Sentencing for Sexual Offences: Difference between revisions
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''De facto'' consent of the victim is not an appropriate form of mitigation.<ref> | ''De facto'' consent of the victim is not an appropriate form of mitigation.<ref> | ||
See [[Victims as a Factor in Sentencing]] | See [[Victims as a Factor in Sentencing]] | ||
</ref> | |||
The use of terms such as "fondling" or "caressing" should be avoided as it tends to minimize the violence involved.<Ref> | |||
{{CanLIIR|Friesen|j64rn|2020 SCC 9 (CanLII)}}{{perSCC|Wagner CJ and Rowe J}} | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
{{Reflist|2}} | {{Reflist|2}} | ||
Revision as of 15:06, 16 November 2020
General Principles
De facto consent of the victim is not an appropriate form of mitigation.[1]
The use of terms such as "fondling" or "caressing" should be avoided as it tends to minimize the violence involved.[2]
- ↑ See Victims as a Factor in Sentencing
- ↑ R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 (CanLII), per Wagner CJ and Rowe J
Child Sexual Offences
Position of Trust
Position of Trust as a Factor in Sentencing
Historical Sex Offences
Historical Sexual Offences should not have their penalties reduced simply because of the time that has passed between the offence and sentence. The magnitude and culpability remain the same. [1] The importance of denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives are not diminished.[2]
However, the passage of time can show that the offender is a low risk to re-offend and that the offence is not in the character of the offender.
- ↑ See Delay as a Factor in Sentencing
- ↑
R v Spence, 1992 ABCA 352 (CanLII), per curiam, at paras 9 to 14
Case Digests
See Also
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