 (CanLII)| OAC 241}}{{perONCA|Blair J}}{{atL|2fbx2|114}}
</ref>
</ref>


The rule requiring the admission of the whole statement, however, cannot be used to force the Crown to adduce all statements made by the accused. The rule should not be allowed to be used by defence to avoid subjecting the accused to cross-examination, challenges to credibility.<ref>
The rule requiring the admission of the whole statement, however, cannot be used to force the Crown to adduce all statements made by the accused. The rule should not be allowed to be used by defence to avoid subjecting the accused to cross-examination, challenges to credibility.<ref>
''R v Fredrick'', (1931) 57 CCC 340 (BCCA), [http://canlii.ca/t/gbxtr 1931 CanLII 495] (BC CA){{perBCCA|MacDonald CJ}} at p. 342</ref> The exception to the hearsay rule permitting admission is based on the reliability of statements of guilt. Exculpatory statements are self-serving and so are not considered as reliable.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Fredrick|gbxtr|1931 CanLII 495 (BC CA)|57 CCC 340 (BCCA)}}{{perBCCA|MacDonald CJ}}{{atp|342}}</ref>
The exception to the hearsay rule permitting admission is based on the reliability of statements of guilt. Exculpatory statements are self-serving and so are not considered as reliable.<ref>
See Sopinka, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2nd Ed. at ss. 8.94</ref>
See Sopinka, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2nd Ed. at ss. 8.94</ref>


An accused cannot lead evidence of any of his statements made at the time as it permits the accused from avoiding to testify, it self-serving and lacks probative value.<ref>
An accused cannot lead evidence of any of his statements made at the time as it permits the accused from avoiding to testify, it self-serving and lacks probative value.<ref>
''R v Rojas'', [http://canlii.ca/t/218cw 2008 SCC 56] (CanLII), [2008] 3 SCR 111{{perSCC|Charron J}}{{at|36}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Rojas|218cw|2008 SCC 56 (CanLII)|[2008] 3 SCR 111}}{{perSCC|Charron J}}{{atL|218cw|36}}<br>
''R v Simpson'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftjr 1988 CanLII 89] (SCC), [1988] 1 SCR 3{{perSCC|McIntyre J}}{{at|24}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Simpson|1ftjr|1988 CanLII 89 (SCC)|[1988] 1 SCR 3}}{{perSCC-H|McIntyre J}}{{atL|1ftjr|24}}<br>
''R v Edgar'', [http://canlii.ca/t/2br4d 2010 ONCA 529] (CanLII){{perONCA|Sharpe J}} at paras 72, 73<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Edgar|2br4d|2010 ONCA 529 (CanLII)|260 CCC (3d) 1}}{{perONCA|Sharpe J}}{{AtsL|2br4d|72| to 73}}<br>
</ref> Exceptions exist for circumstances such as [[Recent Possession|recent possession]].<ref>
</ref>
R v Burton [2008] OJ No 4044 (S.C.J.){{NOCANLII}}{{at|10}} - no closed list of circumstances of admitting post-arrest statements<br>
Exceptions exist for circumstances such as [[Recent Possession|recent possession]].<ref>
''R v Pattison'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fp0f5 2011 BCSC 1594] (CanLII){{perBCSC|Holmes J}} aff'd at [http://canlii.ca/t/fxlxw 2013 BCCA 246] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Frankel JA}} - considers alternatives to rule against leading prior statements such as hearsay exceptions and prior consistent statement rule
{{CanLIIRP|Burton|fxlxw|2013 BCCA 246 (CanLII)|[2008] OJ No 4044 (SCJ)}}{{at-|10}} - no closed list of circumstances of admitting post-arrest statements<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Pattison|fp0f5|2011 BCSC 1594 (CanLII)|BCJ No 2231}}{{perBCSC|Holmes J}} aff'd at }}{{perBCCA|Frankel JA}} - considers alternatives to rule against leading prior statements such as hearsay exceptions and prior consistent statement rule
</ref>
</ref>


