Hearsay: Difference between revisions

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== Introduction ==
== Introduction ==
Hearsay evidence is any statement, either written or oral, which was made out of court, but is presented in court to prove the truth of that statement.<ref>
Hearsay evidence is any statement, either written or oral, which was made out of court, but is presented in court to prove the truth of that statement.<ref>
Subramanian v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 W.L.R. 965 (P.C.) at 970 and adopted in Canada first in R v Abbey, [http://canlii.ca/t/1lpcd 1982 CanLII 25] (SCC), [1982] 2 SCR 24<br>
Subramanian v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 W.L.R. 965 (P.C.) at 970 and adopted in Canada first in R v Abbey, [http://canlii.ca/t/1lpcd 1982 CanLII 25] (SCC), [1982] 2 SCR 24{{perSCC|Dickson J}}<br>
R v Evans, [http://canlii.ca/t/1frzq 1993 CanLII 86] (SCC), [1993] 3 SCR 653; [1993] S.C.J. No. 115 at para 16 ("An out-of-court statement which is for the truth of its contents is hearsay.")</ref> It is a type of evidence that is generally considered inadmissible.<ref>
R v Evans, [http://canlii.ca/t/1frzq 1993 CanLII 86] (SCC), [1993] 3 SCR 653; [1993] S.C.J. No. 115{{perSCC|Sopinka J}} at para 16 ("An out-of-court statement which is for the truth of its contents is hearsay.")</ref> It is a type of evidence that is generally considered inadmissible.<ref>
R v Christie, [1914] A.C. 545 at p. 548<br>
R v Christie, [1914] A.C. 545 at p. 548<br>
R v Bradshaw, [http://canlii.ca/t/h4jxt 2017 SCC 35] (CanLII) at para 20 ("Hearsay is an out-of-court statement tendered for the truth of its contents. ") and 21<br>
R v Bradshaw, [http://canlii.ca/t/h4jxt 2017 SCC 35] (CanLII){{perSCC| Karakatsanis J}} at para 20 ("Hearsay is an out-of-court statement tendered for the truth of its contents. ") and 21<br>
R v Khelawon, [http://canlii.ca/t/1q51r 2006 SCC 57] (CanLII) at para 2 and 3<br>
R v Khelawon, [http://canlii.ca/t/1q51r 2006 SCC 57] (CanLII){{perSCC|Charron J}} at para 2 and 3<br>
</ref>
</ref>


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The definition has been addressed in several cases.<ref>R v Evans<br>  
The definition has been addressed in several cases.<ref>R v Evans<br>  
R v Smith, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fs9x 1992 CanLII 79] (SCC), [1992] 2 SCR 915<br>  
R v Smith, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fs9x 1992 CanLII 79] (SCC), [1992] 2 SCR 915{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}}<br>  
R v Hawkins, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fr51 1996 CanLII 154] (SCC), [1996] 3 SCR 1043, at 153</ref>
R v Hawkins, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fr51 1996 CanLII 154] (SCC), [1996] 3 SCR 1043{{perSCC| Lamer CJ and Iacobucci J}}, at 153</ref>


Any out-of-court statement that is adduced simply to prove the statement was made is not hearsay. The statement is admissible as long as it is relevant.<ref>
Any out-of-court statement that is adduced simply to prove the statement was made is not hearsay. The statement is admissible as long as it is relevant.<ref>
Evans at p. 102-103<br>
Evans{{supra}} at p. 102-103<br>
</ref>
</ref>


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==Reasons for Exclusion==
==Reasons for Exclusion==
Hearsay statements are difficult to assess for trustworthiness.<Ref>
Hearsay statements are difficult to assess for trustworthiness.<Ref>
R v Bradshaw, [http://canlii.ca/t/h4jxt 2017 SCC 35] (CanLII) at para 20<br>
R v Bradshaw, [http://canlii.ca/t/h4jxt 2017 SCC 35] (CanLII){{perSCC| Karakatsanis J}} at para 20<br>
</ref>
</ref>


