Computer-related Search Issues: Difference between revisions
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{{HeaderWarrants}} | {{HeaderWarrants}} | ||
==General Principles== | ==General Principles== | ||
{{seealso|Special Search Warrant Issues}} | {{seealso|Special Search Warrant Issues}} | ||
Search warrants under s. 487 are the most typical manner of authorizing an officer to examine the contents of a computer.<ref> | Search warrants under s. 487 are the most typical manner of authorizing an officer to examine the contents of a computer.<ref> | ||
R v Blazevic, [http://canlii.ca/t/5qng 2011 ONSC 7549] (CanLII), at para 32, ("the police have the right to search computers with a search warrant under s. 487 of the Criminal Code to assist them in uncovering evidence associated with an offence.") | R v Blazevic, [http://canlii.ca/t/5qng 2011 ONSC 7549] (CanLII){{perONSC|PJL Smith J}}, at para 32, ("the police have the right to search computers with a search warrant under s. 487 of the Criminal Code to assist them in uncovering evidence associated with an offence.") | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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===Single Warrant for Multiple Zones of Privacy=== | ===Single Warrant for Multiple Zones of Privacy=== | ||
A residential search warrant that authorizes the seizure of computer devices for its evidential value can also operate as an judicial authorization for the examination of the device.<ref> | A residential search warrant that authorizes the seizure of computer devices for its evidential value can also operate as an judicial authorization for the examination of the device.<ref> | ||
R v Vu, [http://canlii.ca/t/g1r8p 2013 SCC 60] (CanLII)<br> | R v Vu, [http://canlii.ca/t/g1r8p 2013 SCC 60] (CanLII){{perSCC|Cromwell J}}<br> | ||
see also R v Ballendine, [http://canlii.ca/t/fl8xf 2011 BCCA 221] (CanLII)<br> | see also R v Ballendine, [http://canlii.ca/t/fl8xf 2011 BCCA 221] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Frankel JA}}<br> | ||
c.f. R v Jones, [http://canlii.ca/t/fncds 2011 ONCA 632] (CanLII)<br> | c.f. R v Jones, [http://canlii.ca/t/fncds 2011 ONCA 632] (CanLII){{perONCA|Blair JA}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Due to the enhanced privacy interest, the authorization must “specific[ally]” authorize the seizure of a computer before they can search it. The authorization for the device cannot be by implication.<Ref> | Due to the enhanced privacy interest, the authorization must “specific[ally]” authorize the seizure of a computer before they can search it. The authorization for the device cannot be by implication.<Ref> | ||
Vu{{supra}} at para 3 ("...the requirement of specific, prior authorization means that if police intend to search computers found within a place with respect to which they seek a warrant, they must satisfy the authorizing justice that they have reasonable grounds to believe that any computers they discover will contain the things they are looking for.")<Br> | |||
R v Butters, [http://canlii.ca/t/g6r5l 2014 ONCJ 228] (CanLII), at para 25 aff'd [http://canlii.ca/t/gm5m8 2015 ONCA 783] (CanLII)<br> | R v Butters, [http://canlii.ca/t/g6r5l 2014 ONCJ 228] (CanLII){{perONCJ|Paciocco J}}, at para 25 aff'd [http://canlii.ca/t/gm5m8 2015 ONCA 783] (CanLII){{TheCourtONCA}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
If a computer is found during a search under a warrant does not authorize the search of a computer, it can be seized until a computer search warrant is obtained.<ref> | If a computer is found during a search under a warrant does not authorize the search of a computer, it can be seized until a computer search warrant is obtained.<ref> | ||
Vu{{supra}} at para 49</ref> | |||
The initial seizure of the device and the later forensic examination is a separate police activity.<ref> | The initial seizure of the device and the later forensic examination is a separate police activity.<ref> | ||
R v Barwell, [2013] OJ 3743{{NOCANLII}} at para 18<br> | R v Barwell, [2013] OJ 3743{{NOCANLII}}{{perONCJ|Paciocco J}} at para 18<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Where a computer device is lawfully seized, the police are permitted to make a forensic copy of the data.<ref> | Where a computer device is lawfully seized, the police are permitted to make a forensic copy of the data.<ref> | ||
R v Eddy, [http://www.canlii.org/t/gn8kr 2016 ABQB 42] (CanLII) at paras 49 to 50<br> | R v Eddy, [http://www.canlii.org/t/gn8kr 2016 ABQB 42] (CanLII){{perABQB|Rooke ACJ}} at paras 49 to 50<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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===Search of Third Party Devices for Communications=== | ===Search of Third Party Devices for Communications=== | ||