Whether the statement is inclupatory or exclupatory or a mix, does not affect its admissibility.<ref>
Whether the statement is inclupatory or exclupatory or a mix, does not affect its admissibility.<ref>
''R v Docherty'', [http://canlii.ca/t/28spq 2010 ONSC 1338] (CanLII){{perONSC|Wein J}} at para 5
{{CanLIIRx|Docherty|28spq|2010 ONSC 1338 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Wein J}}{{atL|28spq|5}}
</ref>
</ref>


The answers to questions given during police questioning should be considered in light of the impermissible rules on cross-examination. Questions that would be impermissible as a cross-examination may be equally inadmissible within a statement. The police asking the accused "why would complainant lie", is considered inappropriate to put to the jury.<ref>
The answers to questions given during police questioning should be considered in light of the impermissible rules on cross-examination. Questions that would be impermissible as a cross-examination may be equally inadmissible within a statement. The police asking the accused "why would complainant lie", is considered inappropriate to put to the jury.<ref>
''R v LL'', [http://canlii.ca/t/23lbs 2009 ONCA 413] (CanLII){{perONCA|Simmons JA}}
{{CanLIIRP|LL|23lbs|2009 ONCA 413 (CanLII)|244 CCC (3d) 149}}{{perONCA|Simmons JA}}
</ref>
</ref>


An accused statement adduced by the Crown can be afforded the same weight as the actual testimony, however, it may also be given lesser weight in light of it not being under oath and not subject to cross-examination.<ref>
An accused statement adduced by the Crown can be afforded the same weight as the actual testimony, however, it may also be given lesser weight in light of it not being under oath and not subject to cross-examination.<ref>
''R v Randall'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fsl05 2012 CanLII 51156] (NB CA){{perNBCA|Richard JA}}{{at|26}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Randall|fsl05|2012 CanLII 51156 (NB CA)}}{{perNBCA|Richard JA}}{{atL|fsl05|26}}<br>
 
</ref>
</ref>
An accused statement can still be used to establish reasonable doubt.<ref>
An accused statement can still be used to establish reasonable doubt.<ref>
{{ibid1|Randall}}{{at|26}}<br>
{{ibid1|Randall}}{{atL|fsl05|26}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 190: Line 228:


==Editing Statements==
==Editing Statements==
Once a statement has been found to be admissible, the court has a "heavy duty to edit out the prejudicial aspects of the statement, but must also ensure that what remains is meaningful".<ref>
Once a statement has been found to be admissible, the court has a "heavy duty to edit out the prejudicial aspects of the statement, but must also ensure that what remains is meaningful."<ref>
''R v Oseguera'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g902c 2014 BCCA 352] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Neilson JA}}{{at|20}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Oseguera|g902c|2014 BCCA 352 (CanLII)|315 CCC (3d) 542}}{{perBCCA|Neilson JA}}{{atL|g902c|20}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Where the statement cannot be appropriately edited then the statement should not be admitted.<ref>
Where the statement cannot be appropriately edited then the statement should not be admitted.<ref>
Oseguera at para 20<br>
{{ibid1|Oseguera}}{{atL|g902c|20}}<br>
''R v Bonisteel'', [http://canlii.ca/t/20lp2 2008 BCCA 344] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Levine JA}} at para 45
{{CanLIIRP|Bonisteel|20lp2|2008 BCCA 344 (CanLII)|236 CCC (3d) 170}}{{perBCCA|Levine JA}}{{atL|20lp2|45}}</ref>
</ref>


Any statements that are admitted with bad character evidence should require the judge to give a limiting instruction.<ref>
Any statements that are admitted with bad character evidence should require the judge to give a limiting instruction.<ref>
Oseguera at para 21<br>
{{supra1|Oseguera}}{{atL|g902c|21}}<br>
See also [[Character Evidence]]
See also [[Character Evidence]]
</ref>
A police statement where the accused is asked questions that are impermissible at trial, such as asking the accused to explain why the complainant would fabricate the allegations, should be edited out.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Bernier|jct7w|2021 ABCA 27 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtABCA}}
</ref>
</ref>


