Information to Obtain a Judicial Authorization: Difference between revisions

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[[fr:Informations_pour_obtenir_une_autorisation_judiciaire]]
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==General Principles==
==General Principles==


The affiant police officer's role is to provide a "factual foundation" to justify the issuing of a warrant.<ref>
The affiant police officer's role is to provide a "factual foundation" to justify the issuing of a warrant.<ref>
''R v Knight'', [http://canlii.ca/t/22086 2008 NLCA 67] (CanLII){{perNLCA|Welsh JA}} leave refused at para 32 ("It is the role of the police submitting the Affidavit to provide the factual foundation for issuance of the warrant")</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Knight|22086|2008 NLCA 67 (CanLII)|241 CCC (3d) 353}}{{perNLCA|Welsh JA}} leave refused{{atL|22086|32}} ("It is the role of the police submitting the Affidavit to provide the factual foundation for issuance of the warrant")</ref>
The officer has an obligation "to make full and frank disclosure of material facts, avoid boiler plate language and, whenever possible, obtain an affidavit directly from those with firsthand knowledge".<ref>
The officer has an obligation "to make full and frank disclosure of material facts, avoid boiler plate language and, whenever possible, obtain an affidavit directly from those with firsthand knowledge."<ref>
{{supra1|Fan}} at para 15 citing Araujo at paras 46-49<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Fan|fwk7p|2013 BCSC 445 (CanLII)}}{{perBCSC|Brown J}}{{atL|fwk7p|15}} citing {{CanLIIRP|Araujo|5231|2000 SCC 65 (CanLII)|[2000] 2 SCR 992}}{{perSCC|LeBel J}} (9:0){{atsL|5231|46| to 49}}<br>
</ref> A failure in these duties does not necessarily invalidate the warrant.<ref>
</ref>
A failure in these duties does not necessarily invalidate the warrant.<ref>
See [[Judicial Authorization Standard of Review]]
See [[Judicial Authorization Standard of Review]]
</ref>
</ref>


The authorizing justice's job is to "determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the articles in question will afford evidence with respect to the offence". This suggests only that the evidence "which would be relevant to the issue, and would be properly tendered as evidence in a prosecution" of the offence.<ref>
The authorizing justice's job is to "determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the articles in question will afford evidence with respect to the offence". This suggests only that the evidence "which would be relevant to the issue, and would be properly tendered as evidence in a prosecution" of the offence.<ref>
''R v Worrall'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g1g99 1964 CanLII 161] (ON CA){{perONCA|Porter CJ}}
{{CanLIIRP|Worrall|g1g99|1964 CanLII 161 (ON CA)| 2 CCC 1}}{{perONCA|Porter CJ}}
</ref>
</ref>


The need for a judicial authorization aims to prevent unreasonable searches. A judicial officer may independently weigh the conflicting interests of the private individual and the state's interest to investigate.<ref>
The need for a judicial authorization aims to prevent unreasonable searches. A judicial officer may independently weigh the conflicting interests of the private individual and the state's interest to investigate.<ref>
''R v Fan'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fwk7p 2013 BCSC 445] (CanLII){{perBCSC|Brown J}}{{at|14}} ("The process of prior authorization ... provides an opportunity to assess and weigh the conflicting interests of the state and the individual in order to ensure that an individual’s right to privacy is breached only when the interests of the state are demonstrably superior.")<br>
{{supra1|Fan}}{{atL|fwk7p|14}} ("The process of prior authorization ... provides an opportunity to assess and weigh the conflicting interests of the state and the individual in order to ensure that an individual’s right to privacy is breached only when the interests of the state are demonstrably superior.")<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Establishing "credibly based probability" in an ITO requires it include:<ref>
Establishing "credibly based probability" in an ITO requires it include:<ref>
''R v Morris'', [http://canlii.ca/t/6m6f 1998 CanLII 1344] (NS CA), (1998), 173 N.S.R. (2d) 1 (C.A.){{perNSCA|Cromwell JA}} (3:0){{At|31}}br>
{{CanLIIRP|Morris|6m6f|1998 CanLII 1344 (NSCA)|173 NSR (2d) 1 (CA)}}{{perNSCA|Cromwell JA}} (3:0){{AtL|6m6f|31}}br>
</ref>
</ref>
# sworn evidence sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for believing the offence had been committed, that the things to be searched for will afford evidence and that the things in question will be found at a specked place<ref>
# sworn evidence sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for believing the offence had been committed, that the things to be searched for will afford evidence and that the things in question will be found at a specked place<ref>
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{{supra1|Sanchez}}{{atp|364}}</ref>
{{supra1|Sanchez}}{{atp|364}}</ref>
# the affiant’s reasonable belief does not have to be based on personal knowledge, but the Information to obtain must, in the totality of circumstances, disclose a substantial basis for the existence of the affiant’s belief<ref>  
# the affiant’s reasonable belief does not have to be based on personal knowledge, but the Information to obtain must, in the totality of circumstances, disclose a substantial basis for the existence of the affiant’s belief<ref>  
''R v Yorke'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1mrr0 1992 CanLII 2521] (NS CA), (1992), 115 N.S.R. (2d) 426 (C.A.){{perNSCA|Roscoe JA}} (3:0) affd [http://canlii.ca/t/1frzj 1993 CanLII 83] (SCC), [1993] 3 SCR 647{{perSCC|La Forest J}} (4:1)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Yorke|1mrr0|1992 CanLII 2521 (NSCA)|115 NSR (2d) 426 (CA)}}{{perNSCA|Roscoe JA}} (3:0) affd [http://canlii.ca/t/1frzj 1993 CanLII 83] (SCC), [1993] 3 SCR 647{{perSCC|La Forest J}} (4:1)<br>
</ref>
</ref>


It is not necessary that the police demonstrate that the evidence sought will be sufficient to prove the offence.<ref>
It is not necessary that the police demonstrate that the evidence sought will be sufficient to prove the offence.<ref>
''R v TK'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fxg25 2013 MBQB 114] (CanLII){{perMBQB|Menzies J}}{{at|11}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|TK|fxg25|2013 MBQB 114 (CanLII)}}{{perMBQB|Menzies J}}{{atL|fxg25|11}}<br>
{{supra1|Worrall}}  
{{supra1|Worrall}}  
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


==Basic Elements==
==Basic Elements==
The base requirements of an ITO include facts establishing grounds of belief for:<ref>
''R v Chhan'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1nsh1 1996 CanLII 7025] (SK QB){{perSKQB|Laing J}} - lists 5 requirements<br>
''R v Turcotte'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1prwx 1987 CanLII 984](SK CA){{perSKCA|Vancise JA}}{{atp|14}}<br>
''R v Adams'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1grg4 2004 CanLII 12093] (NL PC){{perNLPC|Gorman J}}{{at|24}}<br>
</ref>
* the ''existence'' of thing to be searched for;
* the ''location'' of the thing to be searched for;
* the location of search is a building, receptacle or place;
* the building, receptacle or place is present at location;
* the offence alleged ''has been (or suspected of being) committed'' as described; and
* the thing to be searched for ''affords evidence'' of the commission of the offence ''or'' possession of the thing is an offence itself.
The evidence within the ITO must permit the officer to form ''[[Reasonable and Probable Grounds|reasonable and probable grounds]]''. The affiant must specify their reasonable grounds within the ITO.


The document should be reliable, balanced and material. It should also be clear, concise, legally and
The document should be reliable, balanced and material. It should also be clear, concise, legally and
factually sufficient, but it need not include “every minute detail of the police investigation”. <ref>''CBC v A-G for New Brunswick'', [http://canlii.ca/t/2dsdn 1991 CanLII 50] (SCC), (1991), 67 CCC (3d) 544 (SCC){{perSCC|Cory J}} (6:1){{atp|562}}<br>
factually sufficient, but it need not include “every minute detail of the police investigation”. <ref>
''R v Araujo'', [http://canlii.ca/t/5231 2000 SCC 65] (CanLII), (2000), 149 CCC (3d) 449 (SCC){{perSCC|LeBel J}} (9:0){{atp|470}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|CBC v A-G for New Brunswick|2dsdn|1991 CanLII 50 (SCC)|67 CCC (3d) 544}}{{perSCC|Cory J}} (6:1){{atp|562}}<br>
''R v Ling'', [http://canlii.ca/t/22jfr 2009 BCCA 70] (CanLII), (2009), 241 CCC (3d) 409 (BCCA){{perBCCA|Bauman JA}}, at para 43 (leave to appeal refused, [2009] SCCA No 165)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Araujo|5231|2000 SCC 65 (CanLII)|[2000] 2 SCR 992}}{{perSCC|LeBel J}} (9:0){{atp|470}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ling|22jfr|2009 BCCA 70 (CanLII)|241 CCC (3d) 409}}{{perBCCA|Bauman JA}}{{atL|22jfr|43}} (leave to appeal refused, [2009] SCCA No 165)<br>
</ref>
</ref>


The ITO must specify a particular offence that is being investigated.<ref>''R v Dombrowski'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1pfn3 1985 CanLII 182] (SK CA), (1985) 18 CCC 164{{TheCourtSKCA}}</ref> As well, it must not simply include "conclusory" statements but rather the factual grounds for the conclusions.<ref>
Where the judicial officer is concerned over conclusory language on material issues, the officer may ask for the facts upon which the conclusion is made.<Ref>
R v Stockton Financial Services Co. (1990) 60 CCC 527 (Man CA), [http://canlii.ca/t/gb9x3 1990 CanLII 10950] (MB CA){{perMBCA|Huband JA and Lyon JA}}<br>
Clémenceau at para 7
''R v Harris'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1p77q 1987 CanLII 181] (ON CA), (1987) 35 CCC 1 (Ont.CA){{perONCA|Martin JA}}</ref> A conclusory statement is "where an affiant states their belief but none of the underlying facts, thereby preventing an objective assessment of the affiant’s belief".<ref>
''R v Pilkington'' (No. 1), [http://canlii.ca/t/fx5z9 2013 MBQB 79] (CanLII){{perMBQB|Mainella J}}{{at|54}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


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The date, place and time of the authorization must be present on the warrant to be valid.<ref>
The date, place and time of the authorization must be present on the warrant to be valid.<ref>
see 487.1<br>
see 487.1<br>
related ''R v Steeves'', [http://canlii.ca/t/4w0z 2002 BCSC 551] (CanLII){{perBCSC|Chamberlist J}}{{ats|57 to 62}}</ref>
related {{CanLIIRP|Steeves|4w0z|2002 BCSC 551 (CanLII)|54 WCB (2d) 96}}{{perBCSC|Chamberlist J}}{{atsL|4w0z|57| to 62}}</ref>


An unsigned affidavit supporting a wiretap warrant is not necessarily fatal to the application.<ref> ''R v Dixon'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fpkgs 2012 ONSC 181] (CanLII){{perONSC|Taliano J}}</ref>
An unsigned affidavit supporting a wiretap warrant is not necessarily fatal to the application.<ref>  
{{CanLIIRx|Dixon|fpkgs|2012 ONSC 181 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Taliano J}}</ref>


