Regulatory Offences: Difference between revisions

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==General Principles==
==General Principles==
Regulatory offences (or "public welfare" offences) come in three categories:<ref>
Regulatory offences (or "public welfare" offences) come in three categories:<ref>
R v Kanda, [http://canlii.ca/t/1vdtt 2008 ONCA 22] (CanLII) at para 17 citing R v Sault Ste. Marie, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mkbt 1978 CanLII 11] (SCC), [1978] 2 SCR 1299<br>
R v Kanda, [http://canlii.ca/t/1vdtt 2008 ONCA 22] (CanLII){{perONCA|MacPherson JA}} at para 17 citing R v Sault Ste. Marie, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mkbt 1978 CanLII 11] (SCC), [1978] 2 SCR 1299{{perSCC|Dickson J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
# '''''mens rea'' offences''': offences that require "some positive state of mind such as intent, knowledge, or recklessness, must be proved by the prosecution either as an inference from the nature of the act committed, or by additional evidence".
# '''''mens rea'' offences''': offences that require "some positive state of mind such as intent, knowledge, or recklessness, must be proved by the prosecution either as an inference from the nature of the act committed, or by additional evidence".
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In strict liability offences the Crown does not need to prove intent. The defences of due diligence and mistake of fact are valid defences.<ref>
In strict liability offences the Crown does not need to prove intent. The defences of due diligence and mistake of fact are valid defences.<ref>
R v Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 SCR 1299, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mkbt 1978 CanLII 11] (SCC)<br>
R v Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 SCR 1299, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mkbt 1978 CanLII 11] (SCC){{perSCC|Dickson J}}<br>
R v Chapin, [1979] 2 SCR 121, [http://canlii.ca/t/1tx7c 1979 CanLII 33] (SCC)<br>
R v Chapin, [1979] 2 SCR 121, [http://canlii.ca/t/1tx7c 1979 CanLII 33] (SCC){{perSCC|Dickson J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


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}}
}}
The general approach is that unless the Act creating the offence explicitly excludes the application of the Criminal Code, then it will have application.<ref>
The general approach is that unless the Act creating the offence explicitly excludes the application of the Criminal Code, then it will have application.<ref>
R. v. Del Mastro, [http://canlii.ca/t/gp419 2016 ONSC 2071] (CanLII) at paras 148 and 149 (“law is well settled that, ...the provisions of the Criminal Code will apply to offences created under another Act of Parliament, unless Parliament has clearly expressed an intention to the contrary…The general rule is that the Criminal Code is only ousted, if the statute in issue contains a ‘complete code.’ However, the fact that a statute may be silent, or that the statute has some provision touching upon the same subject matter as a provision in the Criminal Code, is not sufficient to manifest an intention on the part of Parliament to exclude the Criminal Code”)<br>
R. v. Del Mastro, [http://canlii.ca/t/gp419 2016 ONSC 2071] (CanLII){{perONSC|Shaughnessy J}} at paras 148 and 149 (“law is well settled that, ...the provisions of the Criminal Code will apply to offences created under another Act of Parliament, unless Parliament has clearly expressed an intention to the contrary…The general rule is that the Criminal Code is only ousted, if the statute in issue contains a ‘complete code.’ However, the fact that a statute may be silent, or that the statute has some provision touching upon the same subject matter as a provision in the Criminal Code, is not sufficient to manifest an intention on the part of Parliament to exclude the Criminal Code”)<br>
R v Dalum, [http://canlii.ca/t/fq2b2 2012 BCSC 210] (CanLII) <br>
R v Dalum, [http://canlii.ca/t/fq2b2 2012 BCSC 210] (CanLII) <br>
</reF>
</reF>
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==Inspections and Investigations==
==Inspections and Investigations==
An inspection is the same as a search within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter, however, given that it is non-criminal, no warrant is needed so long as it is authorized by a statute.<ref>
An inspection is the same as a search within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter, however, given that it is non-criminal, no warrant is needed so long as it is authorized by a statute.<ref>
Comité paritaire de l'industrie de la chemise v Potash; Comité paritaire de l'industrie de la chemise v Sélection Milton, [1994] 2 SCR 406, [http://canlii.ca/t/1frrp 1994 CanLII 92] (SCC) per La Forest J<br>
Comité paritaire de l'industrie de la chemise v Potash; Comité paritaire de l'industrie de la chemise v Sélection Milton, [1994] 2 SCR 406, [http://canlii.ca/t/1frrp 1994 CanLII 92] (SCC){{perSCC|La Forest J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


