Interception of Private Communications: Difference between revisions

From Criminal Law Notebook
m Text replacement - "c.f." to "cf."
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The right to full answer and defence permits the accused to examine an edited version of the materials available to the authorizing judge to support the wiretap authorization.<ref>
The right to full answer and defence permits the accused to examine an edited version of the materials available to the authorizing judge to support the wiretap authorization.<ref>
R v Garofoli, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fss5 1990 CanLII 52] (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 1421{{perSCC|Sopinka J}} at para 1433, 1452</ref>
''R v Garofoli'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1fss5 1990 CanLII 52] (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 1421{{perSCC|Sopinka J}} at para 1433, 1452</ref>


Modern electronic surveillance has been singled out as a particularly powerful form of privacy intrusion.
Modern electronic surveillance has been singled out as a particularly powerful form of privacy intrusion.
But unregulated, it would destroy any sort of privacy and would threaten society.<ref>
But unregulated, it would destroy any sort of privacy and would threaten society.<ref>
R v Duarte, [1990] 1 SCR 30, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fszz 1990 CanLII 150] (SCC){{perSCC|LaForest J}} - Judge referring to electronic surveillance as "superbly" equipped to fight crime, but left unregulated would mean "privacy no longer had any meaning"<br>
''R v Duarte'', [1990] 1 SCR 30, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fszz 1990 CanLII 150] (SCC){{perSCC|LaForest J}} - Judge referring to electronic surveillance as "superbly" equipped to fight crime, but left unregulated would mean "privacy no longer had any meaning"<br>
R v Wong, [1990] 3 SCR 36, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fsq9 1990 CanLII 56] (SCC){{perSCC|LaForest J}} - LaForest J suggesting that electronic surveillance would "annihilate privacy"<br>
''R v Wong'', [1990] 3 SCR 36, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fsq9 1990 CanLII 56] (SCC){{perSCC|LaForest J}} - LaForest J suggesting that electronic surveillance would "annihilate privacy"<br>
R v Wise, [1992] 1 SCR 527, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fsdl 1992 CanLII 125] (SCC){{perSCC|Cory J}} - LaForest J (dissenting) suggesting that surviellance was a "danger to individual autonomy and the organization of a free society”)
''R v Wise'', [1992] 1 SCR 527, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fsdl 1992 CanLII 125] (SCC){{perSCC|Cory J}} - LaForest J (dissenting) suggesting that surviellance was a "danger to individual autonomy and the organization of a free society”)
</ref>
</ref>


The Crown and police have a positive obligation not to disseminate irrelevant private communications revealed within a wiretap.<Ref>
The Crown and police have a positive obligation not to disseminate irrelevant private communications revealed within a wiretap.<Ref>
R v Guess, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fngn 2000 BCCA 547] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Hall J}}<br>
''R v Guess'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1fngn 2000 BCCA 547] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Hall J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


