Complainant Sexual Activity Evidence and Related Evidence: Difference between revisions

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{{Currency|January 2021}}
[[fr:Preuves relatives à l'activité sexuelle du plaignant]]{{Currency2|November|2023}}
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==General Principles==
==General Principles==
{{seealso|Complainant's Sexual History (Prior to December 13, 2018)|Crown Duty to Disclose|Disclosure of Third Party Records|Production of Records for Sexual Offences}}
{{seealso|Complainant's Sexual History (Prior to December 13, 2018)|Crown Duty to Disclose|Disclosure of Third Party Records|Admission of Sexual Activity Evidence for Sexual Offences|Production of Records for Sexual Offences}}


Section 276{{CCC}} is an exclusionary rule of evidence prohibiting any party from adducing evidence of sexual activity of a complainant that is not part of a criminal offence on the basis that it may be used to support prohibited inferences related to the sexual activity of the victim.  
Section 276{{CCC}} is an exclusionary rule of evidence prohibiting any party from adducing evidence of sexual activity of a complainant that is not part of a criminal offence on the basis that it may be used to support prohibited inferences related to the sexual activity of the victim.  
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; Applicable to Defence and Crown
; Applicable to Defence and Crown
The exclusionary rule found in s. 276 will require both defence and Crown to apply to the trial judge before they can adduce sexual activity evidence.<Ref>
The exclusionary rule found in s. 276 will require both defence and Crown to apply to the trial judge before they can adduce sexual activity evidence.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Barton|j0fqj|2019 SCC 33 (CanLII)|[2019] 2 SCR 579}}{{perSCC|Moldaver J}}{{atL|j0fqj|80}} ("...s. 276(1), which confirms the irrelevance of the “twin myths”, is categorical in nature and applies irrespective of which party has led the prior sexual activity evidence. Thus, regardless of the evidence adduced by the Crown, Mr. Barton’s evidence was inadmissible to support either of the “twin myths”.")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Barton|j0fqj|2019 SCC 33 (CanLII)|[2019] 2 SCR 579}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver J}}{{atL|j0fqj|80}} ("...s. 276(1), which confirms the irrelevance of the “twin myths”, is categorical in nature and applies irrespective of which party has led the prior sexual activity evidence. Thus, regardless of the evidence adduced by the Crown, Mr. Barton’s evidence was inadmissible to support either of the “twin myths”.")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Goldfinch|j16t7|2019 SCC 38 (CanLII)|380 CCC (3d) 1}}{{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}}{{atL|j16t7|75}} ("I note that Crown counsel would not have adduced this evidence but for the s. 276 application, which I have concluded should not have been granted. While the parties did not have the benefit of this Court’s recent holding in Barton, I would reiterate that Crown-led evidence of prior sexual activity must be governed by the principles set out in s. 276(1) and Seaboyer (Barton, at paras. 68, 80 and 197)")
{{CanLIIRP|Goldfinch|j16t7|2019 SCC 38 (CanLII)|380 CCC (3d) 1}}{{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}}{{atL|j16t7|75}} ("I note that Crown counsel would not have adduced this evidence but for the s. 276 application, which I have concluded should not have been granted. While the parties did not have the benefit of this Court’s recent holding in Barton, I would reiterate that Crown-led evidence of prior sexual activity must be governed by the principles set out in s. 276(1) and Seaboyer (Barton, at paras. 68, 80 and 197)")
</ref>
</ref>
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; Components of the Rule
; Components of the Rule
The exclusionary rule under s. 276 can be broken down into three components to be engaged:<ref>
The exclusionary rule under s. 276 can be broken down into three components to be engaged:<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|MT|fs52f|2012 ONCA 511 (CanLII)|289 CCC (3d) 115}}{{perONCA|Watt JA}}{{atL|fs52f|29}}</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|MT|fs52f|2012 ONCA 511 (CanLII)|289 CCC (3d) 115}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{atL|fs52f|29}}</ref>
* offence charged
* offence charged
* subject-matter
* subject-matter
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</ref>
</ref>


The purpose behind the principles from Seaboyer is to protect "a complainant’s dignity, equality and privacy rights".<Ref>
The purpose behind the principles from Seaboyer is to protect "a complainant’s dignity, equality and privacy rights."<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Delmas|j6l6r|2020 ABCA 152 (CanLII)|64 CR (7th) 71}}{{AtL|j6l6r|46}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (2:1) ("The purpose of the Seaboyer common law principle ..., and s 276 is to protect “a complainant’s dignity, equality and privacy rights,”")
{{CanLIIRP|Delmas|j6l6r|2020 ABCA 152 (CanLII)|64 CR (7th) 71}}{{AtL|j6l6r|46}}{{TheCourtABCA}} (2:1) ("The purpose of the Seaboyer common law principle ..., and s 276 is to protect “a complainant’s dignity, equality and privacy rights,”")
</ref>
</ref>
This protection exists beyond the trial and includes the appeal process and potentially beyond.<Ref>
R v Davies, 2022 BCCA 103 at para 1 and 2
</reF>


; Principles of Fundamental Justice
; Principles of Fundamental Justice
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# "protecting the integrity of the trial by excluding evidence that is misleading"
# "protecting the integrity of the trial by excluding evidence that is misleading"
# "protecting the rights of the accused, as well as encouraging the reporting of sexual violence" and  
# "protecting the rights of the accused, as well as encouraging the reporting of sexual violence" and  
# "protecting the “security and privacy of the witnesses” "
# protecting the “security and privacy of the witnesses” "


; Context Necessary
; Context Necessary
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{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


===Constitutionality===
===Complainant Sexual Activity Evidence===
; Constitutionality of s. 276 and 277
Both the procedural and substantive aspects of s. 276 do not violate s. 7 or 11(d){{CCRF}}.<ref>
{{supra1|Darrach}}<br>
</ref>
However, it has been observed that s. 276 "cannot be interpreted so as to deprive a person of a fair defence."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Crosby|1frj7|1995 CanLII 107 (SCC)|[1995] 2 SCR 912}}{{perSCC|L'Heureux‑Dubé J}}{{atL|1frj7|11}}<br>
</ref>
 