Line 210: Line 251:


==See Also==
==See Also==
* [[Admissions from Mr Big Operations]]
* [[Voluntariness]]
* [[Voluntariness]]
* [[Wiretaps]], [[Consent Wiretaps]]
* [[Wiretaps]], [[Consent Wiretaps]]

Latest revision as of 14:22, 14 July 2024

This page was last substantively updated or reviewed July 2021. (Rev. # 95316)

General Principles

A confession is a written or oral statement by the accused to a person in authority that admits a factual element to the Crown's case. The law regarding confessions applies equally to inculpatory statements as well as exculpatory statements. [1]

Where a confession has been admitted as evidence in the Crown's case, the trier-of-fact may consider the statement as proof of facts found within it.[2]

Voluntariness of Confessions

All confessions must be voluntary to be admissible. [3] This is the court's key concern.[4] When it is not voluntary is it not reliable and so is not admissible in evidence.[5]

Burden of Proof

This Crown must prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt in a voir dire.[6]

Vague Statements

The confession must be given sufficient context background to be admissible. If the statement is too vague and the context of the statement could have multiple meanings, it should not be admitted.[7] However, vagueness on the exact wordings of the statement without loss of meaning is not sufficient.[8]

Methods of Recording Statement

There is no requirement that the statement be recorded to be admissible as voluntary.[9]

Where the statement was not recorded under suspicious circumstances, such as where recording facilities were readily available, the judge must determine "whether or not a sufficient substitute for an audio or video tape record has been provided ... to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt."[10] The "completeness, accuracy and reliability of the record have everything to do with the court's inquiry into and scrutiny of the circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement."[11] However, where the recording was not done properly, the Crown will have a heavy onus to admit the statement.[12]

Failure to Records

The issue of voluntariness of an unrecorded statement depends on the circumstances.[13]

  1. For inculpatory statements made to persons other than persons in authority, see Admissions
  2. R v Lynch, (1988), 30 OAC 49 (Ont. C.A.)(*no CanLII links)
    R v Humphrey, 2003 CanLII 6855 (ON CA), 172 CCC (3d) 332, per Moldaver JA
  3. R v Piche, 1970 CanLII 82 (SCC), [1971] SCR 23, per Hall J
    R v Boudreau, 1949 CanLII 26 (SCC), [1949] SCR 262
    Erven v The Queen, 1978 CanLII 19 (SCC), [1979] 1 SCR 926, per Dickson J
    Horvath v The Queen, 1979 CanLII 16 (SCC), [1979] 2 SCR 376
  4. R v Oickle, 2000 SCC 38 (CanLII), [2000] 2 SCR 3, per Iacobucci J, at para 47
  5. see Horvath, supra, at p. 408
  6. R v Moore-McFarlane, 2001 CanLII 6363 (ON CA), [2001] OJ No 4646 (CA), per Charron JA, at paras 65 and 67
    R v Ahmed, 2002 CanLII 695 (ON CA), [2002] OJ No 4597 (CA), per Feldman JA, at para 22
  7. R v Ferris, 1994 ABCA 20 (CanLII), 22 WCB (2d) 265, per curiam (2:1) - no context of statement "I killed David", could have been "The police think I killed David, but I didn’t."
  8. R v Bennight, 2012 BCCA 190 (CanLII), 320 BCAC 195, per Bennett JA, at para 92
    R v Kennealy (1972), 6 CCC (2d) 390 (BCCA)(*no CanLII links) , at pp. 394-95 (CCC)
    R v Richards, 1997 CanLII 12470 (BC CA), BCAC 21, 6 CR (5th) 154 (CA), per Braidwood JA, at para 31
  9. Moore-McFarlane, supra, at para 64
  10. Moore-McFarlane, supra, at para 65
  11. Moore-McFarlane, supra, at para 65
    adopted in see Ahmed, supra
    R v Burke, 2010 ONSC 6530 (CanLII), [2010] OJ No 5219, per Baltman J
  12. Moore-McFarlane, supra, at para 67 ("it is difficult to see how the Crown could discharge its heavy onus of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt where proper recording procedures are not followed.")
  13. R v Swank, 2005 CanLII 3326 (ON CA), OAC 155, [2005] OJ No 493 (CA), per Doherty JA, at para 9