The privacy rights follow and apply to "electronic conversations" whether or not stored on the sender's device. Accordingly, a communication, as it exists on a third-party devices, may be protected under s. 8 of the Charter.<ref> | The privacy rights follow and apply to "electronic conversations" whether or not stored on the sender's device. Accordingly, a communication, as it exists on a third-party devices, may be protected under s. 8 of the Charter.<ref> | ||
R v Marakah, [http://canlii.ca/t/hp63v 2017 SCC 59] (CanLII) | R v Marakah, [http://canlii.ca/t/hp63v 2017 SCC 59] (CanLII){{perSCC|McLachlin CJ}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
'''Search of an Electronic Conversation by Consent'''<br> | '''Search of an Electronic Conversation by Consent'''<br> | ||
There is some suggestion that a conversation may be accessible by the police without warrant on consent of one of the parties to that conversation.<ref> | There is some suggestion that a conversation may be accessible by the police without warrant on consent of one of the parties to that conversation.<ref> | ||
R | Marakah{{ibid}} | ||
But see R v Reeves, [http://canlii.ca/t/hwk3k 2018 SCC 56] (CanLII){{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}} - relating to a search of the family computer on consent of wife<br> | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
The search of a facebook conversation with consent of one of the parties did not require a warrant.<ref> | The search of a facebook conversation with consent of one of the parties did not require a warrant.<ref> | ||
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===A "Locker Warrant"=== | ===A "Locker Warrant"=== | ||
There is some division in the case law in whether proper means of authorizing the examination a device lawfully seized and stored in an evidence locker.<Ref> | There is some division in the case law in whether proper means of authorizing the examination a device lawfully seized and stored in an evidence locker.<Ref> | ||
R v Townsend, [http://canlii.ca/t/h4jdn 2017 ONSC 3435] (CanLII) at paras 61 to 73<br> | R v Townsend, [http://canlii.ca/t/h4jdn 2017 ONSC 3435] (CanLII){{perONSC|Varpio J}} at paras 61 to 73<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
There is a line of cases that suggest that the proper means of examining the device is to ask for a "locker warrant." <ref> | There is a line of cases that suggest that the proper means of examining the device is to ask for a "locker warrant." <ref> | ||
R v Eddy, [http://canlii.ca/t/gn8kr 2016 ABQB 42] (CanLII), 2016 D.T.C. 5032 (Alta. Q.B.) | R v Eddy, [http://canlii.ca/t/gn8kr 2016 ABQB 42] (CanLII), 2016 D.T.C. 5032 (Alta. Q.B.){{perABQB|Rooke ACJ}}<br> | ||
R v Nurse, [http://canlii.ca/t/g68rk 2014 ONSC 1779] (CanLII) | R v Nurse, [http://canlii.ca/t/g68rk 2014 ONSC 1779] (CanLII){{perONSC|Coroza J}}<Br> | ||
R v Barwell, [2013] O.J. No. 3743 (Ont. C.J.) | R v Barwell, [2013] O.J. No. 3743 (Ont. C.J.){{NOCANLII}}{{perONCJ|Paciocco J}}<Br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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===Timing of Forensic Examination=== | ===Timing of Forensic Examination=== | ||
A computer held under a s. 490 warrant can be examined at any time irrespective of the time specified in the warrant.<Ref> | A computer held under a s. 490 warrant can be examined at any time irrespective of the time specified in the warrant.<Ref> | ||
R v Nurse, [http://www.canlii.org/t/g68rk 2014 ONSC 1779] (CanLII) at pars 41 to 49<Br> | R v Nurse, [http://www.canlii.org/t/g68rk 2014 ONSC 1779] (CanLII){{perONSC|Coroza J}} at pars 41 to 49<Br> | ||
R v Rafferty, [http://www.canlii.org/t/fr9w5 2012 ONSC 703] (CanLII) at para 39 to 48<br> | R v Rafferty, [http://www.canlii.org/t/fr9w5 2012 ONSC 703] (CanLII){{perONSC|Heeney J}} at para 39 to 48<br> | ||
R v Weir, [http://www.canlii.org/t/5rdq 2001 ABCA 181] (CanLII) at paras 18 to 19<br> | R v Weir, [http://www.canlii.org/t/5rdq 2001 ABCA 181] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} at paras 18 to 19<br> | ||
R v Ballendine, [http://www.canlii.org/t/fl8xf 2011 BCCA 221] (CanLII) at paras 64 to 70<br> | R v Ballendine, [http://www.canlii.org/t/fl8xf 2011 BCCA 221] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Frankel JA}} at paras 64 to 70<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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'''IP Address and RPG to Search'''<br> | '''IP Address and RPG to Search'''<br> | ||
