Open Court Principle: Difference between revisions
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[[Fr:Principe_de_la_publicité_des_débats_judiciaires]] | |||
{{Currency2|February|2021}} | |||
{{LevelOne}} | {{LevelOne}} | ||
{{HeaderPublication}} | {{HeaderPublication}} | ||
==General Principles== | ==General Principles== | ||
At common law, court proceedings must be open and public.<Ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Josephson|gcc1q|1948 CanLII 356 (MB CA)|93 CCC 136}}{{perMBCA|Coyne JA}} | |||
</ref> | |||
The "open court principle" provides the public the right to observe the court process and access court records, including filings and exhibits. | |||
; Purpose and Importance of Principle | |||
The openness of the court process is necessary to achieve justice. | |||
<ref> | <ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRPC|A.G. (Nova Scotia) v MacIntyre|1lpbn|1982 CanLII 14 (SCC)|[1982] 1 SCR 175}}{{perSCC|Dickson CJ}} ("Where there is no publicity there is no justice. Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion and the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge himself while trying under trial.") | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
It is "one of the hallmarks of a democratic society" | It is "one of the hallmarks of a democratic society."<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRPC|CBC v New Brunswick (A.G.)|1fr65|1996 CanLII 184 (SCC)|[1996] 3 SCR 480}}{{perSCC|La Forest J}} | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
The open courts principle intends "to illuminate the avenue of accountability for the judicial system" | The open courts principle intends "to illuminate the avenue of accountability for the judicial system."<ref> | ||
Coltsfoot Publishing Ltd. v Foster-Jacques | {{CanLIIRPC|Coltsfoot Publishing Ltd. v Foster-Jacques|fsbr7|2012 NSCA 83 (CanLII)|1014 APR 166}}{{perNSCA|Fichaud JA}}{{atL|fsbr7|85}}<br> | ||
See also Vancouver Sun (Re) | See also {{CanLIIRPC|Vancouver Sun (Re)|1hbl8|2004 SCC 43 (CanLII)|[2004] 2 SCR 332}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci and Arbour JJ}}{{atL|1hbl8|25}} <br> | ||
Vickery v Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Prothonotary) | {{CanLIIRPC|Vickery v Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Prothonotary)|1fsm3|1991 CanLII 90 (SCC)|[1991] 1 SCR 671}}{{perSCC|Cory J}} (in dissent on other issue: "If court proceedings, and particularly the criminal process, are to be accepted, they must be completely open so as to enable members of the public to assess both the procedure followed and the final result obtained. Without public acceptance, the criminal law is itself at risk.")<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Every stage of a proceeding should have "public accessibility and concomitant judicial accountability" | Every stage of a proceeding should have "public accessibility and concomitant judicial accountability."<ref> | ||
{{ibid1|A.G. (N.S.) v MacIntyre}}</ref> Reduction of "public accessibility can only be justified where there is present the need to protect social values of superordinate importance.”<ref> | {{ibid1|A.G. (N.S.) v MacIntyre}}</ref> | ||
Reduction of "public accessibility can only be justified where there is present the need to protect social values of superordinate importance.”<ref> | |||
{{ibid1|A.G. (N.S.) v MacIntyre}}</ref> | {{ibid1|A.G. (N.S.) v MacIntyre}}</ref> | ||
The right to a open court includes access "to the court’s proceedings, records and exhibits" as well as the right to copy and distribute the information.<ref> | The right to a open court includes access "to the court’s proceedings, records and exhibits" as well as the right to copy and distribute the information.<ref> | ||
E.g. | E.g. {{CanLIIRP|Canadian Broadcasting Corporation|2d4c5|2010 ONCA 726 (CanLII)|262 CCC (3d) 455}}{{perONCA|Sharpe JA}} <br> | ||
Lac Amiante du Quebec Ltee v 2858-0702 Quebec Inc | {{CanLIIRPC|Lac Amiante du Quebec Ltee v 2858-0702 Quebec Inc|520p|2001 SCC 51 (CanLII)|[2001] 2 SCR 743}}{{perSCC|LeBel J}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
