Retrospective Punishments: Difference between revisions

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All rights under s. 11 of the Charter are considered "crucial fundamental rights".<ref>
All rights under s. 11 of the Charter are considered "crucial fundamental rights".<ref>
R v Wigglesworth, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftkp 1987 CanLII 41] (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541, per Wilson J at p. 558<br>
R v Wigglesworth, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftkp 1987 CanLII 41] (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541,{{perSCC|Wilson J}} at p. 558<br>
</ref> The Charter does not protect against "insignificant or 'trivial' limitations or rights". The state action must "warrant constitutional protections".<Ref>
</ref> The Charter does not protect against "insignificant or 'trivial' limitations or rights". The state action must "warrant constitutional protections".<Ref>
R v KRJ, [http://canlii.ca/t/gsm3w 2016 SCC 31] (CanLII), at para 42<Br>
R v KRJ, [http://canlii.ca/t/gsm3w 2016 SCC 31] (CanLII){{perSCC| J}}, at para 42<Br>
Cunningham v Canada, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fs4b 1993 CanLII 139] (SCC), [1993] 2 SCR 143 at p. 151B<br>
Cunningham v Canada, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fs4b 1993 CanLII 139] (SCC), [1993] 2 SCR 143{{perSCC| J}} at p. 151B<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Purpose'''<br>
'''Purpose'''<br>
The purpose of s. 11(i) of the Charter was to enshrine the provisions of the federal and provincial Interpretation Acts that relate to accused benefiting from lesser punishments should legislation change.<ref>
The purpose of s. 11(i) of the Charter was to enshrine the provisions of the federal and provincial Interpretation Acts that relate to accused benefiting from lesser punishments should legislation change.<ref>
Re McCutcheon and City of Toronto et al., [http://canlii.ca/t/g1jl1 1983 CanLII 1629] (ON SC)<br>
Re McCutcheon and City of Toronto et al., [http://canlii.ca/t/g1jl1 1983 CanLII 1629] (ON SC){{perONSC| J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
It prevents the retroactivity of any increase in sanctions.<REf>
It prevents the retroactivity of any increase in sanctions.<REf>
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</ref>
</ref>
Section 11(g) protecting the right "not to be found guilty on account of any act or omission unless, at the time of the act or omission, it constituted an offence" and s. 11(i) both establish the broader principle that "criminal laws should generally not operate retrospectively".<ref>
Section 11(g) protecting the right "not to be found guilty on account of any act or omission unless, at the time of the act or omission, it constituted an offence" and s. 11(i) both establish the broader principle that "criminal laws should generally not operate retrospectively".<ref>
R v KRJ, [http://canlii.ca/t/gsm3w 2016 SCC 31] (CanLII) at para 22 per Karakatsanis J<br>
R v KRJ, [http://canlii.ca/t/gsm3w 2016 SCC 31] (CanLII){{perSCC|Karakatsanis J}} at para 22 <br>
</ref>
</ref>


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'''Rule Against Retrospective Punishment'''<br>
'''Rule Against Retrospective Punishment'''<br>
The section applies only where there has been a change between the "commission of the offence" and the sentencing.<Ref>
The section applies only where there has been a change between the "commission of the offence" and the sentencing.<Ref>
Liang v Canada (Attorney General), [http://canlii.ca/t/g6wpr 2014 BCCA 190] (CanLII)<br>
Liang v Canada (Attorney General), [http://canlii.ca/t/g6wpr 2014 BCCA 190] (CanLII){{perBCCA| JA}}<br>
Canada (Attorney General) v. Whaling, [2014] 1 SCR 392, [http://canlii.ca/t/g67hl 2014 SCC 20] (CanLII), at para 55 ("Section 11(i), although less explicitly concerned with retroactivity, protects against increases in punishment between the time of commission of the crime and the time of sentencing.")<Br>
Canada (Attorney General) v. Whaling, [2014] 1 SCR 392, [http://canlii.ca/t/g67hl 2014 SCC 20] (CanLII){{perSCC| J}}, at para 55 ("Section 11(i), although less explicitly concerned with retroactivity, protects against increases in punishment between the time of commission of the crime and the time of sentencing.")<Br>
Whaling v. Canada (Attorney General), [http://canlii.ca/t/gx7x5 2017 FC 121] (CanLII) at para 2<br>
Whaling v. Canada (Attorney General), [http://canlii.ca/t/gx7x5 2017 FC 121] (CanLII) at para 2<br>
KRJ{{supra}} at para 3 ("s. 11(i) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that, if the punishment for an offence is varied after a person commits the offence, but before sentencing, the person is entitled to “the benefit of the lesser punishment”.")<Br>
KRJ{{supra}} at para 3 ("s. 11(i) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that, if the punishment for an offence is varied after a person commits the offence, but before sentencing, the person is entitled to “the benefit of the lesser punishment”.")<Br>
</ref> This is sometimes referred to as the "crystallization principle"<ref>
</ref> This is sometimes referred to as the "crystallization principle"<ref>
R v Canto, [http://canlii.ca/t/gld0d 2015 ABCA 306] (CanLII), per Slatter JA<Br>
R v Canto, [http://canlii.ca/t/gld0d 2015 ABCA 306] (CanLII){{perABCA|Slatter JA}}<Br>
R v Letiec, [http://canlii.ca/t/gh6nv 2015 ABCA 123] (CanLII), per Wakeling JA<br>
R v Letiec, [http://canlii.ca/t/gh6nv 2015 ABCA 123] (CanLII){{perABCA|Wakeling A}}<br>
</ref> or the principle of ''lex mitior''.<Ref>
</ref> or the principle of ''lex mitior''.<Ref>
R v Storheim, [http://canlii.ca/t/g850p  2014 MBQB 141] (CanLII) at para 2<br>
R v Storheim, [http://canlii.ca/t/g850p  2014 MBQB 141] (CanLII){{perMBQB| J}} at para 2<br>
</ref>
</ref>