Section 277 does not violate s. 7 or 11(d) of the Charter.<ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme|1fskf|1991 CanLII 76 (SCC)|[1991] 2 SCR 577}}{{perSCC|McLachlin J}}<br>
</ref>
 
; Retrospectivity of Bill C-51 Amendments
The amendments are procedural and do not affect substantive rights.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|RMR|j1rzp|2019 BCSC 1093 (CanLII)|56 CR (7th) 414}}{{AtL|j1rzp|5}}
</ref>
 
; Constitutionality of Bill C-51 Amendments
There are various challenges to the Bill C-51 amendments. Most courts are finding them to be constitutional.<ref>
Constitutional:<br>
{{CanLIIRP|AC|j1h00|2019 ONSC 4270 (CanLII)|439 CRR (2d) 360}}{{perONSC|Sutherland J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|FA|j109l|2019 ONCJ 391 (CanLII)|56 CR (7th) 182}}{{perONCJ|Caponecchia J}}<br>
Unconstitutional:<br>
{{CanLIIRP|AM|j21hz|2019 SKPC 46 (CanLII)|56 CR (7th) 389}}{{perSKPC|Henning J}}<br>
</ref>
 
{{reflist|2}}
 
===Prohibited Inferences for Certain Offences===
Section 276(1){{CCC}} prohibits evidence of prior sexual conduct where it is used to make prohibited general inferences. These inferences are known as the "dual myths" or "dual myths", summarized as inferring "that unchaste women were more likely to consent to intercourse and in any event, were less worthy of belief" <ref>
Section 276(1){{CCC}} prohibits evidence of prior sexual conduct where it is used to make prohibited general inferences. These inferences are known as the "dual myths" or "dual myths", summarized as inferring "that unchaste women were more likely to consent to intercourse and in any event, were less worthy of belief" <ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Seaboyer|1fskf|1991 CanLII 76 (SCC)|[1991] 2 SCR 577}}{{perSCC|McLachlin J}}{{atp|386}}<br>  
{{CanLIIRP|Seaboyer|1fskf|1991 CanLII 76 (SCC)|[1991] 2 SCR 577}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}{{atp|386}}<br>  
{{CanLIIRP|MM|1wd0m|1999 CanLII 15063 (ON SC)|[1999] OJ No 3943 (SCJ)}}{{perONSC|Langdon J}}{{atL|1wd0m|19}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|MM|1wd0m|1999 CanLII 15063 (ON SC)|[1999] OJ No 3943 (SCJ)}}{{perONSC|Langdon J}}{{atL|1wd0m|19}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|MT|fs52f|2012 ONCA 511 (CanLII)|289 CCC (3d) 115}}{{perONCA|Watt JA}}{{atL|fs52f|32}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|MT|fs52f|2012 ONCA 511 (CanLII)|289 CCC (3d) 115}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{atL|fs52f|32}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


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; Must Relate to Myths
; Must Relate to Myths
Where the purpose of the evidence does not touch on the two "myths", then the exclusionary rule does not apply.<ref>
Where the purpose of the evidence does not touch on the two "myths", then the exclusionary rule does not apply.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|MT|fs52f|2012 ONCA 511 (CanLII)|289 CCC (3d) 115}}{{perONCA|Watt JA}}{{atL|fs52f|32}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|MT|fs52f|2012 ONCA 511 (CanLII)|289 CCC (3d) 115}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{atL|fs52f|32}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


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{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}
===Constitutionality===
; Constitutionality of s. 276 and 277
Both the procedural and substantive aspects of s. 276 do not violate s. 7 or 11(d){{CCRF}}.<ref>
{{supra1|Darrach}}<br>
</ref>
However, it has been observed that s. 276 "cannot be interpreted so as to deprive a person of a fair defence."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Crosby|1frj7|1995 CanLII 107 (SCC)|[1995] 2 SCR 912}}{{perSCC|L'Heureux‑Dubé J}}{{atL|1frj7|11}}<br>
</ref>


==Procedure==
Section 277 does not violate s. 7 or 11(d) of the Charter.<ref>
; Accused
{{CanLIIRPC|R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme|1fskf|1991 CanLII 76 (SCC)|[1991] 2 SCR 577}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}<br>
Where the accused seeks to lead evidence of the complainant's prior sexual history for one or more valid purposes, they must apply under s. 276(2) and satisfy the necessary pre-conditions.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Stover|jc8m2|2020 BCCA 368 (CanLII)}}{{perBCCA|Abrioux JA}}{{AtL|jc8m2|43}} ("The legal framework which governs this ground of appeal is well known. An accused who seeks to lead evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual history for a purpose apart from the twin myths must make an application and satisfy the pre-conditions for admissibility set out in s. 276(2) of the Code.")<br>
</ref>
</ref>


; Crown
; Retrospectivity of Bill C-51 Amendments
When the Crown seeks to lead evidence of the complainant's prior sexual history for one or more valid purposes, they must apply under ''Seyboyer'' to determine whether the evidence is admissible.<Ref>
The amendments are procedural and do not affect substantive rights.<ref>
{{ibid1|Stover}}{{AtL|jc8m2|43}} ("Where the Crown seeks to lead such evidence, trial judges should follow the Supreme Court’s guidance in Seaboyer to determine the admissibility of the evidence in a voir dire...")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|RMR|j1rzp|2019 BCSC 1093 (CanLII)|56 CR (7th) 414}}{{AtL|j1rzp|5}}
{{CanLIIRP|Barton|j0fqj|2019 SCC 33 (CanLII)|[2019] 2 SCR 579}}{{perSCC|Moldaver J}}{{atL|j0fqj|80}}
</ref>
</ref>