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===History===
===History===
The modern legislation protecting against the interception of private communications arose from the 1969 Ouimet report which resulted in the Protection of Privacy Act.<Ref>
The modern legislation protecting against the interception of private communications arose from the 1969 Ouimet report which resulted in the Protection of Privacy Act.<Ref>
R. Ouimet, Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, Towards Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1969) cited in detail at R v Nguyen, [http://canlii.ca/t/1hjsb 2001 ABPC 52] (CanLII){{perABPC|Stevenson ACJ}} at para 17<br>
R. Ouimet, Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, Towards Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1969) cited in detail at ''R v Nguyen'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1hjsb 2001 ABPC 52] (CanLII){{perABPC|Stevenson ACJ}} at para 17<br>
R v Lyons (1984), 15 CCC (3d0 417 at p.453, [http://canlii.ca/t/1lpg0 1984 CanLII 30] (SCC), [1984] 2 SCR 633{{perSCC|Estey J}} - comments on the origin of the wiretap provisions
R v Lyons (1984), 15 CCC (3d0 417 at p.453, [http://canlii.ca/t/1lpg0 1984 CanLII 30] (SCC), [1984] 2 SCR 633{{perSCC|Estey J}} - comments on the origin of the wiretap provisions
</ref>
</ref>
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===Purpose===
===Purpose===
Part VI of the Code regulates the "power of the state to record communications that their originator expects will not be intercepted".<ref>
Part VI of the Code regulates the "power of the state to record communications that their originator expects will not be intercepted".<ref>
R v Duarte, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fszz 1990 CanLII 150] (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 30, (1990), 53 CCC (3d) 1 (SCC){{perSCC|La Forest J}}
''R v Duarte'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1fszz 1990 CanLII 150] (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 30, (1990), 53 CCC (3d) 1 (SCC){{perSCC|La Forest J}}
R v Jones, [http://canlii.ca/t/hp63x 2017 SCC 60] (CanLII){{perSCC|Cote J}} at para 60<Br>
''R v Jones'', [http://canlii.ca/t/hp63x 2017 SCC 60] (CanLII){{perSCC|Cote J}} at para 60<Br>
</ref> It avoids the "danger inherent in allowing the state, in its unfettered discretion, to record and transmit our words."<ref>
</ref> It avoids the "danger inherent in allowing the state, in its unfettered discretion, to record and transmit our words."<ref>
Duarte{{supra}}
Duarte{{supra}}
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These provisions aim to "strike a balance between the protection of privacy and the availability of effective law enforcement techniques".
These provisions aim to "strike a balance between the protection of privacy and the availability of effective law enforcement techniques".
<Ref>
<Ref>
R v Nguyen, [http://canlii.ca/t/1hjsb 2001 ABPC 52] (CanLII){{perABPC|Stevenson ACJ}} at para 17<br>
''R v Nguyen'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1hjsb 2001 ABPC 52] (CanLII){{perABPC|Stevenson ACJ}} at para 17<br>
Regina v Welsh and Iannuzzi (No. 6), [http://canlii.ca/t/g19w7 1977 CanLII 1215] (ON CA), (1977) 32 CCC (2d) 363{{perONCA|Zuber JA}} (5:0) at p. 369<br>
Regina v Welsh and Iannuzzi (No. 6), [http://canlii.ca/t/g19w7 1977 CanLII 1215] (ON CA), (1977) 32 CCC (2d) 363{{perONCA|Zuber JA}} (5:0) at p. 369<br>
</ref>
</ref>
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</ref>
</ref>
The intention of who is to receive the communication includes those who the originator had knowledge would receive it but may not desire them to receive it.<ref>
The intention of who is to receive the communication includes those who the originator had knowledge would receive it but may not desire them to receive it.<ref>
R v Goldman, [http://canlii.ca/t/1tx9c 1979 CanLII 60] (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 976{{perSCC|Mclntyre J}} </ref>
''R v Goldman'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1tx9c 1979 CanLII 60] (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 976{{perSCC|Mclntyre J}} </ref>


