Res Gestae and Dying Declarations: Difference between revisions

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{{seealso|Traditional Exceptions to Hearsay}}
{{seealso|Traditional Exceptions to Hearsay}}
Spontaneous or excited utterances (''res gestae'') are a traditional class of exception to the hearsay rule. <ref>
Spontaneous or excited utterances (''res gestae'') are a traditional class of exception to the hearsay rule. <ref>
{{CanLIIR|Nurse|hzhw9|2019 ONCA 260 (CanLII)}}{{AtL|hzhw9|78}} ("Like the dying declaration exception, the spontaneous utterance exception has long been recognized in Canada.")<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Nurse|hzhw9|2019 ONCA 260 (CanLII)|145 OR (3d) 241}}{{AtL|hzhw9|78}} ("Like the dying declaration exception, the spontaneous utterance exception has long been recognized in Canada.")<Br>
{{CanLIIR|Camara|jd1hr|2021 ONCA 79 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA|Watt JA}}{{AtL|jd1hr|83}} ("Res gestae is a long-established concept in the law of evidence. Despite its antiquity, its precise doctrinal significance at common law eludes clarity and precision. In translation for forensic purposes, it approximates “the events at issue in the litigation”. This adds little to our basic concepts of relevance and materiality. Its passing would not be mourned. All the more so when we have substituted principle for shibboleth.")
{{CanLIIRx|Camara|jd1hr|2021 ONCA 79 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA|Watt JA}}{{AtL|jd1hr|83}} ("Res gestae is a long-established concept in the law of evidence. Despite its antiquity, its precise doctrinal significance at common law eludes clarity and precision. In translation for forensic purposes, it approximates “the events at issue in the litigation”. This adds little to our basic concepts of relevance and materiality. Its passing would not be mourned. All the more so when we have substituted principle for shibboleth.")
</ref>
</ref>
An utterance falls in this category where the evidence can characterize it as being a spontaneous exclamation made without premeditation or artifice and before the speaker had time to concoct something.<ref>
An utterance falls in this category where the evidence can characterize it as being a spontaneous exclamation made without premeditation or artifice and before the speaker had time to concoct something.<ref>
See {{CanLIIRP|Schwartz|htvqf|1978 CanLII 2477 (NSCA)| (1978) NSR (2d) 335}}{{perNSCA|MacDonald JA}}{{atL|htvqf|15}}<br>
See {{CanLIIRP|Schwartz|htvqf|1978 CanLII 2477 (NSCA)| (1978) NSR (2d) 335}}{{perNSCA|MacDonald JA}}{{atL|htvqf|15}}<br>
{{CanLIIR|Magloir|57pp|2003 NSCA 74 (CanLII)}}{{perNSCA|Oland JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Magloir|57pp|2003 NSCA 74 (CanLII)|178 CCC (3d) 310}}{{perNSCA|Oland JA}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Slugoski|22kj8|1985 CanLII 631 (BCCA)|[1985] BCJ 1835}}{{perBCCA|Esson JA}} (2:1)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Slugoski|22kj8|1985 CanLII 631 (BCCA)|[1985] BCJ 1835}}{{perBCCA|Esson JA}} (2:1)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Khan|gbs0g|1988 CanLII 7106 (ON CA)|42 CCC (3d) 197}}{{perONCA|Robins JA}}{{atp|207}}, aff'd on other grounds [http://canlii.ca/t/1fsvb 1990 CanLII 77] (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 531{{perSCC|McLachlin J}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Khan|gbs0g|1988 CanLII 7106 (ON CA)|42 CCC (3d) 197}}{{perONCA|Robins JA}}{{atp|207}}, aff'd on other grounds [http://canlii.ca/t/1fsvb 1990 CanLII 77] (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 531{{perSCC|McLachlin J}}<br>
{{CanLIIR|Head|g7cpp|2014 MBCA 59 (CanLII)}}{{perMBCA|Mainella JA}}{{atL|g7cpp|29}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Head|g7cpp|2014 MBCA 59 (CanLII)|310 CCC (3d) 474}}{{perMBCA|Mainella JA}}{{atL|g7cpp|29}}<Br>
</ref>
</ref>


