Duty of Care: Difference between revisions
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==General Principles== | ==General Principles== |
Revision as of 12:55, 13 May 2024
This page was last substantively updated or reviewed January 2014. (Rev. # 92488) |
- < Criminal Law
- < Proof of Elements
General Principles
Certain criminal offences create a duty of care, where, if the standard of care is violated, will result in a criminal act. The offences that impose a duty of care include:
- breach of duty towards explosives (80)
- unsafe storage of a firearm (86)
- criminal negligence (219)
- dangerous operation of a motor vehicle (249)
- failing to provide necessities of life (215)
- duty to safeguard opening in ice (263(1))
- duty to safeguard excavation sites (263(2))
Further, there are special duties of care. Persons who take care or control "inherently dangerous materials" that may cause serious injury or death have a "special duty of care."[1]
See also s. 430(5.1) concerning breach of duty causing danger to life or mischief to property.
- ↑ R v Gosset, 1993 CanLII 62 (SCC), [1993] 3 SCR 76, per McLachlin J
Standard of Care
Any criminal duty of care requires a standard of care that includes, at a minimum, a "modified objective test" for mens rea.[1]
For any offence where the standard of care involves objectively dangerous conduct, the conduct must be shown to be a "marked departure" from the norm. Wherein a "reasonable person in the position of the accused would have been aware of the risk" and "would not have undertaken the activity."[2] The assessment, then, is of a "reasonably prudent person in the circumstances" the accused found himself when the events occurred.[3]
Thus, if the accused's actions show a marked departure from the standard of care described in the offence provision, he still cannot be convicted if a reasonably prudent person in the position of the accused would not have been aware of the risk or would not have been able to avoid the creating the risk.[4]
Proof of a marked departure does not require proof of what the accused actually had in their mind. Only that there was as failure to direct his mind to the risk that a reasonably prudent person would have appreciated.[5]
- ↑ see R v Hundal, 1993 CanLII 120 (SCC), [1993] 1 SCR 867, per Cory J, at p. 887 (SCR)
- ↑ R v Beatty, 2008 SCC 5 (CanLII), [2008] 1 SCR 49, per Charron J
- ↑ Beatty, ibid., at para 40
- ↑ R v Tayfel (M), 2009 MBCA 124 (CanLII), 250 CCC (3d) 219, per Hamilton JA, at para 51
- ↑
R v Canhoto, 1999 CanLII 3819 (ON CA), 140 CCC (3d) 321, per Doherty JA
R v Fredericks, 2013 NSPC 11 (CanLII), per Tufts J, at para 70