An accused convicted of an offence that is subsequently repealed after conviction but before sentencing, the accused can only be sentenced for the offence as it existed before the repeal.<Ref>
An accused convicted of an offence that is subsequently repealed after conviction but before sentencing, the accused can only be sentenced for the offence as it existed before the repeal.<Ref>
R v Vernacchia, [http://canlii.ca/t/1pmjl 1988 CanLII 244] (QC CA) - the offender was convicted of rape and so could not be sentenced to the new offence of "sexual assault"<Br>
R v Vernacchia, [http://canlii.ca/t/1pmjl 1988 CanLII 244] (QC CA){{perQCCA| JA}} - the offender was convicted of rape and so could not be sentenced to the new offence of "sexual assault"<Br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Presumptions'''<br>
'''Presumptions'''<br>
There is a presumptions against the retrospective application all changes in legislation unless there is "clear legislative direction".<ref>
There is a presumptions against the retrospective application all changes in legislation unless there is "clear legislative direction".<ref>
R v Dineley, [http://canlii.ca/t/ftl1j 2012 SCC 58] (CanLII), [2012] 3 S.C.R. 272, at para. 10<br>
R v Dineley, [http://canlii.ca/t/ftl1j 2012 SCC 58] (CanLII), [2012] 3 S.C.R. 272{{perSCC| J}}, at para. 10<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Application in Non-Criminal Matters'''<Br>
'''Application in Non-Criminal Matters'''<Br>
Section 11(i) was not intended to apply outside of criminal matters and certainly should not apply to subsequent civil matters.<Ref>
Section 11(i) was not intended to apply outside of criminal matters and certainly should not apply to subsequent civil matters.<Ref>
Bulmer v Alberta (Solicitor General), [http://canlii.ca/t/28ld4 1987 CanLII 3318] (AB QB), per McFadyen J<br>
Bulmer v Alberta (Solicitor General), [http://canlii.ca/t/28ld4 1987 CanLII 3318] (AB QB){{perABQB|McFadyen J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Common Law Retrospective Punishment'''<Br>
'''Common Law Retrospective Punishment'''<Br>
The right under s. 11(i) only applies to statutory punishment. It has not bearing on the interpretation and application of case law that post-dates the offence itself.<Ref>
The right under s. 11(i) only applies to statutory punishment. It has not bearing on the interpretation and application of case law that post-dates the offence itself.<Ref>
R v WJ, [http://canlii.ca/t/gn7kz 2016 BCSC 161] (CanLII)
R v WJ, [http://canlii.ca/t/gn7kz 2016 BCSC 161] (CanLII){{perBCSC| J}}
</ref>
</ref>


'''Amendments Favourable to Accused'''<br>
'''Amendments Favourable to Accused'''<br>
It is generally said that changes to punishments that are favourable to the accused should be available to an accused.<Ref>
It is generally said that changes to punishments that are favourable to the accused should be available to an accused.<Ref>
R v Dorfer, [http://canlii.ca/t/22k66 2009 BCSC 202] (CanLII), per Ehrcke J, at para 51, appeal upheld at [http://canlii.ca/t/fxc4w 2013 BCCA 223] (CanLII) <br>
R v Dorfer, [http://canlii.ca/t/22k66 2009 BCSC 202] (CanLII){{perBCSC|Ehrcke J}}, at para 51, appeal upheld at [http://canlii.ca/t/fxc4w 2013 BCCA 223] (CanLII){{perBCCA| JA}} <br>
</ref>
</ref>