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Requirements to the exception usually include:<ref>  
Requirements to the exception usually include:<ref>  
{{CanLIIR|Hamilton|fmg7r|2011 NSSC 305 (CanLII)}}{{perNSSC|Rosinski J}}{{atL|fmg7r|20}}</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Hamilton|fmg7r|2011 NSSC 305 (CanLII)|284 CCC (3d) 386}}{{perNSSC|Rosinski J}}{{atL|fmg7r|20}}</ref>
# utterance made soon after underlying offence
# utterance made soon after underlying offence
# speaker was in state of upset or trauma
# speaker was in state of upset or trauma
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For a dying declaration to be admissible it must satisfy four criteria:<ref>
For a dying declaration to be admissible it must satisfy four criteria:<ref>
{{CanLIIR|Praljak|fst70|2012 ONSC 5262 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Dambrot J}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Praljak|fst70|2012 ONSC 5262 (CanLII)|OJ No 4430}}{{perONSC|Dambrot J}}<Br>
{{CanLIIR|Hall|fnv5l|2011 ONSC 5628 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Archibald J}}<Br>
{{CanLIIRP|Hall|fnv5l|2011 ONSC 5628 (CanLII)|OJ No 5109}}{{perONSC|Archibald J}}<Br>
</ref>
</ref>
# the deceased had settled, hopeless expectation of almost immediate death;
# the deceased had settled, hopeless expectation of almost immediate death;
Line 88: Line 88:
</ref>
</ref>
This is often inferred from the extent of the injuries that were present. <ref>
This is often inferred from the extent of the injuries that were present. <ref>
E.g. {{CanLIIR|Nurse|gf28m|2014 ONSC 2340 (CanLII)}}{{perONSC|Coroza J}}{{atL|gf28m|33}} -- victim had an almost severed neck with intestines spilling out</ref>
E.g. {{CanLIIRP|Nurse|gf28m|2014 ONSC 2340 (CanLII)|OJ No 5003}}{{perONSC|Coroza J}}{{atL|gf28m|33}} -- victim had an almost severed neck with intestines spilling out</ref>


An "implied statement" is "any assertion not expressed by language, but rather is revealed through action".<ref>
An "implied statement" is "any assertion not expressed by language, but rather is revealed through action".<ref>

Revision as of 09:29, 13 August 2021

General Principles

See also: Traditional Exceptions to Hearsay

Spontaneous or excited utterances (res gestae) are a traditional class of exception to the hearsay rule. [1] An utterance falls in this category where the evidence can characterize it as being a spontaneous exclamation made without premeditation or artifice and before the speaker had time to concoct something.[2]

It has been characterized as words that are contemporaneous with some action. Statements are admitted at times as "words brigaded to action".[3]

The circumstantial trustworthiness of a statement arises where the declarant is under "stress or pressure" from the triggering event that reduces the possibility of "concoction or distortion".[4]

Requirements to the exception usually include:[5]

  1. utterance made soon after underlying offence
  2. speaker was in state of upset or trauma
  3. enough probative value to outweigh any prejudice

The res gestae exception to hearsay does not require necessity. Allowing the statement to be admitted even when the declarant testifies.[6]

Purpose of Rule

It recognizes that the risk of concoction and deception is mitigated by the stress or pressure of the act at the time of utterance.[7]

Timing of Utterance

The timing of the utterance is important to determine the reliability of the statement.[8] The location and timing of the declarant who makes an excited utterance is not determinative.[9] "Strict contemporaneity" is not a necessary element.[10]

The utterance does not need to be strictly contemporaneous "so long as the stress or pressure created by it is ongoing".[11]

The judge should apply a "functional" analysis to its consideration of whether the statement is "contemporaneous".[12]

The statement can be considered "contemporaneous" even if made shortly after the declarant flees the scene.[13]