The connection of an IP address with an ISP account can form reasonable grounds to believe that a computer will be present at the address, but will often need something more.<ref>see R v Weir [http://canlii.ca/t/5rdq 2001 ABCA 181] (CanLII), 156 CCC (3d) 188 (ABCA): ("While it is possible that the computer may have been at a different location than the billing address, it was not unreasonable to conclude that something as sensitive as child pornography would be kept on a computer in a person’s home.")</ref> | The connection of an IP address with an ISP account can form reasonable grounds to believe that a computer will be present at the address, but will often need something more.<ref>see R v Weir [http://canlii.ca/t/5rdq 2001 ABCA 181] (CanLII), 156 CCC (3d) 188 (ABCA){{TheCourtABCA}}: ("While it is possible that the computer may have been at a different location than the billing address, it was not unreasonable to conclude that something as sensitive as child pornography would be kept on a computer in a person’s home.")</ref> | ||
{{Reflist|2}} | {{Reflist|2}} | ||
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==Manner of Search== | ==Manner of Search== | ||
When searching a computer, the manner of the search must be "reasonable" and is subject to implied restrictions.<ref> | When searching a computer, the manner of the search must be "reasonable" and is subject to implied restrictions.<ref> | ||
R v Vu, [2013] 3 SCR 657, [http://www.canlii.org/t/g1r8p 2013 SCC 60] (CanLII) at para 61</ref> | R v Vu, [2013] 3 SCR 657, [http://www.canlii.org/t/g1r8p 2013 SCC 60] (CanLII){{perSCC|Cromwell J}} at para 61</ref> | ||
It is ''not'' permissible for police examiners to "scour the devices indiscriminately". They must "adhere to the rule that the manner of the search must be reasonable."<ref> | It is ''not'' permissible for police examiners to "scour the devices indiscriminately". They must "adhere to the rule that the manner of the search must be reasonable."<ref> | ||
Vu{{ibid}} at para 61<Br> | Vu{{ibid}} at para 61<Br> | ||
R v Jones, [http://www.canlii.org/t/fncds 2011 ONCA 632] (CanLII) at para 42<br> | R v Jones, [http://www.canlii.org/t/fncds 2011 ONCA 632] (CanLII){{perONCA|Blair JA}} at para 42<br> | ||
R v Fearon, [2014] 3 SCR 621, [http://www.canlii.org/t/gflcd 2014 SCC 77] (CanLII) at para 20<br> | R v Fearon, [2014] 3 SCR 621, [http://www.canlii.org/t/gflcd 2014 SCC 77] (CanLII){{perSCC|Fearon J}} at para 20<br> | ||
R v Nurse and Plummer, [http://canlii.ca/t/gf1fc 2014 ONSC 5989] (CanLII) at paras 24, 34<Br> | R v Nurse and Plummer, [http://canlii.ca/t/gf1fc 2014 ONSC 5989] (CanLII){{perONSC|Coroza J}} at paras 24, 34<Br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
The examiners should not conduct full "data dump" of the entire contents of the device and then simply give the entirety of the materials extracted to the investigator where they have the ability to narrow the scope of their search to better comply with the authorization.<ref> | The examiners should not conduct full "data dump" of the entire contents of the device and then simply give the entirety of the materials extracted to the investigator where they have the ability to narrow the scope of their search to better comply with the authorization.<ref> | ||
Nurse{{ibid}} | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Limitations on search are guided by the type of ''evidence'' being sought, not any particular file format or file name.<ref> | Limitations on search are guided by the type of ''evidence'' being sought, not any particular file format or file name.<ref> | ||
Jones{{supra}} at para 43<br> | Jones{{supra}} at para 43<br> | ||
see also R v Rafferty, [http://canlii.ca/t/fr9w5 2012 ONSC 703] (CanLII)<br> | see also R v Rafferty, [http://canlii.ca/t/fr9w5 2012 ONSC 703] (CanLII){{perONSC|Heeney J}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Limitations based on locations within the device are not practical.<Ref> | Limitations based on locations within the device are not practical.<Ref> | ||
R v Cross, [http://canlii.ca/t/1wcjq 2007 CanLII 64141] (ON SC), [2007] OJ 5384 (ONSC) | R v Cross, [http://canlii.ca/t/1wcjq 2007 CanLII 64141] (ON SC), [2007] OJ 5384 (ONSC){{perONSC|Brennan J}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Examiners are entitled to examine any file or folder, in at least a cursory manner, to determine whether they are likely to contain evidence of the type they are seeking.<Ref> | Examiners are entitled to examine any file or folder, in at least a cursory manner, to determine whether they are likely to contain evidence of the type they are seeking.<Ref> | ||
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===Discovery of a New Offence=== | ===Discovery of a New Offence=== | ||
When executing a search warrant in relation to a certain offence and the examiner discovers evidence of another crime, the discovered evidence is admissible, but any further searches for further evidence of the new offence must be done after applying for a new warrant.<ref> | When executing a search warrant in relation to a certain offence and the examiner discovers evidence of another crime, the discovered evidence is admissible, but any further searches for further evidence of the new offence must be done after applying for a new warrant.<ref> | ||
R v Jones, [http://canlii.ca/t/fncds 2011 ONCA 632] (CanLII)<br> | R v Jones, [http://canlii.ca/t/fncds 2011 ONCA 632] (CanLII){{perONCA|Blair JA}}<br> | ||
