Admissions: Difference between revisions

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==General Principles==
==General Principles==
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An admission is evidence presented in trial that consists of either a written or oral statement by the Accused admitting some fact made to a witness. This form of admission is a categorical exception to the hearsay rule of inadmissibility. This applies regardless of whether the admission is exculpatory or inculpatory. The main determiner for admissibility is the discretionary balance of probative value and prejudicial effect.<Ref>
An "admission" is evidence presented in trial that consists of either a written or oral statement by the Accused admitting some fact made to a witness. This form of admission is a categorical exception to the hearsay rule of inadmissibility. This applies regardless of whether the admission is exculpatory or inculpatory. The main determiner for admissibility is the discretionary balance of probative value and prejudicial effect.<ref>
R v Hodgson, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqrf 1998 CanLII 798] (SCC), [1998] 2 SCR 449<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Hodgson|1fqrf|1998 CanLII 798 (SCC)|[1998] 2 SCR 449}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}<br>
R v Wells, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqrh 1998 CanLII 799] (SCC), [1998] 2 SCR 517<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Wells|1fqrh|1998 CanLII 799 (SCC)|[1998] 2 SCR 517}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


An admission can be made by actions/conduct rather than simply words.<ref>eg. Hubin, [http://canlii.ca/t/fsm4k 1927 CanLII 79] (SCC), [1927] SCR 442</ref> The most often seen example is [[Post-Offence Conduct|post-offence conduct]] such as flight or demeanour at arrest.
An admission can be made by actions/conduct rather than simply words.<ref>
eg. {{CanLIIRP|Hubin|fsm4k|1927 CanLII 79 (SCC)|[1927] SCR 442}}{{perSCC-H|Aniglin CJ}}
</ref>
The most often seen example is [[Post-Offence Conduct|post-offence conduct]] such as flight or demeanour at arrest.


{{Reflist|2}}
{{Reflist|2}}
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A third party admission is evidence given from a non-accused witness with respect to a statement given by the accused at some time in the past. The two main forms of third party admissions are adoptive admissions and vicarious admissions.
A third party admission is evidence given from a non-accused witness with respect to a statement given by the accused at some time in the past. The two main forms of third party admissions are adoptive admissions and vicarious admissions.


An '''adoptive admission''' is where the admission arises by the Accused's adoption of a 3rd party's statement. The adoption can be made by words, actions, or demeanour. The adoption is only to the extent the Accused accepts the statement by words, conduct or demeanour.<ref>R v Emele (1940), [http://canlii.ca/t/g78mq 1940 CanLII 203] (SK CA), 74 CCC 76 (SKCA), per MacKenzie JA</ref>
An '''adoptive admission''' is where the admission arises by the Accused's adoption of a 3rd party's statement. The adoption can be made by words, actions, or demeanour. The adoption is only to the extent the Accused accepts the statement by words, conduct or demeanour.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Emele|g78mq|1940 CanLII 203 (SK CA)|74 CCC 76 (SKCA)}}{{perSKCA|MacKenzie JA}}</ref>


This admission can apply where the accused makes a statement, action or is silent in the face of a criminal accusation. The weight depends on whether the accused had a duty to speak and was expected to say something. <ref>R v Sigmund (1968), 1 CCC 92 (BCCA), [http://canlii.ca/t/gdgd2 1967 CanLII 686] (BC CA)</ref>
This admission can apply where the accused makes a statement, action or is silent in the face of a criminal accusation. The weight depends on whether the accused had a duty to speak and was expected to say something. <ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Sigmund|gdgd2|1967 CanLII 686 (BC CA)|1 CCC 92 (BCCA)}}{{perBCCA|Davey JA}}</ref>