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==Punishments==
==Punishments==
A "punishment" within the meaning of s. 11 of the Charter refers to sanctions imposed by the court in an attempt to meet the purposes and principles of sentencing. It does not include every potential consequence from a conviction that may provide deterrent value.<ref>
A "punishment" within the meaning of s. 11 of the Charter refers to sanctions imposed by the court in an attempt to meet the purposes and principles of sentencing. It does not include every potential consequence from a conviction that may provide deterrent value.<ref>
R v Rodgers, [http://canlii.ca/t/1n3br 2006 SCC 15] (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 554, per Charron J
R v Rodgers, [http://canlii.ca/t/1n3br 2006 SCC 15] (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 554{{perSCC|Charron J}}
</ref>
</ref>
It can include any "severe handling" or "harsh or injurious treatment".<Ref>
It can include any "severe handling" or "harsh or injurious treatment".<Ref>
R v Lambert, [http://canlii.ca/t/1npm0 1994 CanLII 4531] (NL CA)<br>
R v Lambert, [http://canlii.ca/t/1npm0 1994 CanLII 4531] (NL CA){{perNLCA| JA}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


The consequences of an order will amount to punishment where: <Ref>
The consequences of an order will amount to punishment where: <Ref>
R v KRJ, [http://canlii.ca/t/gsm3w 2016 SCC 31] (CanLII) at para 41, modifying the test in Rodgers{{supra}} at para 63<Br>
R v KRJ, [http://canlii.ca/t/gsm3w 2016 SCC 31] (CanLII){{perSCC| J}} at para 41, modifying the test in Rodgers{{supra}} at para 63<Br>
</ref>
</ref>
# the measure must be a consequence of a conviction that “forms part of the arsenal of sanctions to which an accused may be liable in respect of a particular offence”; and either
# the measure must be a consequence of a conviction that “forms part of the arsenal of sanctions to which an accused may be liable in respect of a particular offence”; and either
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Hurd v Canada (MEI) [1989] 2 FC 594 (FCA){{NOCANLII}}<br>
Hurd v Canada (MEI) [1989] 2 FC 594 (FCA){{NOCANLII}}<br>
</ref> and license suspension under provincial law which is considered a "civil disability"<ref>
</ref> and license suspension under provincial law which is considered a "civil disability"<ref>
see Johnston v Superintendent of Motor Vehicles [1987] BCJ No44 (BCSC), [http://canlii.ca/t/22wfs 1987 CanLII 2859] (BC SC)</ref>.  
see Johnston v Superintendent of Motor Vehicles [1987] BCJ No44 (BCSC), [http://canlii.ca/t/22wfs 1987 CanLII 2859] (BC SC){{perBCSC| J}}</ref>.  


There is some opinion that a criminal record under the Criminal Records Act itself constitutes a form of punishment.<ref>
There is some opinion that a criminal record under the Criminal Records Act itself constitutes a form of punishment.<ref>
Chu v Canada (Attorney General), [http://canlii.ca/t/h38cd 2017 BCSC 630] (CanLII)<br>
Chu v Canada (Attorney General), [http://canlii.ca/t/h38cd 2017 BCSC 630] (CanLII){{perBCSC| J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


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Ancillary orders including forfeiture, prohibition, restitution and probation, all "have the potential" to be "additional punishment".<Ref>
Ancillary orders including forfeiture, prohibition, restitution and probation, all "have the potential" to be "additional punishment".<Ref>
Lambert{{ibid}}<br>
Lambert{{ibid}}<br>
R v Wiles, [http://canlii.ca/t/1m7f5 2005 SCC 84] (CanLII), per Charron J, at para 3 ("Although the purpose of the prohibition order is primarily preventative, in taking away the privilege to possess weapons, it may have some punitive effect on the offender...") <Br>
R v Wiles, [http://canlii.ca/t/1m7f5 2005 SCC 84] (CanLII){{perSCC|Charron J}}, at para 3 ("Although the purpose of the prohibition order is primarily preventative, in taking away the privilege to possess weapons, it may have some punitive effect on the offender...") <Br>
R v Wauer, [http://canlii.ca/t/g8s0q 2014 ABCA 270] (CanLII) at para 13<Br>
R v Wauer, [http://canlii.ca/t/g8s0q 2014 ABCA 270] (CanLII){{perABCA| JA}} at para 13<Br>
</ref>
</ref>


A suspension of driving privileges subsequent to a criminal conviction is a civil or administrative consequence and does not amount to a punishment within the meaning of s. 11(i) of the Charter.<ref>
A suspension of driving privileges subsequent to a criminal conviction is a civil or administrative consequence and does not amount to a punishment within the meaning of s. 11(i) of the Charter.<ref>
Ross v Registrar of Motor Vehicles et al., [1975] 1 SCR 5, [http://canlii.ca/t/1xtxk 1973 CanLII 176] (SCC)<br>
Ross v Registrar of Motor Vehicles et al., [1975] 1 SCR 5, [http://canlii.ca/t/1xtxk 1973 CanLII 176] (SCC){{perSCC| J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


