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| {{Reflist|2}} | | {{Reflist|2}} |
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| == Denunciation - s.718(a) == | | ==Denunciation and Deterrence (s. 718(a), (b))== |
| Section 718(a) sets out the sentencing objective of "denounc[ing] unlawful conduct".
| | * [[Denunication and Deterrence]] |
| Denunciation refers to the Court's "communication of society's condemnation of the offender's conduct." The "denunciatory element represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender’s conduct should be punished for encroaching on our society’s basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law".<ref>
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| ''R v Proulx'', [http://canlii.ca/t/527b 2000 SCC 5] (CanLII){{perSCC|Lamer CJ}}{{at|102}}<br>
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| ''R v CAM'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1frb9 1996 CanLII 230], [1996] 1 SCR 500{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}} ("A sentence which expresses denunciation is simply the means by which these values are communicated.") and{{at|81}} ("The principle of denunciation "mandates that a sentence should communicate society's condemnation of that particular offender's conduct ... a sentence with a denunciatory element represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender's conduct should be punished for encroaching on our society's basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law.")
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| </ref>
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| The "symbolism" of denunciation cannot be an objective "in and of itself". Consequently, sentences that exceed the persons "foreseeable life serve no functional purpose" and are "purely symbolic".<ref>
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| ''R v Klaus'', [http://canlii.ca/t/hqf49 2018 ABQB 97] (CanLII){{perABQB|Macklin J}}{{at|110}}<br>
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| ''R v McArthur'', [http://canlii.ca/t/hxg6g 2019 ONSC 963] (CanLII){{perONSC|McMahon J}}{{at|96}}<br>
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| </ref>
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| The denunciatory sentence must also "positively instill the basic set of communal values shared by all Canadians as expressed by the Criminal Code."<ref>
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| {{supra1|M(CA)}}{{at|81}}
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| </ref>
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| Denunciation becomes a major consideration in situations where "there is a “high degree of planning and premeditation, and where the offence and its consequences are highly publicized, [so that] like‑minded individuals may well be deterred by severe sentences” [citation omitted] This is particularly so where a victim is a vulnerable person with respect to age, disability, or other similar factors."<ref>
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| ''R v Latimer'', [http://canlii.ca/t/523c 2001 SCC 1] (CanLII){{TheCourtSCC}}{{at|86}}
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| </ref>
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| ; Retribution
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| Retribution is an important consideration in sentencing.<ref>
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| {{supra1|CAM}}{{at|77}} ("It has been recognized by this Court that retribution is an accepted, and indeed important, principle of sentencing in our criminal law. ")
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| </ref>
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| It is a principle of sentencing "based on an offender's moral blameworthiness or culpability, and the seriousness of the offence and its circumstances."<ref>
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| ''R v Denny'', [http://canlii.ca/t/gp2h1 2016 NSSC 76] (CanLII){{perNSSC|Rosinski J}}{{at|123}}<br>
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| {{supra1|CAM}} (retribution "... properly reflects the moral culpability of the offender, having regard to the intentional risk-taking of the offender, the consequential harm caused by the offender, and the normative character of the offender’s conduct. Furthermore, unlike vengeance, retribution incorporates a principle of restraint; retribution requires the imposition of a just and appropriate punishment, nothing more")<br>
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| see also ''R v Vienneau'', [http://canlii.ca/t/gml8c 2015 ONCA 898] (CanLII){{TheCourtONCA}} (3:0)<Br>
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| </ref>
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| Denunciation should not be equated with retribution which is a separate legitimate purpose of sentencing.<ref>
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| {{supra1|CAM}}{{at|81}} ("Retribution, as well, should be conceptually distinguished from its legitimate sibling, denunciation...")