Admission of Guilt

An admission of guilt can encompass statements that are direct admissions of guilt or admission of fact that tends to prove guilt.[1]

Such an admission can be by words or by conduct that could reasonably be taken as intending to be an assertion.[2]

  1. Ian Scott and Joseph Martino, "Salhany's Police Manual of Arrest, Seizure & Interrogation", 11th ed. at p. 203
  2. R v St Lawrence, 1949 CanLII 100 (ON SC), 93 CCC 376, per McRuer J
    R v Wray, 1970 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1971] SCR 272, per Martland J
    R v Coons, 1980 CanLII 312 (BC CA), 51 CCC (2d) 388, per McFarlane JA

By the Accused

The rules on confessions apply only to statements made by the accused.

This does not include statements by third parties in the presence of the accused. These statements are only admissible as adoptive admissions.[1]

Persons in Authority

A confession includes statements made merely in the presence of a person in authority as long as the accused was aware of their presence. [1]

  1. R v Matchette (1946), 87 CCC 46 (NBCA)(*no CanLII links)
    cf. R v AD, 2003 BCCA 106 (CanLII), 173 CCC (3d) 177, per Finch CJ - admission to cellmate overheard by sheriffs

Voir Dire

A voir dire on the admissibility of a statement to a person in authority requires the judge to determine:[1]

  1. whether there is some evidence that it was made; and
  2. whether it was given voluntarily.

The voir dire should generally be held as part of the Crown's case regardless of whether the statement is only to be used for cross-examination. There are circumstances where the voluntariness can be proven at the time of cross-examination of the accused.[2]

Where the accused denies the statement, the voir dire is not to determine whether the statement was actually made beyond a reasonable doubt. The issue of whether the statement was made for the purpose of trial is determined after the voir dire.[3]

In the voir dire, the judge only needs to have "some credible evidence" that the statement was made.[4]

There is no need to have a voir dire for the admission where the statement of the accused is part of the offence (e.g. uttering threats, perjury, refusal).

  1. R v Gauthier, 1975 CanLII 193 (SCC), [1977] 1 SCR 441 (SCC), per Pigeon J
  2. e.g. R v Drake, 1970 CanLII 577 (SK QB), [1971] 1 CCC (2d) 396, per MacPherson J
  3. R v Mohamed, 2012 ONSC 1784 (CanLII), per Pattillo J, at para 13
  4. R v Lapointe, 1983 CanLII 3558 (ON CA), 9 CCC (3d) 366, per Lacourciere JA, at para 39
    Mohamed, supra, at para 13

Circumstances of the Statement

Suspect Statements Made Before Arrest or Detention

When a suspect is invited to give a formal statement to police the statement is admissible as long as it is given voluntarily and not while detained or charged.[1] If the suspect is detained or charged then they are entitled to have access to counsel.

  1. e.g. R v Kynoch, 2002 ABQB 930 (CanLII), per Moen J

Accused Statements Made During Detention

See also: Right to Counsel

Statements Made Upon Arrest

Exculpatory statements of the accused upon arrest are admissible as an exception to prohibiting self-serving evidence when tendered by the Crown. [1] However, it has been held that such exculpatory statements can be admitted by the accused’s testimony. [2]

  1. Sopinka, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2nd Ed., at p. 319 para (f) and R v Knox, 1967 CanLII 692 (BC CA), 2 CCC (2d) 348, per Branca JA, at p. 360 (CCC)
    see also R v Keller, 36 CCC (2d) 9(*no CanLII links)
  2. The King v Hughes, 1942 CanLII 22 (SCC), [1942] SCR 517, per Duff CJ
    Lucas, supra
    R v Edgar, 2010 ONCA 529 (CanLII), 260 CCC (3d) 1, per Sharpe JA, at para 24