All examinations of witnesses must be done in open court.<ref> | All examinations of witnesses must be done in open court.<ref> | ||
Re Krakat | {{CanLIIRPC|Re Krakat|g134n|1965 CanLII 358 (ON SC)|4 CCC 300}}{{perONSC|Hughes J}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
; Burden and Presumptions | |||
The burden will be upon the person who attempts to deny access to court information.<ref> | The burden will be upon the person who attempts to deny access to court information.<ref> | ||
{{supra1|MacIntyre}}, | {{supra1|MacIntyre}}{{atp|189}} ("The presumption, however, is in favour of public access and the burden of contrary proof lies upon the person who would deny the exercice of the right.") | ||
</ref> | |||
The open court principle imposes a presumption against all discretionary judicial decisions that limit access to the court.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|Bagri|1hbl8|2004 SCC 43 (CanLII)|[2004] 2 SCR 332}} | |||
</ref> | |||
The burden requires Crown to provide "sufficient evidentiary basis in favour of granting the ban."<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRP|ONE|51x7|2001 SCC 77 (CanLII)|[2001] 3 SCR 478}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}}{{atL|51x7|9}} | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
There is a presumption that Courts are open including their exhibits and records.<ref> | There is a presumption that Courts are open including their exhibits and records.<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|Mentuck|51x5|2001 SCC 76 (CanLII)|[2001] 3 SCR 442}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}} | |||
</ref> | |||
The evidence must be "convincing" and "subject to close scrutiny and meet rigorous standards."<REf> | |||
{{CanLIIRPC|MEH v Williams|fpxq4|2012 ONCA 35 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|fpxq4|34}} | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
| Line 42: | Line 63: | ||
At common law, a publication ban should only be ordered where the Dagenais-Mentuck test is satisfied which requires:<ref> | At common law, a publication ban should only be ordered where the Dagenais-Mentuck test is satisfied which requires:<ref> | ||
{{ibid1|Mentuck}} 462<br> | {{ibid1|Mentuck}} 462<br> | ||
{{CanLIIR-N|CBC|, [2010] OJ No 4615 (CA)}}<br> | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
# such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and | # such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and | ||
# the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice. | # the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice. | ||
Restrictions will be in the public interest where it is necessary to:<ref>CBC v New Brunswick (A.G.) | Restrictions will be in the public interest where it is necessary to:<ref> | ||
{{supra1|CBC v New Brunswick (A.G.)}}</ref> | |||
* protect the innocent from unnecessary harm | * protect the innocent from unnecessary harm | ||
* prevent significant harm to the victim or to witnesses | * prevent significant harm to the victim or to witnesses | ||
* "safeguarding privacy interests" of victims to encourage reporting of sexual offences | * "safeguarding privacy interests" of victims to encourage reporting of sexual offences | ||
"Purely personal interests" cannot justify non-publication or sealing orders. Emotional distress or embarrassment of a litigant will not suffice.<Ref> | |||
{{supra1|MEH}} at para 25<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
; Variable Standard | |||
The Dagenais/Mentuck test is to be applied in a "flexible and contextual manner."<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRPC|Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v Ontario|1l27q|2005 SCC 41 (CanLII)|[2005] 2 SCR 188}}{{perSCC-H|Fish J}}{{atL|1l27q|8}} ("The Dagenais/Mentuck test, although applicable at every stage of the judicial process, was from the outset meant to be applied in a flexible and contextual manner.") | |||
</ref> | |||
There is more likely to be a serious risk to the administration of justice at the investigative stage that would warrant less openness.<Ref> | |||