R v Vu, [http://canlii.ca/t/fpfws 2011 BCCA 536] (CanLII)<br> | R v Vu, [http://canlii.ca/t/fpfws 2011 BCCA 536] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Frankel JA}} appealed to [http://canlii.ca/t/g1r8p 2013 SCC 60] (CanLII){{perSCC|Cromwell J}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Where a new authorization is needed, the proper procedure is to apply for a search warrant and not a general warrant.<ref> | Where a new authorization is needed, the proper procedure is to apply for a search warrant and not a general warrant.<ref> | ||
R v KZ, [http://canlii.ca/t/g6ktc 2014 ABQB 235] (CanLII), at para 32 - Note however that this case considers "computers to be "places" of search rather than the "thing" of search within the meaning of s. 487, which is somewhat contrary to numerous other cases<br> | R v KZ, [http://canlii.ca/t/g6ktc 2014 ABQB 235] (CanLII){{perABQB|Hughes J}}, at para 32 - Note however that this case considers "computers to be "places" of search rather than the "thing" of search within the meaning of s. 487, which is somewhat contrary to numerous other cases<br> | ||
</ref>There is nothing wrong with getting a second search warrant for a device that has already been seized and searched.<ref>KZ{{ibid}} at para 40</ref> | </ref>There is nothing wrong with getting a second search warrant for a device that has already been seized and searched.<ref>KZ{{ibid}} at para 40</ref> | ||
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The computer search warrant of a computer permitting the examination of the computer for specific types of child pornography, does not allow the analyst to examine all images.<ref> | The computer search warrant of a computer permitting the examination of the computer for specific types of child pornography, does not allow the analyst to examine all images.<ref> | ||
R v Sop, [http://canlii.ca/t/g8hd5 2014 ONSC 4610] (CanLII)<Br> | R v Sop, [http://canlii.ca/t/g8hd5 2014 ONSC 4610] (CanLII){{perONSC|Sloan J}}<Br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
The police should be limited to images containing the keywords and associated range of dates. | The police should be limited to images containing the keywords and associated range of dates. | ||
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==Search for Data Stored Outside of Computer== | ==Search for Data Stored Outside of Computer== | ||
There is some suggestion that s. 487(2.1) and (2.2) permits a search of a computer to include a search of data stored off-site.<ref> | There is some suggestion that s. 487(2.1) and (2.2) permits a search of a computer to include a search of data stored off-site.<ref> | ||
R v Vu, [http://canlii.ca/t/fpfws 2011 BCCA 536] (CanLII) at para 73 - ''obiter'' appealed on other issues to [http://www.canlii.org/t/g1r8p 2013 SCC 60] (CanLII)<br> | R v Vu, [http://canlii.ca/t/fpfws 2011 BCCA 536] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Frankel JA}} at para 73 - ''obiter'' appealed on other issues to [http://www.canlii.org/t/g1r8p 2013 SCC 60] (CanLII){{perSCC|Cromwell J}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
{{quotation| | {{quotation| | ||
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'''Jurisdiction'''<br> | '''Jurisdiction'''<br> | ||
Generally speaking, where data is stored in a foreign country but is readily accessible through a network within the country, the location of the original data is irrelevant.<ref> | Generally speaking, where data is stored in a foreign country but is readily accessible through a network within the country, the location of the original data is irrelevant.<ref> | ||
eBay Canada Ltd. v. M.N.R., [2010] 1 FCR 145, [http://canlii.ca/t/21j1p 2008 FCA 348] (CanLII), (the court of appeal stated “The location of the servers was irrelevant because electronically stored information relating to the PowerSellers was readily, lawfully, and instantaneously available in a variety of places to the appellants in Canada.”)<br> | eBay Canada Ltd. v. M.N.R., [2010] 1 FCR 145, [http://canlii.ca/t/21j1p 2008 FCA 348] (CanLII), ''per'' Evans JA, (the court of appeal stated “The location of the servers was irrelevant because electronically stored information relating to the PowerSellers was readily, lawfully, and instantaneously available in a variety of places to the appellants in Canada.”)<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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{{seealso|Wiretaps}} | {{seealso|Wiretaps}} | ||
The seizure of historical text messages will not be considered an "interception" requiring a Part VI wiretap warrant.<Ref> | The seizure of historical text messages will not be considered an "interception" requiring a Part VI wiretap warrant.<Ref> | ||
R v Didechko, [http://canlii.ca/t/gll4w 2015 ABQB 642] (CanLII)<br> | R v Didechko, [http://canlii.ca/t/gll4w 2015 ABQB 642] (CanLII){{perABQB|Schutz J}}<br> | ||
