Circumstantial Evidence: Difference between revisions
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{{seealso|Inferences}} | {{seealso|Inferences}} | ||
Circumstantial evidence refers to any evidence from which one or more inferences are to be drawn to establish material facts.<ref> | Circumstantial evidence refers to any evidence from which one or more inferences are to be drawn to establish material facts.<ref> | ||
see Atlee, [http://canlii.ca/t/28jdk 2010 ONCJ 72] (CanLII), at para 14<br> | see R v Atlee, [http://canlii.ca/t/28jdk 2010 ONCJ 72] (CanLII){{perONCJ|Thibideau J}}, at para 14<br> | ||
see also Watt's Manual of Criminal Evidence ss. 9.01<br> | see also Watt's Manual of Criminal Evidence ss. 9.01<br> | ||
R v Campbell, [http://canlii.ca/t/1f823 2001 CanLII 7064] (ON CA), at paras 10 and 11<br> | R v Campbell, [http://canlii.ca/t/1f823 2001 CanLII 7064] (ON CA){{perONCA|Weiler JA}}, at paras 10 and 11<br> | ||
R v Cinous, [http://canlii.ca/t/51tb 2002 SCC 29] (CanLII), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 3 | R v Cinous, [http://canlii.ca/t/51tb 2002 SCC 29] (CanLII), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 3{{perSCC|McLachlin CJ and Bastarache J}} at para 89 (Circumstantial evidence is "evidence that tends to prove a factual matter by proving other events or circumstances from which the occurrence of the matter at issue can be reasonably inferred")<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
While there is no burden to prove every piece of evidence on a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to convict on a circumstantial case, a judge must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the only rational inference that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence is one of guilt.<ref> | While there is no burden to prove every piece of evidence on a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to convict on a circumstantial case, a judge must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the only rational inference that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence is one of guilt.<ref> | ||
R v Griffin, [http://canlii.ca/t/23zqj 2009 SCC 28] (CanLII) at para 33<br> | R v Griffin, [http://canlii.ca/t/23zqj 2009 SCC 28] (CanLII){{perSCC|Charron J}} at para 33<br> | ||
R v Ngo, [http://canlii.ca/t/244x8 2009 BCCA 301] (CanLII) at para 53<br> | R v Ngo, [http://canlii.ca/t/244x8 2009 BCCA 301] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Rowles JA}} at para 53<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Circumstantial evidence may be used to support the inference of innocence as well as guilt so long as the probative value outweighs prejudicial effect and it is not given undue weight.<Ref> | Circumstantial evidence may be used to support the inference of innocence as well as guilt so long as the probative value outweighs prejudicial effect and it is not given undue weight.<Ref> | ||
R v SCB, [http://canlii.ca/t/6hkq 1997 CanLII 6319] (ON CA), (1997), 104 O.A.C. 81 (CA) at para 33 to 36</ref> | R v SCB, [http://canlii.ca/t/6hkq 1997 CanLII 6319] (ON CA), (1997), 104 O.A.C. 81 (CA){{perONCA|Doherty and Rosenberg JJA}} at para 33 to 36</ref> | ||
Examples of circumstantial evidence: | Examples of circumstantial evidence: | ||
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* [[Post-Offence Conduct|post-offence conduct]] (flight, false alibi, destruction of evidence) | * [[Post-Offence Conduct|post-offence conduct]] (flight, false alibi, destruction of evidence) | ||
* knowledge and state of mind | * knowledge and state of mind | ||
* habit<ref>R v Pilon, [http://canlii.ca/t/22v5v 2009 ONCA 248] (CanLII), (2009) 243 CCC (3d) 109 (ONCA)</ref> | * habit<ref>R v Pilon, [http://canlii.ca/t/22v5v 2009 ONCA 248] (CanLII), (2009) 243 CCC (3d) 109 (ONCA){{perONCA|Doherty JA}}</ref> | ||
* disposition for violence by victim | * disposition for violence by victim | ||
'''Inference vs Speculation'''<br> | '''Inference vs Speculation'''<br> | ||
Circumstantial evidence is based on reasoning and inference-drawing through probability.<ref> | Circumstantial evidence is based on reasoning and inference-drawing through probability.<ref> | ||
R v Arp [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqq7 1998 CanLII 769], [1998] 3 SCR 339 at p. 375</ref> | R v Arp [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqq7 1998 CanLII 769], [1998] 3 SCR 339{{perSCC|Cory J}} at p. 375</ref> | ||