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Bradshaw{{supra}} at para 20</ref>
Bradshaw{{supra}} at para 20</ref>
#Hearsay evidence results in a decision based upon secondary and, therefore, weaker evidence, rather than the best evidence available. Related to this, there is no opportunity to cross-examine or otherwise test the evidence of the source.<ref> R v Abel [http://canlii.ca/t/fq2cl 2011 NLTD 173] (CanLII)<br>
#Hearsay evidence results in a decision based upon secondary and, therefore, weaker evidence, rather than the best evidence available. Related to this, there is no opportunity to cross-examine or otherwise test the evidence of the source.<ref> R v Abel [http://canlii.ca/t/fq2cl 2011 NLTD 173] (CanLII)<br>
R v Khelawon, [http://canlii.ca/t/1q51r 2006 SCC 57] (CanLII) at para 38 - no way to examine reliability by cross-examination<br>
R v Khelawon, [http://canlii.ca/t/1q51r 2006 SCC 57] (CanLII){{perSCC|Charron J}} at para 38 - no way to examine reliability by cross-examination<br>
</ref>
</ref>
#There is no opportunity to observe the demeanour of the declarant, thus making it harder to assess the quality of the evidence.<ref>
#There is no opportunity to observe the demeanour of the declarant, thus making it harder to assess the quality of the evidence.<ref>
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Bradshaw at para 20<br>
Bradshaw at para 20<br>
Khelawon{{supra}} at para 2<br>
Khelawon{{supra}} at para 2<br>
R v Baldree, [http://canlii.ca/t/h4jxt 2013 SCC 35] (CanLII) at para 32<br>
R v Baldree, [http://canlii.ca/t/h4jxt 2013 SCC 35] (CanLII){{perSCC|Fish J}} at para 32<br>
</ref>
</ref>


These are known as the hearsay dangers.<ref>
These are known as the hearsay dangers.<ref>
R v KGB, [1993] 1 SCR 740, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fs50 1993 CanLII 116] (SCC), 79 CCC (3d) 257, at pp. 271-72 (CCC)
R v KGB, [1993] 1 SCR 740, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fs50 1993 CanLII 116] (SCC), 79 CCC (3d) 257{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}} at pp. 271-72 (CCC)
</ref>
</ref>


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Khelawon{{supra}} at para 38<br>
Khelawon{{supra}} at para 38<br>
Bradshaw{{supra}} at para 20<br>
Bradshaw{{supra}} at para 20<br>
R v KGB, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fs50 1993 CanLII 116] (SCC), [1993] 1 SCR 740 at p.764<br>
R v KGB, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fs50 1993 CanLII 116] (SCC), [1993] 1 SCR 740{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}} at p.764<br>
</ref>
</ref>


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==Elements of Hearsay==
==Elements of Hearsay==
Where hearsay potentially arises there are four elements to consider for the rule to be engaged:<ref> R v Baldree [http://canlii.ca/t/fqcws 2012 ONCA 138] (CanLII) at para 46, appealed to SCC on other grounds</ref>
Where hearsay potentially arises there are four elements to consider for the rule to be engaged:<ref> R v Baldree [http://canlii.ca/t/fqcws 2012 ONCA 138] (CanLII){{perONCA| Feldman JA}} (1:1:1) at para 46, appealed to SCC on other grounds</ref>
# a declarant
# a declarant
# a recipient
# a recipient
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# a purpose for introducing the statement
# a purpose for introducing the statement


The first three are almost always made out, the fourth requirement is usually the source of controversy. Not every out of court statement is hearsay.<Ref> R v Khelawon, [http://canlii.ca/t/1q51r 2006 SCC 57], [2006] 2 SCR 787, at para 56</ref>
The first three are almost always made out, the fourth requirement is usually the source of controversy. Not every out of court statement is hearsay.<Ref> R v Khelawon, [http://canlii.ca/t/1q51r 2006 SCC 57], [2006] 2 SCR 787{{perSCC|Charron J}}, at para 56</ref>


