Judicial Immunity: Difference between revisions
m Text replacement - "] (CanLII) (CanLII)" to " (CanLII)" |
m Text replacement - "\{\{Fr\|([^\}\}]+)\}\}" to "Fr:$1" |
||
| (28 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown) | |||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
[[Fr:Immunité_judiciaire]] | |||
{{Currency2|January|2018}} | |||
{{LevelOne}}{{HeaderTestimony}} | {{LevelOne}}{{HeaderTestimony}} | ||
==General Principles== | ==General Principles== | ||
{{seealso|Role of the Trial Judge}} | |||
The principle of judicial immunity protects judges from testifying to observations made during any proceedings they are administering. This principle derives from the principle of judicial independence which protects judges from certain consequences when making decisions.<ref> | The principle of judicial immunity protects judges from testifying to observations made during any proceedings they are administering. This principle derives from the principle of judicial independence which protects judges from certain consequences when making decisions.<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|Beauregard|1fts8|1986 CanLII 24 (SCC)|[1986] 2 SCR 56}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}} (3:2)<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRx|Parente|237tm|2009 CanLII 18685 (ON SC)}}{{perONSC|Templeton J}}{{atL|237tm|7}} | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
This typically means that a judge cannot be compelled to testify regarding "events experienced in the course of their judicial duties" or "matters encountered in the course of exercising a judicial function" | This typically means that a judge cannot be compelled to testify regarding "events experienced in the course of their judicial duties" or "matters encountered in the course of exercising a judicial function."<ref> | ||
{{ibid1|Parente}}{{atsL|237tm|6|}}, {{atsL-np|atL|237tm|12|}}<br> | {{ibid1|Parente}}{{atsL|237tm|6|}}, {{atsL-np|atL|237tm|12|}}<br> | ||
{{CanLIIRPC|Ermina v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)|1j1g3|1998 CanLII 8969 (FC)|167 DLR (4th) 764}}, ''per'' Tremblay-Lamer J{{atL|1j1g3|5}} - 11 citing {{CanLIIRPC|MacKeigan v Hickman|gdkp7|1988 CanLII 7124 (NS SC)|43 CCC (3d) 287}}{{perNSSC|Glube CJ}}<br> | |||
{{supra1|Beauregard}}{{atp|69}}<br> | {{supra1|Beauregard}}{{atp|69}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
| Line 16: | Line 18: | ||
Where the evidence would concern events from prior to the judge's appointment then they will be compellable.<ref> | Where the evidence would concern events from prior to the judge's appointment then they will be compellable.<ref> | ||
e.g. {{ | e.g. {{CanLIIRx|Wolf|1rbbs|2007 ONCA 327 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0){{atL|1rbbs|10}}</ref> | ||
Judicial immunity will cover chamber discussions in front of the preliminary inquiry judge.<ref> | Judicial immunity will cover chamber discussions in front of the preliminary inquiry judge.<ref> | ||
{{supra1|Parente}}{{atL|237tm|16}}</ref> | {{supra1|Parente}}{{atL|237tm|16}}</ref> | ||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
===Giving Evidence and Compelling Attendance=== | |||
A judge is not compellable to give evidence concerning their "process of adjudication."<Ref> | |||
{{CanLIIRPC|Mackeigan v Hickman|1ft26|1989 CanLII 40 (SCC)|[1989] 2 SCR 796}}{{perSCC|Lamer J}} | |||
</ref> | |||
However, a judge may be compellable concerning their administrative functions.<ref> | |||
R v Butler, 2014 NLTD 36{{fix}} | |||
</ref> | |||
{{reflist|2}} | {{reflist|2}} | ||
==Judicial Independence== | ==Judicial Independence== | ||
Tribunals are generally not protected by the constitutional rules around judicial independence as their role is largely to affect government policy.<ref> | Tribunals are generally not protected by the constitutional rules around judicial independence as their role is largely to affect government policy.<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRPC|Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing Branch)|520r|2001 SCC 52 (CanLII)|[2001] 2 SCR 781}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin CJ}}{{atL|520r|24}}<br> | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
In order to resolve disputes, interpret the law and defend the Constitution it is necessary that courts be "completely separate in authority and function from all other participants in the justice system" | In order to resolve disputes, interpret the law and defend the Constitution it is necessary that courts be "completely separate in authority and function from all other participants in the justice system."<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|Beauregard|1fts8|1986 CanLII 24 (SCC)|[1986] 2 SCR 56}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}} (3:2)<br> | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
; Sources of Judicial Independence | ; Sources of Judicial Independence | ||