This does ''not'' apply where the accused fails to reply to accusations under caution.<ref>R v Chambers, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fsrt 1990 CanLII 47] (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 1293<br>  
This does ''not'' apply where the accused fails to reply to accusations under caution.<ref>
R v Cripps [1968] 3 CCC 323 (BCCA), [http://canlii.ca/t/gb4vj 1968 CanLII 814] (BC CA), per Davey CJBC </ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Chambers|1fsrt|1990 CanLII 47 (SCC)|[1990] 2 SCR 1293}}{{perSCC|Cory J}}<br>  
{{CanLIIRP|Cripps|gb4vj|1968 CanLII 814 (BC CA)|[1968] 3 CCC 323 (BCCA)}}{{perBCCA|Davey CJ}}</ref>


A '''vicarious admission''' is one where an admission of the Accused is relayed by a third party. The admission can be by words, actions, or demeanour. This form of admission is often taken from a co-conspirator of the Accused.
A '''vicarious admission''' is one where an admission of the Accused is relayed by a third party. The admission can be by words, actions, or demeanour. This form of admission is often taken from a co-conspirator of the Accused.


Statements that were made in the presence of the accused are not admissible unless the accused assents to them by words, conduct, action or demeanour.<ref>
Statements that were made in the presence of the accused are not admissible unless the accused assents to them by words, conduct, action or demeanour.<ref>
R v Thomas, [http://canlii.ca/t/fwktq 2013 ONSC 1640] (CanLII), per O'Marra J, at para 11<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Thomas|fwktq|2013 ONSC 1640 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|O'Marra J}}{{atL|fwktq|11}}<br>
R v Taggert [1999] O.J. No. 1273 (O.C.A.){{NOCANLII}} at para 8<br>
{{CanLIIR-N|Taggert| [1999] OJ No 1273 (O.C.A.)}}{{at-|8}}<br>
R v Pleich, (1980) 55 CCC (2d) 13 (O.C.A.), [http://canlii.ca/t/g9ddf 1980 CanLII 2852] (ON CA), per Morden JA, at para 68<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Pleich|g9ddf|1980 CanLII 2852 (ON CA)|55 CCC (2d) 13 (O.C.A.)}}{{perONCA|Morden JA}}{{atL|g9ddf|68}}<br>
R v Dubois, (1986) 27 CCC (3d) 325 (O.C.A.), [http://canlii.ca/t/g96q5 1986 CanLII 4683] (ON CA), per Morden JA, at para 47<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Dubois|g96q5|1986 CanLII 4683 (ON CA)|27 CCC (3d) 325}}{{perONCA|Morden JA}}{{atL|g96q5|47}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


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==Admissions to Undercover==
==Admissions to Undercover==
An undercover officer posing as an inmate within a prison may only listen and not actively seek a confession.<ref>
{{seealso|Admissions to Undercover Officers or Agents}}
R v Hebert, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fst9 1990 CanLII 118] (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 151<br>
R v Broyles, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fshb 1991 CanLII 15] (SCC), [1991] 3 SCR 595<br>
</ref>


An undercover officer who is in contact with an accused out of custody, such as during a "Mr. Big" operation, may listen and activity attempt to elicit confessions.<ref>
==Admission by Co-Accused==
R v Grandinetti, [http://canlii.ca/t/1jmfq 2005 SCC 5] (CanLII), [2005] 1 SCR 27
</ref>
 
{{reflist|2}}
 
===Admissions During "Mr. Big" Operations===
* [[Confessions from Mr Big Operations]]
 