R v Vader, [http://canlii.ca/t/gs1dj 2016 ABQB 309] (CanLII)<br> | R v Vader, [http://canlii.ca/t/gs1dj 2016 ABQB 309] (CanLII){{perABQB|DRG Thomas J}}<br> | ||
R v Rideout, [http://canlii.ca/t/gr61s 2016 CanLII 24896] (NL SCTD)<br> | R v Rideout, [http://canlii.ca/t/gr61s 2016 CanLII 24896] (NL SCTD){{perNLSC|Burrage J}}<br> | ||
R v Jones, [http://canlii.ca/t/ | R v Jones, [2017] 2 SCR 696, [http://canlii.ca/t/hp63x 2017 SCC 60] (CanLII){{perSCC|Cote J}}<br> | ||
R v Scott, [http://canlii.ca/t/grv2g 2015 MBQB 87] (CanLII) <br> | R v Scott, [http://canlii.ca/t/grv2g 2015 MBQB 87] (CanLII){{perMBQB|Edmond J}}<br> | ||
R v Mills, [http://canlii.ca/t/gxfxd 2017 NLCA 12] (CanLII) leave to appeal granted [http://canlii.ca/t/hp9pt 2017 CanLII 84238] (SCC)<Br> | R v Mills, [http://canlii.ca/t/gxfxd 2017 NLCA 12] (CanLII){{perNLCA|Welsh JA}} leave to appeal granted [http://canlii.ca/t/hp9pt 2017 CanLII 84238] (SCC)<Br> | ||
c.f. R v Croft, [http://canlii.ca/t/gfw5s 2015 ABQB 24] (CanLII)<Br> | c.f. R v Croft, [http://canlii.ca/t/gfw5s 2015 ABQB 24] (CanLII){{perABQB|Burrows J}}<Br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
An undercover peace officer posing as an underage officer does not amount to an intercept.<ref> | An undercover peace officer posing as an underage officer does not amount to an intercept.<ref> | ||
R v Allen, [http://canlii.ca/t/h5c33 2017 ONSC 1712] (CanLII)<BR> | R v Allen, [http://canlii.ca/t/h5c33 2017 ONSC 1712] (CanLII)<BR> | ||
R v Graff, [http://canlii.ca/t/gjrhf 2015 ABQB 415] (CanLII)<Br> | R v Graff, [http://canlii.ca/t/gjrhf 2015 ABQB 415] (CanLII){{perABQB|Neilsen J}}<Br> | ||
R v Ghotra, [2015] OJ No 7253 (ONSC){{NOCANLII}}<br> | R v Ghotra, [2015] OJ No 7253 (ONSC){{NOCANLII}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
The fact that the sender was under the mistaken belief as to the identity of the recipient does not amount an "interception".<ref> | The fact that the sender was under the mistaken belief as to the identity of the recipient does not amount an "interception".<ref> | ||
Mills{{supra}} | |||
</reF> | </reF> | ||
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==Disclosing Passwords== | ==Disclosing Passwords== | ||
It remains an open question whether it is possible to use a general warrant to compel a person to disclose their device password.<ref> | It remains an open question whether it is possible to use a general warrant to compel a person to disclose their device password.<ref> | ||
In Re: Application for a General Warrant and s. 487.02 Assistance Order for Eric Talbot (2017) | In Re: Application for a General Warrant and s. 487.02 Assistance Order for Eric Talbot (2017){{NOCANLII}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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'''Operation of a Computer Device'''<Br> | '''Operation of a Computer Device'''<Br> | ||
It should not be necessary to have the investigator to give details on the "basic functions" of computer storage devices. Computer devices are to be treated as appliance and so no need of need of proof is necessary to establish basic functionality.<ref> | It should not be necessary to have the investigator to give details on the "basic functions" of computer storage devices. Computer devices are to be treated as appliance and so no need of need of proof is necessary to establish basic functionality.<ref> | ||
R v Wonitowy, [http://canlii.ca/t/2cplh 2010 SKQB 346] (CanLII) at para 46<br> | R v Wonitowy, [http://canlii.ca/t/2cplh 2010 SKQB 346] (CanLII){{perSKQB|Dufour J}} at para 46<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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The term "goods" is defined in s. 2(1) of the Customs Act as "conveyances, animals and any document in any form." | The term "goods" is defined in s. 2(1) of the Customs Act as "conveyances, animals and any document in any form." | ||
This includes information found on computers and cellphones.<Ref> | This includes information found on computers and cellphones.<Ref> | ||
R v Buss, [http://canlii.ca/t/g50j1 2014 BCPC 16] (CanLII) <br> | R v Buss, [http://canlii.ca/t/g50j1 2014 BCPC 16] (CanLII){{perBCPC|Oulton J}} <br> | ||
R v Moroz, [http://canlii.ca/t/ft6xj 2012 ONSC 5642] (CanLII)<br> | R v Moroz, [http://canlii.ca/t/ft6xj 2012 ONSC 5642] (CanLII){{perONSC|Desotti J}}<br> | ||
R v Whittaker, [http://canlii.ca/t/2fqp8 2010 NBPC 32] (CanLII)<br> | R v Whittaker, [http://canlii.ca/t/2fqp8 2010 NBPC 32] (CanLII){{perNBPC|Jackson J}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
This can include any data that is in "actual possession of or in accompanying baggage of traveller at time they arrive at border and commence dealings with customs officers", but does not include records stored remotely and accessible from the device.<ref> | This can include any data that is in "actual possession of or in accompanying baggage of traveller at time they arrive at border and commence dealings with customs officers", but does not include records stored remotely and accessible from the device.<ref> | ||