A conditional sentence is a form of "lesser punishment".<ref>
A conditional sentence is a form of "lesser punishment".<ref>
R v Yusuf, [http://canlii.ca/t/flcx5 2011 BCSC 626] (CanLII) at para 29<br>
R v Yusuf, [http://canlii.ca/t/flcx5 2011 BCSC 626] (CanLII){{perBCSC| J}} at para 29<br>
R v SB, [http://canlii.ca/t/21l9h 2008 BCSC 1526] (CanLII) at para 53, aff’d [http://canlii.ca/t/2876l 2010 BCCA 40] (CanLII)<br>
R v SB, [http://canlii.ca/t/21l9h 2008 BCSC 1526] (CanLII){{perBCSC| J}} at para 53, aff’d [http://canlii.ca/t/2876l 2010 BCCA 40] (CanLII){{perBCCA| JA}}<br>
R v RAR, [http://canlii.ca/t/527j 2000 SCC 8] (CanLII), per L'Heureux-Dube J<br>
R v RAR, [http://canlii.ca/t/527j 2000 SCC 8] (CanLII){{perSCC|L'Heureux-Dube J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


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Where the accused is charged after a legislative amendment to the mandatory minimums in relation to offences that are completed before the amendments, then by function of s. 11(i), the old penalties must apply.<ref>
Where the accused is charged after a legislative amendment to the mandatory minimums in relation to offences that are completed before the amendments, then by function of s. 11(i), the old penalties must apply.<ref>
Section 11(i) of the [http://canlii.ca/t/ldsx Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms]<br>
Section 11(i) of the [http://canlii.ca/t/ldsx Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms]<br>
R v RS, [http://canlii.ca/t/ghd9x 2015 ONCA 291] (CanLII)
R v RS, [http://canlii.ca/t/ghd9x 2015 ONCA 291] (CanLII){{perONCA| J}}
</ref>
</ref>


'''Straddling Range of Dates'''<br>
'''Straddling Range of Dates'''<br>
Section 11(i) is only to apply where there has been a variation of the penalty between the commission of the offence and the sentencing.<ref>
Section 11(i) is only to apply where there has been a variation of the penalty between the commission of the offence and the sentencing.<ref>
R v VIC, [http://canlii.ca/t/1lgz1 2005 SKCA 95] (CanLII) at para 11 ("[Section 11(i)] applies only where the punishment was varied between the time of the commission of the offence and the time of sentencing.")<Br>
R v VIC, [http://canlii.ca/t/1lgz1 2005 SKCA 95] (CanLII){{perSKCA| JA}} at para 11 ("[Section 11(i)] applies only where the punishment was varied between the time of the commission of the offence and the time of sentencing.")<Br>
see also  
see also  
</ref>
</ref>


Where an offence occurs over a range of dates that includes the period during which a change in penalty comes into force, the question for the judge to determine is ''when'' the "majority of the offending occurred in relation to the coming into force of the Act".<ref>
Where an offence occurs over a range of dates that includes the period during which a change in penalty comes into force, the question for the judge to determine is ''when'' the "majority of the offending occurred in relation to the coming into force of the Act".<ref>
R v Thow, [http://canlii.ca/t/2fjf0 2010 BCCA 538] (CanLII)<br>
R v Thow, [http://canlii.ca/t/2fjf0 2010 BCCA 538] (CanLII){{perBCCA| JA}}<br>
R v DDB, [http://canlii.ca/t/glblf 2015 ABPC 200] (CanLII) at para 110<br>
R v DDB, [http://canlii.ca/t/glblf 2015 ABPC 200] (CanLII){{perABPC| J}} at para 110<br>
R v Patricio, [http://canlii.ca/t/fllw6 2011 QCCQ 5261] (CanLII) at para 26<br>
R v Patricio, [http://canlii.ca/t/fllw6 2011 QCCQ 5261] (CanLII){{perQCCQ| J}} at para 26<br>
c.f. Stewart, [http://canlii.ca/t/fx1rd 2013 SKPC 64] (CanLII)<Br>
c.f. Stewart, [http://canlii.ca/t/fx1rd 2013 SKPC 64] (CanLII){{perSKPC| J}}<Br>
see also Canada (Attorney General) v Lalonde, [http://canlii.ca/t/gvzcd 2016 ONCA 923] (CanLII) at paras 13 to 25</ref>
see also Canada (Attorney General) v Lalonde, [http://canlii.ca/t/gvzcd 2016 ONCA 923] (CanLII){{perONCA| J}} at paras 13 to 25</ref>