The judge must apply logic, common sense and experience to the evidence. They must consider the inherent probabilities and improbabilities, frequently eliminating the possibility of coincidence.<Ref> | The judge must apply logic, common sense and experience to the evidence. They must consider the inherent probabilities and improbabilities, frequently eliminating the possibility of coincidence.<Ref> | ||
FH v McDougall, [http://canlii.ca/t/20xm8 2008 SCC 53] (CanLII), [2008] 3 SCR 41, at paras 33-40, 47-8<br> | FH v McDougall, [http://canlii.ca/t/20xm8 2008 SCC 53] (CanLII), [2008] 3 SCR 41{{perSCC|Rothstein J}}, at paras 33-40, 47-8<br> | ||
R v Yousif, [http://canlii.ca/t/2fcg8 2011 ABCA 12] (CanLII), at para 5<br> | R v Yousif, [http://canlii.ca/t/2fcg8 2011 ABCA 12] (CanLII){{perABCA|Slatter JA}}, at para 5<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
The judge in his or her analysis must "separate inferences from speculation".<ref> | The judge in his or her analysis must "separate inferences from speculation".<ref> | ||
R v Allen, [http://canlii.ca/t/gkbkr 2015 BCCA 299] (CanLII), at para 27 | R v Allen, [http://canlii.ca/t/gkbkr 2015 BCCA 299] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Donald JA}}, at para 27 | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
'''Strength of Inferences to Establish a Fact'''<br> | '''Strength of Inferences to Establish a Fact'''<br> | ||
The rule of circumstantial evidence does not apply to each piece of evidence but rather only the totality of the evidence.<ref> | The rule of circumstantial evidence does not apply to each piece of evidence but rather only the totality of the evidence.<ref> | ||
R v John, [1970] 5 CCC 63, aff'd at [http://canlii.ca/t/1xd4l 1970 CanLII 199] (SCC), [1971] SCR 781<br> | R v John, [1970] 5 CCC 63, aff'd at [http://canlii.ca/t/1xd4l 1970 CanLII 199] (SCC), [1971] SCR 781{{perSCC|Ritchie J}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
A conclusion cannot be found without evidence, which is to say that it cannot be speculation.<ref> | A conclusion cannot be found without evidence, which is to say that it cannot be speculation.<ref> | ||
R v Torrie, [http://canlii.ca/t/g16lb 1967 CanLII 285] (ON CA), [1967] 3 CCC 303 (ONCA)</ref> | R v Torrie, [http://canlii.ca/t/g16lb 1967 CanLII 285] (ON CA), [1967] 3 CCC 303 (ONCA){{perONCA|Evans JA}}</ref> | ||
The strength of the inference made from circumstantial evidence depends on the relationship between the circumstantial evidence and the rest of the evidence.<ref> | The strength of the inference made from circumstantial evidence depends on the relationship between the circumstantial evidence and the rest of the evidence.<ref> | ||
See R v White, [http://canlii.ca/t/6hx2 1996 CanLII 3013] (ON CA), (1996), 108 CCC (3d) 1 (Ont.C.A.)<br> | See R v White, [http://canlii.ca/t/6hx2 1996 CanLII 3013] (ON CA), (1996), 108 CCC (3d) 1 (Ont.C.A.){{TheCourtONCA}}<br> | ||
R v Uhrig, [http://canlii.ca/t/frwqc 2012 ONCA 470] (CanLII) | R v Uhrig, [http://canlii.ca/t/frwqc 2012 ONCA 470] (CanLII){{TheCourtONCA}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Proof by circumstantial evidence requires consideration of the evidence as a whole and not in part.<ref> | Proof by circumstantial evidence requires consideration of the evidence as a whole and not in part.<ref> | ||
R v Stewart, [http://canlii.ca/t/1z6bm 1976 CanLII 202] (SCC), [1977] 2 SCR 748<br> | R v Stewart, [http://canlii.ca/t/1z6bm 1976 CanLII 202] (SCC), [1977] 2 SCR 748{{perSCC|Pigeon J}}<br> | ||
R v Turlon, (1989) 49 CCC (3d) 186 (Ont. C.A.), [http://canlii.ca/t/gbj2b 1989 CanLII 7206] (ON CA)<br> | R v Turlon, (1989) 49 CCC (3d) 186 (Ont. C.A.), [http://canlii.ca/t/gbj2b 1989 CanLII 7206] (ON CA){{perONCA|Zuber JA}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
The strength of the inference to be drawn from a single piece of circumstantial evidence depends on its context amongst all the other evidence.<ref> | The strength of the inference to be drawn from a single piece of circumstantial evidence depends on its context amongst all the other evidence.<ref> | ||
R v Leitch, [2010] O.J. No. 6240 (C.J.), aff’d [http://canlii.ca/t/fpw8m 2012 ONCA 85] (CanLII)<br> | R v Leitch, [2010] O.J. No. 6240 (C.J.), aff’d [http://canlii.ca/t/fpw8m 2012 ONCA 85] (CanLII){{TheCourtONCA}}<br> | ||