Judicial Independence comes from an "unwritten constitutional principle"<ref> | Judicial Independence comes from an "unwritten constitutional principle"<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRPC|Ref re Remuneration of Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I.; Ref re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I.|1fqzp|1997 CanLII 317 (SCC)|[1997] 3 SCR 3}}{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}}<br> | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Independence is also derived from the separation of powers between the branches of government.<ref> | Independence is also derived from the separation of powers between the branches of government.<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRPC|Ontario v Criminal Lawyers' Association of Ontario|fzw43|2013 SCC 43 (CanLII)|[2013] 3 SCR 3}}{{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}} (5:4){{atL|fzw43|28}}<br> | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
; Two Aspects of Independence | ; Two Aspects of Independence | ||
Judicial independence involves two aspects. Independence must have "both an individual and a collective or institutional aspect" | Judicial independence involves two aspects. Independence must have "both an individual and a collective or institutional aspect."<ref> | ||
{{ibid1|Beauregard}}<br> | {{ibid1|Beauregard}}<br> | ||
{{CanLIIRPC|MacKeigan v Hickman|1ft26|1989 CanLII 40 (SCC)|[1989] 2 SCR 796}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}} (5:2)<br> | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Individual (or personal) independence means that a judge has a "right to refuse to answer to the executive or legislative branches of government ... as to how and why the judge arrived at a particular judicial conclusion" | Individual (or personal) independence means that a judge has a "right to refuse to answer to the executive or legislative branches of government ... as to how and why the judge arrived at a particular judicial conclusion."<ref> | ||
{{ibid1|MacKeigan}}<br> | {{ibid1|MacKeigan}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
; Purpose | ; Purpose | ||
The objective of judicial independence is "to ensure a reasonable perception of impartiality" | The objective of judicial independence is "to ensure a reasonable perception of impartiality."<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|Lippe|1fslj|1990 CanLII 18 (SCC)|[1991] 2 SCR 114}}{{perSCC|Gonthier J}}<br> | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Independence is a "necessary prerequisite for judicial impartiality" | Independence is a "necessary prerequisite for judicial impartiality."<ref> | ||
{{ibid1|Lippe}} | {{ibid1|Lippe}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
| Line 61: | Line 72: | ||
; Salaries | ; Salaries | ||
Judicial salaries are a means by which judicial independence is preserved.<ref> | Judicial salaries are a means by which judicial independence is preserved.<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRPC|Ref re Remuneration of Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I.; Ref re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I.|1fqzp|1997 CanLII 317 (SCC)|[1997] 3 SCR 3}}{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}}<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRPC|Provincial Court Judges' Assn. of New Brunswick v New Brunswick (Minister of Justice)|1l6wl|2005 SCC 44 (CanLII)|[2005] 2 SCR 286}}{{TheCourtSCC}} <br> | |||
{{CanLIIRPC|Provincial Court Judges’ Association of British Columbia v British Columbia (Attorney General)|gxbqp|2017 BCCA 63 (CanLII)|409 DLR (4th) 492}}{{perBCCA|Saunders JA}} (3:0)<br> | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Independence requires that independence commissions play a role in the setting of salary rates.<ref> | Independence requires that independence commissions play a role in the setting of salary rates.<ref> | ||
{{supra1|PEI Reference}}<br> | {{supra1|PEI Reference}}<br> | ||
</ref> | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
===Judicial Privilege=== | |||
{{seealso|privilege}} | |||
Judicial independence includes a judicial privilege that protects judges from civil suits and an immunity from testimony concerning their conduct in the course of their judicial duties.<ref> | |||
{{CanLIIR|KJMJ||}} | |||
</ref> | |||
This privilege protects the judicial institution not individual judges.<Ref> | |||
{{ibid1|KJMJ}} at para 44 ("Judicial privilege exists to protect the institution of the court, not individual judges.")<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
It cannot be waived by parties or the individual judges.<Ref> | |||
{{ibid1|KJMJ}} at para 44 ("The privilege cannot be waived by an individual judge.")<br> | |||
{{CanLIIRC|Kosko c. Bijimine|1pqn9|2006 QCCA 671 (CanLII)}}{{AtL|1pqn9|43}} ("Judges may not voluntarily waive this immunity and agree to testify.[16] Immunity belongs neither to judges nor to the parties before them. Rather, it exists to protect the institution of the judiciary and the public's confidence in it. Consequently, it may not be waived by either the judges or the parties.")<br> | |||
{{CanLIIR|Baldovi et al|gr8mq|2016 MBQB 90 (CanLII)}}{{atL|gr8mq|22}} | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Latest revision as of 07:11, 23 July 2024
| This page was last substantively updated or reviewed January 2018. (Rev. # 95881) |
General Principles
The principle of judicial immunity protects judges from testifying to observations made during any proceedings they are administering. This principle derives from the principle of judicial independence which protects judges from certain consequences when making decisions.[1]