; Drafting Quality
; Drafting Quality
Given that ITOs are drafted by police officer typically before all the evidence is known or without legal advice, the ITO need not have the level of quality of pleadings.<ref>
Given that ITOs are drafted by police officer typically before all the evidence is known or without legal advice, the ITO need not have the level of quality of pleadings.<ref>
''R v Sanchez'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1p79n 1994 CanLII 5271] (ON SC), [1994] OJ No  2260 (S.C.J.){{perSCC|Hill J}}{{at|20}}
{{CanLIIRP|Sanchez|1p79n|1994 CanLII 5271 (ONSC)|[1994] OJ No  2260 (SCJ)}}{{perSCC|Hill J}}{{atL|1p79n|20}}
</ref>
</ref>
Officer’s generally speaking are not held to the same drafting quality as counsel.<ref>  
Officer’s generally speaking are not held to the same drafting quality as counsel.<ref>  
''Re Lubell and the Queen'' (1973), 11 CCC (2d) 188 (Ont. H.C.), [http://canlii.ca/t/htx2p 1973 CanLII 1488] (ON SC){{perONSC|Zuber J}}, at p.190<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Re Lubell and the Queen|htx2p|1973 CanLII 1488 (ONSC)|11 CCC (2d) 188 (Ont. H.C.)}}{{perONSC|Zuber J}}{{atp|190}}<br>
{{supra1|Durling}}{{at|19}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Durling|1q5fg|2006 NSCA 124 (CanLII)|214 CCC (3d) 49}}{{perNSCA|MacDonald CJ}}{{atL|1q5fg|19}}<br>
{{supra1|Sanchez}} at p. 364<br>
{{supra1|Sanchez}}{{atp|364}}<br>
''Re Chapman and the Queen'' (1983), 6 CCC (3d) 296 (Ont. H.C.), [http://canlii.ca/t/gbgfk 1983 CanLII 3587] (ON SC){{perONSC|Reid J}}{{atp|297}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Re Chapman and the Queen|gbgfk|1983 CanLII 3587 (ON SC)|6 CCC (3d) 296}}{{perONSC|Reid J}}{{atp|297}}<br>
''Re Times Square Book Store and R.'' (1985), [http://canlii.ca/t/1p703 1985 CanLII 170] (ON CA), 17 C.R.R. 180, 21 CCC (3d) 503{{perONCA|Cory JA}} ("However, the warrant (and I infer from the heading immediately preceding this quote that he is also speaking of the information in support) need not be drafted with legal precision as it is an instrument for the investigation of crime. A reasonable latitude must be granted when considering its wording.")
{{CanLIIRPC|Re Times Square Book Store and R.|1p703|1985 CanLII 170 (ON CA)|17 CRR 180, 21 CCC (3d) 503}}{{perONCA|Cory JA}} ("However, the warrant (and I infer from the heading immediately preceding this quote that he is also speaking of the information in support) need not be drafted with legal precision as it is an instrument for the investigation of crime. A reasonable latitude must be granted when considering its wording.")
</ref>
</ref>


An ITO should be written and read in a practical, non-technical, common-sense fashion.<ref> ''R v Whitaker'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1wqgl 2008 BCCA 174] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Frankel JA}} (3:0) at paras 41-42</ref>
An ITO should be written and read in a practical, non-technical, common-sense fashion.<ref>  
{{CanLIIRP|Whitaker|1wqgl|2008 BCCA 174 (CanLII)|254 BCAC 234}}{{perBCCA|Frankel JA}} (3:0){{atsL|1wqgl|41| to 42}}</ref>
 
The use of boilerplate or conclusory language may render the ITO insufficient.<Ref>
e.g. {{supra1|Harris}}{{atps|13-16}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Church of Scientology and the Queen (No.6)|1npn2|1987 CanLII 122 (ON CA)|31 CCC (3d) 449}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atp|500}}
</ref>


; Inquiry by Justice
; Inquiry by Justice
A justice has no obligation to make inquiry of the affiant into the grounds of his belief.<ref>
A justice has no obligation to make inquiry of the affiant into the grounds of his belief.<ref>
''R v Donaldson'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1d887 1990 CanLII 630] (BC CA){{perBCCA|Hinkson JA}} (3:0)
{{CanLIIRP|Donaldson|1d887|1990 CanLII 630 (BC CA)|58 CCC (3d) 294}}{{perBCCA|Hinkson JA}} (3:0)
</ref>
</ref>


; Organization and Length
; Organization and Length
An issuing judge or justice is entitled to reject an ITO on the basis of it being too lengthy and disorganized.<ref>
An issuing judge or justice is entitled to reject an ITO on the basis of it being too lengthy and disorganized.<ref>
''Re Criminal Code'', [1997] OJ No 4393 (Gen. Div.){{NOCANLII}}{{ats|9 to 11}}
{{CanLIIRC-N|Re Criminal Code|, [1997] OJ No 4393 (Gen. Div.)}}{{ats-|9 to 11}}
</ref>
</ref>
However, as a reviewing judge, there is no rule against lengthy ITOs or simply poorly drafted ITOs. The test should always come back to the question of whether it contains sufficient grounds   
However, as a reviewing judge, there is no rule against lengthy ITOs or simply poorly drafted ITOs. The test should always come back to the question of whether it contains sufficient grounds   
<ref>
<ref>
''R v Rafferty'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fr9w5 2012 ONSC 703] (CanLII){{perONSC|Heeney J}} at para 34
{{CanLIIRP|Rafferty|fr9w5|2012 ONSC 703 (CanLII)|OJ No 2132}}{{perONSC|Heeney J}} {{atL|fr9w5|34}}
</ref>
</ref>


; Standard of Proof
; Standard of Proof
The standard of proof to establish reasonable grounds or "reasonable belief" in support of a search warrant is one of "reasonable probability".<ref>
The standard of proof to establish reasonable grounds or "reasonable belief" in support of a search warrant is one of "reasonable probability."<ref>
''R v Debot'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1ft1h 1989 CanLII 13] (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 1140{{perSCC|Wilson J}} at p. 1166
{{CanLIIRP|Debot|1ft1h|1989 CanLII 13 (SCC)|[1989] 2 SCR 1140}}{{perSCC|Wilson J}}{{atp|1166}}
</ref>
</ref>


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===Inferences===
===Inferences===
It is not necessary that the officer spell out all possible reasons that they want to rely upon for seizing certain evidence. A judge may infer the reasons based on the evidence given in the ITO.<ref>
It is not necessary that the officer spell out all possible reasons that they want to rely upon for seizing certain evidence. A judge may infer the reasons based on the evidence given in the ITO.<ref>
''R v Vu'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g1r8p 2013 SCC 60] (CanLII){{perSCC|Cromwell J}} (9:0) at paras 13 to 16<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Vu|g1r8p|2013 SCC 60 (CanLII)|[2013] 3 SCR 657}}{{perSCC|Cromwell J}} (9:0){{atsL|g1r8p|13| to 16}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


A Justice is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the ITO.<ref>
A Justice is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the ITO.<ref>
See ''R v Durling'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1q5fg 2006 NSCA 124] (CanLII){{perNSCA|MacDonald CJ}}{{Ats|27-28}}<br>
See {{CanLIIRP|Durling|1q5fg|2006 NSCA 124 (CanLII)|214 CCC (3d) 49}}{{perNSCA|MacDonald CJ}}{{AtsL|1q5fg|27| to 28}}<br>
{{supra1|Vu}}{{at|16}}<br>
{{supra1|Vu}}{{atL|g1r8p|16}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 119: Line 114:


==Full, Frank and Fair Disclosure==
==Full, Frank and Fair Disclosure==
; Standard for ITO Disclosure
The affiant must make "full, frank and fair" disclosure of all information known to the officer relevant to the matter before the authorizing justice.<ref>
The affiant must make "full, frank and fair" disclosure of all information known to the officer relevant to the matter before the authorizing justice.<ref>
''R v Moore'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1d9w9 1993 CanLII 17] (BC CA), (1993), 81 CCC (3d) 161 (BCCA){{perBCCA|Toy JA}} aff'd on appeal<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Moore|1d9w9|1993 CanLII 17 |}}{{perBCCA|Toy JA}} aff'd on appeal<br>
''R v Brown'', [http://canlii.ca/t/21hdg 2008 ABQB 663] (CanLII){{perABQB|Germain J}}{{ats|50, 64}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Brown|21hdg|2008 ABQB 663 (CanLII)|451 AR 1}}{{perABQB|Germain J}}{{atsL|21hdg|50|}}, {{atsL-np|21hdg|64|}}<br>
''R v Kensington Income Tax'', [1917] 1 K.B. 486 (C.A.)<br>  
{{CanLIIR-N|Kensington Income Tax|, [1917] 1 K.B. 486 (CA)}}<br>  
''Re Church of Scientology and The Queen (No. 6)'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1npn2 1987 CanLII 122] (ON CA){{TheCourtONCA}}<br>  
{{CanLIIRPC|Re Church of Scientology and The Queen (No. 6)|1npn2|1987 CanLII 122 (ON CA)|31 CCC (3d) 449}}{{TheCourtONCA}}<br>  
United States of ''America v Friedland'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1w9j3 1996 CanLII 8213] (ON SC), [1996] OJ No 4399 (Gen.Div.){{perONSC|Sharpe J}}{{ats|26-29}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|United States of America v Friedland|1w9j3|1996 CanLII 8213 (ONSC)|[1996] OJ No 4399 (Gen. Div.)}}{{perONSC|Sharpe J}}{{atsL|1w9j3|26| to 29}}<br>
''R v Araujo'', [http://canlii.ca/t/5231 2000 SCC 65] (CanLII){{perSCC|Fish J}} (9:0){{At|46}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Araujo|5231|2000 SCC 65 (CanLII)|[2000] 2 SCR 992}}{{perSCC-H|Fish J}} (9:0){{AtL|5231|46}}<br>
''R v Nguyen'', [http://canlii.ca/t/flxb7 2011 ONCA 465] (CanLII){{perONCA|Blair JA}} (3:0){{at|48}}
{{CanLIIRP|Nguyen|flxb7|2011 ONCA 465 (CanLII)|273 CCC (3d) 37}}{{perONCA|Blair JA}} (3:0){{atL|flxb7|48}}<Br>
R. v. Land (1990), 1990 CanLII 10969 (ON SC), 55 C.C.C. (3d) 382 (Ont. H.C.) per Watt J
</ref>  
</ref>  
This obligation arises due to the ''ex parte'' nature of the application.<ref>
While such form candid disclosure is general expected, duty is heightened due to the ''ex parte'' nature of the application.<ref>
{{supra1|Araujo}}{{Ats|46-47}}<br>
{{supra1|Araujo}}{{AtsL|5231|46| to 47}}<br>
</ref>  
United States of America v. Friedland, [1996] O.J. No. 4399 (Ont. Ct. (Gen.Div.)) per Sharpe J
And applies to all warrants, including wiretaps.<ref>
</ref>
''R v Ling'', [http://canlii.ca/t/22jfr 2009 BCCA 70] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Bauman JA}}{{ats|31 to 32}}
There is a hightened risk of the court's powers being misused.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Liew|fqs60|2012 ONSC 1826 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Boswell J}}{{atsL|fqs60|158| to 159}}<br>
</ref>
 