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| </ref> Nor should retribution be equated with vengance.<Ref>
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| {{supra1|CAM}}{{at|80}}
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| </ref>
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| ; Incarceration Not Necessarily Required
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| In any case emphasizing "general or specific deterrence and denunciation", "the courts have very few options other than imprisonment for meeting these objectives, which are essential to the maintenance of a just, peaceful and law‑abiding society."<ref>
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| ''R v Safarzadeh-Markhali'', [http://canlii.ca/t/gpg9w 2016 SCC 14] (CanLII){{perSCC|McLachlin CJ}}
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| </ref>
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| The principles of denunciation and deterrence can sometimes be satisfied without incarceration. One of these circumstances is where the publicity of the case provides for public humiliation. <ref>
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| ''R v Ewanchuk'', [http://canlii.ca/t/506z 2002 ABCA 95] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}}{{at|65}}<br>
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| ''R v Ambrose'', [http://canlii.ca/t/5rqs 2000 ABCA 264] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}}{{at|134}}<br>
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| ''R v Kneale'', [1999] OJ No 4062 (SCJ){{at|35}}{{NOCANLII}}</ref>
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| ; Conditional Sentence
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| Where denunciation is a paramount consideration a conditional sentence is not necessarily ruled out.<ref>
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| ''R v Wells'', [http://canlii.ca/t/527n 2000 SCC 10] (CanLII){{perSCC|Iacobucci J}}{{ats|31 to 35}}<br>
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| </ref>
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| A conditional sentence under s. 742.1 that includes "onerous" conditions may provide some denunciation but incarceration will generally provide greater denunciation.<ref>
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| {{supra1|Proulx}}{{at|102}} ("Incarceration will usually provide more denunciation than a conditional sentence, as a conditional sentence is generally a more lenient sentence than a jail term of equivalent duration. That said, a conditional sentence can still provide a significant amount of denunciation. This is particularly so when onerous conditions are imposed and the duration of the conditional sentence is extended beyond the duration of the jail sentence that would ordinarily have been imposed in the circumstances.")<br>
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| </ref>
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| {{reflist|2}}
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| == Deterrence - 718(b) ==
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| Deterrence "refers to the imposition of a sanction for the purpose of discouraging the offender and others from engaging in criminal conduct."<ref>
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| ''R v BWP; R v BVN'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1nn6n 2006 SCC 27] (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 941{{perSCC|Charron J}}{{at|2}}</ref>
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| Section 718(b) sets out the objectives of "deter[ing] the offender and other persons from committing offences" We refer to these as the twin objectives of "general deterrence" and "specific deterrence".
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| Deterrence in the "widest sense" refers to a "sentence by emphasizing community disapproval of an act and branding it as reprehensible has a moral or educative effect and thereby affects the attitude of the public" with the expectation that a person will not likely commit such an act.<ref>
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| ''R v Roussy'', [1977] OJ No 1208 (Ont. C.A.){{perONCA|Zuber JA}}{{at|5}}{{NOCANLII}}<br>
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| </ref>
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| In any case emphasizing "general or specific deterrence and denunciation", "the courts have very few options other than imprisonment for meeting these objectives, which are essential to the maintenance of a just, peaceful and law‑abiding society."<ref>
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| ''R v Safarzadeh-Markhali'', [http://canlii.ca/t/gpg9w 2016 SCC 14] (CanLII){{perSCC|McLachlin CJ}}
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| </ref>
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| It is "an error of principle for a trial court to discount the deterrent effect of any particular kind of punishment provided for in the Criminal Code, such as imprisonment, because he or she believes that imprisonment has not proven effective".<ref>
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| ''R v Tran'', [http://canlii.ca/t/2d2xm 2010 ABCA 317] (CanLII){{perABCA|Moen JA}}{{at|12}}<br>
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| ''R v Song'', [http://canlii.ca/t/2734x 2009 ONCA 896] (CanLII){{TheCourtONCA}}{{ats|8 to 12}}<Br>
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| </ref>