An inspection will turn into a full investigation once "the predominant purpose" of an officer's inquiry "is the determination of penal liability".<ref>
An inspection will turn into a full investigation once "the predominant purpose" of an officer's inquiry "is the determination of penal liability".<ref>
R v Jarvis, [http://canlii.ca/t/50d7 2002 SCC 73] (CanLII), (2002), 219 DLR (4th) 233 (S.C.C.) per Iacobucci and Major JJ<br>
R v Jarvis, [http://canlii.ca/t/50d7 2002 SCC 73] (CanLII), (2002), 219 DLR (4th) 233 (S.C.C.) {{perSCC|Iacobucci and Major JJ}}<br>
R v Ling, [http://canlii.ca/t/50d9 2002 SCC 74] (CanLII), (2002), 169 CCC (3d) 46 (S.C.C.) per Iacobucci and Major JJ<br>
R v Ling, [http://canlii.ca/t/50d9 2002 SCC 74] (CanLII), (2002), 169 CCC (3d) 46 (S.C.C.){{perSCC|Iacobucci and Major JJ}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
It is this moment where the "adversarial relationship crystallizes".<ref>
It is this moment where the "adversarial relationship crystallizes".<ref>
R v Lempen, [http://canlii.ca/t/21rm7 2008 NBCA 86] (CanLII) per Bell JA<br>
R v Lempen, [http://canlii.ca/t/21rm7 2008 NBCA 86] (CanLII){{perNBCA|Bell JA}}<br>
</ref> Once an investigation has begun, the inspecting agent must then comply with all procedural requirements for search and seizure.<ref>
</ref> Once an investigation has begun, the inspecting agent must then comply with all procedural requirements for search and seizure.<ref>
R v Canada Brick Ltd., [http://canlii.ca/t/1l5mm 2005 CanLII 24925] (ON SC), at para 11 per Hill J<br>
R v Canada Brick Ltd., [http://canlii.ca/t/1l5mm 2005 CanLII 24925] (ON SC){{perONSC|Hill J}}, at para 11<br>
R v D'Amour, [http://canlii.ca/t/1cskn 2002 CanLII 45015] (ON CA) per Doherty JA<br>  
R v D'Amour, [http://canlii.ca/t/1cskn 2002 CanLII 45015] (ON CA){{perONCA|Doherty JA}}<br>  
</ref>  
</ref>  


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==Determining Category of Offence==
==Determining Category of Offence==
There is a presumption that regulatory offences are "strict liability".<ref>
There is a presumption that regulatory offences are "strict liability".<ref>
R v Kanda [http://canlii.ca/t/1vdtt 2008 ONCA 22] (CanLII) at para 19 per MacPherson JA<br>
R v Kanda [http://canlii.ca/t/1vdtt 2008 ONCA 22] (CanLII){{perONCA|MacPherson JA}} at para 19<br>
</ref>
</ref>


The judge should consider factors to determine the type of offence:<ref>
The judge should consider factors to determine the type of offence:<ref>
Kanda{{ibid}} at para 19<br>
Kanda{{ibid}} at para 19<br>
see also  R v Hickey (1976), [http://canlii.ca/t/g1d9p 1976 CanLII 663] (ON SC), 29 CCC (2d) 23 (Ont. Div. C.T.) rev'd 30 CCC (2d) 416, 70 DLR (3d) 689, [http://canlii.ca/t/g1dvl 1976 CanLII 653] (ON CA)<br>
see also  R v Hickey (1976), [http://canlii.ca/t/g1d9p 1976 CanLII 663] (ON SC), 29 CCC (2d) 23 (Ont. Div. C.T.){{perONSC|Galligan J}} rev'd 30 CCC (2d) 416, 70 DLR (3d) 689, [http://canlii.ca/t/g1dvl 1976 CanLII 653] (ON CA){{perONCA|Jessup JA}}<br>
R v Cooke, [http://canlii.ca/t/1f87f 2001 CanLII 17868] (MB PC) citing Hickey
R v Cooke, [http://canlii.ca/t/1f87f 2001 CanLII 17868] (MB PC){{perMBPC|Joyal J}} citing Hickey{{supra}}
</ref>
</ref>
# overall regulatory pattern and context of the section,  
# overall regulatory pattern and context of the section,  
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Offences that use language suggestive of a ''mens rea'', such as  “wilfully”, “with intent”, “knowingly”, or “intentionally”, will likely be "mens rea offences".<ref>
Offences that use language suggestive of a ''mens rea'', such as  “wilfully”, “with intent”, “knowingly”, or “intentionally”, will likely be "mens rea offences".<ref>
R v Sault Ste. Marie, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mkbt 1978 CanLII 11] (SCC), [1978] 2 SCR 1299 at p. 374 per Dickson J<br>
R v Sault Ste. Marie, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mkbt 1978 CanLII 11] (SCC), [1978] 2 SCR 1299{{perSCC|Dickson J}} at p. 374<br>
R v Gopher, [http://canlii.ca/t/h2mn1 2017 SKQB 50] (CanLII) at para 31<br>
R v Gopher, [http://canlii.ca/t/h2mn1 2017 SKQB 50] (CanLII){{perSKQB|RS Smith J}} at para 31<br>
</ref>
</ref>
However, wording such as "cause" or "permit" will more typically be used in strict liability offences.<ref>
However, wording such as "cause" or "permit" will more typically be used in strict liability offences.<ref>
Sault Ste Marie at p. 1328<br>
Sault Ste Marie{{supra}} at p. 1328<br>
Gopher{{supra}} at para 32<br>
Gopher{{supra}} at para 32<br>
</ref>
</ref>