; Non-Compliance
; Constitutionality of Bill C-51 Amendments
Failure to comply with these principles will not be fatal to the integrity of the trial, but will be a case-by-case assessment.<ref>
There are various challenges to the Bill C-51 amendments. Most courts are finding them to be constitutional.<ref>
{{supra1|Stover}}{{atL||43}} ("Non-compliance with these principles, however, will not always undermine trial integrity. Rather, the individualized features of the case will determine the result...")<br>
Constitutional:<br>
{{CanLIIRP|CMM|j56w8|2020 BCCA 56 (CanLII)|BCJ No 208}}{{perBCCA|DeWitt‑Van Oosten JA}}{{atL|j56w8|183}}
{{CanLIIRP|AC|j1h00|2019 ONSC 4270 (CanLII)|439 CRR (2d) 360}}{{perONSC|Sutherland J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|FA|j109l|2019 ONCJ 391 (CanLII)|56 CR (7th) 182}}{{perONCJ|Caponecchia J}}<br>
Unconstitutional:<br>
{{CanLIIRP|AM|j21hz|2019 SKPC 46 (CanLII)|56 CR (7th) 389}}{{perSKPC|Henning J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


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In addition to the enumerated charges, the protections of s. 276 will also apply to any charges that have "some connection" to an enumerated offence.<ref>
In addition to the enumerated charges, the protections of s. 276 will also apply to any charges that have "some connection" to an enumerated offence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Barton|j0fqj|2019 SCC 33 (CanLII)|[2019] 2 SCR 579}}{{perSCC|Moldaver J}}{{atL|j0fqj|76}} ("...I am of the view that the s. 276 regime applies to any proceeding in which an offence listed in s. 276(1) has some connection to the offence charged, even if no listed offence was particularized in the charging document. ...")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Barton|j0fqj|2019 SCC 33 (CanLII)|[2019] 2 SCR 579}}{{perSCC-H|Moldaver J}}{{atL|j0fqj|76}} ("...I am of the view that the s. 276 regime applies to any proceeding in which an offence listed in s. 276(1) has some connection to the offence charged, even if no listed offence was particularized in the charging document. ...")<br>
</ref>
</ref>


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{{CanLIIRP|Pittiman|1l3db|2005 CanLII 23206 (ON CA)|198 CCC (3d) 308}}{{perONCA|Weiler JA}}{{atL|1l3db|33}}, Borins JA dissenting on result, appealed to {{CanLII|1mv05|2006 SCC 9 (CanLII)}}{{perSCC|Charron J}} (5:0) on another issue <br>
{{CanLIIRP|Pittiman|1l3db|2005 CanLII 23206 (ON CA)|198 CCC (3d) 308}}{{perONCA|Weiler JA}}{{atL|1l3db|33}}, Borins JA dissenting on result, appealed to {{CanLII|1mv05|2006 SCC 9 (CanLII)}}{{perSCC|Charron J}} (5:0) on another issue <br>
{{CanLIIRP|Brothers|2dc9s|1995 ABCA 185 (CanLII)|99 CCC (3d) 64}}{{perABCA|Russell JA}}
{{CanLIIRP|Brothers|2dc9s|1995 ABCA 185 (CanLII)|99 CCC (3d) 64}}{{perABCA|Russell JA}}
</ref>
; Collateral Facts
The trial judge may prohibit the accused from impeaching the complainant on their version of prior sexual contact on account that it violates the collateral fact rule.<ref>
R v Peters, 2023 MBCA 96 (CanLII) at paras 25 to 26{{fix}}
[[Collateral Fact Rule]]
</ref>
</ref>