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| ; Specific Deterrence
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| Specific deterrence targets the specific offender before the court.<ref>
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| {{supra1|BWP}}{{at|2}}</ref>
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| ; General Deterrence
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| General deterrence targets potential criminals by encouraging them not to "engage in criminal activity because of the example provided by the punishment imposed on the offender." <ref>
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| {{supra1|BWP}}{{at|2}}<br>
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| ''R v McGinn'' (1989), 49 CCC (3d) 137 (SKCA), [http://canlii.ca/t/g8f2g 1989 CanLII 4784] (SK CA){{perSKCA|Cameron JA}}, (general deterrence is "punishment of the offender for what other might do")<br>
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| </ref>
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| The objective of general deterrence as a factor will normally result in the offender being “punished more severely, not because he or she deserves it, but because the court decides to send a message to others who may be inclined to engage in similar criminal activity.” <ref>
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| {{supra1|BWP}}{{at|2}}</ref>
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| When general deterrence is emphasized, the deterrent effect of incarceration can be somewhat speculative and so should be used with great restraint.<ref>
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| ''R v Biancofiore'', [http://canlii.ca/t/6hjk 1997 CanLII 3420] (ON CA), (1997), 119 CCC (3d) 344{{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}}{{at|23}}</ref>
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| A lengthy sentence is not the only way of achieving the objective of general deterrence.<ref>
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| See ''R v Morrissette'' (1970), 1 CCC (2d) 307 (Sask. C.A.), [http://canlii.ca/t/g7bxk 1970 CanLII 642] (SK CA){{perSKCA|Culliton J}}, at 310</ref>
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| Crimes committed out of desperation or addiction, such as much drug trafficking, are not offences for which general deterrence has much effect.<ref>
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| ''R v Frost'', [http://canlii.ca/t/ftvn8 2012 NBCA 94] (CanLII){{perNBCA|Quigg JA}} (3:0) ("these crimes are not committed out of desperation or the result of an addiction, crimes for which general deterrence would be of little effect")</ref>
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| Crimes motivated by profit, which can also be drug trafficking, will be addressable by general deterrence.<ref>
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| {{ibid1|Frost}} ("cases such as this, where profit is the offender’s motivation, a significant penalty is generally a deterrent to others who might consider whether or not to undertake such criminal activity")</ref>
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| Offences against recognized classes of vulnerable victims require the Courts to heighten their emphasis on general deterrence.<ref>
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| ''R v Petrovic'' (1984), 47 OR (2d) 97, [http://canlii.ca/t/g1b0c 1984 CanLII 2003] (ON CA){{perONCA|Lacourciere JA}}<br>
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| ''R v Inwood'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1p78h 1989 CanLII 263] (ONCA){{perONCA|Howland CJ}}<br>
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| </ref>
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| Vulnerable classes have included young female victims of distribution of intimate images.<ref>
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| ''R v Zhou'', [http://canlii.ca/t/gt89m 2016 ONCJ 547] (CanLII), [2016] OJ No 4641{{perONCJ|Ray J}}<br>
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| ''R v CNT'', [http://canlii.ca/t/gk29w 2015 NSPC 43] (CanLII){{perNSPC|Atwood J}}{{at|9}} overturned at [http://canlii.ca/t/gr50z 2016 NSCA 35] (CanLII){{TheCourtNSCA}} on other grounds<br>
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| </ref>
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| ; Publicity
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| The degree to which the case is covered by media is relevant to general deterrence.<ref>
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| ''R v Matheson'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1sxvg 2007 NSPC 43] (CanLII){{perNSPC|Derrick J}}{{at|27}}<br>
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| ''R v Clarke'', [1990] NSJ 427 (NSSC){{NOCANLII}}{{perNSSC|Nunn J}}, ("If it receives no publicity then there is no general deterrence, other than the several people who may be in court at the time the sentence is given"<br>
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| </ref>
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| Where there is no publicity of the case at all then there can be no general deterrence.<ref>
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| {{ibid1|Clarke}}
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| </ref>
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| ; Achieving Deterrence
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| There continues to be controversy outside of the courts about whether deterrence is effective.<ref>