Where it is reasonable to expect that the communication may be listened to or recorded, then it is not a private communication.<ref>
Where it is reasonable to expect that the communication may be listened to or recorded, then it is not a private communication.<ref>
R v Newall, [http://canlii.ca/t/23drc 1982 CanLII 276] (BC SC){{perSCC|Bouck J}}<br>
''R v Newall'', [http://canlii.ca/t/23drc 1982 CanLII 276] (BC SC){{perSCC|Bouck J}}<br>
R v Davie, [http://canlii.ca/t/23lwr 1980 CanLII 323] (BC CA){{perSCC|Hutcheon J}}<br>
''R v Davie'', [http://canlii.ca/t/23lwr 1980 CanLII 323] (BC CA){{perSCC|Hutcheon J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Communication requires some exchange of information between persons and not simply all information capturable by the interception. <ref>
Communication requires some exchange of information between persons and not simply all information capturable by the interception. <ref>
R v Balatoni, [http://canlii.ca/t/1h55g 2003 CanLII 13174] (ON SC){{perONSC|Dawson J}} at para 8
''R v Balatoni'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1h55g 2003 CanLII 13174] (ON SC){{perONSC|Dawson J}} at para 8
</ref> Consequently, sounds not intended to convey information does not constitute a communication.<ref>
</ref> Consequently, sounds not intended to convey information does not constitute a communication.<ref>
Balatoni</ref>
Balatoni</ref>
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The following has been found not to be a "private communication":
The following has been found not to be a "private communication":
* Electronic signals captured by a digital number recorder (DNR) <ref>
* Electronic signals captured by a digital number recorder (DNR) <ref>
R v Fegan, [http://canlii.ca/t/g16wp 1993 CanLII 8607] (ON CA), (1993), 80 CCC (3d) 356{{perONCA|Finlayson JA}}<br>
''R v Fegan'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g16wp 1993 CanLII 8607] (ON CA), (1993), 80 CCC (3d) 356{{perONCA|Finlayson JA}}<br>
cf. R v Griffith (1989) 44 CCC (3d) 63 (Ont. Dis. Ct.), [http://canlii.ca/t/g91l1 1988 CanLII 7059] (ON SC){{perONSC|McDermid J}} <br></ref>
cf. R v Griffith (1989) 44 CCC (3d) 63 (Ont. Dis. Ct.), [http://canlii.ca/t/g91l1 1988 CanLII 7059] (ON SC){{perONSC|McDermid J}} <br></ref>
* communication of a paging device.<ref>
* communication of a paging device.<ref>
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Davie{{supra}}</ref>
Davie{{supra}}</ref>
* a cassette sent through the mail<ref>
* a cassette sent through the mail<ref>
R v Newall, [http://canlii.ca/t/23drc 1982 CanLII 276] (BC SC){{perBCSC|Bouck J}}</ref>
''R v Newall'', [http://canlii.ca/t/23drc 1982 CanLII 276] (BC SC){{perBCSC|Bouck J}}</ref>
* prayers to God<ref>
* prayers to God<ref>
Davie{{supra}}
Davie{{supra}}
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;"originator"
;"originator"
The "originator" refers to the person whose "remarks which the Crown seeks to adduce in evidence" and are protected under Part VI of the Code.<ref>
The "originator" refers to the person whose "remarks which the Crown seeks to adduce in evidence" and are protected under Part VI of the Code.<ref>
R v Goldman, [http://canlii.ca/t/1tx9c 1979 CanLII 60] (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 976{{perSCC|Mclntyre J}}
''R v Goldman'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1tx9c 1979 CanLII 60] (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 976{{perSCC|Mclntyre J}}
</ref>
</ref>


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This definition was found to include technology such as Dialed number recorders.<ref>
This definition was found to include technology such as Dialed number recorders.<ref>
R v Lee, [http://canlii.ca/t/1v9z2 2007 ABQB 767] (CanLII){{perABQB|Sulyma J}}<br>
''R v Lee'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1v9z2 2007 ABQB 767] (CanLII){{perABQB|Sulyma J}}<br>
R v Croft, [http://canlii.ca/t/g1pvx 2013 ABQB 644] (CanLII){{perABQB|Burrows J}} at para 22</ref>
''R v Croft'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g1pvx 2013 ABQB 644] (CanLII){{perABQB|Burrows J}} at para 22</ref>


This term is also used in the offence of [[Child Luring (Offence)]], [[Agree or Arrange a Sexual Offence Against Child (Offence)]], and [[Telecommunication Offences (Offence)]].
This term is also used in the offence of [[Child Luring (Offence)]], [[Agree or Arrange a Sexual Offence Against Child (Offence)]], and [[Telecommunication Offences (Offence)]].
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An online undercover police officer who impersonates a young person and communicates with the accused is not intercepting as there is no "surreptitious" recording of the conversation and no "interception" as between the accused and third party.<ref>
An online undercover police officer who impersonates a young person and communicates with the accused is not intercepting as there is no "surreptitious" recording of the conversation and no "interception" as between the accused and third party.<ref>
R v Mills, [http://canlii.ca/t/gxfxd 2017 NLCA 12] (CanLII){{perNLCA|Welsh JA}} pending appeal at SCC<br>
''R v Mills'', [http://canlii.ca/t/gxfxd 2017 NLCA 12] (CanLII){{perNLCA|Welsh JA}} pending appeal at SCC<br>
R v Beairsto, [http://canlii.ca/t/hr8cq 2018 ABCA 118] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0)
''R v Beairsto'', [http://canlii.ca/t/hr8cq 2018 ABCA 118] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} (3:0)
</ref>
</ref>