This principle applies to all warrants, including wiretaps.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Ling|22jfr|2009 BCCA 70 (CanLII)|241 CCC (3d) 409}}{{perBCCA|Bauman JA}}{{atsL|22jfr|31| to 32}}
</ref>
 
The police must give full and frank disclosure so that the authorizing justice can decide in a "neutral and impartial manner."<ref>
{{ibid1|Ling}}{{atL|22jfr|40}}
</ref>
</ref>


; Consequence of Failure to be FF&F
A failure to satisfy the affiant's duty to be full, fair and frank in its disclosure in the ITO may be a breach of s. 8 of the Charter.<ref>
A failure to satisfy the affiant's duty to be full, fair and frank in its disclosure in the ITO may be a breach of s. 8 of the Charter.<ref>
''R v Rocha'', [http://canlii.ca/t/ftczl 2012 ONCA 707] (CanLII){{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Rocha|ftczl|2012 ONCA 707 (CanLII)|292 CCC (3d) 325}}{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}}<br>
''R v White'', [http://canlii.ca/t/h6b3f 2017 ONSC 5647] (CanLII){{perONSC|De Sa J}}{{at|33}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|White|h6b3f|2017 ONSC 5647 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|De Sa J}}{{atL|h6b3f|33}}<br>
</ref>  
</ref>  


A flagrant, deliberate, or wilfully blind failure to make full and complete disclosure can be fatal to the warrant.<ref>
A flagrant, deliberate, or wilfully blind failure to make full and complete disclosure can be fatal to the warrant.<ref>
''R v Duncan'' (W.), [http://canlii.ca/t/1hnqt 2004 MBCA 64] (CanLII){{perMBCA|Monnin JA}} (2:1){{at|32}}</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Duncan (W.)|1hnqt|2004 MBCA 64 (CanLII)|188 CCC (3d) 17}}{{perMBCA|Monnin JA}} (2:1){{atL|1hnqt|32}}</ref>


The police must give full and frank disclosure so that the authorizing justice can decide in a "neutral and impartial manner".<ref>
; Breadth of FF&F Standard
''R v Ling'', [http://canlii.ca/t/22jfr 2009 BCCA 70] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Bauman JA}}{{at|40}}
In any ''ex parte'' application process, the applicant must disclose "material facts" that may affect the outcome of the application.<ref>  
{{CanLIIRP|Montgomery|gtr51|2016 BCCA 379 (CanLII)|341 CCC (3d) 147}}{{perBCCA|Frankel JA}}{{atL|gtr51|98}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Evans v Umbrella Capital LLC|1gnx5|2004 BCCA 149 (CanLII)|237 DLR (4th) 106}}{{perBCCA|Donald JA}}{{atL|1gnx5|33}} ("A material fact is one that may or might affect the outcome of an application:... . It is for the court to decide what is a material fact..")
</ref>
</ref>
The ITO does not need to state every step a police officer takes in obtaining information.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Sanchez|1p79n|1994 CanLII 5271 (ONSC)|93 CCC (3d) 357}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}{{atL|1p79n|20}}</ref>


The ITO does not need to state every step a police officer takes in obtaining information.<ref>''R v Sanchez'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1p79n 1994 CanLII 5271] (ON SC), (1994), 93 CCC (3d) 357 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.){{perONSC|Hill J}}{{at|20}}</ref>
"Material facts" refers to something that "bears on the merits or substance of the application rather than on its form or some other inconsequential matter"<Ref>
{{CanLIIR|Nguyen|flxb7|2011 ONCA 465 (CanLII)}} <Br>
R. v. Land (1990), 1990 CanLII 10969 (ON SC), 55 C.C.C. (3d) 382 (Ont. H.C.), per Watt J., at p. 417<br>
</ref>


This does not require disclosing every fact that might possibly be relevant.<ref>
This does not require disclosing every fact that might possibly be relevant.<ref>
''R v Chambers'', [http://canlii.ca/t/23m18 1983 CanLII 245] (BC CA), (1983), 9 CCC (3d) 132 (BCCA){{perBCCA|Craig JA}} at p. 143 aff'd [http://canlii.ca/t/1fts4 1986 CanLII 22] (SCC), (1986), 26 CCC (3d) 353 (SCC){{perSCC|McIntyre J}} (5:2)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Chambers|23m18|1983 CanLII 245 |}}{{perBCCA|Craig JA}}{{atp|143}} aff'd [http://canlii.ca/t/1fts4 1986 CanLII 22] (SCC), 26 CCC (3d) 353{{perSCC-H|McIntyre J}} (5:2)<br>
''R v Concepcion'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1dcv3 1994 CanLII 1746] (BC CA), (1994), 48 BCAC 44 (B.C.C.A){{perBCCA|Finch JA}} (3:0)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Concepcion|1dcv3|1994 CanLII 1746 (BCCA)|48 BCAC 44 (BCCA)}}{{perBCCA|Finch JA}} (3:0){{atL|1dcv3|36}} (it does not impose a blanket obligation “to disclose every fact which might possibly be relevant”)<br>
</ref> It should only be those that are "material facts".<ref>
{{supra1|Montgomery}}{{atL|gtr51|97}}<br>
{{supra1|Araujo}}{{At|46}}
</ref>  
It should only be those that are "material facts."<ref>
{{supra1|Araujo}}{{atL|5231|46}}
</ref>
 
It is also not necessary to "anticipate" and explain "every conceivable indicia of crime they did not see or sense and every conceivable investigative step they did not take at the time in order to counter the creative arguments of able defence counsel on a review hearing many months or years after the event." <ref>
Nguyen
</ref>
</ref>


It is also generally not necessary to include in the ITO the absence of any other potentially relevant observations.<ref>
It is also generally not necessary to include in the ITO the absence of any other potentially relevant observations.<ref>
e.g. ''R v Nguyen'', [http://canlii.ca/t/flxb7 2011 ONCA 465] (CanLII){{perONCA|Blair JA}} (3:0) - CA overturns a decision to invalidate warrant for failing to mention lack of suspicious activity in front of grow-up house
e.g. {{CanLIIRP|Nguyen|flxb7|2011 ONCA 465 (CanLII)|273 CCC (3d) 37}}{{perONCA|Blair JA}} (3:0) - CA overturns a decision to invalidate warrant for failing to mention lack of suspicious activity in front of grow-up house
</ref>
</ref>


The ITO cannot rely on "broad generalizations about loosely defined classes of people". It would invite reliance on "stereotypes and prejudices" instead of evidence.<ref>
Full and frank disclosure requires that the officer include "what the police believe they can prove at the time of the warrant." It does not include the requirement to reveal "all of their suspicions about the accused."<ref>
{{supra1|Morelli}}{{At|79}}
{{supra1|Brown}}{{atL|21hdg|64}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Middleton|1fndh|2000 BCCA 660 (CanLII)|150 CCC (3d) 556}}{{perBCCA|Finch JA}} (3:0){{atsL|1fndh|18|, 19}}<br>
</ref>
 
; Affiant Discretion
The affiant must exercise some discretion and judgement to decide what is most important to include in the ITO and what to leave out.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Ebanks|26vh9|2009 ONCA 851 (CanLII)|249 CCC (3d) 29}}{{perONCA|MacPherson JA}} (3:0){{atL|26vh9|43}}
</ref>
</ref>


; Good Faith
Lack of good faith in the contents of the ITO may invalidate it.<ref>
Lack of good faith in the contents of the ITO may invalidate it.<ref>
e.g. {{supra1|Ling}} </ref>
e.g. {{supra1|Ling}} </ref>


The ITO must be sure to disclose any "prior association or personal connection" between the informer and the target of the search.<ref>
; Inappropriate Content
''R v Morley'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fwkst 2013 BCSC 463] (CanLII){{perBCSC|Arnold-Bailey J}}{{at|50}}
The ITO cannot rely on "broad generalizations about loosely defined classes of people". It would invite reliance on "stereotypes and prejudices" instead of evidence.<ref>
{{supra1|Morelli}}{{atL|28mrg|79}}
</ref>
</ref>


Full and frank disclosure requires that the officer include "what the police believe they can prove at the time of the warrant."It does not include the requirement to reveal "all of their suspicions about the accused".<ref>
The ITO must be sure to disclose any "prior association or personal connection" between the informer and the target of the search.<ref>
{{supra1|Brown}}{{at|64}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Morley|fwkst|2013 BCSC 463 (CanLII)}}{{perBCSC|Arnold-Bailey J}}{{atL|fwkst|50}}
''R v Middleton'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1fndh 2000 BCCA 660] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Finch JA}} (3:0) at para 18, 19<br>
</ref>
</ref>


