Rules of Evidence for a Qualified Expert: Difference between revisions

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{{fr|Règles_de_preuve_pour_un_expert_qualifié}}
[[fr:Règles_de_preuve_pour_un_expert_qualifié]]
{{Currency2|January|2021}}
{{Currency2|January|2021}}
{{HeaderOpinions}}
{{HeaderOpinions}}
==General Principles==
==General Principles==
{{seealso|Qualified Expert Evidence}}
{{seealso|Qualified Expert Evidence}}
Once the witness is qualified as an expert they are permitted to give evidence in the area for which they were qualified.   
Once the witness is qualified as an expert, they are permitted to give evidence in the area for which they were qualified.   


; Requirement of Citing Sources
; Requirement of Citing Sources
The expert must cite the bases on his opinion in order for the trier-of-fact to evaluate the opinion.
The expert must cite the basis of his opinion in order for the trier-of-fact to evaluate the opinion.
<ref>
<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Neil|22tpj|1957 CanLII 70 (SCC)|[1957] SCR 685}}{{Plurality}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Neil|22tpj|1957 CanLII 70 (SCC)|[1957] SCR 685}}{{Plurality}}<br>
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{{CanLIIRP|Anderson|gcgg2|1914 CanLII 361 (AB CA)|22 CCC 455}}{{perABCA|Harvey J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Anderson|gcgg2|1914 CanLII 361 (AB CA)|22 CCC 455}}{{perABCA|Harvey J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Godfrey|fp05t|1974 ALTASCAD 43 (CanLII)|[1974] 4 WWR 677, 18 CCC (2d) 90}}{{Plurality}} (2:1){{atps|102-104}}
{{CanLIIRP|Godfrey|fp05t|1974 ALTASCAD 43 (CanLII)|[1974] 4 WWR 677, 18 CCC (2d) 90}}{{Plurality}} (2:1){{atps|102-104}}
</ref>  The "second hand" evidence of texts is not admissible as evidence, but can be used to show the information on which the opinion is based.<ref>
</ref>   
The "secondhand" evidence of texts is not admissible as evidence but can be used to show the information on which the opinion is based.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Burns|1frvk|1994 CanLII 127 (SCC)|[1994] 1 SCR 656}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Burns|1frvk|1994 CanLII 127 (SCC)|[1994] 1 SCR 656}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}</ref>


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{{CanLIIRP|Molodowic|5262|2000 SCC 16 (CanLII)|[2000] 1 SCR 420}}{{perSCC-H|Arbour J}}</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Molodowic|5262|2000 SCC 16 (CanLII)|[2000] 1 SCR 420}}{{perSCC-H|Arbour J}}</ref>


; Statistical and Annecdotal Evidence
; Statistical and Anecdotal Evidence
The expert cannot recite statistical evidence of probabilities based on prior similar events to infer what likely occurred in the incident at issue.<ref>
The expert cannot recite statistical evidence of probabilities based on similar events prior to the incident to infer what likely occurred in the incident at issue.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Klymchuk|1m3d6|2005 CanLII 44167 (ON CA)|203 CCC (3d) 341}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|1m3d6|46}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Klymchuk|1m3d6|2005 CanLII 44167 (ON CA)|203 CCC (3d) 341}}{{perONCA-H|Doherty JA}}{{atL|1m3d6|46}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Shafia|gvdw4|2016 ONCA 812 (CanLII)|341 CCC (3d) 354}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{AtL|gvdw4|242}} ("An expert is not entitled to give statistical evidence of probabilities based on prior similar events to support a conclusion about what happened on the occasion that forms the subject-matter of charges")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Shafia|gvdw4|2016 ONCA 812 (CanLII)|341 CCC (3d) 354}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{AtL|gvdw4|242}} ("An expert is not entitled to give statistical evidence of probabilities based on prior similar events to support a conclusion about what happened on the occasion that forms the subject-matter of charges")<br>
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; Area of Expertise
; Area of Expertise
The qualified "area of expertise" does not need to articulate the exact subject matter to which they will give evidence. It often sufficient to articulate the general area of knowledge.<ref>
The qualified "area of expertise" does not need to articulate the exact subject matter to which they will give evidence. It is often sufficient to articulate the general area of knowledge.<ref>
e.g. {{CanLIIRx|Rothgordt|h494z|2017 BCCA 230 (CanLII)}}{{perBCCA|Frankel JA}}{{atL|h494z|16}}<br></ref>
e.g. {{CanLIIRx|Rothgordt|h494z|2017 BCCA 230 (CanLII)}}{{perBCCA|Frankel JA}}{{atL|h494z|16}}<br></ref>