Telephone communications between the accused and the police who answers the phone at a drug house and assumes the identity of the homeowner are not covered by Part VI.<ref>
Telephone communications between the accused and the police who answers the phone at a drug house and assumes the identity of the homeowner are not covered by Part VI.<ref>
R v Singh, [http://canlii.ca/t/1dxvh 1998 CanLII 4819] (BC CA){{perBCCA|Hall JA}}<br>
''R v Singh'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1dxvh 1998 CanLII 4819] (BC CA){{perBCCA|Hall JA}}<br>
R v McQueen (1979) 25 CCC (2d) 262 (SKQB), [http://canlii.ca/t/gbj5r 1975 CanLII 1373] (AB CA){{perABCA|McDermid JA}} (“The [wiretap provisions are] aimed at preventing a third party from intercepting the private communication between two people. It is not intended to apply to the case where there are only two persons involved and one receives a message by impersonation of fraud.”)<br>
R v McQueen (1979) 25 CCC (2d) 262 (SKQB), [http://canlii.ca/t/gbj5r 1975 CanLII 1373] (AB CA){{perABCA|McDermid JA}} (“The [wiretap provisions are] aimed at preventing a third party from intercepting the private communication between two people. It is not intended to apply to the case where there are only two persons involved and one receives a message by impersonation of fraud.”)<br>
see also R v Giles, [http://canlii.ca/t/1w8ms 2007 BCSC 1147] (CanLII){{perBCSC|MacKenzie JA}}{{at|31}}<br>
see also ''R v Giles'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1w8ms 2007 BCSC 1147] (CanLII){{perBCSC|MacKenzie JA}}{{at|31}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


;"Intercept" vs "Disclose"
;"Intercept" vs "Disclose"
The scheme of Part VI distinguishes between "interception" and "use or retention" of that communication, which is conceptually "different and distinct".<ref>
The scheme of Part VI distinguishes between "interception" and "use or retention" of that communication, which is conceptually "different and distinct".<ref>
R v Jones, [2017] 2 SCR 696, [http://canlii.ca/t/hp63x 2017 SCC 60] (CanLII){{perSCC|Cote J}} at para 63<Br>
''R v Jones'', [2017] 2 SCR 696, [http://canlii.ca/t/hp63x 2017 SCC 60] (CanLII){{perSCC|Cote J}} at para 63<Br>
</ref>
</ref>


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However, text messages ''saved'' within the network of a service provider can be otained by a production order as it is not an "intercept".<ref>
However, text messages ''saved'' within the network of a service provider can be otained by a production order as it is not an "intercept".<ref>
Jones{{supra}}<br>
Jones{{supra}}<br>
R v Belcourt, [http://canlii.ca/t/ggrxf 2015 BCCA 126] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Kirkpatrick JA}}<br>
''R v Belcourt'', [http://canlii.ca/t/ggrxf 2015 BCCA 126] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Kirkpatrick JA}}<br>
R v Webster, [http://canlii.ca/t/gjn8s 2015 BCCA 286] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Chiasson JA}}<br>
''R v Webster'', [http://canlii.ca/t/gjn8s 2015 BCCA 286] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Chiasson JA}}<br>
R v Didechko, [http://canlii.ca/t/gll4w 2015 ABQB 642] (CanLII){{perABQB|Schutz J}}<br>
''R v Didechko'', [http://canlii.ca/t/gll4w 2015 ABQB 642] (CanLII){{perABQB|Schutz J}}<br>
cf. R v Hoelscher, [http://canlii.ca/t/gn6l6 2016 ABQB 44] (CanLII){{perABQB|Simpson J}}<br>
cf. ''R v Hoelscher'', [http://canlii.ca/t/gn6l6 2016 ABQB 44] (CanLII){{perABQB|Simpson J}}<br>
R v Croft, [http://canlii.ca/t/g1t5p 2013 ABQB 640] (CanLII){{perABCA|Burrows J}} <Br>
''R v Croft'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g1t5p 2013 ABQB 640] (CanLII){{perABCA|Burrows J}} <Br>
</ref>  
</ref>  
It will generally be required where the message has not yet come into existence or have not yet been received by the recipient.<ref>
It will generally be required where the message has not yet come into existence or have not yet been received by the recipient.<ref>
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<ref>
<ref>
R v Beckner (1978), 43 CCC (2d) 356, [http://canlii.ca/t/htwbs 1978 CanLII 2511] (ON CA){{perONCA|Dubin JA}} -- officer overhears a conversation between accused and a friend<br>
R v Beckner (1978), 43 CCC (2d) 356, [http://canlii.ca/t/htwbs 1978 CanLII 2511] (ON CA){{perONCA|Dubin JA}} -- officer overhears a conversation between accused and a friend<br>
R v Kopinsky, [http://canlii.ca/t/27t7j 1985 CanLII 1191] (AB QB){{perABQB|McFadyen J}}</ref>
''R v Kopinsky'', [http://canlii.ca/t/27t7j 1985 CanLII 1191] (AB QB){{perABQB|McFadyen J}}</ref>


{{quotation|
{{quotation|

Revision as of 12:12, 13 January 2019

General Principles

Wiretaps are governed by Part VI of the Criminal Code.