  1. ↑ R v Nurse, 2019 ONCA 260 (CanLII), 145 OR (3d) 241, at para 78 ("Like the dying declaration exception, the spontaneous utterance exception has long been recognized in Canada.")
    R v Camara, 2021 ONCA 79 (CanLII), per Watt JA, at para 83 ("Res gestae is a long-established concept in the law of evidence. Despite its antiquity, its precise doctrinal significance at common law eludes clarity and precision. In translation for forensic purposes, it approximates “the events at issue in the litigation”. This adds little to our basic concepts of relevance and materiality. Its passing would not be mourned. All the more so when we have substituted principle for shibboleth.")
  2. ↑ See R v Schwartz, 1978 CanLII 2477 (NSCA), (1978) NSR (2d) 335, per MacDonald JA, at para 15
    R v Magloir, 2003 NSCA 74 (CanLII), 178 CCC (3d) 310, per Oland JA
    R v Slugoski, 1985 CanLII 631 (BCCA), [1985] BCJ 1835, per Esson JA (2:1)
    R v Khan, 1988 CanLII 7106 (ON CA), 42 CCC (3d) 197, per Robins JA, at p. 207, aff'd on other grounds 1990 CanLII 77 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 531, per McLachlin J
    R v Head, 2014 MBCA 59 (CanLII), 310 CCC (3d) 474, per Mainella JA, at para 29
  3. ↑ R v Ly, 1996 ABCA 402 (CanLII), 193 AR 149; [1996] AJ No 1089 (CA), per McClung JA, at para 3
  4. ↑ Head, supra, at para 31
  5. ↑ R v Hamilton, 2011 NSSC 305 (CanLII), 284 CCC (3d) 386, per Rosinski J, at para 20
  6. ↑ Head, supra, at para 33
  7. ↑ Nurse, supra, at para 80 R v Clark, 1983 CanLII 1805 (ON CA), , 42 OR (2d) 609 (CA), per Dubin JA citing Ratten v The Queen, [1972] A.C. 378 (P.C.) ("The stress or pressure of the act or event must be such that the possibility of concoction or deception can be safely discounted. The statement need not be made strictly contemporaneous to the occurrence so long as the stress or pressure created by it is ongoing and the statement is made before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent. ")
  8. ↑ Khan, supra, per McLachlin J("I am satisfied that applying the traditional tests for spontaneous declarations, the trial judge correctly rejected the mother's [evidence as to the child’s] statement. The statement was not contemporaneous, being made fifteen minutes after leaving the doctor's office and probably one-half hour after the offence was committed.")
  9. ↑ Head, supra, at para 30
  10. ↑ R v Dakin, 1995 CanLII 1106 (ON CA), , 80 OAC 253 (CA), per curiam, at para 20 ("We do not accept the submission that the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Khan - in which there appears no reference to Clark - has changed the law regarding spontaneous declarations as stated in Clark and has reinstated the principle of strict contemporaneity enunciated in some earlier authorities. The admissibility of the declaration is assessed not simply by mechanical reference to time but rather in the context of all of the circumstances obtaining at the time, including those which tell against the possibility of concoction or distortion")
    R v Nguyen, 2015 ONCA 278 (CanLII), 125 OR (3d) 321, per Gillese JA, at paras 144 to 153
    R v Carty, 2017 ONCA 770 (CanLII), 356 CCC (3d) 309, per curiam, at paras 8 to 12
    R v Khan, 2017 ONCA 114 (CanLII), 136 OR (3d) 520, per Hourigan JA, at para 15
  11. ↑ See R v Khan, 1988 CanLII 7106 (ON CA), 42 CCC (3d) 197, per Robins JA, at p. 207, aff'd on other grounds at SCC
  12. ↑ Head, supra, at para 31
  13. ↑ Head, supra, at para 30

Dying Declaration

Dying declarations are only admissible where the declarant's death is the issue of the case and where the statement speaks to the circumstances of death.[1]

For a dying declaration to be admissible it must satisfy four criteria:[2]

  1. the deceased had settled, hopeless expectation of almost immediate death;
  2. the statement was about the circumstances of death;
  3. The statement would have been admissible if the deceased had been able to testify; And
  4. the offence involved the homicide of the victim

The statement must have been admissible if the person was alive to give the statement as evidence.[3]

The first criteria is determined on what would be the expectations of a reasonable person.[4] This is often inferred from the extent of the injuries that were present. [5]

An "implied statement" is "any assertion not expressed by language, but rather is revealed through action".[6] Assertions by conduct include pointing.[7]

  1. ↑ Schwartzenhauer v The King, 1935 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1935] SCR 367
  2. ↑ R v Praljak, 2012 ONSC 5262 (CanLII), OJ No 4430, per Dambrot J
    R v Hall, 2011 ONSC 5628 (CanLII), OJ No 5109, per Archibald J
  3. ↑ Rex v Buck et al, 1940 CanLII 107 (ON CA), per Robertson CJ
  4. ↑ R v Buffalo, [2003] AJ No 1738 (QB)(*no CanLII links)
    R v Mulligan, 1974 CanLII 1662 (ON CA), , (1973) 23 CR (NS) 1 (ONSC) aff'd at (1974) 18 CCC (2d) 270 (ONCA), per Martin JA
  5. ↑ E.g. R v Nurse, 2014 ONSC 2340 (CanLII), OJ No 5003, per Coroza J, at para 33 -- victim had an almost severed neck with intestines spilling out
  6. ↑ Nurse, ibid., at para 37
    Paciocco and Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 6th Ed (Toronto: iRwin Law, 2011), at p. 108
  7. ↑ Nurse, supra, at para 37
    R v Perciballi, 2001 CanLII 13394 (ONCA), 154 CCC (3d) 481, per Charron JA (2:1), at pp. 520 to 521 (ONCA)
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