==Admission by Co-accused==
It is generally well established that an accused's statement is admissible only against the person making making it. It is not admissible against a co-accused.<ref>
It is generally well established that an accused's statement is admissible only against the person making making it. It is not admissible against a co-accused.<ref>
R v Ward, [http://canlii.ca/t/fn0kk 2011 NSCA 78] (CanLII) paras 28 to 40
{{CanLIIRP|Ward|fn0kk|2011 NSCA 78 (CanLII)|975 APR 216}}{{perNSCA|Saunders JA}}{{AtsL|fn0kk|28| to 40}}<br>
R v BC, <br>
{{CanLIIRPC|McFall v The Queen|1z45s|1979 CanLII 176 (SCC)|[1980] 1 SCR 321}}{{perSCC|Ritchie J}}<br>
McFall v The Queen, [1980] 1 SCR 321, [http://canlii.ca/t/1z45s 1979 CanLII 176]<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Starr|525l|2000 SCC 40 (CanLII)|[2000] 2 SCR 144}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci J}}{{atL|525l|217}}<br>
R v Starr, [http://canlii.ca/t/525l 2000 SCC 40] (CanLII) at para 217<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Kelawon|1q51r|2006 SCC 96 (CanLII)|[2006] 2 SCR 787}}{{perSCC|Charron J}}{{atL|1q51r|96}} ("While a statement made by a co-accused was admissible for its truth against the co‑accused, it remained hearsay as against the accused.  The co-accused had recanted his statement at trial.  His statement was not shown to be reliable so as to be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule against the accused.  ... [R v C(B)] simply reaffirms the well-established rule that an accused’s statement is only admissible against its maker, not the co-accused.")<br>
R v Kelawon [http://canlii.ca/t/1q51r 2006 SCC 96] (CanLII) at para 96<br>
</ref>
</ref>


It is for this reason that co-accused can have separate trials.<Ref>
It is for this reason that co-accused can have separate trials.<ref>
Guimond v The Queen, [1979] 1 SCR 960, [http://canlii.ca/t/1z77f 1979 CanLII 204]</ref>
{{CanLIIRPC|Guimond v The Queen|1z77f|1979 CanLII 204 (SCC)|[1979] 1 SCR 960}}{{perSCC|Ritchie J}}</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}
===Guilty Plea of Co-Accused===
===Guilty Plea of Co-Accused===
A guilty plea of a co-accused or uncharged accomplice will usually no relevancy to the issue of guilt of the accused.<ref>
A guilty plea of a co-accused or uncharged accomplice will usually no relevancy to the issue of guilt of the accused.<ref>
R v Berry, [http://canlii.ca/t/g191v 1957 CanLII 115] (ON CA), [1957] O.R. 249 (C.A.)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Berry|g191v|1957 CanLII 115 (ON CA)|[1957] OR 249 (CA)}}{{perONCA|Laidlaw JA}}<br>
R v Buxbaum (1989), 33 O.A.C. 1 (C.A.), leave to S.C.C. refused<br>
{{CanLIIR-N|Buxbaum| (1989), 33 OAC 1 (CA)}}, leave to SCC refused<br>
R v Lessard (1979), 50 C.C.C. (2d) 175 (Que. C.A.), [http://canlii.ca/t/g9b4v 1979 CanLII 2901] (QC CA)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Lessard|g9b4v|1979 CanLII 2901 (QC CA)|50 CCC (2d) 175}}{{perQCCA|Rinfret CJ}}<br>
R v Caesar, [http://canlii.ca/t/gspk8 2016 ONCA 599] (CanLII), 350 O.A.C. 352<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Caesar|gspk8|2016 ONCA 599 (CanLII)|350 OAC 352}}{{perONCA|Blair JA}}<br>
</ref>
The prejudicial effect of the evidence will often outweigh any probative value of such evidence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Berry|gwvpf|2017 ONCA 17 (CanLII)|345 CCC (3d) 32}}{{perONCA|Blair JA}}{{atL|gwvpf|35}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
The prejudicial effect of the evidence will often outweigh any probative value of such evidence.<REf>
However, where it is permissible, such as for the purpose of credibility assessment, it should usually be accompanied by instructions warning of its use.<ref>
R v Berry, [http://canlii.ca/t/gwvpf 2017 ONCA 17] (CanLII) at para 35<br>
{{ibid1|Berry}}{{atL|gwvpf|36}}<br>
</ref>However, where it is permissible, such as for the purpose of credibility assessment, it should usually be accompanied by instructions warning of its use.<ref>
Berry{{ibid}} at para 36<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''As Relevant to Credibility of Co-Accused'''<br>
; As Relevant to Credibility of Co-Accused
Where a co-accused testifies, the Crown may be able to tender evidence of the guilty plea as relevant the credibility of that witness.<Ref>
Where a co-accused testifies, the Crown may be able to tender evidence of the guilty plea as relevant the credibility of that witness.<ref>
R v Granados-Arana, [http://canlii.ca/t/hvhv4 2018 ONCA 826] (CanLII)
{{CanLIIRx|Granados-Arana|hvhv4|2018 ONCA 826 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}
</ref>
</ref>