The prohibited purpose consists of admission for the purpose of proving the “truth” of its contents. Otherwise, it is admissible evidence. That is, statements that used to show the recipient had notice, knowledge or motive, or was in some way probative, then it is otherwise admissible.<ref> R v Evans, [http://canlii.ca/t/1frzq 1993 CanLII 86] (SCC), [1993] 3 SCR 653 at para 16 ("An out-of-court statement offered simply as proof that the statement was made is not hearsay, and is admissible as long as it has some probative value")</ref>
The prohibited purpose consists of admission for the purpose of proving the “truth” of its contents. Otherwise, it is admissible evidence. That is, statements that used to show the recipient had notice, knowledge or motive, or was in some way probative, then it is otherwise admissible.<ref> R v Evans, [http://canlii.ca/t/1frzq 1993 CanLII 86] (SCC), [1993] 3 SCR 653{{perSCC|Sopinka J}}{{at|16}} ("An out-of-court statement offered simply as proof that the statement was made is not hearsay, and is admissible as long as it has some probative value")</ref>


If it is for the “truth of its contents” then it is presumptively inadmissible unless it fits in a traditional categorical exception or under the principled exception.<ref>R v Khelawon at 42</reF>
If it is for the “truth of its contents” then it is presumptively inadmissible unless it fits in a traditional categorical exception or under the principled exception.<ref>Khelawon{{supra}} at 42</reF>
The primary reason for this is that is it not possible to test the reliability of the statement such as by cross examination.<ref>
The primary reason for this is that is it not possible to test the reliability of the statement such as by cross-examination.<ref>
R v Sharif, [http://canlii.ca/t/25kbx 2009 BCCA 390] (CanLII), at para 12</ref>
R v Sharif, [http://canlii.ca/t/25kbx 2009 BCCA 390] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Saunders JA}}{{at|12}}</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}
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Courts do not make a principled distinction between implied assertions and explicit hearsay.<ref>
Courts do not make a principled distinction between implied assertions and explicit hearsay.<ref>
R v Baldree, [http://canlii.ca/t/fz7b7 2013 SCC 35] (CanLII)
R v Baldree, [http://canlii.ca/t/fz7b7 2013 SCC 35] (CanLII){{perSCC|Fish J}}
</ref>
</ref>