R v Gibson, [http://canlii.ca/t/h5l2r 2017 BCPC 237] (CanLII) | R v Gibson, [http://canlii.ca/t/h5l2r 2017 BCPC 237] (CanLII){{perBCPC|Gillespie ACJ}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
'''Expectation of Privacy'''<br> | '''Expectation of Privacy'''<br> | ||
International travelers have a diminished expectation of privacy while crossing international borders.<ref> | International travelers have a diminished expectation of privacy while crossing international borders.<ref> | ||
R v Simmons, [1988] 2 SCR 495, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftcb 1988 CanLII 12] (SCC) | R v Simmons, [1988] 2 SCR 495, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftcb 1988 CanLII 12] (SCC){{perSCC|Dickson CJ}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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It is not necessary that the border agent first form reasonable grounds before engaging in such a "routine search" of electronic devices.<Ref> | It is not necessary that the border agent first form reasonable grounds before engaging in such a "routine search" of electronic devices.<Ref> | ||
R v Sekhon, [http://canlii.ca/t/23c20 2009 BCCA 187] (CanLII) | R v Sekhon, [http://canlii.ca/t/23c20 2009 BCCA 187] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Ryan JA}}<br> | ||
R v Leask, [http://canlii.ca/t/1vlpf 2008 ONCJ 25] (CanLII) | R v Leask, [http://canlii.ca/t/1vlpf 2008 ONCJ 25] (CanLII){{perONCJ|Nadel J}}<br> | ||
See CBSA policy on electronic devices: [http://www.lexsage.com/documents/CBSA%20Operational%20Bulletin%20PRG-2015-31%20Examination%20of%20Digital%20Devices%20and%20Media%20at%20Port%20of%20Entry.pdf OB PRG-2015-31] | See CBSA policy on electronic devices: [http://www.lexsage.com/documents/CBSA%20Operational%20Bulletin%20PRG-2015-31%20Examination%20of%20Digital%20Devices%20and%20Media%20at%20Port%20of%20Entry.pdf OB PRG-2015-31] | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
{{reflist|2}} | {{reflist|2}} |
Revision as of 12:47, 13 December 2018
General Principles
Search warrants under s. 487 are the most typical manner of authorizing an officer to examine the contents of a computer.[1]
- ↑ R v Blazevic, 2011 ONSC 7549 (CanLII), per PJL Smith J, at para 32, ("the police have the right to search computers with a search warrant under s. 487 of the Criminal Code to assist them in uncovering evidence associated with an offence.")
Warrant Issues
Single Warrant for Multiple Zones of Privacy
A residential search warrant that authorizes the seizure of computer devices for its evidential value can also operate as an judicial authorization for the examination of the device.[1]
Due to the enhanced privacy interest, the authorization must “specific[ally]” authorize the seizure of a computer before they can search it. The authorization for the device cannot be by implication.[2]
If a computer is found during a search under a warrant does not authorize the search of a computer, it can be seized until a computer search warrant is obtained.[3]
The initial seizure of the device and the later forensic examination is a separate police activity.[4]
Where a computer device is lawfully seized, the police are permitted to make a forensic copy of the data.[5]
- ↑
R v Vu, 2013 SCC 60 (CanLII), per Cromwell J
see also R v Ballendine, 2011 BCCA 221 (CanLII), per Frankel JA
c.f. R v Jones, 2011 ONCA 632 (CanLII), per Blair JA
- ↑
Vu, supra at para 3 ("...the requirement of specific, prior authorization means that if police intend to search computers found within a place with respect to which they seek a warrant, they must satisfy the authorizing justice that they have reasonable grounds to believe that any computers they discover will contain the things they are looking for.")
R v Butters, 2014 ONCJ 228 (CanLII), per Paciocco J, at para 25 aff'd 2015 ONCA 783 (CanLII), per curiam
- ↑ Vu, supra at para 49
- ↑
R v Barwell, [2013] OJ 3743(*no CanLII links)
, per Paciocco J at para 18
- ↑
R v Eddy, 2016 ABQB 42 (CanLII), per Rooke ACJ at paras 49 to 50
Search of Third Party Devices for Communications
The privacy rights follow and apply to "electronic conversations" whether or not stored on the sender's device. Accordingly, a communication, as it exists on a third-party devices, may be protected under s. 8 of the Charter.[1]
Search of an Electronic Conversation by Consent
There is some suggestion that a conversation may be accessible by the police without warrant on consent of one of the parties to that conversation.[2]
The search of a facebook conversation with consent of one of the parties did not require a warrant.[3]
- ↑ R v Marakah, 2017 SCC 59 (CanLII), per McLachlin CJ
- ↑
Marakah, ibid.