'''Amendments Reducing the Penalties'''<Br>
'''Amendments Reducing the Penalties'''<Br>
A penalty that was available after the commission of the offence but subsequently removed before sentencing may still be available to the accused.<ref>
A penalty that was available after the commission of the offence but subsequently removed before sentencing may still be available to the accused.<ref>
R v Mehanmal, [http://canlii.ca/t/ftltd 2012 ONCJ 681] (CanLII)<Br>
R v Mehanmal, [http://canlii.ca/t/ftltd 2012 ONCJ 681] (CanLII){{perONCJ| J}}<Br>
R v Yusuf, [http://canlii.ca/t/flcx5 2011 BCSC 626] (CanLII)<br>
R v Yusuf, [http://canlii.ca/t/flcx5 2011 BCSC 626] (CanLII){{perBCSC| J}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


A lesser penalty that was unavailable at the time of the commission of the offence but later made available at the time of sentencing will be available to the accused.<ref>
A lesser penalty that was unavailable at the time of the commission of the offence but later made available at the time of sentencing will be available to the accused.<ref>
R v Cadman, [http://canlii.ca/t/hr2gl 2018 BCCA 100] (CanLII) per Goepel JA
R v Cadman, [http://canlii.ca/t/hr2gl 2018 BCCA 100] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Goepel JA}}
</ref>
</ref>


'''Application in Appellate Proceedings'''<Br>  
'''Application in Appellate Proceedings'''<Br>  
The rights under s. 11(i) of the Charter do not apply to a review of sentence on appeal.<Ref>
The rights under s. 11(i) of the Charter do not apply to a review of sentence on appeal.<Ref>
R v Potvin, [1993] 2 SCR 880, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fs21 1993 CanLII 113] (SCC), per Sopinka J<Br>
R v Potvin, [1993] 2 SCR 880, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fs21 1993 CanLII 113] (SCC){{perSCC|Sopinka J}}<Br>
R v Luke, [http://canlii.ca/t/6jvs 1994 CanLII 823] (ON CA), per Griffiths JA<br>
R v Luke, [http://canlii.ca/t/6jvs 1994 CanLII 823] (ON CA){{perONCA|Griffiths JA}}<br>
R v Bishop, [http://canlii.ca/t/2dbsk 1994 ABCA 361] (CanLII)<Br>
R v Bishop, [http://canlii.ca/t/2dbsk 1994 ABCA 361] (CanLII){{perABCA| JA}}<Br>
</ref>
</ref>


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=== SOIRA Orders===
=== SOIRA Orders===
SOIRA legislation is not considered a "punishment" within the meaning of s. 11(i) of the Charter except where the impact of the order amounts to "harsh treatment".<ref>R v Cross, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mt83 2006 NSCA 30] (CanLII) at para 85</ref> As such, the dominant line of cases suggests that the provisions of SOIRA are retrospective.<ref>  
SOIRA legislation is not considered a "punishment" within the meaning of s. 11(i) of the Charter except where the impact of the order amounts to "harsh treatment".<ref>R v Cross, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mt83 2006 NSCA 30] (CanLII){{perNSCA|Bateman JA}} at para 85</ref> As such, the dominant line of cases suggests that the provisions of SOIRA are retrospective.<ref>  
Cross{{ibid}}<br>  
Cross{{ibid}}<br>  
R v Redhead, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ms3j 2006 ABCA 84] (CanLII)<Br>
R v Redhead, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ms3j 2006 ABCA 84] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}}<Br>
R v Aberdeen, [2005] AJ No. 1062, [http://canlii.ca/t/1lj5b 2005 ABPC 203] (CanLII)<br>
R v Aberdeen, [2005] AJ No. 1062, [http://canlii.ca/t/1lj5b 2005 ABPC 203] (CanLII){{perABPC|LeGrandeur J}}<br>
R v ME, [http://canlii.ca/t/fqzhj 2012 ONSC 1078] (CanLII) per Hill J<Br>
R v ME, [http://canlii.ca/t/fqzhj 2012 ONSC 1078] (CanLII){{perONSC|Hill J}}<Br>
</ref>
</ref>