There are four categories of wiretap:

  • a general wiretap authorized under s. 185 and 186.
  • a wiretap with consent under s. 184.2
  • an emergency wiretap under s. 184.1, 184.4 and 188
  • video intercepts s. 487.01

The emergency wiretap (s. 184.1), exceptional circumstances wiretaps (s. 184.4), and video intercepts (s. 487.01) do not require full judicial authorization.

A wilful interception of "a private communication" without authorization is a indictable offence under s. 184 with a maximum penalty of 5 years. This offence does not include situations where one of the parties consents (s.184(2)).

An interception of a private communication under a Part VI authorization is a search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter.[1]

The right to full answer and defence permits the accused to examine an edited version of the materials available to the authorizing judge to support the wiretap authorization.[2]

Modern electronic surveillance has been singled out as a particularly powerful form of privacy intrusion. But unregulated, it would destroy any sort of privacy and would threaten society.[3]

The Crown and police have a positive obligation not to disseminate irrelevant private communications revealed within a wiretap.[4]

  1. R v Grant 1999 CanLII 3694 (ON CA), (1999), 132 CCC (3d) 531 (SCC), per Charron J at 539
  2. R v Garofoli, 1990 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 1421, per Sopinka J at para 1433, 1452
  3. R v Duarte, [1990] 1 SCR 30, 1990 CanLII 150 (SCC), per LaForest J - Judge referring to electronic surveillance as "superbly" equipped to fight crime, but left unregulated would mean "privacy no longer had any meaning"
    R v Wong, [1990] 3 SCR 36, 1990 CanLII 56 (SCC), per LaForest J - LaForest J suggesting that electronic surveillance would "annihilate privacy"
    R v Wise, [1992] 1 SCR 527, 1992 CanLII 125 (SCC), per Cory J - LaForest J (dissenting) suggesting that surviellance was a "danger to individual autonomy and the organization of a free society”)
  4. R v Guess, 2000 BCCA 547 (CanLII), per Hall J

History

The modern legislation protecting against the interception of private communications arose from the 1969 Ouimet report which resulted in the Protection of Privacy Act.[1]

  1. R. Ouimet, Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, Towards Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1969) cited in detail at R v Nguyen, 2001 ABPC 52 (CanLII), per Stevenson ACJ at para 17
    R v Lyons (1984), 15 CCC (3d0 417 at p.453, 1984 CanLII 30 (SCC), [1984] 2 SCR 633, per Estey J - comments on the origin of the wiretap provisions

Purpose

Part VI of the Code regulates the "power of the state to record communications that their originator expects will not be intercepted".[1] It avoids the "danger inherent in allowing the state, in its unfettered discretion, to record and transmit our words."[2]

These provisions aim to "strike a balance between the protection of privacy and the availability of effective law enforcement techniques". [3]

Electronic surveillance has the potential to "annihilate" any expectation of privacy in our communications. Society should not expose us to permanent electronic surveillance.[4]

Surveillance is one of the "the greatest leveler[s] of human privacy ever known".[5]

This provision has nothing to do with protecting persons from the risk that the recipient of the communication will divulge anything.[6]

  1. R v Duarte, 1990 CanLII 150 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 30, (1990), 53 CCC (3d) 1 (SCC), per La Forest J R v Jones, 2017 SCC 60 (CanLII), per Cote J at para 60
  2. Duarte, supra
  3. R v Nguyen, 2001 ABPC 52 (CanLII), per Stevenson ACJ at para 17
    Regina v Welsh and Iannuzzi (No. 6), 1977 CanLII 1215 (ON CA), (1977) 32 CCC (2d) 363, per Zuber JA (5:0) at p. 369
  4. Duarte, supra at p. 11 (CCC)
    see also United States v White, 201 US 745 (1971) at p.756 ("electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known")
  5. United States v White, 201 U.S. 745 (1971) at p. 756
  6. Duarte, supra ("has nothing to do with protecting individuals from the threat that their interlocutors will divulge communications that are meant to be private")