; Use of Report
; Use of Report
It is common-place that an expert may testify with their reports on hand and may refer to them during testimony.<ref>
It is commonplace for an expert to testify with their reports on hand and refer to them during testimony.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Sandham|26cvj|2009 CanLII 58982 (ONSC)|[2009] OJ No 4517 (Ont. SCJ)}}{{perONSC|Heeney J}} ("Experts are routinely permitted to have their reports in front of them as they testify, and to refer to them as they deliver their evidence. Such reports are frequently entered as exhibits.")<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Sandham|26cvj|2009 CanLII 58982 (ONSC)|[2009] OJ No 4517 (Ont. SCJ)}}{{perONSC|Heeney J}} ("Experts are routinely permitted to have their reports in front of them as they testify, and to refer to them as they deliver their evidence. Such reports are frequently entered as exhibits.")<br>
</ref>
</ref>
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{{ibid1|Sekhon}}<br>
{{ibid1|Sekhon}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
It is considered not legally relevant as guilt of persons that the expert "had encountered in the past is legally irrelevant to the guilt or innocence" of the accused.<ref>
While it may be logically relevant, it is not legally relevant whether the expert had encountered other accused in the past who were guilty of an offence.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Cook|jbm3n|2020 ONCA 731 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA|Trotter JA}}{{atL|jbm3n|100}}
{{CanLIIRP|Cook|jbm3n|2020 ONCA 731 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA|Trotter JA}}{{atL|jbm3n|100}}
</ref>
</ref>
The trier of fact should not reason from a generalized ocnclusion based on prior experience to a specific state of mind of the person charged."<ref>
The trier of fact should not reason from a generalized conclusion based on prior experience to a specific state of mind of the person charged.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Burnett|hvbfd|2018 ONCA 790 (CanLII)|367 CCC (3d) 65}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{atL|hvbfd|75}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Burnett|hvbfd|2018 ONCA 790 (CanLII)|367 CCC (3d) 65}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{atL|hvbfd|75}}<Br>
{{supra1|Cook}}{{atL|jbm3n|100}}
{{supra1|Cook}}{{atL|jbm3n|100}}
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</ref>
</ref>


The expert need not have personal knowledge of any facts to give an opinion.<ref>
The expert does not need to have personal knowledge of any facts to give an opinion.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Preeper and Doyle|ggx87|1888 CanLII 56 (SCC)|15 SCR 401}}{{Plurality}}
{{CanLIIRP|Preeper and Doyle|ggx87|1888 CanLII 56 (SCC)|15 SCR 401}}{{Plurality}}
</ref>
</ref>
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</ref>
</ref>


A jury must be instructed that the hearsay evidence of the facts underlying the experts opinion is not admissible for any purpose other than to evaluate the weight of the opinion.<ref>
A jury must be instructed that the hearsay evidence of the facts underlying the expert's opinion is not admissible for any purpose other than to evaluate the weight of the opinion.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Babcock|2dgrk|1984 ABCA 291 (CanLII)|16 CCC (3d) 26}}{{perABCA-H|Moir JA}}
{{CanLIIRP|Babcock|2dgrk|1984 ABCA 291 (CanLII)|16 CCC (3d) 26}}{{perABCA-H|Moir JA}}
</ref>
</ref>
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</ref>
</ref>


The evidence relied upon for the opinion can include second-hand evidence, but that the it may affect the weight accorded to the opinion.<ref>
The evidence relied upon for the opinion can include second-hand evidence, but that it may affect the weight accorded to the opinion.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Alcantara|fqvvj|2012 ABQB 225 (CanLII)|538 AR 44}}{{perABQB|Greckol J}}{{atL|fqvvj|125}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Alcantara|fqvvj|2012 ABQB 225 (CanLII)|538 AR 44}}{{perABQB|Greckol J}}{{atL|fqvvj|125}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