A retrospective SOIRA order is a valid order.<Ref>
A retrospective SOIRA order is a valid order.<Ref>
R v Owusu, [http://canlii.ca/t/1qxj4 2007 ABCA 95] (CanLII)<Br>
R v Owusu, [http://canlii.ca/t/1qxj4 2007 ABCA 95] (CanLII){{perABCA|Fruman JA}}<Br>
R v Youngpine, [http://canlii.ca/t/22z72 2009 ABCA 89] (CanLII) at para 16 to 17<Br>
R v Youngpine, [http://canlii.ca/t/22z72 2009 ABCA 89] (CanLII){{perABCA|Fraser JA}} at para 16 to 17<Br>
R v Warren, [http://canlii.ca/t/29ffn 2010 ABCA 133] (CanLII) at para 9<Br>
R v Warren, [http://canlii.ca/t/29ffn 2010 ABCA 133] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} at para 9<Br>
</ref>
</ref>
These orders do not infringe upon s. 7 of the Charter.<Ref>
These orders do not infringe upon s. 7 of the Charter.<Ref>
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The DNA provisions under s. 487.055(1) is not a "punishment" within the meaning of s. 11 and so changes to the provision can be retrospective without violating s. 11(h) or 11(i) of the Charter.
The DNA provisions under s. 487.055(1) is not a "punishment" within the meaning of s. 11 and so changes to the provision can be retrospective without violating s. 11(h) or 11(i) of the Charter.
<ref>
<ref>
R v Rodgers, [http://canlii.ca/t/1n3br 2006 SCC 15] (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 554<Br>
R v Rodgers, [http://canlii.ca/t/1n3br 2006 SCC 15] (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 554{{perSCC|Charron J}} (4:3)<Br>
R v Redhead, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ms3j 2006 ABCA 84] (CanLII)
R v Redhead, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ms3j 2006 ABCA 84] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}}
</ref>
</ref>


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This rule found in s. 11(h) of the Charter is a adoption of the "''ex post facto'' doctrine" of law.<Ref>
This rule found in s. 11(h) of the Charter is a adoption of the "''ex post facto'' doctrine" of law.<Ref>
R v Letiec, [http://canlii.ca/t/gh6nv 2015 ABCA 123] (CanLII)<br>
R v Letiec, [http://canlii.ca/t/gh6nv 2015 ABCA 123] (CanLII){{perABCA|Wakeling JA}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


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Ex post facto laws are considered an "affront to the basic principles which underlie the rule of law...completely counters the notice function of criminal law and is detrimental to basic community values."<ref>
Ex post facto laws are considered an "affront to the basic principles which underlie the rule of law...completely counters the notice function of criminal law and is detrimental to basic community values."<ref>
R v Carriere, [http://canlii.ca/t/g1pgs  2013 ABQB 645] (CanLII)
R v Carriere, [http://canlii.ca/t/g1pgs  2013 ABQB 645] (CanLII){{perABQB|Wakeling J}}
</ref>
</ref>



Revision as of 16:27, 28 December 2018

General Principles

Section 11(i) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom protects against the use of retrospective application of criminal punishments. It states:

11. Any person charged with an offence has the right
...

(i) if found guilty of the offence and if the punishment for the offence has been varied between the time of commission and the time of sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser punishment.


CCRF

All rights under s. 11 of the Charter are considered "crucial fundamental rights".[1] The Charter does not protect against "insignificant or 'trivial' limitations or rights". The state action must "warrant constitutional protections".[2]

Purpose
The purpose of s. 11(i) of the Charter was to enshrine the provisions of the federal and provincial Interpretation Acts that relate to accused benefiting from lesser punishments should legislation change.[3] It prevents the retroactivity of any increase in sanctions.[4] Section 11(g) protecting the right "not to be found guilty on account of any act or omission unless, at the time of the act or omission, it constituted an offence" and s. 11(i) both establish the broader principle that "criminal laws should generally not operate retrospectively".[5]

The two foundational values that the right protects is "fairness of criminal proceedings" and "safeguarding the rule of law".[6] These rights has its origins in the principle that "a citizen, before committing himself to any course of action, should be able to know in advance what are the legal consequences that will flow from it".[7]

Rule Against Retrospective Punishment
The section applies only where there has been a change between the "commission of the offence" and the sentencing.[8] This is sometimes referred to as the "crystallization principle"[9] or the principle of lex mitior.[10]

An accused convicted of an offence that is subsequently repealed after conviction but before sentencing, the accused can only be sentenced for the offence as it existed before the repeal.[11]

Presumptions
There is a presumptions against the retrospective application all changes in legislation unless there is "clear legislative direction".[12]

Application in Non-Criminal Matters
Section 11(i) was not intended to apply outside of criminal matters and certainly should not apply to subsequent civil matters.[13]

Common Law Retrospective Punishment
The right under s. 11(i) only applies to statutory punishment. It has not bearing on the interpretation and application of case law that post-dates the offence itself.[14]

Amendments Favourable to Accused
It is generally said that changes to punishments that are favourable to the accused should be available to an accused.[15]