"Authorization"

Definitions
183 In this Part,
authorization means an authorization to intercept a private communication given under section 186 or subsection 184.2(3), 184.3(6) or 188(2); (autorisation)
...
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 183; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), ss. 7, 23, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), s. 213, c. 1 (4th Supp.), s. 13, c. 29 (4th Supp.), s. 17, c. 42 (4th Supp.), s. 1; 1991, c. 28, s. 12; 1992, c. 27, s. 90; 1993, c. 7, s. 5, c. 25, s. 94, c. 40, s. 1, c. 46, s. 4; 1995, c. 39, s. 140; 1996, c. 19, s. 66; 1997, c. 18, s. 7, c. 23, s. 3; 1998, c. 34, s. 8; 1999, c. 2, s. 47, c. 5, s. 4; 2000, c. 24, s. 43; 2001, c. 32, s. 4, c. 41, ss. 5, 31, 133; 2002, c. 22, s. 409; 2004, c. 15, s. 108; 2005, c. 32, s. 10, c. 43, s. 1; 2008, c. 6, s. 15; 2009, c. 2, s. 442, c. 22, s. 4, c. 28, s. 3; 2010, c. 3, s. 1, c. 14, s. 2; 2012, c. 1, s. 24; 2013, c. 8, s. 2, c. 9, s. 14, c. 13, s. 7; 2014, c. 17, s. 2, c. 25, s. 11, c. 31, s. 7, c. 32, s. 59; 2015, c. 20, s. 19.


CCC

Interception of Private Communications

"Private Communication"

See also: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

Section 183 defines "private communication":

183.
...
"private communication" means any oral communication, or any telecommunication, that is made by an originator who is in Canada or is intended by the originator to be received by a person who is in Canada and that is made under circumstances in which it is reasonable for the originator to expect that it will not be intercepted by any person other than the person intended by the originator to receive it, and includes any radio-based telephone communication that is treated electronically or otherwise for the purpose of preventing intelligible reception by any person other than the person intended by the originator to receive it; (communication privée)
...
...2015, c. 20, s. 19.


CCC

"Private"

A communication is private where the originator has a reasonable expectation that the communication would "not be intercepted by any person other than the person intended by the originator to receive it".[1] The intention of who is to receive the communication includes those who the originator had knowledge would receive it but may not desire them to receive it.[2]

Where it is reasonable to expect that the communication may be listened to or recorded, then it is not a private communication.[3]

Communication requires some exchange of information between persons and not simply all information capturable by the interception. [4] Consequently, sounds not intended to convey information does not constitute a communication.[5]

"Communications"

According to s. 183, a "communication" can be either "oral communication" or "telecommunication".

The following has been found not to be a "private communication":

  • Electronic signals captured by a digital number recorder (DNR) [6]
  • communication of a paging device.[7]
  • a prayer to God as God does not meet the legal definition of a person.[8]
  • a cassette sent through the mail[9]
  • prayers to God[10]
"originator"

The "originator" refers to the person whose "remarks which the Crown seeks to adduce in evidence" and are protected under Part VI of the Code.[11]

  1. R c Kyling, 2009 QCCS 3311 (CanLII), per Tardif J
  2. R v Goldman, 1979 CanLII 60 (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 976, per Mclntyre J
  3. R v Newall, 1982 CanLII 276 (BC SC), per Bouck J
    R v Davie, 1980 CanLII 323 (BC CA), per Hutcheon J
  4. R v Balatoni, 2003 CanLII 13174 (ON SC), per Dawson J at para 8
  5. Balatoni
  6. R v Fegan, 1993 CanLII 8607 (ON CA), (1993), 80 CCC (3d) 356, per Finlayson JA
    cf. R v Griffith (1989) 44 CCC (3d) 63 (Ont. Dis. Ct.), 1988 CanLII 7059 (ON SC), per McDermid J
  7. R v Lubovac (1990) 52 CCC (3d) 551 (ABCA), 1989 ABCA 320 (CanLII), per McClung JA
  8. Davie, supra
  9. R v Newall, 1982 CanLII 276 (BC SC), per Bouck J
  10. Davie, supra
  11. R v Goldman, 1979 CanLII 60 (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 976, per Mclntyre J

"Telecommunications"

Section 35 of the Interpretation Act defines "telecommunications" as: "means the emission, transmission or reception of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds or intelligence of any nature by any wire, cable, radio, optical or other electromagnetic system, or by any similar technical system"

This definition was found to include technology such as Dialed number recorders.[1]

This term is also used in the offence of Child Luring (Offence), Agree or Arrange a Sexual Offence Against Child (Offence), and Telecommunication Offences (Offence).