'''Jury Instructions'''<br>
; Jury Instructions
Where evidence of an accomplice's guilty plea is tendered, there will ordinarily be a caution to the jury on its use. However, the failure to do so is not fatal absent prejudice to the accused.<Ref>
Where evidence of an accomplice's guilty plea is tendered, there will ordinarily be a caution to the jury on its use. However, the failure to do so is not fatal absent prejudice to the accused.<ref>
R v MacGregor, MacGregor (1981), [http://canlii.ca/t/g9k7j 1981 CanLII 3351] (ON CA), 64 C.C.C. (2d) 353 at p. 358<br>
{{CanLIIRP|MacGregor|g9k7j|1981 CanLII 3351 (ON CA)|64 CCC (2d) 353}}{{perONCA-H|Martin JA}}{{atp|358}}<br>
R v Simpson, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftjr 1988 CanLII 89] (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 3, at p. 19<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Simpson|1ftjr|1988 CanLII 89 (SCC)|[1988] 1 SCR 3}}{{perSCC-H|McIntyre J}}{{atp|19}}<br>
Granados-Arana{{supra}}, per curiam, at para 7<Br>
{{supra1|Granados-Arana}}{{atL|hvhv4|7}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>



Latest revision as of 14:25, 14 July 2024

This page was last substantively updated or reviewed January 2019. (Rev. # 95399)

General Principles

An "admission" is evidence presented in trial that consists of either a written or oral statement by the Accused admitting some fact made to a witness. This form of admission is a categorical exception to the hearsay rule of inadmissibility. This applies regardless of whether the admission is exculpatory or inculpatory. The main determiner for admissibility is the discretionary balance of probative value and prejudicial effect.[1]

An admission can be made by actions/conduct rather than simply words.[2] The most often seen example is post-offence conduct such as flight or demeanour at arrest.

  1. R v Hodgson, 1998 CanLII 798 (SCC), [1998] 2 SCR 449, per Cory J
    R v Wells, 1998 CanLII 799 (SCC), [1998] 2 SCR 517, per Cory J
  2. eg. R v Hubin, 1927 CanLII 79 (SCC), [1927] SCR 442, per Aniglin CJ

Third Party Admissions

See also: Traditional Exceptions to Hearsay#Adoptive Admissions and Confessions

A third party admission is evidence given from a non-accused witness with respect to a statement given by the accused at some time in the past. The two main forms of third party admissions are adoptive admissions and vicarious admissions.

An adoptive admission is where the admission arises by the Accused's adoption of a 3rd party's statement. The adoption can be made by words, actions, or demeanour. The adoption is only to the extent the Accused accepts the statement by words, conduct or demeanour.[1]

This admission can apply where the accused makes a statement, action or is silent in the face of a criminal accusation. The weight depends on whether the accused had a duty to speak and was expected to say something. [2]

This does not apply where the accused fails to reply to accusations under caution.[3]

A vicarious admission is one where an admission of the Accused is relayed by a third party. The admission can be by words, actions, or demeanour. This form of admission is often taken from a co-conspirator of the Accused.