  1. R v Wigglesworth, 1987 CanLII 41 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541,, per Wilson J at p. 558
  2. R v KRJ, 2016 SCC 31 (CanLII), per J, at para 42
    Cunningham v Canada, 1993 CanLII 139 (SCC), [1993] 2 SCR 143, per J at p. 151B
  3. Re McCutcheon and City of Toronto et al., 1983 CanLII 1629 (ON SC), per J
  4. McCutcheon, ibid.
  5. R v KRJ, 2016 SCC 31 (CanLII), per Karakatsanis J at para 22
  6. KRJ, supra at para 20 to 27
  7. KRJ, supra at para 23
  8. Liang v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 BCCA 190 (CanLII), per JA
    Canada (Attorney General) v. Whaling, [2014] 1 SCR 392, 2014 SCC 20 (CanLII), per J, at para 55 ("Section 11(i), although less explicitly concerned with retroactivity, protects against increases in punishment between the time of commission of the crime and the time of sentencing.")
    Whaling v. Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FC 121 (CanLII) at para 2
    KRJ, supra at para 3 ("s. 11(i) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that, if the punishment for an offence is varied after a person commits the offence, but before sentencing, the person is entitled to “the benefit of the lesser punishment”.")
  9. R v Canto, 2015 ABCA 306 (CanLII), per Slatter JA
    R v Letiec, 2015 ABCA 123 (CanLII), per Wakeling A
  10. R v Storheim, 2014 MBQB 141 (CanLII), per J at para 2
  11. R v Vernacchia, 1988 CanLII 244 (QC CA), per JA - the offender was convicted of rape and so could not be sentenced to the new offence of "sexual assault"
  12. R v Dineley, 2012 SCC 58 (CanLII), [2012] 3 S.C.R. 272, per J, at para. 10
  13. Bulmer v Alberta (Solicitor General), 1987 CanLII 3318 (AB QB), per McFadyen J
  14. R v WJ, 2016 BCSC 161 (CanLII), per J
  15. R v Dorfer, 2009 BCSC 202 (CanLII), per Ehrcke J, at para 51, appeal upheld at 2013 BCCA 223 (CanLII), per JA

Punishments

A "punishment" within the meaning of s. 11 of the Charter refers to sanctions imposed by the court in an attempt to meet the purposes and principles of sentencing. It does not include every potential consequence from a conviction that may provide deterrent value.[1] It can include any "severe handling" or "harsh or injurious treatment".[2]

The consequences of an order will amount to punishment where: [3]

  1. the measure must be a consequence of a conviction that “forms part of the arsenal of sanctions to which an accused may be liable in respect of a particular offence”; and either
    1. the consequence must be “imposed in furtherance of the purpose and principles of sentencing” or
    2. it has a significant impact on an offender’s liberty or security interests.

A "liberal and purposive approach" must be taken to defining punishment.[4] This requires that the purpose of s. 11(i) should be focused on "the rule of law and fairness in criminal proceedings".[5] However, it does not "encompass every potential consequence of being convicted of a criminal offence".[6]

Certain types of ex post facto treatment of the offender is not viewed as punishment under s. 11(i). That includes deportation following conviction[7] and license suspension under provincial law which is considered a "civil disability"[8].

There is some opinion that a criminal record under the Criminal Records Act itself constitutes a form of punishment.[9]

Established Categories of Orders
Ancillary orders including forfeiture, prohibition, restitution and probation, all "have the potential" to be "additional punishment".[10]

A suspension of driving privileges subsequent to a criminal conviction is a civil or administrative consequence and does not amount to a punishment within the meaning of s. 11(i) of the Charter.[11]

A conditional sentence is a form of "lesser punishment".[12]

  1. R v Rodgers, 2006 SCC 15 (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 554, per Charron J
  2. R v Lambert, 1994 CanLII 4531 (NL CA), per JA
  3. R v KRJ, 2016 SCC 31 (CanLII), per J at para 41, modifying the test in Rodgers, supra at para 63
  4. KRJ, supra at para 29
  5. KRJ, supra at para 37
  6. Rodgers, supra at para 63
  7. see Re Gittens and the Queen [1983] 1 FC 152, 68 CCC 2d 438 (FCTD), 1982 CanLII 2948 (FC)
    Hurd v Canada (MEI) [1989] 2 FC 594 (FCA)(*no CanLII links)
  8. see Johnston v Superintendent of Motor Vehicles [1987] BCJ No44 (BCSC), 1987 CanLII 2859 (BC SC), per J
  9. Chu v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 BCSC 630 (CanLII), per J
  10. Lambert, ibid.
    R v Wiles, 2005 SCC 84 (CanLII), per Charron J, at para 3 ("Although the purpose of the prohibition order is primarily preventative, in taking away the privilege to possess weapons, it may have some punitive effect on the offender...")
    R v Wauer, 2014 ABCA 270 (CanLII), per JA at para 13
  11. Ross v Registrar of Motor Vehicles et al., [1975] 1 SCR 5, 1973 CanLII 176 (SCC), per J
  12. R v Yusuf, 2011 BCSC 626 (CanLII), per J at para 29
    R v SB, 2008 BCSC 1526 (CanLII), per J at para 53, aff’d 2010 BCCA 40 (CanLII), per JA
    R v RAR, 2000 SCC 8 (CanLII), per L'Heureux-Dube J