Warrants Apply to Many Types of Communication

One application for authorization sufficient
184.6 For greater certainty, an application for an authorization under this Part may be made with respect to both private communications and radio-based telephone communications at the same time.
1993, c. 40, s. 4.


CCC

  1. R v Lee, 2007 ABQB 767 (CanLII), per Sulyma J
    R v Croft, 2013 ABQB 644 (CanLII), per Burrows J at para 22

"Interception"

"Interception" means to "listen to, record or acquire a communication or acquire the substance, meaning or purport thereof;" (s. 183).[1]

Identity of Intended Recipient

A communication that is directed to law enforcement under false assumption of identity is not usually an "intercept" where it is not "participant surveillance".

An online undercover police officer who impersonates a young person and communicates with the accused is not intercepting as there is no "surreptitious" recording of the conversation and no "interception" as between the accused and third party.[2]

Telephone communications between the accused and the police who answers the phone at a drug house and assumes the identity of the homeowner are not covered by Part VI.[3]

"Intercept" vs "Disclose"

The scheme of Part VI distinguishes between "interception" and "use or retention" of that communication, which is conceptually "different and distinct".[4]

Timing of Capture

There is the suggestion that there does not need to be a direct temporal connection between the message seizure and the transmission of the message.[5]

However, text messages saved within the network of a service provider can be otained by a production order as it is not an "intercept".[6] It will generally be required where the message has not yet come into existence or have not yet been received by the recipient.[7]

Devices Used to Intercept

The interception must be done by way of an "electromagnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device" (s.183). Consequently, simply to use one's human senses without technological aids does not invoke Part VI. [8]

Definitions
183 In this Part,
...
electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device means any device or apparatus that is used or is capable of being used to intercept a private communication, but does not include a hearing aid used to correct subnormal hearing of the user to not better than normal hearing; (dispositif électromagnétique, acoustique, mécanique ou autre)
...
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 183; ... 2000, c. 24, s. 43; 2001, c. 32, s. 4, c. 41, ss. 5, 31, 133; 2002, c. 22, s. 409; 2004, c. 15, s. 108; 2005, c. 32, s. 10, c. 43, s. 1; 2008, c. 6, s. 15; 2009, c. 2, s. 442, c. 22, s. 4, c. 28, s. 3; 2010, c. 3, s. 1, c. 14, s. 2; 2012, c. 1, s. 24; 2013, c. 8, s. 2, c. 9, s. 14, c. 13, s. 7; 2014, c. 17, s. 2, c. 25, s. 11, c. 31, s. 7, c. 32, s. 59; 2015, c. 20, s. 19.