; Evaluating Conflicting Expert Evidence
; Evaluating Conflicting Expert Evidence
Where the evidence of multiple experts conflict, it is not a matter of choosing one expert over the other, but rather giving weight to each expert and review the opinions as a whole.<ref>
Where the evidence of multiple experts conflict, it is not a matter of choosing one expert over the other but rather giving weight to each expert and reviewing the opinions as a whole.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Jonkman|fvfwq|2012 SKQB 511 (CanLII)|410 Sask R 171}}{{perSKQB|Schwann J}}{{atL|fvfwq|97}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Jonkman|fvfwq|2012 SKQB 511 (CanLII)|410 Sask R 171}}{{perSKQB|Schwann J}}{{atL|fvfwq|97}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Toneguzza-Norvell v Burnaby Hospital|1frwb|1994 CanLII 106 (SCC)|[1994] 1 SCR 114}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRPC|Toneguzza-Norvell v Burnaby Hospital|1frwb|1994 CanLII 106 (SCC)|[1994] 1 SCR 114}}{{perSCC-H|McLachlin J}}<br>
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; Generic questions
; Generic questions
Generic evidence about practices can be necessary to assist the jury.<ref>
Generic evidence about practices can be necessary to assist the jury.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Solleveld|g6xv9|2014 ONCA 418 (CanLII)|311 CCC (3d) 387}}{{TheCourtsONCA}}{{atL|g6xv9|19}}
{{CanLIIRP|Solleveld|g6xv9|2014 ONCA 418 (CanLII)|311 CCC (3d) 387}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|g6xv9|19}}


</ref>
</ref>
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==Ultimate Issue Rule==
==Ultimate Issue Rule==
Traditionally, an expert should not give an opinion on an "ultimate issue" to the case otherwise the expert would usurp the role of the trier-of-fact.<ref>
Traditionally, an expert should not give an opinion on an "ultimate issue" to the case; otherwise, the expert would usurp the role of the trier-of-fact.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Béland|1ftm1|1987 CanLII 27 (SCC)|[1987] 2 SCR 398}}{{perSCC-H|McIntyre J}}
{{CanLIIRP|Béland|1ftm1|1987 CanLII 27 (SCC)|[1987] 2 SCR 398}}{{perSCC-H|McIntyre J}}
</ref>
</ref>
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{{CanLIIRP|More|22vz3|1963 CanLII 79 (SCC)|[1963] SCR 522}}{{perSCC|Cartwright J}}
{{CanLIIRP|More|22vz3|1963 CanLII 79 (SCC)|[1963] SCR 522}}{{perSCC|Cartwright J}}
</ref>
</ref>
Also whether the accused's condition is a "disease of the mind."<ref>
Also, whether the accused's condition is a "disease of the mind."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Cooper|1tx9m|1979 CanLII 63 (SCC)|[1980] 1 SCR 1149}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}}
{{CanLIIRP|Cooper|1tx9m|1979 CanLII 63 (SCC)|[1980] 1 SCR 1149}}{{perSCC|Dickson J}}
</ref>
</ref>
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==Specific Types of Expert==
==Specific Types of Expert==
; Drug Expert
; Drug Expert
A lay person such as an RCMP officer cannot be a reliable expert simply by "conducting numerous casual conversations with drug users or traffickers."  This sort of "[a]necdotal evidence cannot be tested or verified hearsay must be supplemented and supported by some form of admissible evidence."<ref>
A layperson such as an RCMP officer cannot be a reliable expert simply by "conducting numerous casual conversations with drug users or traffickers."  This sort of "[a]necdotal evidence cannot be tested or verified hearsay must be supplemented and supported by some form of admissible evidence."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Klassen|26j|2003 MBQB 253 (CanLII)|[2003] MJ No 417}}{{perMBQB|Scurfield J}}</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Klassen|26j|2003 MBQB 253 (CanLII)|[2003] MJ No 417}}{{perMBQB|Scurfield J}}</ref>



Latest revision as of 09:39, 1 November 2024

This page was last substantively updated or reviewed January 2021. (Rev. # 96678)

General Principles

See also: Qualified Expert Evidence

Once the witness is qualified as an expert, they are permitted to give evidence in the area for which they were qualified.