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| e.g. see {{supra1|BWP}}{{at|3}}<br>
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| </ref>
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| Some have suggested that the availability of conditional sentences is an concession that general deterrence is "speculative".<ref>
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| ''R v Wismayer'', [http://canlii.ca/t/6h6j 1997 CanLII 3294] (ON CA), (1997), 5 C.R. (5th) 248 (C.A.){{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}} (3:0){{Ats|49, 50}}<br>
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| ''R v Biancofiore''{{Atp|356}} (cited to CCC)<br>
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| </ref>
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| Given that incarceration is harsher than a conditional sentence it is considered more effective at providing deterrence.<ref>
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| ''R v Proulx'', [2000] 1 SCR 61, [http://canlii.ca/t/527b 2000 SCC 5] (CanLII){{perSCC|Lamer CJ}}{{at|107}} ("Incarceration, which is ordinarily a harsher sanction, may provide more deterrence than a conditional sentence")
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| </ref>
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| It has been said that conditional sentences are not necessarily capable of providing general deterrence.<ref>
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| {{supra1|Frost}} ("The question is whether a conditional sentence is capable of providing general deterrence. ...The answer is clearly no.")</ref>
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| This is apparent due to the frequency that CSO are rejected on serious offences.
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| For a conditional sentence to achieve the goals of "denunciation and general deterrence, the punishment must be meaningful by being visible, sufficiently restrictive, enforceable and capable of attracting stern sanction for failure to comply with the conditions."<ref>
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| {{supra1|Wismayer}}{{at|52}}</ref>
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| It is an error of law for a judge to increase the sentence to achieve specific deterrence without considering whether the sentence is still proportionate.<ref>
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| {{supra1|Rogers}}{{at|43}}</ref>
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| {{reflist|2}}
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|
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| == Separation from Society - 718(c) == | | == Separation from Society - 718(c) == |
General Principles
- See also: Purpose and Principles of Sentencing
The purposes of sentencing are laid out in section 718 of the Criminal Code:
- Purpose
718. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:
- (a) to denounce unlawful conduct;
- (b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
- (c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
- (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
- (e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
- (f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 718; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 155; 1995, c. 22, s. 6.
– CCC
- Fundamental Purpose
The fundamental purpose as stated is that there be "respect for the law" and the maintenance of a "just, peaceful and safe society". [1]
This fundamental purpose will generally take precedent over the welfare of the accused.[2]
- How Public is Protected
The public is protected "through sanctions a court imposes upon a person...[e]ach codified objective of sentencing is designed to further the protection of the community."[3]
- Objectives Will Vary By Case
There is no single "sentencing objective [that] trumps the other". It is to "the sentencing judge to determine which objective or objectives merit the greatest weight, given the particulars of the case."[4]
In the Canadian system, "the respective importance of prevention, deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation will vary according to the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the offender". None of these factors can be excluded from consideration.[5]
- ↑ R v Whicher, 2002 BCCA 336 (CanLII), per Hall JA (3:0)
R v Priest, 1996 CanLII 1381 (ON CA), per Rosenberg JA
- ↑
R v Cole, 2004 CanLII 58282 (QC CM), per Discepola J
R v Jackson (1977) 21 N.S.R. (2d) 17 (NSCA) (*no CanLII links)
R v Smith, [1987] 1 SCR 1045, 1987 CanLII 64 (SCC), per Lamer J
R v Sweeney, 1992 CanLII 4030 (BC CA), per Hutcheon JA
- ↑
R v Berner, 2013 BCCA 188 (CanLII), per curiam
- ↑ R v Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6 (CanLII), per LeBel J (9:0), at para 43 ("... No one sentencing objective trumps the others and it falls to the sentencing judge to determine which objective or objectives merit the greatest weight, given the particulars of the case. The relative importance of any mitigating or aggravating factors will then push the sentence up or down the scale of appropriate sentences for similar offences. The judge’s discretion to decide on the particular blend of sentencing goals and the relevant aggravating or mitigating factors ensures that each case is decided on its facts, subject to the overarching guidelines and principles in the Code and in the case law.")