; Inferences
The justice is entitled to draw reasonable inference from the facts set out in the ITO.<ref>
The justice is entitled to draw reasonable inference from the facts set out in the ITO.<ref>
''R v Schiers'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1g3fz 2003 NSCA 138] (CanLII){{perNSCA|Fichaud JA}}{{at|15}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Schiers|1g3fz|2003 NSCA 138 (CanLII)|114 CRR (2d) 53}}{{perNSCA|Fichaud JA}}{{atL|1g3fz|15}}<br>
''R v Durling'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1q5fg 2006 NSCA 124] (CanLII){{perNSCA|MacDonald CJ}}{{ats|20, 27}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Durling|1q5fg|2006 NSCA 124 (CanLII)|214 CCC (3d) 49}}{{perNSCA|MacDonald CJ}}{{atsL|1q5fg|20|, 27}}<br>
''R v Jackson'', [http://canlii.ca/t/23m17 1983 CanLII 244] (BCCA){{perBCCA|Taggart JA and Seaton JA}} at p. 131<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Jackson|23m17|1983 CanLII 244 (BC CA)|9 CCC (3d) 125}}{{perBCCA|Taggart JA and Seaton JA}}{{atp|131}}<br>
''R v Sanchez'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1p79n 1994 CanLII 5271] (ONSC){{perONSC|Hill J}} at p. 365, 370<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Sanchez|1p79n|1994 CanLII 5271 (ON SC)|93 CCC (3d) 357}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}{{atps|365, 370}}<br>
''R v Church of Scientology'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1npn2 1987 CanLII 122] (ONCA){{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0) at p. 514 to 515<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Church of Scientology|1npn2|1987 CanLII 122 (ON CA)|31 CCC (3d) 449}}{{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0){{atps|514 to 515}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
It is not necessary that the affiant spell out all inferences they are relying upon.<ReF>
It is not necessary that the affiant spell out all inferences they are relying upon.<ReF>
Line 189: Line 218:
; Experience of Officer
; Experience of Officer
The officer's experience is relevant to the investigative narrative.<ref>
The officer's experience is relevant to the investigative narrative.<ref>
''R v Ngo'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fnsl3 2011 ONSC 6676] (CanLII){{perONSC|Hill J}} at para 35(4)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ngo|fnsl3|2011 ONSC 6676 (CanLII)|OJ No 5023}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}{{AtL|fnsl3|35}}(4)<br>
''R v Cunsolo'', [http://canlii.ca/t/20wwp 2008 CanLII 48640] (ON SC), [2008] OJ NO 3754{{perONSC|Hill J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Cunsolo|20wwp|2008 CanLII 48640 (ON SC)|[2008] OJ NO 3754}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}<br>
</ref> Training and experience permits an officer to draw inferences and make deductions not otherwise available to a lay person.<ref>
</ref>
''R v Jacques and Mitchell'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1fr7n 1996 CanLII 174] (SCC){{perSCC|Gonthier J}}{{atp|12}}<br>
Training and experience permits an officer to draw inferences and make deductions not otherwise available to a lay person.<ref>
''R v Lawes'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1q83x 2007 ONCA 10] (CanLII){{TheCourtONCA}}{{at|4}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Jacques and Mitchell|1fr7n|1996 CanLII 174 (SCC)|[1996] 3 SCR 312}}{{perSCC|Gonthier J}}{{atp|12}}<br>
''R v Simpson'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1npnx 1993 CanLII 3379] (ONCA){{perONCA|Doherty JA}} at p. 501<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Lawes|1q83x|2007 ONCA 10 (CanLII)|72 WCB (2d) 487}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|1q83x|4}}<br>
''R v Juan'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1rvxl 2007 BCCA 351] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Thackray JA}} (3:0) at para 19<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Simpson|1npnx|1993 CanLII 3379 (ON CA)|79 CCC (3d) 482}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atp|501}}<br>
''R v Tran'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1tfzv 2007 BCCA 491] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Levine JA}} (3:0) at para 12<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Juan|1rvxl|2007 BCCA 351 (CanLII)|222 CCC (3d) 289}}{{perBCCA|Thackray JA}} (3:0){{atL|1rvxl|19}} ("...the "reasonable person" is presumed to have the knowledge and experience, in this case in illicit drug matters, of a knowledgeable and experienced police officer.")<br>
''R v Mouland'', 2008 SKCA 105{{NOCANLII}}{{ats|26 to 27}} <br>
{{CanLIIRP|Tran|1tfzv|2007 BCCA 491 (CanLII)|247 BCAC 109}}{{perBCCA|Levine JA}} (3:0){{atL|1tfzv|12}}<br>
''R v Ingle'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1sxk4 2007 BCCA 445] (CanLII), [2007] BCJ No 2024{{perBCCA|Rowles JA}} (3:0) at para 53<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Mouland|1tc29|2007 SKCA 105 (CanLII)|77 WCB (2d) 109}}{{perSKCA|Smith JA}}{{atsL|26| to 27}} <br>
''R v Rajaratnam'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1pxz2 2006 ABCA 333] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0){{Atp|559}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ingle|1sxk4|2007 BCCA 445 (CanLII)|[2007] BCJ No 2024}}{{perBCCA|Rowles JA}} (3:0){{atL|1sxk4|53}}<br>
''R v Grotheim'', [http://canlii.ca/t/4t8n 2001 SKCA 116] (CanLII){{perSKCA|Cameron JA}} (3:0){{at|30}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Rajaratnam|1pxz2|2006 ABCA 333 (CanLII)|214 CCC (3d) 547}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0){{Atp|559}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Grotheim|4t8n|2001 SKCA 116 (CanLII)|161 CCC (3d) 49}}{{perSKCA|Cameron JA}} (3:0){{atL|4t8n|30}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


===Rule Against Narrative (Source Citation)===
==Rule Against Narrative (Source Citation Rule)==
The drafting of an ITO cannot violate what is known as the "rule against narrative". This rule prohibits the drafter from citing any fact that has not been sourced from evidence that is identified within the ITO.<ref>
The drafting of an ITO cannot violate what is known as the "rule against narrative". This rule prohibits the drafter from citing any fact that has not been sourced from evidence that is identified within the ITO.<ref>
''Re Criminal Code'', [1997] OJ No 4393{{NOCANLII}}{{at|8}} ("...any factual assertion by the applicant within the four corners of the affidavit must be sourced to some investigative resource.  Otherwise, the applicant breaches what is sometimes referred to as the rule against narrative.  It is insufficient for an applicant to simply state conclusions, opinions and facts without providing the court with the source or origin for such conclusions, opinions or facts.  The credibility and reliability of the assertions are inextricably linked to the investigative resources themselves.")<br>
{{CanLIIRC-N|Re Criminal Code|, [1997] OJ No 4393}}{{at-|8}} ("...any factual assertion by the applicant within the four corners of the affidavit must be sourced to some investigative resource.  Otherwise, the applicant breaches what is sometimes referred to as the rule against narrative.  It is insufficient for an applicant to simply state conclusions, opinions and facts without providing the court with the source or origin for such conclusions, opinions or facts.  The credibility and reliability of the assertions are inextricably linked to the investigative resources themselves.")<br>
</ref>
</ref>


{{Reflist|2}}
{{Reflist|2}}


==Description of the Location to be Searched==
==Time of Search==
{{seealso|General Warrants#Content of Warrant}}
The warrant should describe the time period in which the execution of the search is to be authorized. That period can be implied as being "within a reasonable time" from being authorized.<REf>
 
{{CanLIIRx|Saint|h4949|2017 ONCA 491 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA|BW Miller JA}}
Precision is necessary in the identification of the place to be searched. Vagueness can lead to searches of the wrong location and can lead to abuse.<ref>
''R v Wisdom'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fpvkb 2012 ONCJ 54] (CanLII){{perONCJ|Lipson J}}{{at|45}}<br>
Fontana, "The Law of Search and Seizure" (8th ed.) at p.87 (“the search warrant process is location-critical and a high degree of precision is expected in both the supporting documents and the warrant itself...Vagueness in the description of premises invites, as a consequence, mistaken searches of wrong places or premises or innocent premises and remedial consequences under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”)<br>
</ref>
</ref>
 
Some authority suggests that where there is an absence of a specific statement of the date of execution, it may be inferred that the execution date was the same as the signing date.<ref>
The ITO must sufficiently describe the location to be searched.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Rafferty|fr9w5|2012 ONSC 703 (CanLII)|OJ No 2132}}{{perONSC|Heeney J}}{{atL|fr9w5|23}}
''R v Parent'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1p1h5 1989 CanLII 217] (YK CA){{perYKCA|Locke JA}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
The description should be appropriate "description should be appropriate to the nature of the locus in question".<ref>
Fontana</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
A warrant omitting the time of search can still be facially valid.<REf>
===Motor Vehicles===
{{ibid1|Saint}}{{atL|h4949|21}}<br>
A motor vehicle can be both a location to be searched as well as the actual thing to be searched for.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jones|fncds|2011 ONCA 632 (CanLII)|278 CCC (3d) 157}}{{perONCA|Blair JA}} (3:0)
''R v Rafferty'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fr9w5 2012 ONSC 703] (CanLII){{perONSC|Heeney J}}{{at|43}}
see also [[Judicial_Authorization_Standard_of_Review#Time_Limitation_on_the_Search|Time limitations on searches]]
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
There should be a specified or inferred time period in which the search is to be conducted.<ref>
===Residences===
{{CanLIIRP|Du|1j9ff|2004 ABQB 849 (CanLII)|65 WCB (2d) 720}}{{perABQB|Macklin J}} - warrant quashed for failing to set time range of search
A warrant to search a residence should be appropriate for the context. A single family home should include municipal address, including number, street, town or city.<ref>
Fontana at p. 87</ref>
 
A warrant authorizing the search of a dwelling-house will generally not include motor vehicles, particularly where the ITO does not address the existence and relevance of the motor vehicle.<ref>
''R v Vu'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1gzvq 2004 BCCA 230] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Frankel JA}} (2:1)
</ref>
</ref>


For a search of an apartment building, the warrant must specify the unit number.<ref>
; Time of Day
''R v Wisdom'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fpvkb 2012 ONCJ 54] (CanLII){{perONCJ|Lipson J}}{{at|44}} ("The warrant fails to specifically authorize a search of apartment 303 which is where the applicants resided")<br>
{{seealso|Execution of Search Warrants#Night Searches}}
</ref>
Normally authorizations under s. 487, 487.1, 462.32 are to be executed during day time hours, which range from 6am to 9pm.


A warrant is still valid where the address is wrong or vague in one section of the ITO but valid in another section.<ref>
A night-time warrant requires additional grounds if done pursuant to s. 487, while it is not needed if authorized under s. 11 CDSA.<REf>
''R v Sexton'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fnl3l 2011 NBCA 97] (CanLII){{perNBCA|Bell JA}} (3:0){{ats|4-9}}
[[Execution of Search Warrants]]
</ref>
 
Where the ITO is inconsistent with the warrant some level of error is permissible as long as the location remains sufficient clear.<ref>
''R v Parker'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1q6fs 2006 NBPC 38] (CanLII){{perNBPC|Ferguson J}} - address on warrant varied from address in ITO. ITO address was correct. Warrant found valid.<br>
''R v Jacobson'', [http://canlii.ca/t/22fnp 2009 ONCA 130] (CanLII){{TheCourtONCA}} - correct address in ITO, error in warrant address. Warrant valid to search car only, lower expectation of privacy in car<br>
</ref>
 
It is possible for a single ITO and warrant to describe and authorize several premises.<ref>
''R v NM'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1sg9k 2007 CanLII 31570] (ON SC){{perONSC|Hill J}}{{At|363}}
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