{{ibid1|Toronto Star}} ("...serious risk to administration of justice at the investigative stage, for example, will often involve considerations that have become irrelevant by the time of trial. On the other hand, the perceived risk may be more difficult to demonstrate in a concrete manner at an early stage.") | |||
</ref> | |||
However, the interest may swing the other way to openness by the time of trial.<Ref> | |||
{{ibid1|Toronto Star}} | |||
</ref> | |||
; Search Warrants | |||
After a search warrant is executed openness is "presumptively favoured."<Ref> | |||
{{ibid1|Toronto Star}} at para 21 | |||
</ref> | |||
; UK Experience | ; UK Experience | ||
The United Kingdom also has an "open court principle" that it describes as "an essential requisite of the criminal justice system" and the "embodiment of the principle of open justice in a free country" | The United Kingdom also has an "open court principle" that it describes as "an essential requisite of the criminal justice system" and the "embodiment of the principle of open justice in a free country."<ref> | ||
''R v Pearce'', (December 7, 2017 Nottingham Crown Court) [https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/R-v-Charlie-Pearce-Press-Restrictions-Ruling-1.pdf] <br> | ''R v Pearce'', (December 7, 2017 Nottingham Crown Court) [https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/R-v-Charlie-Pearce-Press-Restrictions-Ruling-1.pdf] <br> | ||
Re Trinity Mirror and others (A and another intervening) [2008] QB 770 {{at|32}}<br> | {{UKCase|Re Trinity Mirror and others (A and another intervening)| [2008] QB 770}}{{at-|32}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
The need for open court includes the need to know the identity of the accused.<ref> | The need for open court includes the need to know the identity of the accused.<ref> | ||
{{supra1|Pearce}}{{at|16}}<br> | {{supra1|Pearce}}{{at-|16}}<br> | ||
Re S (FC) (a child) [2005] 1 AC 593 {{at|34}}<br> | {{UKCase|Re S (FC) (a child)| [2005] 1 AC 593}}{{at-|34}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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{{reflist|2}} | {{reflist|2}} | ||
==See Also== | |||
* [[Statutory Publication Ban on Identity Information]] | |||
* [[Statutory Publication Ban on Evidence]] | |||
* [[Excluding People From Court]] | |||
Latest revision as of 07:08, 23 July 2024
| This page was last substantively updated or reviewed February 2021. (Rev. # 95779) |
- < Procedure and Practice
- < Pre-Trial and Trial Matters
- < Public and Media Restrictions
General Principles
At common law, court proceedings must be open and public.[1]
The "open court principle" provides the public the right to observe the court process and access court records, including filings and exhibits.
- Purpose and Importance of Principle
The openness of the court process is necessary to achieve justice. [2] It is "one of the hallmarks of a democratic society."[3]
The open courts principle intends "to illuminate the avenue of accountability for the judicial system."[4] Every stage of a proceeding should have "public accessibility and concomitant judicial accountability."[5] Reduction of "public accessibility can only be justified where there is present the need to protect social values of superordinate importance.”[6]
The right to a open court includes access "to the court’s proceedings, records and exhibits" as well as the right to copy and distribute the information.[7]
All examinations of witnesses must be done in open court.[8]
- Burden and Presumptions
The burden will be upon the person who attempts to deny access to court information.[9]
The open court principle imposes a presumption against all discretionary judicial decisions that limit access to the court.[10]
The burden requires Crown to provide "sufficient evidentiary basis in favour of granting the ban."[11]
There is a presumption that Courts are open including their exhibits and records.[12]
The evidence must be "convincing" and "subject to close scrutiny and meet rigorous standards."[13]
- Standard
At common law, a publication ban should only be ordered where the Dagenais-Mentuck test is satisfied which requires:[14]
- such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
- the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.