R v Sykes, [http://canlii.ca/t/g744j 2014 NSCA 57] (CanLII), at para 43<br> | R v Sykes, [http://canlii.ca/t/g744j 2014 NSCA 57] (CanLII){{perNSCA|Farrar JA}}, at para 43<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
The whole of all the evidence may be more compelling than the sum of its parts.<Ref> | The whole of all the evidence may be more compelling than the sum of its parts.<Ref> | ||
R v Nolet, [http://canlii.ca/t/2b8jp 2010 SCC 24] (CanLII), at para 48<br> | R v Nolet, [http://canlii.ca/t/2b8jp 2010 SCC 24] (CanLII){{perSCC|Binnie J}}, at para 48<br> | ||
R v Luc, [2007] O.J. No. 4210 (C.J.){{NOCANLII}} at para 36-37 <br> | R v Luc, [2007] O.J. No. 4210 (C.J.){{NOCANLII}} at para 36-37 <br> | ||
Sykes{{supra}} at para 43<br> | Sykes{{supra}} at para 43<br> | ||
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'''Juries'''<br> | '''Juries'''<br> | ||
A judge does not need to give special instructions for circumstantial evidence.<ref> Griffin{{supra}} at para 33 ("We have long departed from any legal requirement for a “special instruction” on circumstantial evidence, even where the issue is one of identification...")<br> | A judge does not need to give special instructions for circumstantial evidence.<ref> Griffin{{supra}} at para 33 ("We have long departed from any legal requirement for a “special instruction” on circumstantial evidence, even where the issue is one of identification...")<br> | ||
R v Robert, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fb32 2000 CanLII 5129] (ON CA) at para 15<br> | R v Robert, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fb32 2000 CanLII 5129] (ON CA){{perONCA|Sharpe JA}} at para 15<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
There is also no need to explain circustantial evidence in any sort of formulaic manner. It is sufficient just to use the language of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.<ref> | There is also no need to explain circustantial evidence in any sort of formulaic manner. It is sufficient just to use the language of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.<ref> | ||
R v Tombran, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fb3r 2000 CanLII 2688] (ON CA), (2000), 142 CCC (3d) 380 at 392<br> | R v Tombran, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fb3r 2000 CanLII 2688] (ON CA), (2000), 142 CCC (3d) 380{{perONCA|Sharpe JA}} at 392<br> | ||
R v Fleet, [http://canlii.ca/t/6hm2 1997 CanLII 867] (ON CA), (1997), 36 O.R. (3d) 542, 120 CCC (3d) 457 (C.A.)<br> | R v Fleet, [http://canlii.ca/t/6hm2 1997 CanLII 867] (ON CA), (1997), 36 O.R. (3d) 542, 120 CCC (3d) 457 (C.A.){{TheCourtONCA}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
'''Types of Evidence'''<br> | '''Types of Evidence'''<br> | ||
Evidence of prior violence by the victim, including threats, can be relevant circumstantial evidence to establish the reasonableness of an apprehension of harm and could not otherwise protect themselves from harm.<ref> | Evidence of prior violence by the victim, including threats, can be relevant circumstantial evidence to establish the reasonableness of an apprehension of harm and could not otherwise protect themselves from harm.<ref> | ||
R v Petel, [http://canlii.ca/t/1frw4 1994 CanLII 133] (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 3 </ref> | R v Petel, [http://canlii.ca/t/1frw4 1994 CanLII 133] (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 3{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}} </ref> | ||
Drug paraphernalia found with drugs can be relevant to support the inference of knowledge of the nature of the drugs, participation in drug dealing, and specific plans of dealing.<ref> | Drug paraphernalia found with drugs can be relevant to support the inference of knowledge of the nature of the drugs, participation in drug dealing, and specific plans of dealing.<ref> | ||
R v Froese (1988) 44 CCC (3d) 1 (MBCA) {{ | R v Froese (1988) 44 CCC (3d) 1 (MBCA), [http://canlii.ca/t/gcfz4 1988 CanLII 7088] (MB CA){{perMBCA|Huband JA}}</ref> | ||
Fingerprint evidence can infer that the person who the fingerprint matches touched or held the object it was found on. It is other evidence that will determine the time and place that the object was touched or held.<ref> | Fingerprint evidence can infer that the person who the fingerprint matches touched or held the object it was found on. It is other evidence that will determine the time and place that the object was touched or held.<ref> | ||