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</reF>
</reF>


Solo activities of a sexual nature such as watching pornography can constitute "sexual activity".<ref>
Solo activities of a sexual nature such as watching pornography can constitute "sexual activity."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|DCS|jspvw|2022 ABPC 223 (CanLII)}}{{atL|jspvw|18}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|DCS|jspvw|2022 ABPC 223 (CanLII)}}{{atL|jspvw|18}}<br>
{{CanLIIRT|RI|jfr28|2021 ONSC 3236 (CanLII)}}<br>
{{CanLIIRT|RI|jfr28|2021 ONSC 3236 (CanLII)}}<br>
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Courts have found that the following types of evidence are not "sexual activity":
Courts have found that the following types of evidence are not "sexual activity":
* discussions of prospective sexual activity<ref>
* discussions of prospective sexual activity<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Langan|j46xt|2019 BCCA 467 (CanLII)|383 CCC (3d) 516}}{{perBCCA|Bauman CJ}}{{atsL|j46xt|118| to 119}} -  affirmed at 2020 SCC 33 (CanLII)
{{CanLIIRP|Langan|j46xt|2019 BCCA 467 (CanLII)|383 CCC (3d) 516}}{{perBCCA|Bauman CJ}}{{atsL|j46xt|118| to 119}} (dissent) with majority rev'd at [http://canlii.ca/t/jbjhd 2020 SCC 33 (CanLII)]
</ref>
</ref>
* general discussions of the complainant's relationship<Ref>
* general discussions of the complainant's relationship<Ref>
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{{CanLIIRP|Antonelli|fnhlh|2011 ONSC 5416 (CanLII)|280 CCC (3d) 96}}{{perONSC|Himel J}}
{{CanLIIRP|Antonelli|fnhlh|2011 ONSC 5416 (CanLII)|280 CCC (3d) 96}}{{perONSC|Himel J}}
</ref>
</ref>
{{reflist|2}}
==Purpose of Admission==
===Evidence Related to Credibility and Consent===
Evidence advanced to make an inference supported by an established myth is prohibited.  Any other inferences directed to credibility and consent may be argued as admissible. <ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Ecker|1mdjz|1995 CanLII 3910 (SK CA)|96 CCC (3d) 161}}{{perSKCA|Cameron JA}} </ref>
Using prior sexual activity to go to credibility at large is not a valid purpose.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Goldfinch|j16t7|2019 SCC 38 (CanLII)|380 CCC (3d) 1}}{{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}}{{atL|j16t7|56}}
</ref>
Commentators have suggested that the prohibition should focus on "general" inference that are focused on attacking the character of the complainant.<ref>David M. Paciocco, "The New Rape Shield Provisions In Section 276 Should Survive Charter Challenge" (1993), 21 C.R.(4th) 223</ref>
Some courts have adopted this in an attempt to reconcile s.276(1) and (2). <ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Harper|1fnm4|1995 CanLII 3483 (PE SCTD)| Nfld & PEIR 77 (PEISC)}}{{perPEISC|Jenkins J}}, rev’d on other grounds [http://canlii.ca/t/1cvx9 1997 CanLII 4553] (PE SCAD), (1997), 149 Nfld. & PEIR 295 (P.E.I.C.A.){{perPEICA|Carruthers CJ}}</ref>
Where credibility is an essential issue of trial, the right to full answer and defence weighs in favour of admitting evidence of inconsistencies and contradictions even where it involves prior sexual activity.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Gill|fm6x5|2011 ONCJ 345 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Clark J}}{{atL|fm6x5|27}} ("Where credibility is the essential issue at trial, however, the right to make full answer and defence will often militate in favour of the admission of evidence that demonstrates inconsistencies or contradicts the complainant’s evidence, even if it reveals prior sexual activity")<br>
see {{CanLIIRP|Harris|6hgs|1997 CanLII 6317 (ON CA)|[1997] OJ No 35 60 (CA), 118 CCC (3d) 498}}{{perONCA|Moldaver JA}}{{atp|509}} citing {{CanLIIRP|Crosby|1frj7|1995 CanLII 107 (SCC)|98 CCC (3d) 225}}{{perSCC|L'Heureux-Dubé J}}<br>
</ref>
Evidence has been admitted in the following scenarios:
* where the defence wanted to lead evidence of a romantic relationship between the accused and complainant where the complainant characterized it as platonic.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Harris|6hgs|1997 CanLII 6317 (ON CA)|118 CCC (3d) 498}}{{perONCA|Moldaver JA}}</ref>
* evidence of prior sexual activity between the accused and complainant is relevant to the issue of consent as it addresses the complainant's state of mind<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|WJA, et al.|2cwgl|2010 YKTC 108 (CanLII)}}, ''per'' Cozens J{{atL|2cwgl|33}}<br>
</ref>
* evidence that contradicts the complainant's claims that she had no sexual interest in the accused at the time of the incident;<ref>
{{supra1|Harris}}</ref>
* evidence of prior relationships to demonstrate the development of the relationship between the accused and victim<ref>
{{supra1|Gill}}{{atL|fm6x5|32}}<br>
</ref><!--
* evidence of prior activity as an explanation for the presence of semen during the medical examination of the complainant at after the offence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Downey|1mrxx|1992 CanLII 2615 (NS CA)|307 APR 73}}{{perNSCA-H|Hallett JA}}<br>
</ref>-->
* complainant's prior reports of strikingly similar incidents of sexual assaults<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|SG|1r9ml|2007 CanLII 14331 (ON SC)|219 CCC (3d) 549}}{{perONSC|Spies J}} <br>
{{CanLIIRP|Anstey|1vm0q|2002 NLCA 7 (CanLII)|162 CCC (3d) 567}}{{perNLCA|O'Neill JA}}</ref>
* evidence that contradicts the complainant's claims that they believed the sexual encounter was "too early in the relationship."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Nelson|4zct|2001 BCCA 351 (CanLII)}}{{perBCCA-H|Prowse JA}} (2:1)</ref>
Evidence has been found inadmissible in the following scenarios:
* A sex toy party earlier in the day held by the victim was not relevant to the allegations so is not admissible.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|McDonald|56h0|2003 SKQB 165 (CanLII)|156 CCC (3d) 248}}{{perSKQB|Hrabinsky J}}</ref>
Evidence should be admitted where it "contains highly distinctive features of a consensual sexual relationship as between the parties which is similar to the allegations before the Court."<ref>
{{supra1|Gill}}{{atL|fm6x5|29}}<br>
{{CanLIIR-N|McIntyre|, [1993] OJ No 2971 (CA)}}
</ref>
Evidence of sexual activity tending to establish the development of the parties' relationship can often be admitted. It may be admitted to provide the necessary context to the incident evidence in order to avoid assessing the incident in a vacuum and lead to the perception that the accused's testimony was improbable.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|MM|1wd0m|1999 CanLII 15063 (ON SC)|[1999] OJ No 3943 (ONSC)}}{{perONSC|Langdon J}}<br>
see also {{CanLIIRP|Harris|6hgs|1997 CanLII 6317 (ON CA)|[1997] OJ No 3560}}{{perONCA|Moldaver JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Strickland|1qj3v|2007 CanLII 3679 (ON SC)|[2007] OJ No 517 (O.S.C.)}}{{perONSC|Heeney J}}{{atsL|1qj3v|34| to 35}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|BB|22p4x|2009 CanLII 9404 (ON SC)|[2009] OJ No 862 (O.S.C.)}}{{perONSC|Spies J}}{{atsL|22p4x|19| to 20}}<br>
{{supra1|WJA}}{{atL|2cwgl|35}}<br>
</ref>
Excluding such evidence will distort and diminish the accused's evidence enough to suggest sexual activity occurred "out of the blue."<ref>
{{supra1|Strickland}}
</ref>
Evidence of the closeness of the accused and complainant in the form of flirting, can be found relevant to the context of the incident and admissible.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Ayenun|fxfp6|2013 ONCJ 260 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Feldman J}}{{atsL|fxfp6|35|, 36}}<br>
</ref>
{{reflist|2}}
==Exception to Prohibition==
; Exceptions
Section 276(2) sets out the exception to the rule permitting extrinsic evidence of sexual activity to be admitted where it:<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|MT|fs52f|2012 ONCA 511 (CanLII)|289 CCC (3d) 115}}{{perONCA|Watt JA}}{{atL|fs52f|33}}</ref>
* is of specific instances of sexual activity;
* is relevant to an issue at trial; and