Statements that were made in the presence of the accused are not admissible unless the accused assents to them by words, conduct, action or demeanour.[4]

  1. R v Emele, 1940 CanLII 203 (SK CA), 74 CCC 76 (SKCA), per MacKenzie JA
  2. R v Sigmund, 1967 CanLII 686 (BC CA), 1 CCC 92 (BCCA), per Davey JA
  3. R v Chambers, 1990 CanLII 47 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 1293, per Cory J
    R v Cripps, 1968 CanLII 814 (BC CA), [1968] 3 CCC 323 (BCCA), per Davey CJ
  4. R v Thomas, 2013 ONSC 1640 (CanLII), per O'Marra J, at para 11
    R v Taggert [1999] OJ No 1273 (O.C.A.)(*no CanLII links) , at para 8
    R v Pleich, 1980 CanLII 2852 (ON CA), 55 CCC (2d) 13 (O.C.A.), per Morden JA, at para 68
    R v Dubois, 1986 CanLII 4683 (ON CA), 27 CCC (3d) 325, per Morden JA, at para 47

Admissions to Undercover

See also: Admissions to Undercover Officers or Agents

Admission by Co-Accused

It is generally well established that an accused's statement is admissible only against the person making making it. It is not admissible against a co-accused.[1]

It is for this reason that co-accused can have separate trials.[2]

  1. R v Ward, 2011 NSCA 78 (CanLII), 975 APR 216, per Saunders JA, at paras 28 to 40
    McFall v The Queen, 1979 CanLII 176 (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 321, per Ritchie J
    R v Starr, 2000 SCC 40 (CanLII), [2000] 2 SCR 144, per Iacobucci J, at para 217
    R v Kelawon, 2006 SCC 96 (CanLII), [2006] 2 SCR 787, per Charron J, at para 96 ("While a statement made by a co-accused was admissible for its truth against the co‑accused, it remained hearsay as against the accused. The co-accused had recanted his statement at trial. His statement was not shown to be reliable so as to be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule against the accused. ... [R v C(B)] simply reaffirms the well-established rule that an accused’s statement is only admissible against its maker, not the co-accused.")
  2. Guimond v The Queen, 1979 CanLII 204 (SCC), [1979] 1 SCR 960, per Ritchie J

Guilty Plea of Co-Accused

A guilty plea of a co-accused or uncharged accomplice will usually no relevancy to the issue of guilt of the accused.[1] The prejudicial effect of the evidence will often outweigh any probative value of such evidence.[2] However, where it is permissible, such as for the purpose of credibility assessment, it should usually be accompanied by instructions warning of its use.[3]

As Relevant to Credibility of Co-Accused

Where a co-accused testifies, the Crown may be able to tender evidence of the guilty plea as relevant the credibility of that witness.[4]

Jury Instructions

Where evidence of an accomplice's guilty plea is tendered, there will ordinarily be a caution to the jury on its use. However, the failure to do so is not fatal absent prejudice to the accused.[5]

  1. R v Berry, 1957 CanLII 115 (ON CA), [1957] OR 249 (CA), per Laidlaw JA
    R v Buxbaum (1989), 33 OAC 1 (CA)(*no CanLII links) , leave to SCC refused
    R v Lessard, 1979 CanLII 2901 (QC CA), 50 CCC (2d) 175, per Rinfret CJ
    R v Caesar, 2016 ONCA 599 (CanLII), 350 OAC 352, per Blair JA
  2. R v Berry, 2017 ONCA 17 (CanLII), 345 CCC (3d) 32, per Blair JA, at para 35
  3. Berry, ibid., at para 36
  4. R v Granados-Arana, 2018 ONCA 826 (CanLII), per curiam
  5. R v MacGregor, 1981 CanLII 3351 (ON CA), 64 CCC (2d) 353, per Martin JA, at p. 358
    R v Simpson, 1988 CanLII 89 (SCC), [1988] 1 SCR 3, per McIntyre J, at p. 19
    Granados-Arana, supra, at para 7

See Also