R v Mars, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mjp2 2006 CanLII 3460] (ON CA), (2006), 205 CCC (3d) 376 | R v Mars, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mjp2 2006 CanLII 3460] (ON CA), (2006), 205 CCC (3d) 376{{perONCA|Doherty JA}}, at paras 19 to 24<br> | ||
R v Pakula, [http://canlii.ca/t/gxlb1 2017 ABPC 33] (CanLII)<br> | R v Pakula, [http://canlii.ca/t/gxlb1 2017 ABPC 33] (CanLII){{perABPC|Semenuk J}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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The standard of review of any instructions on the drawing of inferences of knowledge in a circumstantial case is "whether the trier of fact, acting judicially, could reasonably be satisfied that the accused’s guilt was the only reasonable conclusion available on the totality of the evidence". | The standard of review of any instructions on the drawing of inferences of knowledge in a circumstantial case is "whether the trier of fact, acting judicially, could reasonably be satisfied that the accused’s guilt was the only reasonable conclusion available on the totality of the evidence". | ||
<ref> | <ref> | ||
R v Villaroman, [http://canlii.ca/t/gsq3b 2016 SCC 33] (CanLII) | R v Villaroman, [http://canlii.ca/t/gsq3b 2016 SCC 33] (CanLII){{perSCC|Cromwell J}}, at para 55 <br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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In order for a judge to convict on only circumstantial evidence, the "circumstances must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence"<ref> | In order for a judge to convict on only circumstantial evidence, the "circumstances must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence"<ref> | ||
R v Yebes, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftlc 1987 CanLII 17] (SCC), [1987] 2 SCR 168<br> | R v Yebes, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftlc 1987 CanLII 17] (SCC), [1987] 2 SCR 168{{perSCC|McIntyre J}}<br> | ||
R v Griffin; R. v. Harris, [http://canlii.ca/t/23zqj 2009 SCC 28] (CanLII), [2009] S.C.J. No. 28 | R v Griffin; R. v. Harris, [http://canlii.ca/t/23zqj 2009 SCC 28] (CanLII), [2009] S.C.J. No. 28{{perSCC|Charron J}}, at para. 33 (The "essential component of an instruction on circumstantial evidence is to instill in the jury that in order to convict, they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the only rational inference that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence is that the accused is guilty.") | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
The modern rule of circumstantial evidence requires that before a conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be entered the trier-of-fact must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilt of the accused is the only reasonable inference from the proven facts.<ref> | The modern rule of circumstantial evidence requires that before a conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be entered the trier-of-fact must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilt of the accused is the only reasonable inference from the proven facts.<ref> | ||
R v Cooper, [1978] 1 SCR 860, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mkb1 1977 CanLII 11] (SCC) | R v Cooper, [1978] 1 SCR 860, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mkb1 1977 CanLII 11] (SCC){{perSCC|Ritchie J}}<br> | ||
Mezzo v The Queen, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftrq 1986 CanLII 16], [1986] 1 SCR 802 at para 12</ref> | Mezzo v The Queen, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftrq 1986 CanLII 16], [1986] 1 SCR 802{{perSCC|McIntyre J}} at para 12</ref> | ||
The reverse of the principle is also true, where "there is exculpatory evidence. One piece of exculpatory evidence might not be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt but the cumulative effect of a number of pieces of exculpatory evidence may well do so."<ref> | The reverse of the principle is also true, where "there is exculpatory evidence. One piece of exculpatory evidence might not be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt but the cumulative effect of a number of pieces of exculpatory evidence may well do so."<ref> | ||