CCC

  1. R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 183; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), ss. 7, 23, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), s. 213, c. 1 (4th Supp.), s. 13, c. 29 (4th Supp.), s. 17, c. 42 (4th Supp.), s. 1; 1991, c. 28, s. 12; 1992, c. 27, s. 90; 1993, c. 7, s. 5, c. 25, s. 94, c. 40, s. 1, c. 46, s. 4; 1995, c. 39, s. 140; 1996, c. 19, s. 66; 1997, c. 18, s. 7, c. 23, s. 3; 1998, c. 34, s. 8; 1999, c. 2, s. 47, c. 5, s. 4; 2000, c. 24, s. 43; 2001, c. 32, s. 4, c. 41, ss. 5, 31, 133; 2002, c. 22, s. 409; 2004, c. 15, s. 108; 2005, c. 32, s. 10, c. 43, s. 1; 2008, c. 6, s. 15; 2009, c. 2, s. 442, c. 22, s. 4, c. 28, s. 3; 2010, c. 3, s. 1, c. 14, s. 2; 2012, c. 1, s. 24; 2013, c. 8, s. 2, c. 9, s. 14, c. 13, s. 7; 2014, c. 17, s. 2, c. 25, s. 11, c. 31, s. 7, c. 32, s. 59; 2015, c. 20, s. 19.
  2. R v Mills, 2017 NLCA 12 (CanLII), per Welsh JA pending appeal at SCC
    R v Beairsto, 2018 ABCA 118 (CanLII), per curiam (3:0)
  3. R v Singh, 1998 CanLII 4819 (BC CA), per Hall JA
    R v McQueen (1979) 25 CCC (2d) 262 (SKQB), 1975 CanLII 1373 (AB CA), per McDermid JA (“The [wiretap provisions are] aimed at preventing a third party from intercepting the private communication between two people. It is not intended to apply to the case where there are only two persons involved and one receives a message by impersonation of fraud.”)
    see also R v Giles, 2007 BCSC 1147 (CanLII), per MacKenzie JA, at para 31
  4. R v Jones, [2017] 2 SCR 696, 2017 SCC 60 (CanLII), per Cote J at para 63
  5. R v Telus Communications, 2013 SCC 16 (CanLII) per plurality reasons at para 35 ("definition of “intercept” that the interception of a private communication be simultaneous or contemporaneous with the making of the communication itself")
  6. Jones, supra
    R v Belcourt, 2015 BCCA 126 (CanLII), per Kirkpatrick JA
    R v Webster, 2015 BCCA 286 (CanLII), per Chiasson JA
    R v Didechko, 2015 ABQB 642 (CanLII), per Schutz J
    cf. R v Hoelscher, 2016 ABQB 44 (CanLII), per Simpson J
    R v Croft, 2013 ABQB 640 (CanLII), per Burrows J
  7. Jones, ibid.
  8. R v Beckner (1978), 43 CCC (2d) 356, 1978 CanLII 2511 (ON CA), per Dubin JA -- officer overhears a conversation between accused and a friend
    R v Kopinsky, 1985 CanLII 1191 (AB QB), per McFadyen J

"Offence"

Within the provisions of the wiretap sections of the code, "offence" refers to a specific closed-list of offences. Those offences are listed within s. 2.[1] It will include any conspiracies, attempts or counselling to commit the offence, or any accessories after the fact.[2]

  1. See Criminal Code and Related Definitions
  2. see s. 183 definition of "offence"

Misc Wiretap Terms

Definitions
183 In this Part,
...
police officer means any officer, constable or other person employed for the preservation and maintenance of the public peace; (policier)
...
public switched telephone network means a telecommunication facility the primary purpose of which is to provide a land line-based telephone service to the public for compensation; (réseau téléphonique public commuté)
radio-based telephone communication means any radiocommunication within the meaning of the Radiocommunication Act that is made over apparatus that is used primarily for connection to a public switched telephone network; (communication radiotéléphonique)
sell includes offer for sale, expose for sale, have in possession for sale or distribute or advertise for sale; (vendre) solicitor means, in the Province of Quebec, an advocate or a notary and, in any other province, a barrister or solicitor. (avocat)
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 183; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), ss. 7, 23, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), s. 213, c. 1 (4th Supp.), s. 13, c. 29 (4th Supp.), s. 17, c. 42 (4th Supp.), s. 1; 1991, c. 28, s. 12; 1992, c. 27, s. 90; 1993, c. 7, s. 5, c. 25, s. 94, c. 40, s. 1, c. 46, s. 4; 1995, c. 39, s. 140; 1996, c. 19, s. 66; 1997, c. 18, s. 7, c. 23, s. 3; 1998, c. 34, s. 8; 1999, c. 2, s. 47, c. 5, s. 4; 2000, c. 24, s. 43; 2001, c. 32, s. 4, c. 41, ss. 5, 31, 133; 2002, c. 22, s. 409; 2004, c. 15, s. 108; 2005, c. 32, s. 10, c. 43, s. 1; 2008, c. 6, s. 15; 2009, c. 2, s. 442, c. 22, s. 4, c. 28, s. 3; 2010, c. 3, s. 1, c. 14, s. 2; 2012, c. 1, s. 24; 2013, c. 8, s. 2, c. 9, s. 14, c. 13, s. 7; 2014, c. 17, s. 2, c. 25, s. 11, c. 31, s. 7, c. 32, s. 59; 2015, c. 20, s. 19.


CCC

Interception to prevent bodily harm
184.1 (1) ...
Definition of agent of the state
(4) For the purposes of this section, agent of the state means

(a) a peace officer; and
(b) a person acting under the authority of, or in cooperation with, a peace officer.


1993, c. 40, s. 4.


CCC

Topics