The greater the penalty to more likely it will be a "mens rea offence".<ref>
The greater the penalty to more likely it will be a "mens rea offence".<ref>
Sault Ste. Marie{{ibid}} at p. 374<br>
Sault Ste. Marie{{supra}} at p. 374<br>
</ref>
</ref>




Even where the penalty is "severe", the offence may still be strict liability where the public safety is not compromised by the conduct and the wording of the offence does not indicate guilt as require proof.<ref>
Even where the penalty is "severe", the offence may still be strict liability where the public safety is not compromised by the conduct and the wording of the offence does not indicate guilt as require proof.<ref>
R v Blackburn, [http://canlii.ca/t/23nj1 1980 CanLII 455] (BC CA) per McFarlane JA
R v Blackburn, [http://canlii.ca/t/23nj1 1980 CanLII 455] (BC CA){{perBCCA|McFarlane JA}}
</ref>
</ref>


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Offences of "public welfare" are prima facie presumed to be strict liability offences.<ref>
Offences of "public welfare" are prima facie presumed to be strict liability offences.<ref>
Lévis (City) v Tétreault; Lévis (City) v 2629-4470 Québec inc., [http://canlii.ca/t/1n0zk 2006 SCC 12] (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 420 [Lévis], per LeBel J at para 16<br>
Lévis (City) v Tétreault; Lévis (City) v 2629-4470 Québec inc., [http://canlii.ca/t/1n0zk 2006 SCC 12] (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 420 [Lévis]{{perSCC|LeBel J}} at para 16<br>
</ref>
</ref>
This includes offences contained in regulatory statutes and are prima facie strict liability offences.<ref>
This includes offences contained in regulatory statutes and are prima facie strict liability offences.<ref>
Cook v Saskatchewan (Attorney General) (1983), [http://canlii.ca/t/g7m84 1983 CanLII 2012] (SK QB), 23 Sask R 236 (QB)<br>
Cook v Saskatchewan (Attorney General) (1983), [http://canlii.ca/t/g7m84 1983 CanLII 2012] (SK QB), 23 Sask R 236 (QB){{perSKQB|Halvorson J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


An Ontario seatbelt law under provincial road Act was not found to be strict liability.<ref>
An Ontario seatbelt law under provincial road Act was not found to be strict liability.<ref>
e.g. R v Kanda, [http://canlii.ca/t/1vdtt 2008 ONCA 22] (CanLII)<br>
e.g. R v Kanda, [http://canlii.ca/t/1vdtt 2008 ONCA 22] (CanLII){{perONCA|MacPherson JA}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


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==Absolute Liability Offences==
==Absolute Liability Offences==
Absolute liability offences are somewhat rare and exceptional.<Ref>
Absolute liability offences are somewhat rare and exceptional.<Ref>
Lévis (City) v Tétreault; Lévis (City) v 2629-4470 Québec inc., [http://canlii.ca/t/1n0zk 2006 SCC 12] (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 420 [Lévis], per LeBel J at para 17<br>
Lévis (City) v Tétreault; Lévis (City) v 2629-4470 Québec inc., [http://canlii.ca/t/1n0zk 2006 SCC 12] (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 420 [Lévis]{{perSCC|LeBel J}} at para 17<br>
</ref>
</ref>
There must be "clear proof of legislative intent" before an offence will be considered one of absolute liability.<ref>
There must be "clear proof of legislative intent" before an offence will be considered one of absolute liability.<ref>
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Absolute liability Offences that are punishable by a period of imprisonment violate s. 7 of the Charter and are not permissible.<ref>
Absolute liability Offences that are punishable by a period of imprisonment violate s. 7 of the Charter and are not permissible.<ref>
R v Cancoil Thermal Corp. and Parkinson, [http://CanLII.ca/t/1p70g 1986 CanLII 154] (ONCA)<Br>
R v Cancoil Thermal Corp. and Parkinson, [http://CanLII.ca/t/1p70g 1986 CanLII 154] (ONCA){{perONCA|Lacourciere JA}}<Br>
</ref>
</ref>