R v Moose, [http://canlii.ca/t/ggcbj 2015 ABCA 71] (CanLII), at para 12<br> | R v Moose, [http://canlii.ca/t/ggcbj 2015 ABCA 71] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}}, at para 12<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Inferences consistent with innocence do not need to arise from proven facts.<Ref> | Inferences consistent with innocence do not need to arise from proven facts.<Ref> | ||
R. v. Khela, [http://canlii.ca/t/2260t 2009 SCC 4] (CanLII), [2009] 1 S.C.R. 104, at para. 58<br> | R. v. Khela, [http://canlii.ca/t/2260t 2009 SCC 4] (CanLII), [2009] 1 S.C.R. 104{{perSCC|Fish J}}, at para. 58<br> | ||
see also R. v. Defaveri, [http://canlii.ca/t/gdsl5 2014 BCCA 370] (CanLII), 361 B.C.A.C. 301, at para. 10<bR> | see also R. v. Defaveri, [http://canlii.ca/t/gdsl5 2014 BCCA 370] (CanLII), 361 B.C.A.C. 301{{perBCCA|Lowry JA}}, at para. 10<bR> | ||
R. v. Bui, [http://canlii.ca/t/g8sgp 2014 ONCA 614] (CanLII), 14 C.R. (7th) 149, at para. 28<br> | R. v. Bui, [http://canlii.ca/t/g8sgp 2014 ONCA 614] (CanLII), 14 C.R. (7th) 149{{perONCA|Simmons JA}}, at para. 28<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
To require proven facts wrongly places the burden upon the accused to prove what happened rather than simply raise a doubt.<Ref> | To require proven facts wrongly places the burden upon the accused to prove what happened rather than simply raise a doubt.<Ref> | ||
R. v. Villaroman, [2016] 1 SCR 1000, [http://canlii.ca/t/gsq3b 2016 SCC 33] (CanLII), at para 35<br> | R. v. Villaroman, [2016] 1 SCR 1000, [http://canlii.ca/t/gsq3b 2016 SCC 33] (CanLII){{perSCC|Cromwell J}}, at para 35<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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The Court must look at the cumulative effect of the evidence and not in piecemeal.<ref> | The Court must look at the cumulative effect of the evidence and not in piecemeal.<ref> | ||
Trevor{{supra}}<br> | Trevor{{supra}}<br> | ||
R v Smith, [http://canlii.ca/t/gmw9r 2016 ONCA 25] (CanLII) | R v Smith, [http://canlii.ca/t/gmw9r 2016 ONCA 25] (CanLII){{perONCA|Watt JA}} at paras 81 to 82<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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'''Inference of Guilt is The Only Reasonable One'''<br> | '''Inference of Guilt is The Only Reasonable One'''<br> | ||
The judge must make inquiry into whether an inference of guilt is the only reasonable inference available on the facts, which requires consideration whether there are alternative inferences capable of raising a reasonable doubt.<ref> | The judge must make inquiry into whether an inference of guilt is the only reasonable inference available on the facts, which requires consideration whether there are alternative inferences capable of raising a reasonable doubt.<ref> | ||
R v Garciacruz, [http://canlii.ca/t/gg0n5 2015 ONCA 27] (CanLII)<br> | R v Garciacruz, [http://canlii.ca/t/gg0n5 2015 ONCA 27] (CanLII){{perONCA|Rouleau JA}}<br> | ||
R v Griffin, [2009] 2 SCR 42, [http://canlii.ca/t/23zqj 2009 SCC 28] (CanLII), at para 33 ("The essential component of an instruction on circumstantial evidence is to instill in the jury that in order to convict, they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the only rational inference that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence is that the accused is guilty. Imparting the necessary message to the jury may be achieved in different ways")<br> | R v Griffin, [2009] 2 SCR 42, [http://canlii.ca/t/23zqj 2009 SCC 28] (CanLII){{perSCC|Charron J}}, at para 33 ("The essential component of an instruction on circumstantial evidence is to instill in the jury that in order to convict, they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the only rational inference that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence is that the accused is guilty. Imparting the necessary message to the jury may be achieved in different ways")<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
'''Inference'''<br> | '''Inference'''<br> | ||
An inference is a deduction made from the evidence.<Ref> | An inference is a deduction made from the evidence.<Ref> | ||
R v Shields, [http://canlii.ca/t/g71x4 2014 NSPC 21] (CanLII) at para 105<br> | R v Shields, [http://canlii.ca/t/g71x4 2014 NSPC 21] (CanLII){{perNSPC|Derrick J}} at para 105<br> | ||
R v Latif, [2004] OJ No. 5891 (SCJ){{NOCANLII}} at para 4 <br> | R v Latif, [2004] OJ No. 5891 (SCJ){{NOCANLII}} at para 4 <br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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'''Example: Presence in Vehicle'''<br> | '''Example: Presence in Vehicle'''<br> | ||