Penalties

See also: Maximum and Minimum Sentences

Where the accused is charged after a legislative amendment to the mandatory minimums in relation to offences that are completed before the amendments, then by function of s. 11(i), the old penalties must apply.[1]

Straddling Range of Dates
Section 11(i) is only to apply where there has been a variation of the penalty between the commission of the offence and the sentencing.[2]

Where an offence occurs over a range of dates that includes the period during which a change in penalty comes into force, the question for the judge to determine is when the "majority of the offending occurred in relation to the coming into force of the Act".[3]

Amendments Reducing the Penalties
A penalty that was available after the commission of the offence but subsequently removed before sentencing may still be available to the accused.[4]

A lesser penalty that was unavailable at the time of the commission of the offence but later made available at the time of sentencing will be available to the accused.[5]

Application in Appellate Proceedings
The rights under s. 11(i) of the Charter do not apply to a review of sentence on appeal.[6]

  1. Section 11(i) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
    R v RS, 2015 ONCA 291 (CanLII), per J
  2. R v VIC, 2005 SKCA 95 (CanLII), per JA at para 11 ("[Section 11(i)] applies only where the punishment was varied between the time of the commission of the offence and the time of sentencing.")
    see also
  3. R v Thow, 2010 BCCA 538 (CanLII), per JA
    R v DDB, 2015 ABPC 200 (CanLII), per J at para 110
    R v Patricio, 2011 QCCQ 5261 (CanLII), per J at para 26
    c.f. Stewart, 2013 SKPC 64 (CanLII), per J
    see also Canada (Attorney General) v Lalonde, 2016 ONCA 923 (CanLII), per J at paras 13 to 25
  4. R v Mehanmal, 2012 ONCJ 681 (CanLII), per J
    R v Yusuf, 2011 BCSC 626 (CanLII), per J
  5. R v Cadman, 2018 BCCA 100 (CanLII), per Goepel JA
  6. R v Potvin, [1993] 2 SCR 880, 1993 CanLII 113 (SCC), per Sopinka J
    R v Luke, 1994 CanLII 823 (ON CA), per Griffiths JA
    R v Bishop, 1994 ABCA 361 (CanLII), per JA

SOIRA Orders

SOIRA legislation is not considered a "punishment" within the meaning of s. 11(i) of the Charter except where the impact of the order amounts to "harsh treatment".[1] As such, the dominant line of cases suggests that the provisions of SOIRA are retrospective.[2]

A retrospective SOIRA order is a valid order.[3] These orders do not infringe upon s. 7 of the Charter.[4]

  1. R v Cross, 2006 NSCA 30 (CanLII), per Bateman JA at para 85
  2. Cross, ibid.
    R v Redhead, 2006 ABCA 84 (CanLII), per curiam
    R v Aberdeen, [2005] AJ No. 1062, 2005 ABPC 203 (CanLII), per LeGrandeur J
    R v ME, 2012 ONSC 1078 (CanLII), per Hill J
  3. R v Owusu, 2007 ABCA 95 (CanLII), per Fruman JA
    R v Youngpine, 2009 ABCA 89 (CanLII), per Fraser JA at para 16 to 17
    R v Warren, 2010 ABCA 133 (CanLII), per curiam at para 9
  4. Warren, ibid. at para 23

DNA Orders

The DNA provisions under s. 487.055(1) is not a "punishment" within the meaning of s. 11 and so changes to the provision can be retrospective without violating s. 11(h) or 11(i) of the Charter. [1]

  1. R v Rodgers, 2006 SCC 15 (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 554, per Charron J (4:3)
    R v Redhead, 2006 ABCA 84 (CanLII), per curiam

Retrospective Offences

Section 11(h) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom protects against the use of retrospective application of criminal offences. It states:

11. Any person charged with an offence has the right
...

(g) not to be found guilty on account of any act or omission unless, at the time of the act or omission, it constituted an offence under Canadian or international law or was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations;


CCRF

This rule found in s. 11(h) of the Charter is a adoption of the "ex post facto doctrine" of law.[1]

This doctrine is also found in article 11(2) of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states: “No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed”.

Ex post facto laws are considered an "affront to the basic principles which underlie the rule of law...completely counters the notice function of criminal law and is detrimental to basic community values."[2]

  1. R v Letiec, 2015 ABCA 123 (CanLII), per Wakeling JA
  2. R v Carriere, 2013 ABQB 645 (CanLII), per Wakeling J

See Also