Requirement of Citing Sources

The expert must cite the basis of his opinion in order for the trier-of-fact to evaluate the opinion. [1] The expert can use sources and information found in the "scope of his or her expertise"[2] as well as sources outside his knowledge in limited contexts.[3] The "secondhand" evidence of texts is not admissible as evidence but can be used to show the information on which the opinion is based.[4]

Questions on Reports, Texts, and Articles

An expert may be cross-examined on a text, report or article relating to his area of expertise. [5] The expert can only comment on works they are familiar with. If the expert acknowledges the authority, the examiner may read parts of the document to the witness to the extent that it is accepted as valid. Those confirmed passages will become evidence in the case[6]

Rejecting Uncontradicted Expert Evidence

A judge may reject the uncontradicted expert evidence as unreasonable. [7] The evidence should not be rejected if there is no contradictory evidence and the opinion is not seriously challenged.[8]

Statistical and Anecdotal Evidence

The expert cannot recite statistical evidence of probabilities based on similar events prior to the incident to infer what likely occurred in the incident at issue.[9]

The expert may not give anecdotal evidence concerning prior similar events to suggest an opinion about the event at issue.[10]

Area of Expertise

The qualified "area of expertise" does not need to articulate the exact subject matter to which they will give evidence. It is often sufficient to articulate the general area of knowledge.[11]

Use of Report

It is commonplace for an expert to testify with their reports on hand and refer to them during testimony.[12]

There is some division of whether an expert report should be filed as an exhibit.[13]

Offer of Alternate Theories

A crown expert is permitted to offer up alternate theories of causation based on the evidence.[14]

  1. R v Neil, 1957 CanLII 70 (SCC), [1957] SCR 685
    R v Grandinetti, 2003 ABCA 307 (CanLII), 178 CCC (3d) 449, per McFadyen JA (2:1)
    R v Trudel, 1994 CanLII 5397 (QC CA), 90 CCC (3d) 318, per Brossard JA
  2. R v SAB, 2003 SCC 60 (CanLII), [2003] 2 SCR 678, per Arbour J, at para 63
  3. R v Anderson, 1914 CanLII 361 (AB CA), 22 CCC 455, per Harvey J
    R v Godfrey, 1974 ALTASCAD 43 (CanLII), [1974] 4 WWR 677, 18 CCC (2d) 90 (2:1), at pp. 102-104
  4. R v Burns, 1994 CanLII 127 (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 656, per McLachlin J
  5. R c Taillefer, 1995 CanLII 4592 (QC CA), 100 CCC (3d) 1, per Proulx JA
    R v Marquard, 1993 CanLII 37 (SCC), [1993] 4 SCR 223, per McLachlin J
  6. Marquard, ibid. ("...in examining an expert witness on other expert opinions found in papers or books is to ask the witness if he or she knows the work. If the answer is "no", or if the witness denies the work's authority, that is the end of the matter. ...If the answer is "yes", and the witness acknowledges the work's authority, then the witness has confirmed it by the witness's own testimony. Parts of it may be read to the witness, and to the extent they are confirmed, they become evidence in the case.")
  7. R v Prince, 1971 CanLII 1285 (ON CA), 6 CCC (2d) 183, per Gale CJ
    R v Lambkin, 2002 MBCA 157 (CanLII), 170 Man R (2d) 62, per Monnin JA
  8. R v Molodowic, 2000 SCC 16 (CanLII), [2000] 1 SCR 420, per Arbour J
  9. R v Klymchuk, 2005 CanLII 44167 (ON CA), 203 CCC (3d) 341, per Doherty JA, at para 46
    R v Shafia, 2016 ONCA 812 (CanLII), 341 CCC (3d) 354, per Watt JA, at para 242 ("An expert is not entitled to give statistical evidence of probabilities based on prior similar events to support a conclusion about what happened on the occasion that forms the subject-matter of charges")
  10. Shafia, ibid., at para 243 ("Experts may not give anecdotal evidence gathered from prior experiences in proffering their opinion about conduct on a particular occasion. The evidence lacks legal relevance and is apt to engender significant prejudice, especially when adduced to rebut a defence")
    R v Sekhon, 2014 SCC 15 (CanLII), [2014] 1 SCR 272, per Moldaver J, at paras 49 to 50
  11. e.g. R v Rothgordt, 2017 BCCA 230 (CanLII), per Frankel JA, at para 16
  12. R v Sandham, 2009 CanLII 58982 (ONSC), [2009] OJ No 4517 (Ont. SCJ), per Heeney J ("Experts are routinely permitted to have their reports in front of them as they testify, and to refer to them as they deliver their evidence. Such reports are frequently entered as exhibits.")
  13. R v Millard and Smich, 2016 ONSC 1517 (CanLII), per Goodman J (" Generally speaking, I agree that experts’ reports, per se, ought not to be filed as exhibits. The evidence is their “in-court” testimony. ")
  14. R v Biddersingh, 2020 ONCA 241 (CanLII), per Tulloch JA, at para 67