- ↑
R v Lyons, [1987] 2 SCR 309, 1987 CanLII 25 (SCC), per La Forest J (5:2), at para 26 ("... In a rational system of sentencing, the respective importance of prevention, deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation will vary according to the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the offender. No one would suggest that any of these functional considerations should be excluded from the legitimate purview of legislative or judicial decisions regarding sentencing.")
Denunciation and Deterrence (s. 718(a), (b))
Separation from Society - 718(c)
A sentencing judge must take into account "the exigencies of the case" before determining whether total deprivation of liberty is necessary.[1]
- Mental Health
Where a person with mental illness poses a risk to the public the court may need to resort to separating the offender from society, rather than focus on treatment.[2]
Treatment in the community is generally preferred over incarceration.[3]
However, this is less so for serious offences.[4]
- ↑
R v Creighton, [1997] OJ No 2220(*no CanLII links)
, at para 6
R v Shahcheraghi, 2017 ONSC 574 (CanLII), per MOrgan J, at para 19
- ↑
see R v Desjardins-Paquette, 2012 ONCA 674 (CanLII), per curiam
R v Virani, 2012 ABCA 155 (CanLII), [2012] AJ No 507 (C.A.), per curiam (3:0), at para 16
- ↑
R v Lundrigan, 2012 NLCA 43 (CanLII), [2012] NJ No 231 (NLCA), per Rowe JA (3:0), at para 20
- ↑
see R v JM, [2008] N.J. No. 262 (P.C.) (*no CanLII links)
R v Taylor, 2012 CanLII 42053 (NL PC), [2012] N.J. No. 251 (P.C.), per Mennie J
Rehabilitation - s.718(d)
Section 718(d) sets out the objective of "assist[ing] in rehabilitating offenders".[1]
Rehabilitation can be seen to achieve the objective of protecting the public as it assists in preventing further offences.[2]
- Rehabilitation Mitigates Sentence
An offender's "positive potential for rehabilitation" should be to the benefit of the accused on sentence.[3]
In certain cases, where there is a realistic possibility of rehabilitation, the courts may opt not to impose a jail sentence where it would otherwise be appropriate.[4]
- Rehabilitation Requires Acceptance of Responsibility
Effective rehabilitation has been seen by some courts as requiring an acceptance of responsibility, likely by way of a guilty plea, and an understanding of the harm done.[5]
- Rehabilitation Always a Factor
No sentence should deprive the offender of any hope of rehabilitation.[6]
- ↑
see also R v Gill (2006), 2006 BCCA 127 (CanLII), per Mackenzie JA (2:1)
- ↑
R v Simmons, Allen and Bezzo (1973), 13 CCC 65 (Ont.C.A.), 1973 CanLII 1522 (ON CA), per Brooke JA
- ↑
R v Gouliaeff, 2012 ONCA 690 (CanLII), per curiam (3:0), at para 12
- ↑
R v Preston, 1990 CanLII 576 (BC CA), per curiam (5:0)
- ↑
See R v Lee, 2011 NSPC 81 (CanLII), per Derrick J, at para 83
R v Seguin, [1997] OJ No 5439 at 18 (*no CanLII links)
- ↑
R v Johnson, 2012 ONCA 339 (CanLII), per Blair JA, at paras 15-25
R v Parry, 2012 ONCA 171 (CanLII), per Armstrong JA, at paras 17-19
Specific Offence Objectives - 718.01 and 718.02
In 2005 and 2009, sections 718.01 and 718.02 were added:
- Objectives — offences against children
718.01 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of eighteen years, it shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct.
2005, c. 32, s. 24.
– CCC
- Objectives — offence against peace officer or other justice system participant
718.02 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence under subsection 270(1), section 270.01 or 270.02 or paragraph 423.1(1)(b), the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.
2009, c. 22, s. 18.
– CCC