Restrictions will be in the public interest where it is necessary to:[15]
- protect the innocent from unnecessary harm
- prevent significant harm to the victim or to witnesses
- "safeguarding privacy interests" of victims to encourage reporting of sexual offences
"Purely personal interests" cannot justify non-publication or sealing orders. Emotional distress or embarrassment of a litigant will not suffice.[16]
- Variable Standard
The Dagenais/Mentuck test is to be applied in a "flexible and contextual manner."[17]
There is more likely to be a serious risk to the administration of justice at the investigative stage that would warrant less openness.[18] However, the interest may swing the other way to openness by the time of trial.[19]
- Search Warrants
After a search warrant is executed openness is "presumptively favoured."[20]
- UK Experience
The United Kingdom also has an "open court principle" that it describes as "an essential requisite of the criminal justice system" and the "embodiment of the principle of open justice in a free country."[21]
The need for open court includes the need to know the identity of the accused.[22]
- ↑ R v Josephson, 1948 CanLII 356 (MB CA), 93 CCC 136, per Coyne JA
- ↑ A.G. (Nova Scotia) v MacIntyre, 1982 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1982] 1 SCR 175, per Dickson CJ ("Where there is no publicity there is no justice. Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion and the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge himself while trying under trial.")
- ↑ CBC v New Brunswick (A.G.), 1996 CanLII 184 (SCC), [1996] 3 SCR 480, per La Forest J
- ↑
Coltsfoot Publishing Ltd. v Foster-Jacques, 2012 NSCA 83 (CanLII), 1014 APR 166, per Fichaud JA, at para 85
See also Vancouver Sun (Re), 2004 SCC 43 (CanLII), [2004] 2 SCR 332, per Iacobucci and Arbour JJ, at para 25
Vickery v Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Prothonotary), 1991 CanLII 90 (SCC), [1991] 1 SCR 671, per Cory J (in dissent on other issue: "If court proceedings, and particularly the criminal process, are to be accepted, they must be completely open so as to enable members of the public to assess both the procedure followed and the final result obtained. Without public acceptance, the criminal law is itself at risk.")
- ↑ A.G. (N.S.) v MacIntyre, ibid.
- ↑ A.G. (N.S.) v MacIntyre, ibid.
- ↑
E.g. R v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2010 ONCA 726 (CanLII), 262 CCC (3d) 455, per Sharpe JA
Lac Amiante du Quebec Ltee v 2858-0702 Quebec Inc, 2001 SCC 51 (CanLII), [2001] 2 SCR 743, per LeBel J
- ↑ Re Krakat, 1965 CanLII 358 (ON SC), 4 CCC 300, per Hughes J
- ↑ MacIntyre, supra, at p. 189 ("The presumption, however, is in favour of public access and the burden of contrary proof lies upon the person who would deny the exercice of the right.")
- ↑ R v Bagri, 2004 SCC 43 (CanLII), [2004] 2 SCR 332
- ↑ R v ONE, 2001 SCC 77 (CanLII), [2001] 3 SCR 478, per Iacobucci J, at para 9
- ↑ R v Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76 (CanLII), [2001] 3 SCR 442, per Iacobucci J
- ↑ MEH v Williams, 2012 ONCA 35 (CanLII), {{{4}}}, per Doherty JA, at para 34
- ↑
Mentuck, ibid. 462
R v CBC, [2010] OJ No 4615 (CA)(*no CanLII links)
- ↑ CBC v New Brunswick (A.G.), supra
- ↑
MEH, supra at para 25
- ↑ Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v Ontario, 2005 SCC 41 (CanLII), [2005] 2 SCR 188, per Fish J, at para 8 ("The Dagenais/Mentuck test, although applicable at every stage of the judicial process, was from the outset meant to be applied in a flexible and contextual manner.")
- ↑ Toronto Star, ibid. ("...serious risk to administration of justice at the investigative stage, for example, will often involve considerations that have become irrelevant by the time of trial. On the other hand, the perceived risk may be more difficult to demonstrate in a concrete manner at an early stage.")
- ↑ Toronto Star, ibid.
- ↑ Toronto Star, ibid. at para 21
- ↑
R v Pearce, (December 7, 2017 Nottingham Crown Court) [1]
Re Trinity Mirror and others (A and another intervening) [2008] QB 770 (UK), at para 32
- ↑
Pearce, supra, at para 16
Re S (FC) (a child) [2005] 1 AC 593 (UK), at para 34
Sub Judice
The common law principle of contempt sub judice prevents parties from making statements to the public that are calculated to interfere with the court proceedings.[1]
- ↑ See also Contempt of Court (Offence)