* has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.
Section 276(2) prohibits the admission of sexual history evidence described in s. 276(1) unless it is:
# not being used for a prohibited inference described in 276(1);
# is relevant to a trial issue;
# is of specific instances of sexual activity; and
# has a ''significant'' probative value not substantially outweighed by the prejudice.
{{quotation2|
276<br>
{{Removed|(1)}}
; Conditions for admissibility
(2) In proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection (1) {{AnnSec2|276(1)}}, evidence shall not be adduced by or on behalf of the accused that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity other than the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge, whether with the accused or with any other person, unless the judge, provincial court judge or justice determines, in accordance with the procedures set out in sections 278.93 {{AnnSec2|278.93}} and 278.94 {{AnnSec2|278.94}}, that the evidence
:(a) is not being adduced for the purpose of supporting an inference described in subsection (1) {{AnnSec2|276(1)}};
:(b) is relevant to an issue at trial; and
:(c) is of specific instances of sexual activity; and
:(d) has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.
{{Removed|(3) and (4)}}
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 276;
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.)}}, s. 12 {{LegHistory90s|1992, c. 38}}, s. 2 {{LegHistory00s|2002, c. 13}}, s. 13; {{LegHistory10s|2018, c. 29}}, s. 21; {{LegHistory10s|2019, c. 25}}, s. 100.
{{Annotation}}
|{{CCCSec2|276}}
|{{NoteUp|276|2}}
}}
; Standard of Proof
The applicant must satisfy the requirements of admission on a balance of probabilities.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Darrach|523t|2000 SCC 46 (CanLII)|[2000] 2 SCR 443}}{{perSCC|Gonthier J}}{{atL|523t|46}}<br>
</ref>
; Application to Defence Only
The requirements of s. 276(2) will only apply to the accused and not the Crown. The Crown-led evidence is governed by 276(1) and the rule from ''Seyboyer''.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Langan|j46xt|2019 BCCA 467 (CanLII)|383 CCC (3d) 516}}{{perBCCA|Bauman CJ}}{{atL|j46xt|112}} - affirmed at 2020 SCC 33 (CanLII)
</ref>
Where the Crown seeks to lead 276 evidence, they are governed by the principles from Seaboyer that "[e]vidence of consensual sexual conduct on the part of the complainant may be admissible for purposes other than [the twin myths] where it possesses probative value on an issue in the trial and where that probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice flowing from the evidence".<Ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme|1fskf|1991 CanLII 76 (SCC)|[1991] 2 SCR 577}}{{perSCC|McLachlin J}}{{atL|1fskf|101}}
</ref>
{{reflist|2}}
===Factors===
Section 276(3) sets out statutory factors that must be considered on defence application:
{{quotation2|
276<br>
{{Removed|(1) and (2)}}
; Factors that judge must consider
(3) In determining whether evidence is admissible under subsection (2) {{AnnSec2|276(2)}}, the judge, provincial court judge or justice shall take into account
:(a) the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make a full answer and defence;
:(b) society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault offences;
:(c) whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evidence will assist in arriving at a just determination in the case;
:(d) the need to remove from the fact-finding process any discriminatory belief or bias;
:(e) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of prejudice, sympathy or hostility in the jury;
:(f) the potential prejudice to the complainant’s personal dignity and right of privacy;
:(g) the right of the complainant and of every individual to personal security and to the full protection and benefit of the law; and
:(h) any other factor that the judge, provincial court judge or justice considers relevant.
{{Removed|(4)}}
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 276;
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.)}}, s. 12;
{{LegHistory90s|1992, c. 38}}, s. 2;
{{LegHistory00s|2002, c. 13}}, s. 13;
{{LegHistory10s|2018, c. 29}}, s. 21;
{{LegHistory10s|2019, c. 25}}, s. 100.
{{Annotation}}
|{{CCCSec2|276}}
|{{NoteUp|276|3}}
}}
Where the application comes from the Crown, the factors from 276(3) still apply.<ref>
e.g. {{CanLIIRx|Boyle|j1hpv|2019 ONCJ 516 (CanLII)}}{{perONCJ|Doody J}}{{atL|j1hpv|14}} ("I must apply those principles [from s. 276(3)], appropriately modified because I am considering Crown-led evidence, in determining whether to admit the evidence in issue.")
</ref>
This arises from the fact that s. 276 codifies the rules articulated in Seaboyer.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Darrach|523t|2000 SCC 46 (CanLII)|[2000] 2 SCR 443}}{{perSCC|Gonthier J}}{{atL|523t|20}}
</ref>
Evidence of extrinsic sexual activity of the complainant is "rarely ... relevant to support a denial that sexual activity took place or to establish consent."<ref>
{{ibid1|Darrach}}{{atL|523t|58}}</ref>
Whether the complainant has previously been sexually assaulted is irrelevant.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|ARB|1v98j|1998 CanLII 14603 (ON CA)| OR (3d) 361}}{{perONCA|Finlayson JA}}{{atp|365}}, (2:1) aff’d [http://canlii.ca/t/524z 2000 SCC 30] (CanLII), [2000] 1 SCR 781 {{perSCC|McLachlin CJ}}</ref>
; Significant probative value
The ''significant probative value'' standard places a greater threshold on relevance for the admission of prior sexual history evidence. It is intended to prohibit evidence that may be of trifling relevance. Regardless of the purpose of the evidence, sexual history evidence can tend to bring the administration of justice to disrepute.
<ref> {{supra1|Darrach}} at 40</ref>
"Significant" must be read in light of the requirement of having "full answer and defence."<ref>
{{supra1|Darrach}}</ref>
; No Need for Full Analysis
Where the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value, the judge need not undertake a full consideration of all the factors found in s. 276(3).<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Nicholson|5skh|1998 ABCA 290 (CanLII)|129 CCC (3d) 198}}{{perABCA|Rawlins JA}}{{atL|5skh|17}}<br>
see also {{CanLIIRP|Gauthier|2326c|1995 CanLII 8937 (BC CA)|100 CCC (3d) 563}}<br>
</ref>
{{reflist|2}}
===Examples===
Prior acts of prostitution are generally never considered relevant for admission.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Seaboyer; R v Gayme|1fskf|1991 CanLII 76 (SCC)|[1991] 2 SCR 577}}{{perSCC|McLachlin J}} ("Evidence of prior acts of prostitution or allegations of prostitution are properly excluded by the provision.  In my opinion, this evidence is never relevant and, besides its irrelevance, is hugely prejudicial.")
</ref>
Examples where sexual history should be admitted:<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Seaboyer; R v Gayme|1fskf|1991 CanLII 76 (SCC)|[1991] 2 SCR 577}}{{perSCC|McLachlin J}}{{atsL|1fskf|99| to 106}}
</ref>
* where the "[e]vidence of specific instances of sexual conduct tend[s] to prove that a person other than the accused caused the physical consequences of the rape alleged by the prosecution"
* where the "[e]vidence of sexual conduct tending to prove bias or motive to fabricate on the part of the complainant"
* where the "[e]vidence of prior sexual conduct, known to the accused at the time of the act charged, tending to prove that the accused believed that the complainant was consenting to the act charged (without laying down absolute rules, normally one would expect some proximity in time between the conduct that is alleged to have given rise to an honest belief and the conduct charged)";
* where there is "[e]vidence of prior sexual conduct which meets the requirements for the reception of similar act evidence, bearing in mind that such evidence cannot be used illegitimately merely to show that the complainant consented or is an unreliable witness";
* where there is "[e]vidence tending to rebut proof introduced by the prosecution regarding the complainant's sexual conduct."