==Description of Thing(s) to be Searched For==
The warrant's description of things to be seized "operates as a guide for the officers conducting the search."<ref>
''R v Du'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1j9ff 2004 ABQB 849] (CanLII){{perABQB|Macklin J}}{{at|12}}</ref>
The justice of the peace loses jurisdiction where the description is over-broad or too vague such that it essentially allows the officer to conduct a "carte blanche" search for any evidence within the premises.<ref>
{{ibid1|Du}}{{At|12}}</ref>
Generally, an approving justice should be satisfied that:<ref>''R v Adams'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1grg4 2004 CanLII 12093] (NL PC){{perNLPC|Gorman J}}{{at|24}}</ref>
# that the items specified exist;
# that the items specified will be found in the place to be searched at the time of the search;
# that the offence alleged has been, or will be, (depending on the type of search warrant being sought) committed;
# that the items specified will afford evidence of the offence alleged; and
# that the place to be searched is the location where the items will be located.
It has been recommended the following principles be considered:<ref>{{supra1|Du}}{{at|12}}<br>
See also ''R v Church of Scientology'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1npn2 1987 CanLII 122] (ON CA){{TheCourtONCA}}<br>
''Re: Lubell and The Queen'' (1973), 11 CCC (2d) 188 (Ont. H.C.J.), [http://canlii.ca/t/htx2p 1973 CanLII 1488] (ON SC){{perONSC|Zuber J}}<br>
''R v Silverstar Energy Inc.'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1hpv4 2004 BCSC 1115] (CanLII), [2004] BCJ No. 1767 (B.C.S.C.){{perBCSC|Allan J}}<br>
''R v Sanchez and Sanchez'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1p79n 1994 CanLII 5271] (ON SC), [http://canlii.ca/t/1p79n 1994 CanLII 5271] (ON SC), (1994), 93 CCC (3d) 357 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.){{perONSC|Hill J}}<br>
''R v PSI Mind Development Institute Ltd.'' (1977), 37 CCC (2d) 263 (Ont. H.C.), [http://canlii.ca/t/htz2j 1977 CanLII 2013] (ON SC){{perONSC|Lerner J}}<br>
</ref>
#peace officers should be given some latitude in describing things as they are still at the investigative stage;
#the description may be limited to classes of documents if it is sufficiently limited to the crime for which they are alleged to afford evidence;
#the Information sworn to obtain the Search Warrant must be read together with the Search Warrant;
#the nature of the offence(s) must be considered;
#in considering all of the factors, appropriate inferences may be made;
#there need not always be a time limit set out with respect to the documents sought;
#overly broad or vague descriptions can be severed leaving validly described things remaining;
#each case must be considered on its own facts.
The main question the reviewing judge must ask is, upon reviewing the ITO and the warrant "whether either the officers conducting the search or the Applicants whose premises were being searched would have any reasonable doubt about the things being searched for or the offences alleged to have been committed."<ref>
{{supra1|Du}}{{At|13}}
</ref>
A motor vehicle can be both a location to be searched as well as the actual thing to be searched for.<ref>
''R v Rafferty'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fr9w5 2012 ONSC 703] (CanLII){{perONSC|Heeney J}}{{at|43}}
</ref>
See also ''R v Solloway and Mills'' (1930), 24 Alta.L.R. 410 (Alta. S.C.A.D.), [http://canlii.ca/t/g9zm7 1930 CanLII 487] (AB CA){{perABCA|Harvey CJ}}.
{{reflist|2}}
==Description of Offence(s) Being Investigated==
An ITO must set out "a clear description of the offence being investigated". A lack of description will invalidate a warrant.<ref>
''R v Anderson and Slater'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fvxl7 2012 BCPC 496] (CanLII){{perBCPC|Jardine J}}{{at|37}}<br>
''R v Branton'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1fbt3 2001 CanLII 8535] (ON CA){{perONCA|Weiler JA}} (3:0){{ats|35 to 37}} - simply stating the act without mention of the specific offence is not enough
</ref> It is not necessary that the description set out the specific charge or be of quality for pleadings at trial.<ref>
{{supra1|Anderson and Slater}} at para 37<br>
''R v Times Square Book Store'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1p703 1985 CanLII 170] (ON CA), (1985), 21 CCC (3d) 503{{perONCA|Cory JA}}{{atp|512}}<br>
</ref>
It is not necessary that the ITO be as specific in the offence as the wording in the indictment.<ref>
''R v Royal American Shows Incorporated'', [http://canlii.ca/t/2bj10 1975 CanLII 260] (AB QB){{perABQB|Cavanagh J}}
</ref>
The authorizing justice need not be satisfied that the offence was committed or that the items seized will afford evidence in proving the offence. The justice need only be satisfied that there are ''reasonable grounds for believing'' that the items can be of assistance to establishing the commission of the offence and that they are in the premises to be searched.<ref>
''R v Kent'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1mr7h 1993 CanLII 3231] (NS CA){{perNSCA|Hallett JA}} (3:0)<br>
cf. ''R v Lemon'', [2004] OJ No 6043 (Ont. S.C.){{NOCANLII}}<br>
</ref>
The ITO must also set out the evidentiary basis that makes out the offence.<ref>
''Capostinsky v Olsen'', [http://canlii.ca/t/23pcf 1981 CanLII 643] (BC SC){{perBCSC|Berger J}} - warrant quashed due to a conclusory statement by officer that BAC level was over 0.08
''R v Cunsolo'', [http://canlii.ca/t/213l3 2008 CanLII 51468] (ON SC){{perONSC|Hill J}} at para 73 - ITO must describe how fraud was committed<br>
</ref>
Evidence supporting a charge of accessing child pornography cannot support a warrant based on an investigation for possessing child pornography. <ref>
''R v Morelli'', [http://canlii.ca/t/28mrg 2010 SCC 8] (CanLII), [2010] 1 SCR 253{{perSCC|Fish J}} (4:3) at paras 13-38<br>
</ref>
It is not necessary that the suspect be named. It is enough to say "unknown persons".<ref>
''R v Sanchez'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1p79n 1994 CanLII 5271] (ON SC){{perONSC|Hill J}} ("in the instance of the crime of conspiracy such identification constitutes a significant investigative challenge ...The offence is not infrequently investigated, for some dura­tion, as committed by "a person or persons at present unknown"."</ref>
{{reflist|2}}
==Connecting the Thing to the Location==
The approving justice must be satisfied that there is a connection between the grounds for belief of the offence and that evidence of or information related to the offence will be found on the premises to be searched.<ref>
''R v Turcotte'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1prwx 1987 CanLII 984] (SK CA), (1987), 39 CCC (3d) 193 (Sask.C.A){{perSKCA|Vancise JA}}</ref>
The affiant must establish a link between the believed committed offences as well as any evidence of the offence and the belief that it will be found on the premises.<ref>
e.g. ''R v Davis'', [http://canlii.ca/t/frc6t 2012 ABPC 125] (CanLII){{perABPC|Lamoureux J}}{{at|26}}<br>
e.g. ''R v Morse'', [http://canlii.ca/t/231w4 2006 CanLII 63690] (ON SC){{perONSC|Nordheimer J}}<br>
{{supra1|Turcotte}}<br>
</ref>
The informant must pledge that the items not simply "could" be found but would be found. <ref> ''R v Kelly'', [http://canlii.ca/t/2dznf 2010 NBCA 89] (CanLII){{perNBCA|Drapeau CJ}}{{at|39}}</ref>
; Rooming House
All rooms within a rooming house has the same level of privacy as a single residence.<ref>
''R v Campbell'', [2011] 2 SCR 549, [http://canlii.ca/t/flz50 2011 SCC 32] (CanLII){{perSCC|Charron J}} (7:0){{at|15}}<br>
</ref>
An ITO proposing to search several units within a multi-unit dwelling should "clearly [set] out reasonable and probable grounds for each unit to be searched".<ref>
Campbell, at para 15<br>
</ref>
{{Reflist|2}}
==Time Limitation on the Search==
There should be a specified or inferred time period in which the search is to be conducted.<ref>
''R v Du'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1j9ff 2004 ABQB 849] (CanLII){{perABQB|Macklin J}} - warrant quashed for failing to set time range of search
</ref> There is some suggestion that it should not be fatal.<ref>
''R v Jones'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fncds 2011 ONCA 632] (CanLII){{perONCA|Blair JA}} (3:0)
</ref>
Where there is an absence of a specific statement of the date of execution, it may be inferred that the execution date was the same as the signing date.<ref>
''R v Rafferty'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fr9w5 2012 ONSC 703] (CanLII){{perONSC|Heeney J}} at para 23
</ref>
{{reflist|2}}


==Reliability of Information Within the ITO==
==Reliability of Information Within the ITO==
Information such as references to previously dismissed charges are irrelevant and should not be included in an ITO. They may be misleading and suggest an unfair propensity.<ref>
Information such as references to previously dismissed charges are irrelevant and should not be included in an ITO. They may be misleading and suggest an unfair propensity.<ref>
''R v King'' (No. 4), [http://canlii.ca/t/gwdg8 2016 CanLII 88801] (NL SCTD){{perNLSC|Marshall J}}{{at|30}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|King (No. 4)|gwdg8|2016 CanLII 88801 (NLSCTD)}}{{perNLSC|Marshall J}}{{atL|gwdg8|30}}<br>
''R v Nguyen'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fr569 2011 ONSC 2187] (CanLII){{perONSC|O’Neill J}}{{at|11}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Nguyen|fr569|2011 ONSC 2187 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|O’Neill J}}{{atL|fr569|11}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 378: Line 280:
===Currency of Information===
===Currency of Information===
It is essential that the affiant provide some detail on the recency of the information he is relying upon. An ITO without any detail on timing will be void.<ref>
It is essential that the affiant provide some detail on the recency of the information he is relying upon. An ITO without any detail on timing will be void.<ref>
''R v Hosie'', [http://canlii.ca/t/6htx 1996 CanLII 450] (ON CA){{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}} (3:0)
{{CanLIIRP|Hosie|6htx|1996 CanLII 450 (ON CA)|107 CCC (3d) 385}}{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}} (3:0)
</ref>
</ref>


The age of the information will be a factor in considering whether reasonable grounds still exist. There is no fixed amount of time that renders it "stale".<ref>
The age of the information will be a factor in considering whether reasonable grounds still exist. There is no fixed amount of time that renders it "stale."<ref>
''R v Ballendine'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fl8xf 2011 BCCA 221] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Frankel JA}} (3:0) at para 54</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Ballendine|fl8xf|2011 BCCA 221 (CanLII)|271 CCC (3d) 418}}{{perBCCA|Frankel JA}} (3:0){{atL|fl8xf|54}}</ref>


Even "stale" or "dated" information may be used in an ITO.<ref>
Even "stale" or "dated" information may be used in an ITO.<ref>
''R v Brown'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1w1mv 2007 BCPC 448] (CanLII){{perBCPC|De Couto J}} at para 65
{{CanLIIRx|Brown|1w1mv|2007 BCPC 448 (CanLII)}}{{perBCPC|De Couto J}} {{atL|1w1mv|65}}
</ref>
</ref>


The timing should be specific for the context. Simply saying that the suspect was seen near the location of the crime "several hour" ago is not sufficient.<ref>
The timing should be specific for the context. Simply saying that the suspect was seen near the location of the crime "several hour" ago is not sufficient.<ref>
''R v Carroll'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1nx1x 1989 CanLII 206] (NS CA){{perNSCA|Macdonald JA}}
{{CanLIIRP|Carroll|1nx1x|1989 CanLII 206 (NS CA)|47 CCC (3d) 263}}{{perNSCA-H|Macdonald JA}}
</ref>
</ref>