Evidence putting the accused in a vehicle in which it is established that someone from the vehicle committed an offence is not enough to establish guilt where there is evidence suggesting other persons in the vehicle could be responsible.<ref> | Evidence putting the accused in a vehicle in which it is established that someone from the vehicle committed an offence is not enough to establish guilt where there is evidence suggesting other persons in the vehicle could be responsible.<ref> | ||
R v Bouzied, [http://canlii.ca/t/fx7fw 2013 ONCA 276] (CanLII) | R v Bouzied, [http://canlii.ca/t/fx7fw 2013 ONCA 276] (CanLII){{TheCourtONCA}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
'''Example: Fingerprints'''<br> | '''Example: Fingerprints'''<br> | ||
The mere finding of fingerprints on a household item moved during a break and enter can be sufficient to establish guilt.<Ref> | The mere finding of fingerprints on a household item moved during a break and enter can be sufficient to establish guilt.<Ref> | ||
e.g. R v Miller, [http://canlii.ca/t/gs4zn 2016 BCCA 263] (CanLII) | e.g. R v Miller, [http://canlii.ca/t/gs4zn 2016 BCCA 263] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Lowry JA}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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It must be kept in mind however that as a rule the "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence".<ref> | It must be kept in mind however that as a rule the "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence".<ref> | ||
R v Piec, [http://canlii.ca/t/1tf3k 2007 MBCA 138] (CanLII) | R v Piec, [http://canlii.ca/t/1tf3k 2007 MBCA 138] (CanLII){{perMBCA|Steel JA}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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The original common law requirement of proof for a finding of guilt in circumstantial case is based on the rule in hodge’s case.<ref> | The original common law requirement of proof for a finding of guilt in circumstantial case is based on the rule in hodge’s case.<ref> | ||
considered in R v Linn [http://canlii.ca/t/1nqp9 1994 CanLII 4643] (SK CA), (1994), 116 Sask.R. 203, [1994] 4 W.W.R. 305 at paras 13-15 | considered in R v Linn [http://canlii.ca/t/1nqp9 1994 CanLII 4643] (SK CA), (1994), 116 Sask.R. 203, [1994] 4 W.W.R. 305{{perSKCA|Vancise JA}} at paras 13-15<bR>R v Munro, [http://canlii.ca/t/5hl3 2001 SKQB 138] (CanLII){{perSKQB|Baynton J}} at paras 13-14<br> | ||
R v Trevor, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mnwm 2006 BCCA 91] (CanLII) at para 12<br> | R v Trevor, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mnwm 2006 BCCA 91] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Low JA}} at para 12<br> | ||
c.f. R v Cooper, [1978] 1 SCR 860, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mkb1 1977 CanLII 11] (SCC) | c.f. R v Cooper, [1978] 1 SCR 860, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mkb1 1977 CanLII 11] (SCC){{perSCC|Ritchie J}}, at p. 881<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Hodge's rule does not apply to determine the ''mens rea'' (including the accused's intention) for an offence.<ref> | Hodge's rule does not apply to determine the ''mens rea'' (including the accused's intention) for an offence.<ref> | ||
R v Mitchell, [http://canlii.ca/t/21v98 1964 CanLII 42] (SCC), [1964] SCR 471<br> | R v Mitchell, [http://canlii.ca/t/21v98 1964 CanLII 42] (SCC), [1964] SCR 471{{perSCC|Spence J}}<br> | ||
Cooper{{supra}} at p. 881 ("It is enough if it is made plain to the members of the jury that before basing a verdict of guilty on circumstantial evidence they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilt of the accused is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the proven facts.')<br> | Cooper{{supra}} at p. 881 ("It is enough if it is made plain to the members of the jury that before basing a verdict of guilty on circumstantial evidence they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilt of the accused is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the proven facts.')<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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The Hodge's rule is not the "inexorable rule of law in Canada". It is only one manner of phrasing the essential test of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.<ref> | The Hodge's rule is not the "inexorable rule of law in Canada". It is only one manner of phrasing the essential test of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.<ref> | ||