Proper Bounds of Opinion

It is the duty of the trial judge to ensure that the expert stays within the bounds of their expertise.[1]

The "opinion rule" does not prevent an expert from giving evidence of fact. The expert may express any firsthand observations that are relevant.[2]

Anecdotal Evidence

The recitation of "anecdotal" evidence about the expert's experience and what the expert has and has not seen carries with it a high degree of prejudice and may result in an error if relied upon for conviction.[3] While it may be logically relevant, it is not legally relevant whether the expert had encountered other accused in the past who were guilty of an offence.[4] The trier of fact should not reason from a generalized conclusion based on prior experience to a specific state of mind of the person charged.[5]

Anecdotal evidence is also often not necessary as individual experience may not be beyond the common knowledge and experience of a judge or a matter of technical or scientific in nature.[6]

  1. R v Sekhon, 2014 SCC 15 (CanLII), [2014] 1 SCR 272, per Moldaver J, at para 46 ("...all trial judges ... have an ongoing duty to ensure that expert evidence remains within its proper scope."), 47 ("The trial judge must both ensure that an expert stays within the proper bounds of his or her expertise and that the content of the evidence itself is properly the subject of expert evidence.")
  2. R v Abbey, 1982 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1982] 2 SCR 24, per Dickson J at p. 42
    R v Sheriffe, 2015 ONCA 880 (CanLII), per curiam, at para 106 ("The opinion rule does not bar an expert from giving evidence of fact: Abbey 1982, at p. 42. Put another way, an expert is not confined by the opinion rule to expressing opinions only. The expert is entitled to give evidence of firsthand observations, including for example, those made during a psychiatric interview by a psychiatrist called to proffer an opinion on criminal responsibility.")
  3. Sekhon, ibid.
  4. R v Cook, 2020 ONCA 731 (CanLII), per Trotter JA, at para 100
  5. R v Burnett, 2018 ONCA 790 (CanLII), 367 CCC (3d) 65, per Watt JA, at para 75
    Cook, supra, at para 100
  6. Cook, supra, at para 101
    Sekhon, supra, at para 49

Weight of Opinion

Expert opinion on anything that is not necessary for the trier-of-fact to make findings is not admissible.[1]

The opinion evidence given must be within the qualified field of expertise.[2]

The expert does not need to have personal knowledge of any facts to give an opinion.[3]

The weight given to an opinion is a question of fact.[4]

The opinion must be specific to the case and not simply in generalities.[5]

Hearsay

Where a factual premise of an expert is established solely by an out-of-court statement, the opinion can be entitled to less weight and sometimes no weight at all.[6]

A jury must be instructed that the hearsay evidence of the facts underlying the expert's opinion is not admissible for any purpose other than to evaluate the weight of the opinion.[7]

Requirements for a Factual Foundation

Before a judge can rely upon an expert opinion, the expert must give evidence on the factual foundation relied upon to form the opinion.[8] Where the underlying facts are not established in evidence, the judge cannot rely upon the opinion.[9]

The evidence relied upon for the opinion can include second-hand evidence, but that it may affect the weight accorded to the opinion.[10]

Evaluating Conflicting Expert Evidence

Where the evidence of multiple experts conflict, it is not a matter of choosing one expert over the other but rather giving weight to each expert and reviewing the opinions as a whole.[11]

Evaluating Expert Evidence Without A Conflicting Evidence

A judge need not believe or make any findings of fact based on the testimony of an expert witness due to the failure of the other side to adduce contradicting evidence.[12]