Derived Confessions

Confessions that follow an inadmissible involuntary confession may also be excluded from evidence as a derived confession. [1]

The judge must consider the connection between the statements and the influence the improper conduct had on the derived confession, taking into account all relevant circumstances including:[2]

  1. the time span between the statements;
  2. advertence to the earlier statement during questioning in the subsequent interview, including whether there were cautions that the prior statement should not influence the decision to make subsequent statements;
  3. discovery of additional information after completion of the first statement;
  4. the presence of the same police officers during both interviews; and
  5. other similarities between the two sets of circumstances.

The derived statement will be involuntary if "the tainting features that disqualified the first continue to be present" or if "the fact that the first statement was made was a substantial factor that contributed to the making of the second statement."[3] All of this is to the view of whether the derived statement was contaminated by the first statement.[4]

Connection between statements includes a temporal, contextual and causal connection.[5]

Contamination is not limited to involuntariness but also to Charter breaches such as the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter. In such cases, the admissibility is based on s. 24(2) of the Charter.[6]

A secondary caution or warning can be a major factor in eliminating any contamination that a previous involuntary statement would have on a subsequent derived statement.[7]

  1. R v I(LR) and T(E), 1993 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1993] 4 SCR 504, per Sopinka J, at p. 526
    R v Hobbins, 1982 CanLII 46 (SCC), [1982] 1 SCR 553, per Laskin CJ, at p. 558
  2. R v MD, 2012 ONCA 841 (CanLII), 293 CCC (3d) 79, per Watt JA, at para 54
    T(E), supra, at p. 526
    Hobbins, at p. 558
    R v G(B), 1999 CanLII 690 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 475, per Bastarache J, at para 21
    R v Foster, 2017 ONCA 751 (CanLII), per curiam, at para 11
  3. MD, supra, at para 55
    T(E), supra, at p. 526
    G(B), supra, at and 23 paras 21 and 23{{{3}}}
  4. MD, supra, at para 55 and G(B), supra, at para 23
  5. MD, supra, at para 56
    R v Plaha, 2004 CanLII 21043 (ON CA), 188 CCC (3d) 289, per Doherty JA, at para 46
  6. R v Wittwer, 2008 SCC 33 (CanLII), [2008] 2 SCR 235, per Fish J, at para 21
    Plaha, supra, at paras 42 to 45
  7. R v Whittle, 1992 CanLII 12777 (ON CA), 78 CCC (3d) 49, per Goodman JA appealed on other grounds
    R v Lehman, 2000 ABPC 43 (CanLII), 260 AR 92, per Allen J, at para 62

Admission of a Confession as Part of Crown's Case or for Cross-Examination

A confession that is found to be admissible may be used by the Crown to be admitted as part of its case for the truth of its contents as a hearsay exception or it may be held for cross-examination purposes.[1]

If the Crown introduces the as part of its case, the parts favourable to the defence also become admissible.[2] The trier-of-fact, however, determines what part of the statement to accept as fact.[3] When the statement is put in as part of the Crown's case, the Court must consider the statement as if he had testified.[4]

The rule requiring the admission of the whole statement, however, cannot be used to force the Crown to adduce all statements made by the accused. The rule should not be allowed to be used by defence to avoid subjecting the accused to cross-examination, challenges to credibility.[5] The exception to the hearsay rule permitting admission is based on the reliability of statements of guilt. Exculpatory statements are self-serving and so are not considered as reliable.[6]

An accused cannot lead evidence of any of his statements made at the time as it permits the accused from avoiding to testify, it self-serving and lacks probative value.[7] Exceptions exist for circumstances such as recent possession.[8]

Whether the statement is inclupatory or exclupatory or a mix, does not affect its admissibility.[9]

The answers to questions given during police questioning should be considered in light of the impermissible rules on cross-examination. Questions that would be impermissible as a cross-examination may be equally inadmissible within a statement. The police asking the accused "why would complainant lie", is considered inappropriate to put to the jury.[10]