; Child Pornography
; Child Pornography
The searching officer may draw the inference upon learning of the download of suspected child pornography that the files may remain on the computer well after download and even where efforts to delete the materials have been made.<ref>
The searching officer may draw the inference upon learning of the download of suspected child pornography that the files may remain on the computer well after download and even where efforts to delete the materials have been made.<ref>
''R v Ward'', [http://canlii.ca/t/ft0ft 2012 ONCA 660] (CanLII){{perONCA|Doherty JA}} (3:0){{at|114}} ("...extensive technical evidence to the effect that files downloaded by the appellant on the computer could be recovered by police technicians even if the appellant had made efforts to delete those files. This evidence offered some basis for an inference that the prohibited material remained on the computer long after it was downloaded and could be recovered if the police were given access to the computer")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ward|ft0ft|2012 ONCA 660 (CanLII)|97 CR (6th) 377}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}} (3:0){{atL|ft0ft|114}} ("...extensive technical evidence to the effect that files downloaded by the appellant on the computer could be recovered by police technicians even if the appellant had made efforts to delete those files. This evidence offered some basis for an inference that the prohibited material remained on the computer long after it was downloaded and could be recovered if the police were given access to the computer")<br>
{{supra1|Brown}}{{at|82}}<br>
{{supra1|Brown}}{{atL|1w1mv|82}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


The searching officer may in some cases also rely upon their experience "of individuals who access and possess child pornography on their computers" which tells them that "often these individuals kept images for “long periods of time” and “rarely deleted collections”." Generally, dated information on the presence of child pornography can be relied upon as those who collect such materials are known to keep it for a long period of time. <ref>
The searching officer may in some cases also rely upon their experience "of individuals who access and possess child pornography on their computers" which tells them that "often these individuals kept images for “long periods of time” and “rarely deleted collections”." Generally, dated information on the presence of child pornography can be relied upon as those who collect such materials are known to keep it for a long period of time. <ref>
Ward at para 115<br>
{{supra1|Ward}}{{atL|ft0ft|115}}<br>
''R v Neveu'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1m6m0 2005 NSPC 51] (CanLII){{perNSPC|Gibson J}}{{at|18}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Neveu|1m6m0|2005 NSPC 51 (CanLII)|760 APR 59}}{{perNSPC|Gibson J}}{{atL|1m6m0|18}}<br>
''R v Wonitowy'', [http://canlii.ca/t/2cplh 2010 SKQB 346] (CanLII){{perSKQB|Dufour J}}{{ats|37 to 50}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Wonitowy|2cplh|2010 SKQB 346 (CanLII)|358 Sask R 303}}{{perSKQB|Dufour J}}{{atsL|2cplh|37| to 50}}<br>
{{supra1|Brown}}{{at|82}}<br>
{{supra1|Brown}}{{atL|1w1mv|82}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
   
   
A computer previously identified as being in the home would reasonably be inferred to still be present at the same location absent evidence suggesting otherwise.<ref>
A computer previously identified as being in the home would reasonably be inferred to still be present at the same location absent evidence suggesting otherwise.<ref>
''R v Stemberger'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fpqjb 2012 ONCJ 31] (CanLII){{perONCJ|Borenstein J}}{{at|99}}<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Stemberger|fpqjb|2012 ONCJ 31 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Borenstein J}}{{atL|fpqjb|99}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 413: Line 315:
===Cross-Examination of Affiant===
===Cross-Examination of Affiant===
The accused may only cross-examine an officer who sworn an affidavit to obtain a search warrant with leave of the court. Leave should be granted where it would assist in the determination of whether there is a basis upon which the authorizing judge could have granted the order.<ref>Salhany, Canadian Criminal Procedure, Sixth Edition, at 3.1880<br>
The accused may only cross-examine an officer who sworn an affidavit to obtain a search warrant with leave of the court. Leave should be granted where it would assist in the determination of whether there is a basis upon which the authorizing judge could have granted the order.<ref>Salhany, Canadian Criminal Procedure, Sixth Edition, at 3.1880<br>
see also: ''R v Parsons'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fs5md 2012 CanLII 42275] (NL SCTD){{perNLSC|Goulding J}} - leave refused </ref>
see also: {{CanLIIRx|Parsons|fs5md|2012 CanLII 42275 (NLSCTD)}}{{perNLSC|Goulding J}} - leave refused </ref>


; Standard for Leave to Cross-Examine
; Standard for Leave to Cross-Examine
The applicant must show the basis of that the examination "will elicit testimony tending to discredit the existence of one of the pre-conditions".<ReF>
The applicant must show the basis of that the examination "will elicit testimony tending to discredit the existence of one of the pre-conditions."<ReF>
''R v Garofoli'', [1990] 2 SCR 1421, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fss5 1990 CanLII 52] (SCC){{perSCC|Sopinka J}}
{{CanLIIRP|Garofoli|1fss5|1990 CanLII 52 (SCC)|[1990] 2 SCR 1421}}{{perSCC-H|Sopinka J}}
</ref>
</ref>


Dangers of allowing cross-examination of an affiant include the prolixity and slowing down of the proceedings.<ref>
Dangers of allowing cross-examination of an affiant include the prolixity and slowing down of the proceedings.<ref>
R v Pires and Lising, [2005] 3 SCR 343, [http://canlii.ca/t/1m021 2005 SCC 66] (CanLII){{perSCC|Charron J}} at paras 33 and 34<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Pires and Lising|1m021|2005 SCC 66 (CanLII)|[2005] 3 SCR 343}}{{perSCC|Charron J}}{{atsL|1m021|33| and 34}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


; Getting Behind a "Strawman" Affiant
; Getting Behind a "Strawman" Affiant
There is some right to cross-examine sub-affiant (ie. the first-hand source of information attested to by the affiant) where the affiant is largely relying upon the hearsay evidence of others.
There is some right to cross-examine sub-affiant (ie. the first-hand source of information attested to by the affiant) where the affiant is largely relying upon the hearsay evidence of others.
; Standard of Review of Decision
The discretionary decision to deny the right to cross-examine an affiant can be reviewed if there is an error in principle, material apprehension of evidence, or unreasonable finding.<REf>
{{CanLIIR|Daye|js6nt|2022 ONCA 675 (CanLII)}}{{atL|js6nt|11}}
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}
Line 433: Line 340:


A source who gives fraudulent or deliberately misleading information does not automatically invalidate the warrant.<ref>
A source who gives fraudulent or deliberately misleading information does not automatically invalidate the warrant.<ref>
''R v Morris (W.R.)'', [http://canlii.ca/t/6m6f 1998 CanLII 1344] (NS CA), (1998), 173 N.S.R. (2d) 1 (C.A.){{perNSCA|Cromwell JA}} (3:0) at para 91<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Morris (W.R.)|6m6f|1998 CanLII 1344 (NS CA)|173 NSR (2d) 1 (CA)}}{{perNSCA|Cromwell JA}} (3:0){{atL|6m6f|91}}<br>
''R v Evans (E.D.)'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g6skw 2014 MBCA 44] (CanLII){{perMBCA|Mainella JA}} (3:0){{at|17}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Evans (E.D.)|g6skw|2014 MBCA 44 (CanLII)|306 Man R (2d) 9}}{{perMBCA|Mainella JA}} (3:0){{atL|g6skw|17}}<br>
</ref> However, if on review the information is sufficiently "subversive", then the warrant should be invalidated. The offending materials should also be excised from the ITO.<ref>
</ref>  
{{supra1|Morris}}{{at|91}}</ref>
However, if on review the information is sufficiently "subversive", then the warrant should be invalidated. The offending materials should also be excised from the ITO.<ref>
{{supra1|Morris}}{{atL|6m6f|91}}</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


==Relying on Redacted ITOs==
==Relying on Redacted ITOs==
{{Seealso|Confidential Informers}}
{{Seealso|Confidential Informers|Judicial Authorization Standard of Review}}
 
Where a challenged ITO has been redacted to an extent that the unredacted information is insufficient to support the issuance of the warrant, the Crown can invoke "step six of Garofoli" which permits them to rely on a vetted summary of redacted information.<ref>
''R v Reid'', [http://canlii.ca/t/gsb3w 2016 ONCA 524] (CanLII){{perONCA|Watt JA}} (3:0) at para 19<br>
</ref>
The summary is vetted by the judge and then provided to defence counsel.<ref>
{{ibid1|Reid}}{{at|19}}<br>
</ref>
The summary must provide sufficient detail as to permit full answer and defence.<ref>
e.g. Reid<br>
</ref>
    
    
{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}
Line 458: Line 356:


; Crown Role in Drafting ITOs
; Crown Role in Drafting ITOs
A Crown should assist in pointing out "flaws, inconsistencies, or ambiguities" in the ITO they should not engage in the "wholesale review of the file". This would otherwise "blur the line" between the two roles.<ref>''R v Ebanks'', [http://canlii.ca/t/26vh9 2009 ONCA 851] (CanLII){{perONCA|MacPherson JA}} (3:0) at para 49</ref>
A Crown should assist in pointing out "flaws, inconsistencies, or ambiguities" in the ITO they should not engage in the "wholesale review of the file". This would otherwise "blur the line" between the two roles.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Ebanks|26vh9|2009 ONCA 851 (CanLII)|249 CCC (3d) 29}}{{perONCA|MacPherson JA}} (3:0){{atL|26vh9|49}}</ref>


; Retaining Early Drafts
; Retaining Early Drafts
There is no constitutional obligation to retain early drafts of an ITO.
There is no constitutional obligation to retain early drafts of an ITO.
<ref>
<ref>
''R v Croft'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g2m2b 2014 ABQB 23] (CanLII){{perABQB|Burrows J}}
{{CanLIIRx|Croft|g2m2b|2014 ABQB 23 (CanLII)}}{{perABQB|Burrows J}}
</ref>
</ref>
{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}

Latest revision as of 14:22, 14 July 2024

This page was last substantively updated or reviewed October 2022. (Rev. # 95310)

General Principles

The affiant police officer's role is to provide a "factual foundation" to justify the issuing of a warrant.[1] The officer has an obligation "to make full and frank disclosure of material facts, avoid boiler plate language and, whenever possible, obtain an affidavit directly from those with firsthand knowledge."[2] A failure in these duties does not necessarily invalidate the warrant.[3]

The authorizing justice's job is to "determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the articles in question will afford evidence with respect to the offence". This suggests only that the evidence "which would be relevant to the issue, and would be properly tendered as evidence in a prosecution" of the offence.[4]

The need for a judicial authorization aims to prevent unreasonable searches. A judicial officer may independently weigh the conflicting interests of the private individual and the state's interest to investigate.[5]

Establishing "credibly based probability" in an ITO requires it include:[6]

  1. sworn evidence sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for believing the offence had been committed, that the things to be searched for will afford evidence and that the things in question will be found at a specked place[7]
  2. that it as a whole must be considered and peace officers, who generally will prepare these documents without legal assistance, should not be held to the “specificity and legal precision expected of pleadings at the trial stage."[8]
  3. the affiant’s reasonable belief does not have to be based on personal knowledge, but the Information to obtain must, in the totality of circumstances, disclose a substantial basis for the existence of the affiant’s belief[9]