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}
Line 486: Line 292:
==See Also==
==See Also==
* [[Complainant's Sexual History (Prior to December 13, 2018)]]
* [[Complainant's Sexual History (Prior to December 13, 2018)]]
* [[Admission of Certain Complainant Evidence for Sexual Offences]]
* [[Production of Records for Sexual Offences]]
* [[Production of Records for Sexual Offences]]
* [[Precedent_-_Section_276_Application]]
* [[Precedent_-_Section_276_Application]]
* [[Precedent - Section 278.3 Application]]
* [[Precedent - Section 278.3 Application]]
* [[Precedent - Seaboyer Application]]
* [[Precedent - Seaboyer Application]]

Latest revision as of 11:49, 26 September 2024

This page was last substantively updated or reviewed November 2023. (Rev. # 96533)

General Principles

See also: Complainant's Sexual History (Prior to December 13, 2018), Crown Duty to Disclose, Disclosure of Third Party Records, Admission of Sexual Activity Evidence for Sexual Offences, and Production of Records for Sexual Offences

Section 276 of the Criminal Code is an exclusionary rule of evidence prohibiting any party from adducing evidence of sexual activity of a complainant that is not part of a criminal offence on the basis that it may be used to support prohibited inferences related to the sexual activity of the victim.

Applicable to Defence and Crown

The exclusionary rule found in s. 276 will require both defence and Crown to apply to the trial judge before they can adduce sexual activity evidence.[1]

Components of the Rule

The exclusionary rule under s. 276 can be broken down into three components to be engaged:[2]

  • offence charged
  • subject-matter
  • purpose

It is considered rare for prior sexual activity to have any bearing to support a finding that the sexual offence did not occur.[3]

Purpose

The intention of Parliament in enacting this provision was to respond to the findings of R v Seaboyer as they relate to the false relevancy of prior sexual activities.[4]

The purpose behind the principles from Seaboyer is to protect "a complainant’s dignity, equality and privacy rights."[5] This protection exists beyond the trial and includes the appeal process and potentially beyond.[6]

Principles of Fundamental Justice

The principles of fundamental justice include three purposes of s. 276:[7]

  1. "protecting the integrity of the trial by excluding evidence that is misleading"
  2. "protecting the rights of the accused, as well as encouraging the reporting of sexual violence" and
  3. protecting the “security and privacy of the witnesses” "
Context Necessary

Section 276 is not a "blanket exclusion of evidence of other sexual activity" and should not leave the trier-of-fact with a "misleading impression" of the relationship between the parties.[8]

When Section 276 Not Usually Available to Accused

Where the accused's defence is a denial that the sexual activity ever took place, the use of evidence captured by s. 276 will "rarely" be available.[9]

Accidental Disclosure of 276 Records

Defence counsel are not permitted to possess s. 276 records nor can they use the records without first making an application. When obtained unlawfully, they must be returned and then subject to an application. The records cannot be used to support the granting of the application.[10]

  1. ↑ R v Barton, 2019 SCC 33 (CanLII), [2019] 2 SCR 579, per Moldaver J, at para 80 ("...s. 276(1), which confirms the irrelevance of the “twin myths”, is categorical in nature and applies irrespective of which party has led the prior sexual activity evidence. Thus, regardless of the evidence adduced by the Crown, Mr. Barton’s evidence was inadmissible to support either of the “twin myths”.")
    R v Goldfinch, 2019 SCC 38 (CanLII), 380 CCC (3d) 1, per Karakatsanis J, at para 75 ("I note that Crown counsel would not have adduced this evidence but for the s. 276 application, which I have concluded should not have been granted. While the parties did not have the benefit of this Court’s recent holding in Barton, I would reiterate that Crown-led evidence of prior sexual activity must be governed by the principles set out in s. 276(1) and Seaboyer (Barton, at paras. 68, 80 and 197)")
  2. ↑ R v MT, 2012 ONCA 511 (CanLII), 289 CCC (3d) 115, per Watt JA, at para 29
  3. ↑ MT, ibid., at para 41
    R v Darrach, 2000 SCC 46 (CanLII), [2000] 2 SCR 443, per Gonthier J, at para 58
  4. ↑ Darrach, ibid., at para 33
  5. ↑ R v Delmas, 2020 ABCA 152 (CanLII), 64 CR (7th) 71, at para 46, per curiam (2:1) ("The purpose of the Seaboyer common law principle ..., and s 276 is to protect “a complainant’s dignity, equality and privacy rights,”")
  6. ↑ R v Davies, 2022 BCCA 103 at para 1 and 2
  7. ↑ Darrach, supra, at para 25
  8. ↑ R v Temertzoglou, 2002 CanLII 2852 (ON SC), [2002] OJ No 4951 (O.S.C.), per Furest J
  9. ↑ R v Kulasingam, 2019 ABCA 6 (CanLII), per curiam, at para 8 (" Evidence of prior sexual activity will rarely be relevant to support a denial that sexual activity took place:" citing Darrach, supra, at para 58)
  10. ↑ R v Gray2015 ONSC 3284(*no CanLII links)