  1. R v Howard, 1989 CanLII 99 (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 1337, per Lamer J
    R v Béland, 1987 CanLII 27 (SCC), [1987] 2 SCR 398, per McIntyre J R v Millar, 1989 CanLII 7151 (ON CA), 49 CCC (3d) 193, per Morden JA, at 220
  2. Howard, supra
    Millar, supra
  3. R v Preeper and Doyle, 1888 CanLII 56 (SCC), 15 SCR 401
  4. R v Smithers, 1977 CanLII 7 (SCC), [1978] 1 SCR 506, per Dickson J
  5. R v Li, 1980 CanLII 344 (BC SC), 59 CCC (2d) 79, per Trainor J
  6. R v Sheriffe, 2015 ONCA 880 (CanLII), per curiam, at para 105
    R v Abbey, 1982 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1982] 2 SCR 24, per Dickson J at p. 46
    R. v. Lavallee, 1990 CanLII 95 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852, at p. 893
  7. R v Babcock, 1984 ABCA 291 (CanLII), 16 CCC (3d) 26, per Moir JA
  8. R v Neil, 1957 CanLII 70 (SCC), [1957] SCR 685
    R v Dietrich, 1970 CanLII 377 (ON CA), 1 CCC (2d) 49, per Gale CJ
  9. R v Abbey, 1982 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1982] 2 SCR 24, per Dickson J ("Before any weight can be given to an expert's opinion, the facts upon which the opinion is based must be found to exist.")
    R v Morgentaler, 1973 CanLII 1462 (QC CQ), 14 CCC (2d) 450, per Hugessen ACJ R v Lupien, 1969 CanLII 55 (SCC), [1970] SCR 263
    Howard, supra
    R v Phillion, 1977 CanLII 23 (SCC), [1978] 1 SCR 18, per Ritchie J
  10. R v Alcantara, 2012 ABQB 225 (CanLII), 538 AR 44, per Greckol J, at para 125
  11. R v Jonkman, 2012 SKQB 511 (CanLII), 410 Sask R 171, per Schwann J, at para 97
    Toneguzza-Norvell v Burnaby Hospital, 1994 CanLII 106 (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 114, per McLachlin J
    Housen v Nikulaison, 2002 SCC 33 (CanLII), [2002] 2 SCR 235, per Iacobucci and Major JJ
  12. R v Doodnaught, 2017 ONCA 781 (CanLII), 358 CCC (3d) 250, per Watt JA, at para 124 ("...as with the testimony of any witness, a trial judge need not believe or make findings of fact based on the testimony of an expert witness simply because no witness is called by the opposite party or evidence adduced to contradict it")
    R v Moke, 1917 CanLII 426 (AB CA), 28 CCC 296 (Alta. S.C., A.D.), per Walsh J, at p. 300

Hypothetical and Generic Questions

The opinion evidence can be related by way of hypothetical questions put to the expert.[1] However, the testimony cannot be "oath-helping" evidence.[2]

The hypotheticals can be put to the expert where the facts are not in dispute.[3] If the underlying facts are in dispute the opinion cannot remove the fact-finding function of the trier-of-fact.[4] The cross-examiner can put to the expert any proven or provable facts to determine whether it alters the confidence of the opinion.[5]

It can be preferable to ask questions in hypothetical form on contradictory matters in order to avoid overly influencing the jury's fact-finding process.[6] Where hypotheticals are not used in contradicting an expert, "careful instructions" are required.[7]

The party seeking to rely on an expert opinion based on a hypothetical fact has the burden of establishing those underlying facts.[8]

Generic questions

Generic evidence about practices can be necessary to assist the jury.[9]

  1. R v Fiqia, 1994 ABCA 402 (CanLII), (1994) 162 AR 117 (CA), per Hunt JA
  2. R v Reid, 2003 CanLII 14779 (ON CA), 177 CCC (3d) 260, per Moldaver JA
  3. R v Bleta, 1964 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1964] SCR 561, per Ritchie J
  4. R v PG, 2009 ONCA 32 (CanLII), 242 CCC (3d) 558, per Juriansz JA
  5. R v Kerr, 2000 BCCA 209 (CanLII), 32 CR (5th) 359, per McEachern CJ
  6. R v Leinen, 2013 ABCA 283 (CanLII), 301 CCC (3d) 1, per Hunt JA (2:1), at para 24 ("Using hypotheticals when dealing with experts is preferred (especially when there is contradictory evidence) because that is said to remove the danger of an expert overly influencing the jury’s fact-finding mission. When the hypothetical question technique is not used, careful instructions to the jury are required...")
  7. Leinen, ibid., at para 24
    R v PG, 2009 ONCA 32 (CanLII), 242 CCC (3d) 558, per Juriansz JA, at paras 29 to 30, 244 OAC 316(complete citation pending)
    R v Kelly, 1990 CanLII 11053 (ON CA), 41 OAC 32, 59 CCC (3d) 497, per Finlayson JA
  8. R v Lavallee, 1990 CanLII 95 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 852, per Wilson J
    R v Flight, 2014 ABCA 185 (CanLII), 313 CCC (3d) 442, per Veldhuis JA
  9. R v Solleveld, 2014 ONCA 418 (CanLII), 311 CCC (3d) 387, per curiam, at para 19