But see R v Reeves, 2018 SCC 56 (CanLII), per Karakatsanis J - relating to a search of the family computer on consent of wife
- ↑ R v Cairns, 2018 ONSC 6411(link pending), per Sweeny J
A "Locker Warrant"
There is some division in the case law in whether proper means of authorizing the examination a device lawfully seized and stored in an evidence locker.[1] There is a line of cases that suggest that the proper means of examining the device is to ask for a "locker warrant." [2]
- ↑
R v Townsend, 2017 ONSC 3435 (CanLII), per Varpio J at paras 61 to 73
- ↑
R v Eddy, 2016 ABQB 42 (CanLII), 2016 D.T.C. 5032 (Alta. Q.B.), per Rooke ACJ
R v Nurse, 2014 ONSC 1779 (CanLII), per Coroza J
R v Barwell, [2013] O.J. No. 3743 (Ont. C.J.)(*no CanLII links) , per Paciocco J
Timing of Forensic Examination
A computer held under a s. 490 warrant can be examined at any time irrespective of the time specified in the warrant.[1]
- ↑
R v Nurse, 2014 ONSC 1779 (CanLII), per Coroza J at pars 41 to 49
R v Rafferty, 2012 ONSC 703 (CanLII), per Heeney J at para 39 to 48
R v Weir, 2001 ABCA 181 (CanLII), per curiam at paras 18 to 19
R v Ballendine, 2011 BCCA 221 (CanLII), per Frankel JA at paras 64 to 70
Sufficiency of Computer Evidence
IP Address and RPG to Search
The connection of an IP address with an ISP account can form reasonable grounds to believe that a computer will be present at the address, but will often need something more.[1]
- ↑ see R v Weir 2001 ABCA 181 (CanLII), 156 CCC (3d) 188 (ABCA), per curiam: ("While it is possible that the computer may have been at a different location than the billing address, it was not unreasonable to conclude that something as sensitive as child pornography would be kept on a computer in a person’s home.")
Manner of Search
When searching a computer, the manner of the search must be "reasonable" and is subject to implied restrictions.[1]
It is not permissible for police examiners to "scour the devices indiscriminately". They must "adhere to the rule that the manner of the search must be reasonable."[2]
The examiners should not conduct full "data dump" of the entire contents of the device and then simply give the entirety of the materials extracted to the investigator where they have the ability to narrow the scope of their search to better comply with the authorization.[3]
Limitations on search are guided by the type of evidence being sought, not any particular file format or file name.[4] Limitations based on locations within the device are not practical.[5] Examiners are entitled to examine any file or folder, in at least a cursory manner, to determine whether they are likely to contain evidence of the type they are seeking.[6]
Search Protocols
There is no need for the computer search warrant to set out a search "protocol" to limit what can be examined in the computer.[7]
- ↑ R v Vu, [2013] 3 SCR 657, 2013 SCC 60 (CanLII), per Cromwell J at para 61
- ↑
Vu, ibid. at para 61
R v Jones, 2011 ONCA 632 (CanLII), per Blair JA at para 42
R v Fearon, [2014] 3 SCR 621, 2014 SCC 77 (CanLII), per Fearon J at para 20
R v Nurse and Plummer, 2014 ONSC 5989 (CanLII), per Coroza J at paras 24, 34
- ↑ Nurse, ibid.
- ↑
Jones, supra at para 43
see also R v Rafferty, 2012 ONSC 703 (CanLII), per Heeney J
- ↑ R v Cross, 2007 CanLII 64141 (ON SC), [2007] OJ 5384 (ONSC), per Brennan J
- ↑
Jones, supra at para 44
- ↑ Vu, ibid. at para 59 ("...my view is that search protocols are not, as a general rule, constitutionally required for pre-authorization of computer searches.")
Discovery of a New Offence
When executing a search warrant in relation to a certain offence and the examiner discovers evidence of another crime, the discovered evidence is admissible, but any further searches for further evidence of the new offence must be done after applying for a new warrant.[1]
Where a new authorization is needed, the proper procedure is to apply for a search warrant and not a general warrant.[2]There is nothing wrong with getting a second search warrant for a device that has already been seized and searched.[3]
- ↑
R v Jones, 2011 ONCA 632 (CanLII), per Blair JA
R v Vu, 2011 BCCA 536 (CanLII), per Frankel JA appealed to 2013 SCC 60 (CanLII), per Cromwell J
- ↑
R v KZ, 2014 ABQB 235 (CanLII), per Hughes J, at para 32 - Note however that this case considers "computers to be "places" of search rather than the "thing" of search within the meaning of s. 487, which is somewhat contrary to numerous other cases
- ↑ KZ, ibid. at para 40
Child Pornography
The computer search warrant of a computer permitting the examination of the computer for specific types of child pornography, does not allow the analyst to examine all images.[1] The police should be limited to images containing the keywords and associated range of dates.
For details on the issue of dated information regarding the presence of CP on a computer, see Information to Obtain a Search Warrant#Currency of Information.
- ↑
R v Sop, 2014 ONSC 4610 (CanLII), per Sloan J
Search for Data Stored Outside of Computer
There is some suggestion that s. 487(2.1) and (2.2) permits a search of a computer to include a search of data stored off-site.[1]
487.
...
Operation of computer system and copying equipment
(2.1) A person authorized under this section to search a computer system in a building or place for data may
- (a) use or cause to be used any computer system at the building or place to search any data contained in or available to the computer system;
- (b) reproduce or cause to be reproduced any data in the form of a print-out or other intelligible output;
- (c) seize the print-out or other output for examination or copying; and
- (d) use or cause to be used any copying equipment at the place to make copies of the data.
Duty of person in possession or control
(2.2) Every person who is in possession or control of any building or place in respect of which a search is carried out under this section shall, on presentation of the warrant, permit the person carrying out the search
- (a) to use or cause to be used any computer system at the building or place in order to search any data contained in or available to the computer system for data that the person is authorized by this section to search for;
- (b) to obtain a hard copy of the data and to seize it; and
- (c) to use or cause to be used any copying equipment at the place to make copies of the data.