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{{seealso|Electronic Documents}}
{{seealso|Electronic Documents}}
The absence of data in a computer system is not generally hearsay. For example, inquiries into the police records regarding a suspect that result in a negative result was found not to be hearsay.<Ref>
The absence of data in a computer system is not generally hearsay. For example, inquiries into the police records regarding a suspect that result in a negative result was found not to be hearsay.<Ref>
R v Saddleback, [http://canlii.ca/t/ftxnv 2012 ABQB 670] (CanLII) at para 45-54</ref>
R v Saddleback, [http://canlii.ca/t/ftxnv 2012 ABQB 670] (CanLII){{perABQB|Lee J}} at para 45-54</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}
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===Phone Calls or Text Messages===
===Phone Calls or Text Messages===
Drug purchase phone calls, usually where the police are on the other end of a call, have a history of litigation to exclude them as hearsay. More often than not they have been admitted as either necessary and reliable or as non-hearsay.<ref>
Drug purchase phone calls, usually where the police are on the other end of a call, have a history of litigation to exclude them as hearsay. More often than not they have been admitted as either necessary and reliable or as non-hearsay.<ref>
As non-hearsay see R v Lucia, [http://canlii.ca/t/2br2d 2010 ONCA 533] (CanLII) at para 7<br>
As non-hearsay see R v Lucia, [http://canlii.ca/t/2br2d 2010 ONCA 533] (CanLII){{TheCourt}} at para 7<br>
R v Edwards, [http://canlii.ca/t/6k30 1994 CanLII 1461] (ON CA) at pp. 248-249 (see also para 22) -admissible as non-hearsay<br>
R v Edwards, [http://canlii.ca/t/6k30 1994 CanLII 1461] (ON CA){{perONCA| McKinlay JA}} at pp. 248-249 (see also para 22) -admissible as non-hearsay<br>
R v Nguyen, [http://canlii.ca/t/dtz 2003 BCCA 556] (CanLII), (2003), 180 CCC (3d) 347 (BCCA), at para 17<br>  
R v Nguyen, [http://canlii.ca/t/dtz 2003 BCCA 556] (CanLII), (2003), 180 CCC (3d) 347 (BCCA){{perBCCA| Mackenzie JA}} at para 17<br>  
R v Ly, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqxc 1997 CanLII 330] (SCC), [1997] 3 SCR 698, at paras 1-4<br>
R v Ly, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqxc 1997 CanLII 330] (SCC), [1997] 3 SCR 698{{perSCC| McLachlin J}}, at paras 1-4<br>
R v Cook, [http://canlii.ca/t/23gjx 1978 CanLII 399] (BC CA), (1978), 46 CCC (2d) 318 (BCCA), at p. 320<br>
R v Cook, [http://canlii.ca/t/23gjx 1978 CanLII 399] (BC CA), (1978), 46 CCC (2d) 318 (BCCA){{perBCCA|McIntyre JA}}, at p. 320<br>
R v Duncan, [http://canlii.ca/t/1f81b 2001 CanLII 11779] (MB PC) - phone-call inadmissible<br>
R v Duncan, [http://canlii.ca/t/1f81b 2001 CanLII 11779] (MB PC){{perMBPC|Joyal J}} - phone-call inadmissible<br>
R v Bjornson, [http://canlii.ca/t/27522 2009 BCSC 1779] (CanLII) - admissible <br>
R v Bjornson, [http://canlii.ca/t/27522 2009 BCSC 1779] (CanLII){{perBCSC|Bennett J}} - admissible <br>
R v Guan, [http://canlii.ca/t/2blxm 2010 YKSC 14] (CanLII) - admissible b/c not hearsay<br>
R v Guan, [http://canlii.ca/t/2blxm 2010 YKSC 14] (CanLII), ''per'' Veale J - admissible b/c not hearsay<br>
R v Mironuk-Hurak, [http://canlii.ca/t/ftr6l 2012 MBQB 290] (CanLII) - admissible b/c not hearsay(CanLII)
R v Mironuk-Hurak, [http://canlii.ca/t/ftr6l 2012 MBQB 290] (CanLII){{perMBQB|Oliphant J}} - admissible b/c not hearsay(CanLII)
</ref>
</ref>


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* the fact that the statement was made
* the fact that the statement was made
* narrative  
* narrative  
* investigative narrative to counter claim that the investigation was inadequate.<Ref>
* investigative narrative to counterclaim that the investigation was inadequate.<Ref>
R v Dhillon, [http://canlii.ca/t/1cqpr 2002 CanLII 41540] (ON CA)
R v Dhillon, [http://canlii.ca/t/1cqpr 2002 CanLII 41540] (ON CA){{perONCA|Laskin and Goudge JJA}}
</ref>
</ref>


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===Statements of Co-Accused===
===Statements of Co-Accused===
The out-of-court statements of a co-accused will be hearsay and cannot be admitted for the purpose of corroborating a witness.<ref>
The out-of-court statements of a co-accused will be hearsay and cannot be admitted for the purpose of corroborating a witness.<ref>
R v Denholme, [http://canlii.ca/t/2d3qn 2010 BCSC 1513] (CanLII)
R v Denholme, [http://canlii.ca/t/2d3qn 2010 BCSC 1513] (CanLII){{perBCSC| Voith J}}
</ref>
</ref>


