Spousal Immunity: Difference between revisions
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;Communications during marriage | |||
(3) No husband is compellable to disclose any communication made to him by his wife during their marriage, and no wife is compellable to disclose any communication made to her by her husband during their marriage. | (3) No husband is compellable to disclose any communication made to him by his wife during their marriage, and no wife is compellable to disclose any communication made to her by her husband during their marriage. | ||
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This protection in s. 4(3) is testimonial in nature and is designed to prevent compelled testimony. It does not protect the actual content of the communication.<ref> | This protection in s. 4(3) is testimonial in nature and is designed to prevent compelled testimony. It does not protect the actual content of the communication.<ref> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|Nguyen|ghblp|2015 ONCA 278 (CanLII)|125 OR (3d) 321}}{{perONCA|Gillese JA}}{{AtL|ghblp|135}} ("As Couture makes clear, at para. 41, the spousal privilege established by s. 4(3) of the CEA is testimonial in nature and prevents compelled testimony. The communications themselves are not privileged.")<br> | {{CanLIIRP|Nguyen|ghblp|2015 ONCA 278 (CanLII)|125 OR (3d) 321}}{{perONCA|Gillese JA}}{{AtL|ghblp|135}} ("As Couture makes clear, at para. 41, the spousal privilege established by s. 4(3) of the CEA is testimonial in nature and prevents compelled testimony. The communications themselves are not privileged.")<br> | ||
{{CanLIIRP|Couture|1rrws|2007 SCC 28 (CanLII)|[2007] 2 SCR 517}}{{AtL|1rrws|41}} ("The privilege is testimonial in nature, giving a right to withhold evidence but the communications themselves are not privileged. The privilege belongs to the spouse receiving the communication and can be waived by him or her.") | {{CanLIIRP|Couture|1rrws|2007 SCC 28 (CanLII)|[2007] 2 SCR 517}}{{AtL|1rrws|41}} ("The privilege is testimonial in nature, giving a right to withhold evidence but the communications themselves are not privileged. The privilege belongs to the spouse receiving the communication and can be waived by him or her.")<br> | ||
Siniscalchi, 2010 BCCA 354 (CanLII) at para 50 to 52<br> | |||
</ref> | |||
A person testifying can be cross-examined on anything they said to his partner, but not anything in reply.<Ref> | |||
R. v Meer, 2015 ABCA 141 (CanLII), at para 69, <https://canlii.ca/t/gh77g#par69> ("The appellant, conversely, could be cross-examined on anything he said to his wife, but not anything she said in reply. The statute is clear: spousal communication privilege extends only to a recipient spouse, not a communicating spouse such as the appellant") | |||
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{{supra1|Nguyen}}{{atL|ghblp|20}}<br> | {{supra1|Nguyen}}{{atL|ghblp|20}}<br> | ||
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;Non-private communications | |||
The privilege does not cover communications which were not reasonably believed to be confidential.<ref> | |||
{{supra1|Meer}}{{atL||70}} ("it does not extend to communications which the spouses knew or could not reasonably believe were confidential ... communications between the spouses at a busy dinner table, or otherwise within obvious earshot of other persons, are not privileged. If the spouses communicate in public, requiring them to repeat those conversations while testifying is not within the purpose of the privilege. Disclosing communications that are already public cannot reasonably affect the marital relationship. Once something is made public, it cannot thereafter be made secret.")<br> | |||
R. v Jean and Piesinger (1980), 1979 ALTASCAD 89 (CanLII), 15 AR 147 at paras. 40-1, 46 CCC (2d) 176 (CA) affirmed 1980 CanLII 163 (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 400<br> | |||
Siniscalchi at para. 57<Br> | |||
R. v Hawkins, 1996 CanLII 154 (SCC), [1996] 3 SCR 1043 at paras. 130-1<br> | |||
US: State v Christian (2004), 841 A2d 1158 at pp. 1172-3, 1177-8, 267 Conn 710 | |||
</ref> | |||
; Common Law Partners | ; Common Law Partners | ||
Latest revision as of 13:38, 17 November 2024
| This page was last substantively updated or reviewed August 2021. (Rev. # 96780) |
General Principles
Spousal competency, compellability and privilege are "distinct but related concepts."[1] The purpose of all of these rules is to "protect marital harmony" and avoid having a spouse testify against another.[2]
- ↑
R v Al-Enzi, 2021 ONCA 81 (CanLII), per Tulloch JA, at para 185
R v Nguyen, 2015 ONCA 278 (CanLII), 125 OR (3d) 321, per Gillese JA, at para 10
- ↑
Nguyen, ibid. at para 20
R v Couture, 2007 SCC 28 (CanLII), [2007] 2 SCR 517, per Charron J, at para 43
Spousal Competence
There are two exceptions to the common law rule against spousal competence. There is a common law exception and a statutory exception.[1] In addition, spouses are permitted to testify for the defence.[2]
- Common law rule of spousal competence
At common law a spouse of an accused is incompetent to testify except where the charge involves the person, liberty, or health, of the spouse.[3]
- Evidence Act rule of spousal competence
Section 4(2) of the Canada Evidence Act modifies the common law by stating that:
4
[omitted (1)]
- Spouse of accused
(2) No person is incompetent, or uncompellable, to testify for the prosecution by reason only that they are married to the accused.