...
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 487; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 68; 1994, c. 44, s. 36; 1997, c. 18, s. 41, c. 23, s. 12; 1999, c. 5, s. 16; 2008, c. 18, s. 11.
– CCC
Jurisdiction
Generally speaking, where data is stored in a foreign country but is readily accessible through a network within the country, the location of the original data is irrelevant.[2]
- ↑
R v Vu, 2011 BCCA 536 (CanLII), per Frankel JA at para 73 - obiter appealed on other issues to 2013 SCC 60 (CanLII), per Cromwell J
- ↑
eBay Canada Ltd. v. M.N.R., [2010] 1 FCR 145, 2008 FCA 348 (CanLII), per Evans JA, (the court of appeal stated “The location of the servers was irrelevant because electronically stored information relating to the PowerSellers was readily, lawfully, and instantaneously available in a variety of places to the appellants in Canada.”)
Police Undercover Investigations
The seizure of historical text messages will not be considered an "interception" requiring a Part VI wiretap warrant.[1]
An undercover peace officer posing as an underage officer does not amount to an intercept.[2]
The fact that the sender was under the mistaken belief as to the identity of the recipient does not amount an "interception".[3]
- ↑
R v Didechko, 2015 ABQB 642 (CanLII), per Schutz J
R v Vader, 2016 ABQB 309 (CanLII), per DRG Thomas J
R v Rideout, 2016 CanLII 24896 (NL SCTD), per Burrage J
R v Jones, [2017] 2 SCR 696, 2017 SCC 60 (CanLII), per Cote J
R v Scott, 2015 MBQB 87 (CanLII), per Edmond J
R v Mills, 2017 NLCA 12 (CanLII), per Welsh JA leave to appeal granted 2017 CanLII 84238 (SCC)
c.f. R v Croft, 2015 ABQB 24 (CanLII), per Burrows J
- ↑
R v Allen, 2017 ONSC 1712 (CanLII)
R v Graff, 2015 ABQB 415 (CanLII), per Neilsen J
R v Ghotra, [2015] OJ No 7253 (ONSC)(*no CanLII links)
- ↑ Mills, supra
Disclosing Passwords
It remains an open question whether it is possible to use a general warrant to compel a person to disclose their device password.[1]
Evidence
Operation of a Computer Device
It should not be necessary to have the investigator to give details on the "basic functions" of computer storage devices. Computer devices are to be treated as appliance and so no need of need of proof is necessary to establish basic functionality.[2]
- ↑ In Re: Application for a General Warrant and s. 487.02 Assistance Order for Eric Talbot (2017)(*no CanLII links)
- ↑
R v Wonitowy, 2010 SKQB 346 (CanLII), per Dufour J at para 46
Canadian Border Searches
There are two sources of authority for a warrantless search of an electronic device.
Section 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act states in part that:
Examination of goods
99 (1) An officer may
- (a) at any time up to the time of release, examine any goods that have been imported and open or cause to be opened any package or container of imported goods and take samples of imported goods in reasonable amounts;
...
R.S., 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), s. 99; 1988, c. 65, s. 79; 2001, c. 25, s. 59; 2017, c. 7, s. 52.
Section 139(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act states in part that:
Search
139 (1) An officer may search any person seeking to come into Canada and may search their luggage and personal effects and the means of transportation that conveyed the person to Canada if the officer believes on reasonable grounds that the person
- (a) has not revealed their identity or has hidden on or about their person documents that are relevant to their admissibility; or
- (b) has committed, or possesses documents that may be used in the commission of, an offence referred to in section 117, 118 or 122.
...
– IRPA
"Goods" Under Customs Act
The term "goods" is defined in s. 2(1) of the Customs Act as "conveyances, animals and any document in any form." This includes information found on computers and cellphones.[1]
This can include any data that is in "actual possession of or in accompanying baggage of traveller at time they arrive at border and commence dealings with customs officers", but does not include records stored remotely and accessible from the device.[2]
Expectation of Privacy
International travelers have a diminished expectation of privacy while crossing international borders.[3]
Warrantless Search of Phones
It has been found that warrantless searches of phones are permitted at borders.[4]
It is not necessary that the border agent first form reasonable grounds before engaging in such a "routine search" of electronic devices.[5]
- ↑
R v Buss, 2014 BCPC 16 (CanLII), per Oulton J
R v Moroz, 2012 ONSC 5642 (CanLII), per Desotti J
R v Whittaker, 2010 NBPC 32 (CanLII), per Jackson J
- ↑ R v Gibson, 2017 BCPC 237 (CanLII), per Gillespie ACJ
- ↑ R v Simmons, [1988] 2 SCR 495, 1988 CanLII 12 (SCC), per Dickson CJ
- ↑
Buss, supra
Moroz, supra
Whittaker, supra
- ↑
R v Sekhon, 2009 BCCA 187 (CanLII), per Ryan JA
R v Leask, 2008 ONCJ 25 (CanLII), per Nadel J
See CBSA policy on electronic devices: OB PRG-2015-31