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===Exculpatory Statements===
===Exculpatory Statements===
Hearsay statements of the accused that are exculpatory are still presumptively inadmissible under the general rule of hearsay.<ref>
Hearsay statements of the accused that are exculpatory are still presumptively inadmissible under the general rule of hearsay.<ref>
R v Simpson, [http://canlii.ca/t/gkdsj 2015 SCC 40] (CanLII) at para 41<br>
R v Simpson, [http://canlii.ca/t/gkdsj 2015 SCC 40] (CanLII){{perSCC| Moldaver J}} at para 41<br>
R v Rojas, [http://canlii.ca/t/218cw 2008 SCC 56] (CanLII) at para 36 to 37<br>
R v Rojas, [http://canlii.ca/t/218cw 2008 SCC 56] (CanLII){{perSCC|Charron J}} at para 36 to 37<br>
</ref>
</ref>


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A communication by a co-conspirator in furtherance of a common unlawful design that makes out the conspiracy can be admissible to prove the existence of a prior agreement.
A communication by a co-conspirator in furtherance of a common unlawful design that makes out the conspiracy can be admissible to prove the existence of a prior agreement.
<ref>
<ref>
R v Wang, [http://canlii.ca/t/fzgmk 2013 BCCA 311] (CanLII) at para 49
R v Wang, [http://canlii.ca/t/fzgmk 2013 BCCA 311] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Bennett JA}} at para 49
</ref>
</ref>


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=== Opinion Evidence===
=== Opinion Evidence===
Non-specific hearsay opinion evidence is inadmissible.<ref> R v Ranger, [http://canlii.ca/t/5xwr 2003 CanLII 32900] (ON CA), (2003), 67 O.R. (3d) 1, 14 C.R. (6th) 324 (C.A.) at para 65</ref>
Non-specific hearsay opinion evidence is inadmissible.<ref> R v Ranger, [http://canlii.ca/t/5xwr 2003 CanLII 32900] (ON CA), (2003), 67 O.R. (3d) 1, 14 C.R. (6th) 324 (C.A.){{perONCA|Charron JA}} at para 65</ref>
{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


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'''State of Mind'''<br>
'''State of Mind'''<br>
An out of court statement can be admitted as proof of state of mind of the speaker.<ref>
An out of court statement can be admitted as proof of state of mind of the speaker.<ref>
R v Simpson, [1988] 1 SCR 3, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftjr 1988 CanLII 89] (SCC), at 22
R v Simpson, [1988] 1 SCR 3, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftjr 1988 CanLII 89] (SCC){{perSCC|McIntyre J}}, at 22
</ref>
</ref>



Revision as of 15:26, 25 November 2018

Introduction

Hearsay evidence is any statement, either written or oral, which was made out of court, but is presented in court to prove the truth of that statement.[1] It is a type of evidence that is generally considered inadmissible.[2]

The hearsay rule has stated as:[3]

Written or oral statements, or communicative conduct made by persons otherwise than in testimony at the proceeding in which it is offered, are inadmissible, if such statements or conduct are tendered either as proof of their truth or as proof of assertions implicit therein.

The definition has been addressed in several cases.[4]

Any out-of-court statement that is adduced simply to prove the statement was made is not hearsay. The statement is admissible as long as it is relevant.[5]

Allowing in hearsay can compromise trial fairness and the truth seeking process.[6]

  1. Subramanian v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 W.L.R. 965 (P.C.) at 970 and adopted in Canada first in R v Abbey, 1982 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1982] 2 SCR 24, per Dickson J
    R v Evans, 1993 CanLII 86 (SCC), [1993] 3 SCR 653; [1993] S.C.J. No. 115, per Sopinka J at para 16 ("An out-of-court statement which is for the truth of its contents is hearsay.")
  2. R v Christie, [1914] A.C. 545 at p. 548
    R v Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35 (CanLII), per Karakatsanis J at para 20 ("Hearsay is an out-of-court statement tendered for the truth of its contents. ") and 21
    R v Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57 (CanLII), per Charron J at para 2 and 3
  3. Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, Butterworths, 2d ed. ss.6.2
  4. R v Evans
    R v Smith, 1992 CanLII 79 (SCC), [1992] 2 SCR 915, per Lamer CJ
    R v Hawkins, 1996 CanLII 154 (SCC), [1996] 3 SCR 1043, per Lamer CJ and Iacobucci J, at 153
  5. Evans, supra at p. 102-103
  6. Bradshaw, supra at para 20