R v Robert, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fb32 2000 CanLII 5129] (ON CA), at para 15<br> | R v Robert, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fb32 2000 CanLII 5129] (ON CA){{perONCA|Sharpe JA}}, at para 15<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
'''Canadian Adoption'''<Br> | '''Canadian Adoption'''<Br> | ||
The Rule from Hodges was adopted in Canada and characterized as a test that requires that "conclusions alternative to the guilt of the accused must be rational conclusions based on inferences drawn from proven facts".<Ref> | The Rule from Hodges was adopted in Canada and characterized as a test that requires that "conclusions alternative to the guilt of the accused must be rational conclusions based on inferences drawn from proven facts".<Ref> | ||
see R v McIver, [http://canlii.ca/t/1vk15 1965 CanLII 26] (ON CA), [1965] 2 O.R. 475 (C.A.), at p. 479, aff’d [http://canlii.ca/t/1tvt2 1966 CanLII 6] (SCC), [1966] S.C.R. 254<bR> | see R v McIver, [http://canlii.ca/t/1vk15 1965 CanLII 26] (ON CA), [1965] 2 O.R. 475 (C.A.){{perONCA|Porter CJ}}, at p. 479, aff’d [http://canlii.ca/t/1tvt2 1966 CanLII 6] (SCC), [1966] S.C.R. 254{{perSCC|Cartwright J}}<bR> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
'''The US and UK Rejection'''<br> | '''The US and UK Rejection'''<br> | ||
It should be noted that both the US and the UK have long since abandoned the test from Hodges rule.<ref> | It should be noted that both the US and the UK have long since abandoned the test from Hodges rule.<ref> | ||
see R v Robinson, [http://canlii.ca/t/gwss2 2017 BCCA 6] (CanLII), para 24<br> | see R v Robinson, [http://canlii.ca/t/gwss2 2017 BCCA 6] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Newbury JA}}, para 24<br> | ||
US: Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954)<Br> | US: Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954)<Br> | ||
UK: McGreevy v. D.P.P. [1973] 1 All E.R. 503 (H.L.)<br> | UK: McGreevy v. D.P.P. [1973] 1 All E.R. 503 (H.L.)<br> | ||
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==Motive== | ==Motive== | ||
Motive is a form of ulterior intent that permits the inferential proof of other essential elements of the offence. Evidence of a motive to commit the offence is circumstantial evidence supporting a conviction.<ref> | Motive is a form of ulterior intent that permits the inferential proof of other essential elements of the offence. Evidence of a motive to commit the offence is circumstantial evidence supporting a conviction.<ref> | ||
R v Griffin, [http://canlii.ca/t/23zqj 2009 SCC 28] (CanLII) -- statement of deceased suggests a motive for murder</ref> Conversely, evidence of a lack of motive is circumstantial evidence supporting an acquittal. Evidence of a lack of motive is not the same as lack of evidence of a motive.<ref>R v Lewis, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mkv6 1979 CanLII 19] (SCC), [1979] 2 SCR 821</ref> | R v Griffin, [http://canlii.ca/t/23zqj 2009 SCC 28] (CanLII){{perSCC|Charron J}} -- statement of deceased suggests a motive for murder</ref> Conversely, evidence of a lack of motive is circumstantial evidence supporting an acquittal. Evidence of a lack of motive is not the same as lack of evidence of a motive.<ref>R v Lewis, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mkv6 1979 CanLII 19] (SCC), [1979] 2 SCR 821{{perSCC|Dickson J}}</ref> | ||
Evidence that the accused and victim had a good relationship is not evidence of a lack of motive, but a lack of evidence of a motive.<ref>R v Ilina, [http://canlii.ca/t/1c13f 2003 MBCA 20] (CanLII)</ref> | Evidence that the accused and victim had a good relationship is not evidence of a lack of motive, but a lack of evidence of a motive.<ref>R v Ilina, [http://canlii.ca/t/1c13f 2003 MBCA 20] (CanLII){{perMBCA|Scott CJ}}</ref> | ||
Evidence of motive goes to prove intent as well as the act.<Ref> | Evidence of motive goes to prove intent as well as the act.<Ref> | ||
R v Cloutier, [http://canlii.ca/t/fslnk 1939 CanLII 26] (SCC), [1940] SCR 131<br> | R v Cloutier, [http://canlii.ca/t/fslnk 1939 CanLII 26] (SCC), [1940] SCR 131{{perSCC|Rinfret J}}<br> | ||