An accused statement adduced by the Crown can be afforded the same weight as the actual testimony, however, it may also be given lesser weight in light of it not being under oath and not subject to cross-examination.[11] An accused statement can still be used to establish reasonable doubt.[12]

  1. R v Krause, 1986 CanLII 39 (SCC), [1986] 2 SCR 466, per McIntyre J - court had no problem with crown holding back statement for cross
  2. R v Jackson, 1980 CanLII 2945 (ON CA), 57 CCC (2d) 154 (ONCA), per Martin JA
    R v Lynch (1988), 30 OAC 49 (Ont. C.A.)(*no CanLII links) ("...[the confession] became evidence for the accused as well as against him and that it was open to the jury to consider those statements as proof of the facts contained therein.") R v Allison, 1991 CanLII 492 (BC CA), 68 CCC (3d) 375, per McEachern JA
    R v Ziegler, 2010 BCCA 504 (CanLII), 297 BCAC 47, per Hinkson JA - If a "portion of the statement by and accused is led by the crown, the accused has the right to elicit other parts of the statement that were not adduced by the Crown, so long as they are all part of the same statement."
  3. R v Humphrey, 2003 CanLII 6855 (ON CA), 172 CCC (3d) 332, per Moldaver JA, at para 19
    The King v Hughes, 1942 CanLII 22 (SCC), [1942] SCR 517, per Duff CJ citing Higgins, supra
  4. R v Wood, 2014 MBQB 49 (CanLII), per Greenberg J, at para 29
    R v BD, 2011 ONCA 51 (CanLII), OAC 241, per Blair J, at para 114
  5. R v Fredrick, 1931 CanLII 495 (BC CA), 57 CCC 340 (BCCA), per MacDonald CJ, at p. 342
  6. See Sopinka, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2nd Ed. at ss. 8.94
  7. R v Rojas, 2008 SCC 56 (CanLII), [2008] 3 SCR 111, per Charron J, at para 36
    R v Simpson, 1988 CanLII 89 (SCC), [1988] 1 SCR 3, per McIntyre J, at para 24
    R v Edgar, 2010 ONCA 529 (CanLII), 260 CCC (3d) 1, per Sharpe J, at paras 72 to 73
  8. R v Burton, 2013 BCCA 246 (CanLII), [2008] OJ No 4044 (SCJ), at para 10 - no closed list of circumstances of admitting post-arrest statements
    R v Pattison, 2011 BCSC 1594 (CanLII), BCJ No 2231, per Holmes J aff'd at }}, per Frankel JA - considers alternatives to rule against leading prior statements such as hearsay exceptions and prior consistent statement rule
  9. R v Docherty, 2010 ONSC 1338 (CanLII), per Wein J, at para 5
  10. R v LL, 2009 ONCA 413 (CanLII), 244 CCC (3d) 149, per Simmons JA
  11. R v Randall, 2012 CanLII 51156 (NB CA), per Richard JA, at para 26
  12. Randall, ibid., at para 26

Editing Statements

Once a statement has been found to be admissible, the court has a "heavy duty to edit out the prejudicial aspects of the statement, but must also ensure that what remains is meaningful."[1]

Where the statement cannot be appropriately edited then the statement should not be admitted.[2]

Any statements that are admitted with bad character evidence should require the judge to give a limiting instruction.[3]

A police statement where the accused is asked questions that are impermissible at trial, such as asking the accused to explain why the complainant would fabricate the allegations, should be edited out.[4]

  1. R v Oseguera, 2014 BCCA 352 (CanLII), 315 CCC (3d) 542, per Neilson JA, at para 20
  2. Oseguera, ibid., at para 20
    R v Bonisteel, 2008 BCCA 344 (CanLII), 236 CCC (3d) 170, per Levine JA, at para 45
  3. Oseguera, supra, at para 21
    See also Character Evidence
  4. R v Bernier, 2021 ABCA 27 (CanLII), per curiam

Young Persons

See Also