Reasons for Exclusion

Hearsay statements are difficult to assess for trustworthiness.[1]

Courts generally do not allow such evidence as it is generally said to be untrustworthy for several reasons:[2]

  1. The admission of such evidence lends itself to the perpetration of fraud. This is in part due to the lack of oath on the part of the source.[3]
  2. Hearsay evidence results in a decision based upon secondary and, therefore, weaker evidence, rather than the best evidence available. Related to this, there is no opportunity to cross-examine or otherwise test the evidence of the source.[4]
  3. There is no opportunity to observe the demeanour of the declarant, thus making it harder to assess the quality of the evidence.[5]
  4. The introduction of such evidence will lengthen trials.

These concerns include the inability to investigate "declarant’s perception, memory, narration, or sincerity".[6]

These are known as the hearsay dangers.[7]

Additional concerns were also identified:[8]

  1. "the declarant may have misperceived the facts to which the hearsay statement relates";
  2. "even if correctly perceived, the relevant facts may have been wrongly remembered; "
  3. "the declarant may have narrated the relevant facts in an unintentionally misleading manner; and"
  4. "the declarant may have knowingly made a false assertion. The opportunity to fully probe these potential sources of error arises only if the declarant is present in court and subject to cross-examination."

Of these dangers, the lack of contemporaneous cross-examination is the most essential definiting feature.[9]

Allowing hearsay evidence "compromise trial fairness and the trial’s truth-seeking process".[10]

  1. R v Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35 (CanLII), per Karakatsanis J at para 20
  2. Sopkina, at 175
  3. Bradshaw, supra at para 20
  4. R v Abel 2011 NLTD 173 (CanLII)
    R v Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57 (CanLII), per Charron J at para 38 - no way to examine reliability by cross-examination
  5. Bradshaw, supra at para 20
  6. Bradshaw at para 20
    Khelawon, supra at para 2
    R v Baldree, 2013 SCC 35 (CanLII), per Fish J at para 32
  7. R v KGB, [1993] 1 SCR 740, 1993 CanLII 116 (SCC), 79 CCC (3d) 257, per Lamer CJ at pp. 271-72 (CCC)
  8. Baldree, supra at para 32
  9. Khelawon, supra at para 38
    Bradshaw, supra at para 20
    R v KGB, 1993 CanLII 116 (SCC), [1993] 1 SCR 740, per Lamer CJ at p.764
  10. Bradshaw, supra at para 20

Elements of Hearsay

Where hearsay potentially arises there are four elements to consider for the rule to be engaged:[1]

  1. a declarant
  2. a recipient
  3. a statement and
  4. a purpose for introducing the statement

The first three are almost always made out, the fourth requirement is usually the source of controversy. Not every out of court statement is hearsay.[2]

The prohibited purpose consists of admission for the purpose of proving the “truth” of its contents. Otherwise, it is admissible evidence. That is, statements that used to show the recipient had notice, knowledge or motive, or was in some way probative, then it is otherwise admissible.[3]

If it is for the “truth of its contents” then it is presumptively inadmissible unless it fits in a traditional categorical exception or under the principled exception.[4] The primary reason for this is that is it not possible to test the reliability of the statement such as by cross-examination.[5]

  1. R v Baldree 2012 ONCA 138 (CanLII), per Feldman JA (1:1:1) at para 46, appealed to SCC on other grounds
  2. R v Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 SCR 787, per Charron J, at para 56
  3. R v Evans, 1993 CanLII 86 (SCC), [1993] 3 SCR 653, per Sopinka J, at para 16 ("An out-of-court statement offered simply as proof that the statement was made is not hearsay, and is admissible as long as it has some probative value")
  4. Khelawon, supra at 42
  5. R v Sharif, 2009 BCCA 390 (CanLII), per Saunders JA, at para 12

Types of Statements

Implied Assertions

An implied assertion (also called "implied hearsay") is act or utterance that conveys some information to the recipient in an implied manner. There was considerable debate over whether this sort of evidence is hearsay.