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The term "stunting" in relation to motor vehicle infractions includes "racing or performing tricks or doing anything unusual to attract attention".<ref>
The term "stunting" in relation to motor vehicle infractions includes "racing or performing tricks or doing anything unusual to attract attention".<ref>
R v Brown, [http://canlii.ca/t/grnq3 2016 ABPC 110] (CanLII)
R v Brown, [http://canlii.ca/t/grnq3 2016 ABPC 110] (CanLII){{perABPC|Norheim J}}
</ref>
</ref>



Revision as of 23:14, 11 November 2018

General Principles

Regulatory offences (or "public welfare" offences) come in three categories:[1]

  1. mens rea offences: offences that require "some positive state of mind such as intent, knowledge, or recklessness, must be proved by the prosecution either as an inference from the nature of the act committed, or by additional evidence".
  2. "strict liability" offences: offence with no mens rea where the act creates a prima facie case that requires the accused to show "all reasonable care".
  3. "absolute liability" offences: offences where it is "not open to the accused to exculpate himself by showing that he was free of fault."

Only true criminal matters can be "mens rea offences".[2]

The elements of provincial or regulatory offences, defences and all evidential standards must be proven on a balance of probabilities [3]

In strict liability offences the Crown does not need to prove intent. The defences of due diligence and mistake of fact are valid defences.[4]

In absolute liability offences the Crown does not need to prove intent.The defence of due diligence is not available.[5]

All offences outside of the Criminal Code that are not defined as indictable are deemed to be summary offences.[6]

Similarly, the provisions within the Code that concern indictable offences will relate to indictable offences found in other Acts and provisions in the Code concerning summary offences will apply to summary offences in other Acts unless otherwise stated.[7]

Applicability of the Criminal Code
All federal summary and indictable offences are subject to the procedures of the Criminal Code except where otherwise provided. As stated in s. 34(2) of the Interpretation Act:

34
...
Criminal Code to apply
(2) All the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to indictable offences apply to indictable offences created by an enactment, and all the provisions of that Code relating to summary conviction offences apply to all other offences created by an enactment, except to the extent that the enactment otherwise provides.
...
R.S., c. I-23, s. 27.


CCC

The general approach is that unless the Act creating the offence explicitly excludes the application of the Criminal Code, then it will have application.[8]

  1. R v Kanda, 2008 ONCA 22 (CanLII), per MacPherson JA at para 17 citing R v Sault Ste. Marie, 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), [1978] 2 SCR 1299, per Dickson J
  2. Kanda, ibid. at para 18
  3. Bryant, Lederman, Fuerst "The Law of Evidence in Canada" (Third Edition, LexisNexis Canada Inc. 2009) p. 221, para 5.85
  4. R v Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 SCR 1299, 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), per Dickson J
    R v Chapin, [1979] 2 SCR 121, 1979 CanLII 33 (SCC), per Dickson J
  5. Sault Ste. Marie, supra
  6. see s. 34(1)(b) of the Interpretation Act ("Where an enactment creates an offence, ...the offence is deemed to be one for which the offender is punishable on summary conviction if there is nothing in the context to indicate that the offence is an indictable offence;")
  7. see s. 34(2) of the Interpretation Act ("All the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to indictable offences apply to indictable offences created by an enactment, and all the provisions of that Code relating to summary conviction offences apply to all other offences created by an enactment, except to the extent that the enactment otherwise provides.")
    see also provincial summary proceedings acts:
    Summary Proceedings Act, RSNS 1989, c 450, s. 7
  8. R. v. Del Mastro, 2016 ONSC 2071 (CanLII), per Shaughnessy J at paras 148 and 149 (“law is well settled that, ...the provisions of the Criminal Code will apply to offences created under another Act of Parliament, unless Parliament has clearly expressed an intention to the contrary…The general rule is that the Criminal Code is only ousted, if the statute in issue contains a ‘complete code.’ However, the fact that a statute may be silent, or that the statute has some provision touching upon the same subject matter as a provision in the Criminal Code, is not sufficient to manifest an intention on the part of Parliament to exclude the Criminal Code”)
    R v Dalum, 2012 BCSC 210 (CanLII)

Inspections and Investigations

An inspection is the same as a search within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter, however, given that it is non-criminal, no warrant is needed so long as it is authorized by a statute.[1]