It is not necessary that the police demonstrate that the evidence sought will be sufficient to prove the offence.[10]

  1. R v Knight, 2008 NLCA 67 (CanLII), 241 CCC (3d) 353, per Welsh JA leave refused, at para 32 ("It is the role of the police submitting the Affidavit to provide the factual foundation for issuance of the warrant")
  2. R v Fan, 2013 BCSC 445 (CanLII), per Brown J, at para 15 citing R v Araujo, 2000 SCC 65 (CanLII), [2000] 2 SCR 992, per LeBel J (9:0), at paras 46 to 49
  3. See Judicial Authorization Standard of Review
  4. R v Worrall, 1964 CanLII 161 (ON CA), 2 CCC 1, per Porter CJ
  5. Fan, supra, at para 14 ("The process of prior authorization ... provides an opportunity to assess and weigh the conflicting interests of the state and the individual in order to ensure that an individual’s right to privacy is breached only when the interests of the state are demonstrably superior.")
  6. R v Morris, 1998 CanLII 1344 (NSCA), 173 NSR (2d) 1 (CA), per Cromwell JA (3:0), at para 31br>
  7. Sanchez, supra, at p. 365
  8. Sanchez, supra, at p. 364
  9. R v Yorke, 1992 CanLII 2521 (NSCA), 115 NSR (2d) 426 (CA), per Roscoe JA (3:0) affd 1993 CanLII 83 (SCC), [1993] 3 SCR 647, per La Forest J (4:1)
  10. R v TK, 2013 MBQB 114 (CanLII), per Menzies J, at para 11
    Worrall, supra

Basic Elements

The document should be reliable, balanced and material. It should also be clear, concise, legally and factually sufficient, but it need not include “every minute detail of the police investigation”. [1]

Where the judicial officer is concerned over conclusory language on material issues, the officer may ask for the facts upon which the conclusion is made.[2]

Facial Validity

The date, place and time of the authorization must be present on the warrant to be valid.[3]

An unsigned affidavit supporting a wiretap warrant is not necessarily fatal to the application.[4]

Drafting Quality

Given that ITOs are drafted by police officer typically before all the evidence is known or without legal advice, the ITO need not have the level of quality of pleadings.[5] Officer’s generally speaking are not held to the same drafting quality as counsel.[6]

An ITO should be written and read in a practical, non-technical, common-sense fashion.[7]

The use of boilerplate or conclusory language may render the ITO insufficient.[8]

Inquiry by Justice

A justice has no obligation to make inquiry of the affiant into the grounds of his belief.[9]

Organization and Length

An issuing judge or justice is entitled to reject an ITO on the basis of it being too lengthy and disorganized.[10] However, as a reviewing judge, there is no rule against lengthy ITOs or simply poorly drafted ITOs. The test should always come back to the question of whether it contains sufficient grounds [11]

Standard of Proof

The standard of proof to establish reasonable grounds or "reasonable belief" in support of a search warrant is one of "reasonable probability."[12]

  1. CBC v A-G for New Brunswick, 1991 CanLII 50 (SCC), 67 CCC (3d) 544, per Cory J (6:1), at p. 562
    R v Araujo, 2000 SCC 65 (CanLII), [2000] 2 SCR 992, per LeBel J (9:0), at p. 470
    R v Ling, 2009 BCCA 70 (CanLII), 241 CCC (3d) 409, per Bauman JA, at para 43 (leave to appeal refused, [2009] SCCA No 165)
  2. Clémenceau at para 7
  3. see 487.1
    related R v Steeves, 2002 BCSC 551 (CanLII), 54 WCB (2d) 96, per Chamberlist J, at paras 57 to 62
  4. R v Dixon, 2012 ONSC 181 (CanLII), per Taliano J
  5. R v Sanchez, 1994 CanLII 5271 (ONSC), [1994] OJ No 2260 (SCJ), per Hill J, at para 20
  6. Re Lubell and the Queen, 1973 CanLII 1488 (ONSC), 11 CCC (2d) 188 (Ont. H.C.), per Zuber J, at p. 190
    R v Durling, 2006 NSCA 124 (CanLII), 214 CCC (3d) 49, per MacDonald CJ, at para 19
    Sanchez, supra, at p. 364
    Re Chapman and the Queen, 1983 CanLII 3587 (ON SC), 6 CCC (3d) 296, per Reid J, at p. 297
    Re Times Square Book Store and R., 1985 CanLII 170 (ON CA), 17 CRR 180, 21 CCC (3d) 503, per Cory JA ("However, the warrant (and I infer from the heading immediately preceding this quote that he is also speaking of the information in support) need not be drafted with legal precision as it is an instrument for the investigation of crime. A reasonable latitude must be granted when considering its wording.")
  7. R v Whitaker, 2008 BCCA 174 (CanLII), 254 BCAC 234, per Frankel JA (3:0), at paras 41 to 42
  8. e.g. Harris, supra, at pp. 13-16
    R v Church of Scientology and the Queen (No.6), 1987 CanLII 122 (ON CA), 31 CCC (3d) 449, per curiam, at p. 500
  9. R v Donaldson, 1990 CanLII 630 (BC CA), 58 CCC (3d) 294, per Hinkson JA (3:0)
  10. Re Criminal Code, [1997] OJ No 4393 (Gen. Div.)(*no CanLII links) , at paras 9 to 11
  11. R v Rafferty, 2012 ONSC 703 (CanLII), OJ No 2132, per Heeney J , at para 34
  12. R v Debot, 1989 CanLII 13 (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 1140, per Wilson J, at p. 1166

Inferences

It is not necessary that the officer spell out all possible reasons that they want to rely upon for seizing certain evidence. A judge may infer the reasons based on the evidence given in the ITO.[1]

A Justice is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the ITO.[2]

  1. R v Vu, 2013 SCC 60 (CanLII), [2013] 3 SCR 657, per Cromwell J (9:0), at paras 13 to 16
  2. See R v Durling, 2006 NSCA 124 (CanLII), 214 CCC (3d) 49, per MacDonald CJ, at paras 27 to 28
    Vu, supra, at para 16

Full, Frank and Fair Disclosure

Standard for ITO Disclosure

The affiant must make "full, frank and fair" disclosure of all information known to the officer relevant to the matter before the authorizing justice.[1] While such form candid disclosure is general expected, duty is heightened due to the ex parte nature of the application.[2] There is a hightened risk of the court's powers being misused.[3]

This principle applies to all warrants, including wiretaps.[4]

The police must give full and frank disclosure so that the authorizing justice can decide in a "neutral and impartial manner."[5]

Consequence of Failure to be FF&F

A failure to satisfy the affiant's duty to be full, fair and frank in its disclosure in the ITO may be a breach of s. 8 of the Charter.[6]

A flagrant, deliberate, or wilfully blind failure to make full and complete disclosure can be fatal to the warrant.[7]

Breadth of FF&F Standard

In any ex parte application process, the applicant must disclose "material facts" that may affect the outcome of the application.[8] The ITO does not need to state every step a police officer takes in obtaining information.[9]

"Material facts" refers to something that "bears on the merits or substance of the application rather than on its form or some other inconsequential matter"[10]

This does not require disclosing every fact that might possibly be relevant.[11] It should only be those that are "material facts."[12]

It is also not necessary to "anticipate" and explain "every conceivable indicia of crime they did not see or sense and every conceivable investigative step they did not take at the time in order to counter the creative arguments of able defence counsel on a review hearing many months or years after the event." [13]

It is also generally not necessary to include in the ITO the absence of any other potentially relevant observations.[14]

Full and frank disclosure requires that the officer include "what the police believe they can prove at the time of the warrant." It does not include the requirement to reveal "all of their suspicions about the accused."[15]

Affiant Discretion

The affiant must exercise some discretion and judgement to decide what is most important to include in the ITO and what to leave out.[16]

Good Faith

Lack of good faith in the contents of the ITO may invalidate it.[17]

Inappropriate Content

The ITO cannot rely on "broad generalizations about loosely defined classes of people". It would invite reliance on "stereotypes and prejudices" instead of evidence.[18]

The ITO must be sure to disclose any "prior association or personal connection" between the informer and the target of the search.[19]

Inferences

The justice is entitled to draw reasonable inference from the facts set out in the ITO.[20] It is not necessary that the affiant spell out all inferences they are relying upon.[21]

Experience of Officer

The officer's experience is relevant to the investigative narrative.[22] Training and experience permits an officer to draw inferences and make deductions not otherwise available to a lay person.[23]