Courts do not make a principled distinction between implied assertions and explicit hearsay.[1]

  1. R v Baldree, 2013 SCC 35 (CanLII), per Fish J

Computer Records

See also: Electronic Documents

The absence of data in a computer system is not generally hearsay. For example, inquiries into the police records regarding a suspect that result in a negative result was found not to be hearsay.[1]

  1. R v Saddleback, 2012 ABQB 670 (CanLII), per Lee J at para 45-54

Phone Calls or Text Messages

Drug purchase phone calls, usually where the police are on the other end of a call, have a history of litigation to exclude them as hearsay. More often than not they have been admitted as either necessary and reliable or as non-hearsay.[1]

  1. As non-hearsay see R v Lucia, 2010 ONCA 533 (CanLII), per curiam at para 7
    R v Edwards, 1994 CanLII 1461 (ON CA), per McKinlay JA at pp. 248-249 (see also para 22) -admissible as non-hearsay
    R v Nguyen, 2003 BCCA 556 (CanLII), (2003), 180 CCC (3d) 347 (BCCA), per Mackenzie JA at para 17
    R v Ly, 1997 CanLII 330 (SCC), [1997] 3 SCR 698, per McLachlin J, at paras 1-4
    R v Cook, 1978 CanLII 399 (BC CA), (1978), 46 CCC (2d) 318 (BCCA), per McIntyre JA, at p. 320
    R v Duncan, 2001 CanLII 11779 (MB PC), per Joyal J - phone-call inadmissible
    R v Bjornson, 2009 BCSC 1779 (CanLII), per Bennett J - admissible
    R v Guan, 2010 YKSC 14 (CanLII), per Veale J - admissible b/c not hearsay
    R v Mironuk-Hurak, 2012 MBQB 290 (CanLII), per Oliphant J - admissible b/c not hearsay(CanLII)

Purpose of Introducing the Statement

Typical non-hearsay uses of out-of-court statements include:

  • officers testifying to their reasonable and probable grounds to perform some duty
  • the fact that the statement was made
  • narrative
  • investigative narrative to counterclaim that the investigation was inadequate.[1]

Where evidence of an out-of-court statement is being used for a non-hearsay purpose (not for the truth of its contents), it will still be limited by relevance, probative value, and may be subject to a limiting instruction to a jury.

  1. R v Dhillon, 2002 CanLII 41540 (ON CA), per Laskin and Goudge JJA

Statements of Co-Accused

The out-of-court statements of a co-accused will be hearsay and cannot be admitted for the purpose of corroborating a witness.[1]

  1. R v Denholme, 2010 BCSC 1513 (CanLII), per Voith J

Exculpatory Statements

Hearsay statements of the accused that are exculpatory are still presumptively inadmissible under the general rule of hearsay.[1]

  1. R v Simpson, 2015 SCC 40 (CanLII), per Moldaver J at para 41
    R v Rojas, 2008 SCC 56 (CanLII), per Charron J at para 36 to 37

Conspiracy

See also: Traditional Exceptions to Hearsay

A communication by a co-conspirator in furtherance of a common unlawful design that makes out the conspiracy can be admissible to prove the existence of a prior agreement. [1]

  1. R v Wang, 2013 BCCA 311 (CanLII), per Bennett JA at para 49

Opinion Evidence

Non-specific hearsay opinion evidence is inadmissible.[1]

  1. R v Ranger, 2003 CanLII 32900 (ON CA), (2003), 67 O.R. (3d) 1, 14 C.R. (6th) 324 (C.A.), per Charron JA at para 65

Others

See also Prior Consistent Statements - a form of hearsay

State of Mind
An out of court statement can be admitted as proof of state of mind of the speaker.[1]

  1. R v Simpson, [1988] 1 SCR 3, 1988 CanLII 89 (SCC), per McIntyre J, at 22

Topics

Case Digests