[omitted (3), (4), (5) and (6)]
R.S., 1985, c. C-5, s. 4; R.S., 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 17; 2002, c. 1, s. 166; 2014, c. 25, s. 34, c. 31, s. 27; 2015, c. 13, s. 52.
It remains unsettled whether a witness who is competent under s. 4(2) is compellable.[4]
- Common law partners
There is some suggestion that the rule of spousal privilege does not apply to those in common law relationships.[5] However, it has also been said that where there exists a "marital bond ...in substance", then the immunity will apply.[6]
- Competence for Defence
- Accused and spouse
4 (1) Every person charged with an offence, and, except as otherwise provided in this section, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of the person so charged, is a competent witness for the defence, whether the person so charged is charged solely or jointly with any other person.
[omitted (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6)]
R.S., 1985, c. C-5, s. 4; R.S., 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 17; 2002, c. 1, s. 166; 2014, c. 25, s. 34, c. 31, s. 27; 2015, c. 13, s. 52.
- No Negative Inferences
4
[omitted (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5)]
- Failure to testify
(6) The failure of the person charged, or of the wife or husband of that person, to testify shall not be made the subject of comment by the judge or by counsel for the prosecution.
R.S., 1985, c. C-5, s. 4; R.S., 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 17; 2002, c. 1, s. 166; 2014, c. 25, s. 34, c. 31, s. 27; 2015, c. 13, s. 52.
There must be something more than an "off-hand reference" to the fact that the accused chose not to testify to engage the prohibition under s. 4(6).[7]
- ↑
R v Nguyen, 2015 ONCA 278 (CanLII), 125 OR (3d) 321, per Gillese JA, at para 14
- ↑
Nguyen, ibid. at para 14
see also s. 4(1)
- ↑ R v Hawkins, 1996 CanLII 154 (SCC), [1996] 3 SCR 1043, per Lamer CJ and Iacobucci J
- ↑
Nguyen, supra at para 15 ("whether a spouse who is a competent witness for the prosecution is also compellable at the instance of the prosecution has not been finally resolved")
R v Salituro, 1991 CanLII 17 (SCC), per Iacobucci J at p. 676 (“the possibility that a competent spouse would be found also to be compellable is a real one”.) - ↑ R v Nguyen, 2015 ONCA 278 (CanLII), 125 OR (3d) 321, per Gillese JA
- ↑ R v Legge, 2014 ABCA 213 (CanLII), 310 CCC (3d) 404, per Paperny JA , at para 41
- ↑ R v Potvin, 1989 CanLII 130 (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 525, per Wilson J
Spousal Privilege
Spousal privilege is a class protection of certain communications between husband and wife. It is a protection that is separate and apart from spousal competency.[1]
A spouse who is found to be competent and compellable may still invoke privilege to protect their communications.[2] The privilege belongs to the recipient spouse.[3]
This class of privilege does not exist at common law, but rather was created by way of s. 4(3) of the Evidence Act, which states:
4
[omitted (1) and (2)]
- Communications during marriage
(3) No husband is compellable to disclose any communication made to him by his wife during their marriage, and no wife is compellable to disclose any communication made to her by her husband during their marriage.
[omitted (4), (5) and (6)]
R.S., 1985, c. C-5, s. 4; R.S., 1985, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 17; 2002, c. 1, s. 166; 2014, c. 25, s. 34, c. 31, s. 27; 2015, c. 13, s. 52.