An inspection will turn into a full investigation once "the predominant purpose" of an officer's inquiry "is the determination of penal liability".[2] It is this moment where the "adversarial relationship crystallizes".[3] Once an investigation has begun, the inspecting agent must then comply with all procedural requirements for search and seizure.[4]

  1. Comité paritaire de l'industrie de la chemise v Potash; Comité paritaire de l'industrie de la chemise v Sélection Milton, [1994] 2 SCR 406, 1994 CanLII 92 (SCC), per La Forest J
  2. R v Jarvis, 2002 SCC 73 (CanLII), (2002), 219 DLR (4th) 233 (S.C.C.) , per Iacobucci and Major JJ
    R v Ling, 2002 SCC 74 (CanLII), (2002), 169 CCC (3d) 46 (S.C.C.), per Iacobucci and Major JJ
  3. R v Lempen, 2008 NBCA 86 (CanLII), per Bell JA
  4. R v Canada Brick Ltd., 2005 CanLII 24925 (ON SC), per Hill J, at para 11
    R v D'Amour, 2002 CanLII 45015 (ON CA), per Doherty JA

Determining Category of Offence

There is a presumption that regulatory offences are "strict liability".[1]

The judge should consider factors to determine the type of offence:[2]

  1. overall regulatory pattern and context of the section,
  2. the subject matter or type of conduct regulated;
  3. the purpose of the act;
  4. the community interest in its regulation
  5. the nature of the penalty; and
  6. the precision of the language used

Offences that use language suggestive of a mens rea, such as “wilfully”, “with intent”, “knowingly”, or “intentionally”, will likely be "mens rea offences".[3] However, wording such as "cause" or "permit" will more typically be used in strict liability offences.[4]

The greater the penalty to more likely it will be a "mens rea offence".[5]


Even where the penalty is "severe", the offence may still be strict liability where the public safety is not compromised by the conduct and the wording of the offence does not indicate guilt as require proof.[6]

  1. R v Kanda 2008 ONCA 22 (CanLII), per MacPherson JA at para 19
  2. Kanda, ibid. at para 19
    see also R v Hickey (1976), 1976 CanLII 663 (ON SC), 29 CCC (2d) 23 (Ont. Div. C.T.), per Galligan J rev'd 30 CCC (2d) 416, 70 DLR (3d) 689, 1976 CanLII 653 (ON CA), per Jessup JA
    R v Cooke, 2001 CanLII 17868 (MB PC), per Joyal J citing Hickey, supra
  3. R v Sault Ste. Marie, 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), [1978] 2 SCR 1299, per Dickson J at p. 374
    R v Gopher, 2017 SKQB 50 (CanLII), per RS Smith J at para 31
  4. Sault Ste Marie, supra at p. 1328
    Gopher, supra at para 32
  5. Sault Ste. Marie, supra at p. 374
  6. R v Blackburn, 1980 CanLII 455 (BC CA), per McFarlane JA

Strict Liability Offences

Offences of "public welfare" are prima facie presumed to be strict liability offences.[1] This includes offences contained in regulatory statutes and are prima facie strict liability offences.[2]

An Ontario seatbelt law under provincial road Act was not found to be strict liability.[3]

  1. Lévis (City) v Tétreault; Lévis (City) v 2629-4470 Québec inc., 2006 SCC 12 (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 420 [Lévis], per LeBel J at para 16
  2. Cook v Saskatchewan (Attorney General) (1983), 1983 CanLII 2012 (SK QB), 23 Sask R 236 (QB), per Halvorson J
  3. e.g. R v Kanda, 2008 ONCA 22 (CanLII), per MacPherson JA

Absolute Liability Offences

Absolute liability offences are somewhat rare and exceptional.[1] There must be "clear proof of legislative intent" before an offence will be considered one of absolute liability.[2]

The classification of the offence as absolute liability will depend on the statutory language including:[3]

  • the regulatory pattern adopted by the Legislature,
  • the subject matter of the legislation,
  • the importance of the penalty, and
  • the precision of the language used will be primary considerations.

Absolute liability Offences that are punishable by a period of imprisonment violate s. 7 of the Charter and are not permissible.[4]

  1. Lévis (City) v Tétreault; Lévis (City) v 2629-4470 Québec inc., 2006 SCC 12 (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 420 [Lévis], per LeBel J at para 17
  2. Levis, ibid. at para 17
  3. Levis, ibid. at para 17
  4. R v Cancoil Thermal Corp. and Parkinson, 1986 CanLII 154 (ONCA), per Lacourciere JA

See Also