Ultimate Issue Rule

Traditionally, an expert should not give an opinion on an "ultimate issue" to the case; otherwise, the expert would usurp the role of the trier-of-fact.[1] Where the facts are not in dispute there is a discretion for the judge to allow the expert to give evidence on the ultimate issue.[2]

In modern application, this rule has largely disappeared.[3]

However, the trial judge must apply "increased scrutiny" of the relevance and necessity when the evidence approaches the ultimate issue.[4]

Example

A psychologist has been allowed to give evidence on whether a murder was "planned and deliberate."[5] Also, whether the accused's condition is a "disease of the mind."[6]

  1. R v Béland, 1987 CanLII 27 (SCC), [1987] 2 SCR 398, per McIntyre J
  2. Swietlinski v R, 1978 CanLII 56 (ON CA), 44 CCC (2d) 267, per Martin JA
  3. Hamilton v Bluewater Recycling Association, 2016 ONCA 805 (CanLII), per curiam, at para 21 ("there is no longer a general prohibition on the admission of expert evidence concerning the ultimate issue")
    R v Lucas, 2014 ONCA 561 (CanLII), 121 O.R. (3d) 303, 313 CCC (3d) 159, per curiam leave to appeal refused, [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 460, at para. 271
    Hoang v Vicentini, 2016 ONCA 723 (CanLII), 352 OAC 358, per Brown JA, at para 62
    R v Solleveld, 2014 ONCA 418 (CanLII), 311 CCC (3d) 387, per curiam, at para 18 ("The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly affirmed that the common law rule precluding expert evidence on the ultimate issue no longer applies in Canada")
    R v Burns, 1994 CanLII 127 (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 656, per McLachlin J, at para 25 ("While care must be taken to ensure that the judge or jury, and not the expert, makes the final decisions on all issues in the case, it has long been accepted that expert evidence on matters of fact should not be excluded simply because it suggests answers to issues which are at the core of the dispute before the court")
    R v Bryan, 2003 CanLII 24337 (ON CA), 175 CCC (3d) 285, per Goudge JA, at para 16 ("there is now no general rule precluding expert evidence on the ultimate issue")
    R v Potts, 2018 ONCA 294 (CanLII), per curiam, at para 47 ("It is worth recalling that no general rule precludes the introduction of expert opinion evidence on the ultimate issue in a criminal trial")
    R v Mohan, 1994 CanLII 80 (SCC), [1994] 2 SCR 9, per Sopinka J, at pp. 24-25
    R v Bryan, 2003 CanLII 24337 (ON CA), 175 CCC (3d) 285, per Goudge JA, at paras 16 to 17
    R v Lucas, 2014 ONCA 561 (CanLII), 121 OR (3d) 303, per curiam, at para 271
  4. Solleveld, supra, at para 20
    Mohan, supra, at paras 24 to 25
  5. R v More, 1963 CanLII 79 (SCC), [1963] SCR 522, per Cartwright J
  6. R v Cooper, 1979 CanLII 63 (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 1149, per Dickson J

Change of Opinion

It is accepted that the testimony of witnesses, expert or otherwise, may change over time for various reasons. A mistrial would likely not be available where a witness gives advance notice that their evidence has changed.[1]

  1. R v Chen, 2019 ONSC 3088 (CanLII), at para 22 ("Given this undeniable reality in criminal trials, it is difficult to imagine circumstances where it would be necessary to declare a mistrial simply because a witness gave advance notice to the lawyer who was planning on calling them, that they were going to, in fact, give unanticipated testimony at variance with some earlier indication of what their testimony might be.")

Specific Types of Expert

Drug Expert

A layperson such as an RCMP officer cannot be a reliable expert simply by "conducting numerous casual conversations with drug users or traffickers." This sort of "[a]necdotal evidence cannot be tested or verified hearsay must be supplemented and supported by some form of admissible evidence."[1]

Financial Expert

In a financial crime case, it can be appropriate for the Crown to lead "generic" evidence as to "legitimate and illegitimate ... banking practices and documents."[2]

  1. R v Klassen, 2003 MBQB 253 (CanLII), [2003] MJ No 417, per Scurfield J
  2. R v Solleveld, 2014 ONCA 418 (CanLII), per curiam, at para 19