  1. R v Moore, 1993 CanLII 17 , per Toy JA aff'd on appeal
    R v Brown, 2008 ABQB 663 (CanLII), 451 AR 1, per Germain J, at paras 50, 64
    R v Kensington Income Tax, [1917] 1 K.B. 486 (CA)(*no CanLII links)
    Re Church of Scientology and The Queen (No. 6), 1987 CanLII 122 (ON CA), 31 CCC (3d) 449, per curiam
    United States of America v Friedland, 1996 CanLII 8213 (ONSC), [1996] OJ No 4399 (Gen. Div.), per Sharpe J, at paras 26 to 29
    R v Araujo, 2000 SCC 65 (CanLII), [2000] 2 SCR 992, per Fish J (9:0), at para 46
    R v Nguyen, 2011 ONCA 465 (CanLII), 273 CCC (3d) 37, per Blair JA (3:0), at para 48
    R. v. Land (1990), 1990 CanLII 10969 (ON SC), 55 C.C.C. (3d) 382 (Ont. H.C.) per Watt J
  2. Araujo, supra, at paras 46 to 47
    United States of America v. Friedland, [1996] O.J. No. 4399 (Ont. Ct. (Gen.Div.)) per Sharpe J
  3. R v Liew, 2012 ONSC 1826 (CanLII), per Boswell J, at paras 158 to 159
  4. R v Ling, 2009 BCCA 70 (CanLII), 241 CCC (3d) 409, per Bauman JA, at paras 31 to 32
  5. Ling, ibid., at para 40
  6. R v Rocha, 2012 ONCA 707 (CanLII), 292 CCC (3d) 325, per Rosenberg JA
    R v White, 2017 ONSC 5647 (CanLII), per De Sa J, at para 33
  7. R v Duncan (W.), 2004 MBCA 64 (CanLII), 188 CCC (3d) 17, per Monnin JA (2:1), at para 32
  8. R v Montgomery, 2016 BCCA 379 (CanLII), 341 CCC (3d) 147, per Frankel JA, at para 98
    Evans v Umbrella Capital LLC, 2004 BCCA 149 (CanLII), 237 DLR (4th) 106, per Donald JA, at para 33 ("A material fact is one that may or might affect the outcome of an application:... . It is for the court to decide what is a material fact..")
  9. R v Sanchez, 1994 CanLII 5271 (ONSC), 93 CCC (3d) 357, per Hill J, at para 20
  10. R v Nguyen, 2011 ONCA 465 (CanLII)
    R. v. Land (1990), 1990 CanLII 10969 (ON SC), 55 C.C.C. (3d) 382 (Ont. H.C.), per Watt J., at p. 417
  11. R v Chambers, 1983 CanLII 245 , per Craig JA, at p. 143 aff'd 1986 CanLII 22 (SCC), 26 CCC (3d) 353, per McIntyre J (5:2)
    R v Concepcion, 1994 CanLII 1746 (BCCA), 48 BCAC 44 (BCCA), per Finch JA (3:0), at para 36 (it does not impose a blanket obligation “to disclose every fact which might possibly be relevant”)
    Montgomery, supra, at para 97
  12. Araujo, supra, at para 46
  13. Nguyen
  14. e.g. R v Nguyen, 2011 ONCA 465 (CanLII), 273 CCC (3d) 37, per Blair JA (3:0) - CA overturns a decision to invalidate warrant for failing to mention lack of suspicious activity in front of grow-up house
  15. Brown, supra, at para 64
    R v Middleton, 2000 BCCA 660 (CanLII), 150 CCC (3d) 556, per Finch JA (3:0), at paras 18, 19
  16. R v Ebanks, 2009 ONCA 851 (CanLII), 249 CCC (3d) 29, per MacPherson JA (3:0), at para 43
  17. e.g. Ling, supra
  18. Morelli, supra, at para 79
  19. R v Morley, 2013 BCSC 463 (CanLII), per Arnold-Bailey J, at para 50
  20. R v Schiers, 2003 NSCA 138 (CanLII), 114 CRR (2d) 53, per Fichaud JA, at para 15
    R v Durling, 2006 NSCA 124 (CanLII), 214 CCC (3d) 49, per MacDonald CJ, at paras 20, 27
    R v Jackson, 1983 CanLII 244 (BC CA), 9 CCC (3d) 125, per Taggart JA and Seaton JA, at p. 131
    R v Sanchez, 1994 CanLII 5271 (ON SC), 93 CCC (3d) 357, per Hill J, at pp. 365, 370
    R v Church of Scientology, 1987 CanLII 122 (ON CA), 31 CCC (3d) 449, per curiam (3:0), at pp. 514 to 515
  21. Re Lubell, supra, at p. 190
  22. R v Ngo, 2011 ONSC 6676 (CanLII), OJ No 5023, per Hill J, at para 35(4)
    R v Cunsolo, 2008 CanLII 48640 (ON SC), [2008] OJ NO 3754, per Hill J
  23. R v Jacques and Mitchell, 1996 CanLII 174 (SCC), [1996] 3 SCR 312, per Gonthier J, at p. 12
    R v Lawes, 2007 ONCA 10 (CanLII), 72 WCB (2d) 487, per curiam, at para 4
    R v Simpson, 1993 CanLII 3379 (ON CA), 79 CCC (3d) 482, per Doherty JA, at p. 501
    R v Juan, 2007 BCCA 351 (CanLII), 222 CCC (3d) 289, per Thackray JA (3:0), at para 19 ("...the "reasonable person" is presumed to have the knowledge and experience, in this case in illicit drug matters, of a knowledgeable and experienced police officer.")
    R v Tran, 2007 BCCA 491 (CanLII), 247 BCAC 109, per Levine JA (3:0), at para 12
    R v Mouland, 2007 SKCA 105 (CanLII), 77 WCB (2d) 109, per Smith JA, at to 27 paras to 27{{{3}}}
    R v Ingle, 2007 BCCA 445 (CanLII), [2007] BCJ No 2024, per Rowles JA (3:0), at para 53
    R v Rajaratnam, 2006 ABCA 333 (CanLII), 214 CCC (3d) 547, per curiam (3:0), at p. 559
    R v Grotheim, 2001 SKCA 116 (CanLII), 161 CCC (3d) 49, per Cameron JA (3:0), at para 30

Rule Against Narrative (Source Citation Rule)

The drafting of an ITO cannot violate what is known as the "rule against narrative". This rule prohibits the drafter from citing any fact that has not been sourced from evidence that is identified within the ITO.[1]

  1. Re Criminal Code, [1997] OJ No 4393(*no CanLII links) , at para 8 ("...any factual assertion by the applicant within the four corners of the affidavit must be sourced to some investigative resource. Otherwise, the applicant breaches what is sometimes referred to as the rule against narrative. It is insufficient for an applicant to simply state conclusions, opinions and facts without providing the court with the source or origin for such conclusions, opinions or facts. The credibility and reliability of the assertions are inextricably linked to the investigative resources themselves.")

Time of Search

The warrant should describe the time period in which the execution of the search is to be authorized. That period can be implied as being "within a reasonable time" from being authorized.[1] Some authority suggests that where there is an absence of a specific statement of the date of execution, it may be inferred that the execution date was the same as the signing date.[2]

A warrant omitting the time of search can still be facially valid.[3]

There should be a specified or inferred time period in which the search is to be conducted.[4]

Time of Day
See also: Execution of Search Warrants#Night Searches

Normally authorizations under s. 487, 487.1, 462.32 are to be executed during day time hours, which range from 6am to 9pm.

A night-time warrant requires additional grounds if done pursuant to s. 487, while it is not needed if authorized under s. 11 CDSA.[5]

  1. R v Saint, 2017 ONCA 491 (CanLII), per BW Miller JA
  2. R v Rafferty, 2012 ONSC 703 (CanLII), OJ No 2132, per Heeney J, at para 23
  3. Saint, ibid., at para 21
    R v Jones, 2011 ONCA 632 (CanLII), 278 CCC (3d) 157, per Blair JA (3:0) see also Time limitations on searches
  4. R v Du, 2004 ABQB 849 (CanLII), 65 WCB (2d) 720, per Macklin J - warrant quashed for failing to set time range of search
  5. Execution of Search Warrants


Reliability of Information Within the ITO

Information such as references to previously dismissed charges are irrelevant and should not be included in an ITO. They may be misleading and suggest an unfair propensity.[1]

Currency of Information

It is essential that the affiant provide some detail on the recency of the information he is relying upon. An ITO without any detail on timing will be void.[1]

The age of the information will be a factor in considering whether reasonable grounds still exist. There is no fixed amount of time that renders it "stale."[2]

Even "stale" or "dated" information may be used in an ITO.[3]

The timing should be specific for the context. Simply saying that the suspect was seen near the location of the crime "several hour" ago is not sufficient.[4]

Child Pornography

The searching officer may draw the inference upon learning of the download of suspected child pornography that the files may remain on the computer well after download and even where efforts to delete the materials have been made.[5]

The searching officer may in some cases also rely upon their experience "of individuals who access and possess child pornography on their computers" which tells them that "often these individuals kept images for “long periods of time” and “rarely deleted collections”." Generally, dated information on the presence of child pornography can be relied upon as those who collect such materials are known to keep it for a long period of time. [6]

A computer previously identified as being in the home would reasonably be inferred to still be present at the same location absent evidence suggesting otherwise.[7]

  1. R v Hosie, 1996 CanLII 450 (ON CA), 107 CCC (3d) 385, per Rosenberg JA (3:0)
  2. R v Ballendine, 2011 BCCA 221 (CanLII), 271 CCC (3d) 418, per Frankel JA (3:0), at para 54
  3. R v Brown, 2007 BCPC 448 (CanLII), per De Couto J , at para 65
  4. R v Carroll, 1989 CanLII 206 (NS CA), 47 CCC (3d) 263, per Macdonald JA
  5. R v Ward, 2012 ONCA 660 (CanLII), 97 CR (6th) 377, per Doherty JA (3:0), at para 114 ("...extensive technical evidence to the effect that files downloaded by the appellant on the computer could be recovered by police technicians even if the appellant had made efforts to delete those files. This evidence offered some basis for an inference that the prohibited material remained on the computer long after it was downloaded and could be recovered if the police were given access to the computer")
    Brown, supra, at para 82
  6. Ward, supra, at para 115
    R v Neveu, 2005 NSPC 51 (CanLII), 760 APR 59, per Gibson J, at para 18
    R v Wonitowy, 2010 SKQB 346 (CanLII), 358 Sask R 303, per Dufour J, at paras 37 to 50
    Brown, supra, at para 82
  7. R v Stemberger, 2012 ONCJ 31 (CanLII), per Borenstein J, at para 99

Cross-Examination of Affiant

The accused may only cross-examine an officer who sworn an affidavit to obtain a search warrant with leave of the court. Leave should be granted where it would assist in the determination of whether there is a basis upon which the authorizing judge could have granted the order.[1]

Standard for Leave to Cross-Examine

The applicant must show the basis of that the examination "will elicit testimony tending to discredit the existence of one of the pre-conditions."[2]

Dangers of allowing cross-examination of an affiant include the prolixity and slowing down of the proceedings.[3]

Getting Behind a "Strawman" Affiant

There is some right to cross-examine sub-affiant (ie. the first-hand source of information attested to by the affiant) where the affiant is largely relying upon the hearsay evidence of others.

Standard of Review of Decision

The discretionary decision to deny the right to cross-examine an affiant can be reviewed if there is an error in principle, material apprehension of evidence, or unreasonable finding.[4]

  1. Salhany, Canadian Criminal Procedure, Sixth Edition, at 3.1880
    see also: R v Parsons, 2012 CanLII 42275 (NLSCTD), per Goulding J - leave refused
  2. R v Garofoli, 1990 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 1421, per Sopinka J
  3. R v Pires and Lising, 2005 SCC 66 (CanLII), [2005] 3 SCR 343, per Charron J, at paras 33 and 34
  4. R v Daye, 2022 ONCA 675 (CanLII), at para 11

Credibility and Reliability of Source

See also: Confidential Informers

A source who gives fraudulent or deliberately misleading information does not automatically invalidate the warrant.[1] However, if on review the information is sufficiently "subversive", then the warrant should be invalidated. The offending materials should also be excised from the ITO.[2]

  1. R v Morris (W.R.), 1998 CanLII 1344 (NS CA), 173 NSR (2d) 1 (CA), per Cromwell JA (3:0), at para 91
    R v Evans (E.D.), 2014 MBCA 44 (CanLII), 306 Man R (2d) 9, per Mainella JA (3:0), at para 17
  2. Morris, supra, at para 91

Relying on Redacted ITOs

See also: Confidential Informers and Judicial Authorization Standard of Review

Procedure in Drafting Warrant

Crown Role in Drafting ITOs

A Crown should assist in pointing out "flaws, inconsistencies, or ambiguities" in the ITO they should not engage in the "wholesale review of the file". This would otherwise "blur the line" between the two roles.[1]

Retaining Early Drafts

There is no constitutional obligation to retain early drafts of an ITO. [2]

  1. R v Ebanks, 2009 ONCA 851 (CanLII), 249 CCC (3d) 29, per MacPherson JA (3:0), at para 49
  2. R v Croft, 2014 ABQB 23 (CanLII), per Burrows J

See Also