Complainant Sexual Activity Evidence

Section 276(1) of the Criminal Code prohibits evidence of prior sexual conduct where it is used to make prohibited general inferences. These inferences are known as the "dual myths" or "dual myths", summarized as inferring "that unchaste women were more likely to consent to intercourse and in any event, were less worthy of belief" [1]

The myths also cover the belief that the sexual assault complainant has a higher tendency to fabricate, which is not supported by the law.[2]

The section states:

Evidence of complainant’s sexual activity

276 (1) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 151 [sexual interference], 152 [invitation to sexual touching], 153 [sexual exploitation], 153.1 [sexual exploitation of disabled] or 155 [incest], subsection 160(2) [compelling bestiality] or (3) [bestiality in presence of or by child] or section 170 [parent or guardian procuring sexual activity], 171 [householder permitting prohibited sexual activity], 172 [corrupting children], 173 [Indecent acts], 271 [sexual assault], 272 [sexual assault with a weapon or causing bodily harm] or 273 [aggravated sexual assault], evidence that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity, whether with the accused or with any other person, is not admissible to support an inference that, by reason of the sexual nature of that activity, the complainant

(a) is more likely to have consented to the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge; or
(b) is less worthy of belief.

[omitted (2), (3), and (4)]
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 276; R.S., 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 12 1992, c. 38, s. 2 2002, c. 13, s. 13; 2018, c. 29, s. 21; 2019, c. 25, s. 100.
[annotation(s) added]

– CCC (CanLII), (DOJ)

Note up: 276(1)

Must Relate to Myths

Where the purpose of the evidence does not touch on the two "myths", then the exclusionary rule does not apply.[3]

Exclusion Other than Twin Myths

This section also provides that even if the impugned evidence is not being used in violation of the twin myths it can still be inadmissible where the probative value is not sufficiently "significant" to outweigh competing considerations.[4]

  1. ↑ R v Seaboyer, 1991 CanLII 76 (SCC), [1991] 2 SCR 577, per McLachlin J, at p. 386
    R v MM, 1999 CanLII 15063 (ON SC), [1999] OJ No 3943 (SCJ), per Langdon J, at para 19
    R v MT, 2012 ONCA 511 (CanLII), 289 CCC (3d) 115, per Watt JA, at para 32
  2. ↑ R v G(A), 2000 SCC 17 (CanLII), [2000] 1 SCR 439, per L’Heureux-Dubé J, at para 3
  3. ↑ R v MT, 2012 ONCA 511 (CanLII), 289 CCC (3d) 115, per Watt JA, at para 32
  4. ↑ Darrach, ibid.

Sexual Reputation Evidence

Section 277 further prohibits the use of "sexual reputation" evidence to challenge or bolster credibility:

Reputation evidence

277. In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 151 [sexual interference], 152 [invitation to sexual touching], 153 [sexual exploitation], 153.1 [sexual exploitation of disabled] or 155 [incest], subsection 160(2) [compelling bestiality] or (3) [bestiality in presence of or by child] or section 170 [parent or guardian procuring sexual activity], 171 [householder permitting prohibited sexual activity], 172 [corrupting children], 173 [Indecent acts], 271 [sexual assault], 272 [sexual assault with a weapon or causing bodily harm] or 273 [aggravated sexual assault], evidence of sexual reputation, whether general or specific, is not admissible for the purpose of challenging or supporting the credibility of the complainant.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 277; R.S., 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 13; 2002, c. 13, s. 14; 2019, c. 25, s.101.

– CCC (CanLII), (DOJ)

Note up: 277

This prohibition under s. 277 is absolute with no exceptions.[1] It is directed at evidence of reputation and not actual fact.[2]

  1. ↑ R v Brothers, 1995 ABCA 185 (CanLII), 99 CCC (3d) 64, per Russell JA, at para 26
  2. ↑ Brothers, ibid., at para 27

Constitutionality

Constitutionality of s. 276 and 277

Both the procedural and substantive aspects of s. 276 do not violate s. 7 or 11(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[1] However, it has been observed that s. 276 "cannot be interpreted so as to deprive a person of a fair defence."[2]

Section 277 does not violate s. 7 or 11(d) of the Charter.[3]

Retrospectivity of Bill C-51 Amendments

The amendments are procedural and do not affect substantive rights.[4]

Constitutionality of Bill C-51 Amendments

There are various challenges to the Bill C-51 amendments. Most courts are finding them to be constitutional.[5]

  1. ↑ Darrach, supra
  2. ↑ R v Crosby, 1995 CanLII 107 (SCC), [1995] 2 SCR 912, per L'Heureux‑Dubé J, at para 11
  3. ↑ R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme, 1991 CanLII 76 (SCC), [1991] 2 SCR 577, per McLachlin J
  4. ↑ R v RMR, 2019 BCSC 1093 (CanLII), 56 CR (7th) 414, at para 5
  5. ↑ Constitutional:
    R v AC, 2019 ONSC 4270 (CanLII), 439 CRR (2d) 360, per Sutherland J
    R v FA, 2019 ONCJ 391 (CanLII), 56 CR (7th) 182, per Caponecchia J
    Unconstitutional:
    R v AM, 2019 SKPC 46 (CanLII), 56 CR (7th) 389, per Henning J

Offence Charged

The applicable offences are listed in s. 276(1) as consisting of:

In addition to the enumerated charges, the protections of s. 276 will also apply to any charges that have "some connection" to an enumerated offence.[1]

  1. ↑ R v Barton, 2019 SCC 33 (CanLII), [2019] 2 SCR 579, per Moldaver J, at para 76 ("...I am of the view that the s. 276 regime applies to any proceeding in which an offence listed in s. 276(1) has some connection to the offence charged, even if no listed offence was particularized in the charging document. ...")