This typically means that a judge cannot be compelled to testify regarding "events experienced in the course of their judicial duties" or "matters encountered in the course of exercising a judicial function."[2] However, some suggestion is that this also means they are not competent to testify either.[3]
Where the evidence would concern events from prior to the judge's appointment then they will be compellable.[4]
Judicial immunity will cover chamber discussions in front of the preliminary inquiry judge.[5]
- ↑
R v Beauregard, 1986 CanLII 24 (SCC), [1986] 2 SCR 56, per Dickson J (3:2)
R v Parente, 2009 CanLII 18685 (ON SC), per Templeton J, at para 7 - ↑
Parente, ibid., at paras 6, 237tm12
Ermina v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 8969 (FC), 167 DLR (4th) 764, per Tremblay-Lamer J, at para 5 - 11 citing MacKeigan v Hickman, 1988 CanLII 7124 (NS SC), 43 CCC (3d) 287, per Glube CJ
Beauregard, supra, at p. 69
- ↑ Parente, supra, at para 10
- ↑ e.g. R v Wolf, 2007 ONCA 327 (CanLII), per curiam (3:0), at para 10
- ↑ Parente, supra, at para 16
Giving Evidence and Compelling Attendance
A judge is not compellable to give evidence concerning their "process of adjudication."[1] However, a judge may be compellable concerning their administrative functions.[2]
- ↑ Mackeigan v Hickman, 1989 CanLII 40 (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 796, per Lamer J
- ↑ R v Butler, 2014 NLTD 36(complete citation pending)
Judicial Independence
Tribunals are generally not protected by the constitutional rules around judicial independence as their role is largely to affect government policy.[1]
In order to resolve disputes, interpret the law and defend the Constitution it is necessary that courts be "completely separate in authority and function from all other participants in the justice system."[2]
- Sources of Judicial Independence
Judicial Independence comes from an "unwritten constitutional principle"[3]
Independence is also derived from the separation of powers between the branches of government.[4]
- Two Aspects of Independence
Judicial independence involves two aspects. Independence must have "both an individual and a collective or institutional aspect."[5]
Individual (or personal) independence means that a judge has a "right to refuse to answer to the executive or legislative branches of government ... as to how and why the judge arrived at a particular judicial conclusion."[6]
- Purpose
The objective of judicial independence is "to ensure a reasonable perception of impartiality."[7] Independence is a "necessary prerequisite for judicial impartiality."[8]
- Salaries
Judicial salaries are a means by which judicial independence is preserved.[9]
Independence requires that independence commissions play a role in the setting of salary rates.[10]
- ↑
Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing Branch), 2001 SCC 52 (CanLII), [2001] 2 SCR 781, per McLachlin CJ, at para 24
- ↑
R v Beauregard, 1986 CanLII 24 (SCC), [1986] 2 SCR 56, per Dickson J (3:2)
- ↑
Ref re Remuneration of Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I.; Ref re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I., 1997 CanLII 317 (SCC), [1997] 3 SCR 3, per Lamer CJ
- ↑
Ontario v Criminal Lawyers' Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43 (CanLII), [2013] 3 SCR 3, per Karakatsanis J (5:4), at para 28
- ↑
Beauregard, ibid.
MacKeigan v Hickman, 1989 CanLII 40 (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 796, per McLachlin J (5:2)
- ↑
MacKeigan, ibid.
- ↑
R v Lippe, 1990 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1991] 2 SCR 114, per Gonthier J
- ↑ Lippe, ibid.
- ↑
Ref re Remuneration of Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I.; Ref re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I., 1997 CanLII 317 (SCC), [1997] 3 SCR 3, per Lamer CJ
Provincial Court Judges' Assn. of New Brunswick v New Brunswick (Minister of Justice), 2005 SCC 44 (CanLII), [2005] 2 SCR 286, per curiam
Provincial Court Judges’ Association of British Columbia v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2017 BCCA 63 (CanLII), 409 DLR (4th) 492, per Saunders JA (3:0)
- ↑
PEI Reference, supra
Judicial Privilege
Judicial independence includes a judicial privilege that protects judges from civil suits and an immunity from testimony concerning their conduct in the course of their judicial duties.[1]
This privilege protects the judicial institution not individual judges.[2] It cannot be waived by parties or the individual judges.[3]
- ↑ R v KJMJ, [1]
- ↑
KJMJ, ibid. at para 44 ("Judicial privilege exists to protect the institution of the court, not individual judges.")
- ↑
KJMJ, ibid. at para 44 ("The privilege cannot be waived by an individual judge.")
Kosko c. Bijimine, 2006 QCCA 671 (CanLII), at para 43 ("Judges may not voluntarily waive this immunity and agree to testify.[16] Immunity belongs neither to judges nor to the parties before them. Rather, it exists to protect the institution of the judiciary and the public's confidence in it. Consequently, it may not be waived by either the judges or the parties.")
R v Baldovi et al, 2016 MBQB 90 (CanLII), at para 22