This protection in s. 4(3) is testimonial in nature and is designed to prevent compelled testimony. It does not protect the actual content of the communication.[4] A person testifying can be cross-examined on anything they said to his partner, but not anything in reply.[5]
- Purpose
The purpose of the protection is a) to promote marital harmony and (b) to prevent the "indignity" of having a spouse testify against their partner.[6]
- Non-private communications
The privilege does not cover communications which were not reasonably believed to be confidential.[7]
- Common Law Partners
Traditionally, spousal privilege had not applied to common law partners.[8]
- Dissolution of Marriage
Where the relationship has dissolved, the privilege will dissolve with it.[9]
- Ownership and Waiver
The privilege is owned by the potentially testify spouse and can be waived by them.[10]
- Third Parties Testimony
Third parties may "testify to communications between husband and wife that were overheard, intercepted, or otherwise discovered."[11]
- Wiretap
Pursuant to s. 189(6), any information collected by wiretap are subject to the same protections.
- ↑ See McWilliams' Canadian Criminal Evidence, 4th ed., vol. 1, looseleaf (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 2010) at para 13:40.10
- ↑ R v Zylstra, 1995 CanLII 893 (ON CA), 99 CCC (3d) 477, per curiam
- ↑ R v Legge, 2014 ABCA 213 (CanLII), 310 CCC (3d) 404, per Paperny JA, at para 44 ("The privilege is that of the witness, not the accused. It must be asserted by the witness who will then bear the burden of establishing that the relationship is one with a substantive marital bond.")
- ↑
R v Nguyen, 2015 ONCA 278 (CanLII), 125 OR (3d) 321, per Gillese JA, at para 135 ("As Couture makes clear, at para. 41, the spousal privilege established by s. 4(3) of the CEA is testimonial in nature and prevents compelled testimony. The communications themselves are not privileged.")
R v Couture, 2007 SCC 28 (CanLII), [2007] 2 SCR 517, at para 41 ("The privilege is testimonial in nature, giving a right to withhold evidence but the communications themselves are not privileged. The privilege belongs to the spouse receiving the communication and can be waived by him or her.")
Siniscalchi, 2010 BCCA 354 (CanLII) at para 50 to 52
- ↑ R. v Meer, 2015 ABCA 141 (CanLII), at para 69, <https://canlii.ca/t/gh77g#par69> ("The appellant, conversely, could be cross-examined on anything he said to his wife, but not anything she said in reply. The statute is clear: spousal communication privilege extends only to a recipient spouse, not a communicating spouse such as the appellant")
- ↑
R v Al-Enzi, 2021 ONCA 81 (CanLII), per Tulloch J at para 183
R v Rendon, [1997] O.J. No. 5505 (Gen. Div.)(*no CanLII links) , at para. 46
R v Salituro, 1991 CanLII 17 (SCC), per Iacobucci J at p. 672 (SCR)
Couture, supra, at para 43
Nguyen, supra, at para 20
- ↑
Meer, supra, at para 70 ("it does not extend to communications which the spouses knew or could not reasonably believe were confidential ... communications between the spouses at a busy dinner table, or otherwise within obvious earshot of other persons, are not privileged. If the spouses communicate in public, requiring them to repeat those conversations while testifying is not within the purpose of the privilege. Disclosing communications that are already public cannot reasonably affect the marital relationship. Once something is made public, it cannot thereafter be made secret.")
R. v Jean and Piesinger (1980), 1979 ALTASCAD 89 (CanLII), 15 AR 147 at paras. 40-1, 46 CCC (2d) 176 (CA) affirmed 1980 CanLII 163 (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 400
Siniscalchi at para. 57
R. v Hawkins, 1996 CanLII 154 (SCC), [1996] 3 SCR 1043 at paras. 130-1
US: State v Christian (2004), 841 A2d 1158 at pp. 1172-3, 1177-8, 267 Conn 710 - ↑
Al-Enzi, supra at para 184
R v Nero, 2016 ONCA 160 (CanLII), 334 CCC (3d) 148, per Watt JA, at para 185, leave to appeal refused, [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 184
Nguyen, supra
- ↑
Rendon, supra, at para 46
- ↑
R v Couture, 2007 SCC 28 (CanLII), [2007] 2 SCR 517, per Charron J, at para 41 ("is testimonial in nature, giving a right to withhold evidence but the communications themselves are not privileged. The privilege belongs to the spouse receiving the communication and can be waived by him or her.")
- ↑ R v RRW (No. 2), 2010 NLTD 137 (CanLII), per Goodridge J citing McWilliams’ at para 13:40.50