Applicable Subject Matter

Section 276 applies to prior sexual acts consisting of "[e]vidence ... that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity other than the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge, whether with the accused or with any other person."[1] This includes sexual acts that occur in the moments before the alleged sexual assault.[2] It can also include sexual activity occurring after the events at issue.[3]

The fact that the complainant had previously made allegations of sexual abuse against another person is not admissible to establish a false pattern of accusations or to undermine the complainant unless the other allegations have been recanted or demonstrated as false.[4]

This section does not prohibit the complainant from testifying that she is a virgin, as this is a question of physical fact and not a "sexual activity". Such evidence, however, is prohibited under s. 277 from being used to bolster credibility.[5]

Collateral Facts

The trial judge may prohibit the accused from impeaching the complainant on their version of prior sexual contact on account that it violates the collateral fact rule.[6]

  1. ↑ Section 276(2)
  2. ↑ R v DRS, 1999 ABQB 330 (CanLII), 247 AR 315, per Lee J, at para 19
    R v Silva, 1994 CanLII 4673 (SK CA), 31 CR (4th) 361, per Wakeling JA, at para 33
  3. ↑ R v RSL, 2006 NBCA 64 (CanLII), 209 CCC (3d) 1, per Richard JA
    R v Van Oostrom, [1993] OJ No 1084(*no CanLII links) - re "continued friendly social contact" and "consensual sexual intercourse"
  4. ↑ R v CC, 2015 ONCA 59 (CanLII), 329 OAC 272, per Pardu JA, at para 32
  5. ↑ R v Pittiman, 2005 CanLII 23206 (ON CA), 198 CCC (3d) 308, per Weiler JA, at para 33, Borins JA dissenting on result, appealed to 2006 SCC 9 (CanLII), per Charron J (5:0) on another issue
    R v Brothers, 1995 ABCA 185 (CanLII), 99 CCC (3d) 64, per Russell JA
  6. ↑ R v Peters, 2023 MBCA 96 (CanLII) at paras 25 to 26(complete citation pending) Collateral Fact Rule

"Sexual Activity"

The meaning of "sexual activity" is not restricted to "overly sexual acts" and can include acts "done for a sexual purpose."[1] It can include general activities that are for a sexual purpose such as communicating for the purpose of prostitution.[2]

Communications

Section 276(4) adds to the meaning of "sexual activity" to include communications that either:

  1. were made for a sexual purpose or
  2. have contents of a sexual nature.

The section states:

276
[omitted (1), (2) and (3)]

Interpretation

(4) For the purpose of this section, sexual activity includes any communication made for a sexual purpose or whose content is of a sexual nature.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 276; R.S., 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 12; 1992, c. 38, s. 2; 2002, c. 13, s. 13; 2018, c. 29, s. 21; 2019, c. 25, s. 100.

– CCC (CanLII), (DOJ)

Note up: 276(4)

Other forms of "sexual activity"

It has also be found to include the following activities of the complainant:

  • discussions and solicitation to have a "threesome";[3]
  • passionate kissing in the bathroom; [4]
  • posting of sexually explicit images on social media;[5]
  • a description of being sexual assaulted in the past;[6]
  • engaging in online sex chat with a stranger;[7]
  • the presence of BDSM equipment used by the complainant.[8]

Statements as to the absence of sexual activity, such as the statement that the complainant is a virgin, will likely be captured by s. 276.[9]

Solo activities of a sexual nature such as watching pornography can constitute "sexual activity."[10]

Not Included as "sexual activity"

Courts have found that the following types of evidence are not "sexual activity":

  • discussions of prospective sexual activity[11]
  • general discussions of the complainant's relationship[12]

Sexual inactivity is not a form of sexual activity within the meaning of s. 276.[13]

  1. ↑ R v JL, 2015 ONCJ 61 (CanLII), per Murray J, at para 20 ("“sexual activity” can be comprised of any activity which the evidence establishes was done for a sexual purpose. It need not involve the touching of body parts. It need not be an “invitation” to touching.)
    R v AM, 2017 NBQB 61 (CanLII), per Walsh SCJ, at para 11
    R v NS, 2016 ONCJ 874 (CanLII), per Weagant PCJ, at para 7
  2. ↑ R v Drakes, 1998 CanLII 14968 (BC CA), 122 CCC (3d) 498, per Lambert JA, at paras 16 to 17
  3. ↑ R v Zachariou, 2013 ONSC 6694 (CanLII), [2013] OJ No 4899 (SCJ), per Code SCJ -- appeal dismissed 2015 ONCA 527 (CanLII), per curiam
    Drakes, supra
  4. ↑ Zachariou, ibid.
  5. ↑ R v JI, 2015 ONCJ 61 (CanLII), [2015] OJ No 703 (Ont. C.J.), per Murray PCJ
  6. ↑ JI, ibid.
  7. ↑ JI, ibid.
  8. ↑ R v Boyle, 2019 ONCJ 516 (CanLII), per Doody J
  9. ↑ R v RV, 2019 SCC 41 (CanLII), 378 CCC (3d) 193, per Karakatsanis J, at para 81
  10. ↑ R v DCS, 2022 ABPC 223 (CanLII), at para 18
    R v RI, 2021 ONSC 3236 (CanLII) (working hyperlinks pending)
    R v DM2019 ONSC 3895(*no CanLII links)
  11. ↑ R v Langan, 2019 BCCA 467 (CanLII), 383 CCC (3d) 516, per Bauman CJ, at paras 118 to 119 (dissent) with majority rev'd at 2020 SCC 33 (CanLII)
  12. ↑ Langan, ibid., at paras 106 to 109
  13. ↑ R v Antonelli, 2011 ONSC 5416 (CanLII), 280 CCC (3d) 96, per Himel J

History

See also: Complainant's Sexual History (Prior to December 13, 2018)

On December 13, 2018, sections 276.1 to 276.5 were repealed by 2018, c. 27 (Bill C-51). [1] Section 276.1(2) was modified to rely on s. 278.93 to 278.94 instead of s. 276.1 onward. It also added the requirement of establishing that it "is not being adduced for the purpose of supporting an inference described in subsection (1)". Section 276.1(4) was also added.

  1. ↑ List of Criminal Code Amendments (2010 to 2019)

See Also

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