R c Bari, [http://canlii.ca/t/1q41l 2006 NBCA 119] (CanLII)</ref> | R c Bari, [http://canlii.ca/t/1q41l 2006 NBCA 119] (CanLII){{perNBCA|Deschênes JA}}</ref> | ||
Evidence of insolvency or debt can be admitted to establish motive for an offence of theft, fraud or arson.<Ref> | Evidence of insolvency or debt can be admitted to establish motive for an offence of theft, fraud or arson.<Ref> | ||
R v Portillo, [http://canlii.ca/t/6360 2003 CanLII 5709] (ON CA) - accused's possession of victim's property establish motive of theft for murder charge</ref> | R v Portillo, [http://canlii.ca/t/6360 2003 CanLII 5709] (ON CA){{perONCA|Doherty JA}} - accused's possession of victim's property establish motive of theft for murder charge</ref> | ||
Evidence of the accused previously threatening the victim is admissible to establish an animus and motive to harm the victim, an intent to kill, as well as narrative. It is not bad character evidence.<Ref> | Evidence of the accused previously threatening the victim is admissible to establish an animus and motive to harm the victim, an intent to kill, as well as narrative. It is not bad character evidence.<Ref> | ||
R v Cooper, [http://canlii.ca/t/1j0mf 2004 BCCA 540] (CanLII) at paras 34, 35<br> | R v Cooper, [http://canlii.ca/t/1j0mf 2004 BCCA 540] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Thackray JA}} at paras 34, 35<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
In a murder case, evidence of a prior abuse that establishes an animus or motive to kill is admissible against the accused.<ref> | In a murder case, evidence of a prior abuse that establishes an animus or motive to kill is admissible against the accused.<ref> | ||
R v Chapman, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mdh6 2006 CanLII 1178] (ON CA), (2006), 204 CCC (3d) 449 (Ont CA) at para 27<br> | R v Chapman, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mdh6 2006 CanLII 1178] (ON CA), (2006), 204 CCC (3d) 449 (Ont CA){{perONCA|Simmons JA}} at para 27<br> | ||
R v Cudjoe, [http://canlii.ca/t/2476q 2009 ONCA 543] (CanLII) at para 64<br> | R v Cudjoe, [http://canlii.ca/t/2476q 2009 ONCA 543] (CanLII){{perONCA|Watt JA}} at para 64<br> | ||
R v Van Osselaer, [http://canlii.ca/t/58kj 2002 BCCA 464] (CanLII), (2002), 167 CCC (3d) 225 (BC CA) at para 23, leave to appeal refused, [2002] SCCA No 444 (SCC)<br> | R v Van Osselaer, [http://canlii.ca/t/58kj 2002 BCCA 464] (CanLII), (2002), 167 CCC (3d) 225 (BC CA){{perBCCA|Hall JA}} at para 23, leave to appeal refused, [2002] SCCA No 444 (SCC)<br> | ||
R v Batte, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fb7d 2000 CanLII 5750] (ON CA), (2000), 145 CCC (3d) 449 (Ont CA) at paras 97 and 102<br> | R v Batte, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fb7d 2000 CanLII 5750] (ON CA), (2000), 145 CCC (3d) 449 (Ont CA){{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}} at paras 97 and 102<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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==State of Mind== | ==State of Mind== | ||
Evidence of an utterance by the deceased victim goes to the state of mind of the victim.<Ref> | Evidence of an utterance by the deceased victim goes to the state of mind of the victim.<Ref> | ||
Bari c. R., [http://canlii.ca/t/1q41l 2006 NBCA 119] (CanLII)</ref> | Bari c. R., [http://canlii.ca/t/1q41l 2006 NBCA 119] (CanLII){{perNBCA|Deschênes JA}}</ref> | ||
A complainant's post-even demeanour or emotional state is admissible and may be used to support the credibility of the complainant's evidence of a sexual assault.<ref> | A complainant's post-even demeanour or emotional state is admissible and may be used to support the credibility of the complainant's evidence of a sexual assault.<ref> | ||
R v Woollam, [http://canlii.ca/t/fscd8 2012 ONSC 2188] (CanLII) at para 48<br> | R v Woollam, [http://canlii.ca/t/fscd8 2012 ONSC 2188] (CanLII){{perONSC|Durno J}} at para 48<br> | ||
see Murphy and Butt v The Queen, [http://canlii.ca/t/1z6df 1976 CanLII 198] (SCC), [1977) 2 SCR 603 at p. 617<br> | see Murphy and Butt v The Queen, [http://canlii.ca/t/1z6df 1976 CanLII 198] (SCC), [1977) 2 SCR 603{{perSCC|Spence J}} at p. 617<br> | ||
R v Boss, [http://canlii.ca/t/1p77v 1988 CanLII 190] (ON CA), (1988), 46 CCC (3d) 523 (Ont. C.A.)<br> | R v Boss, [http://canlii.ca/t/1p77v 1988 CanLII 190] (ON CA), (1988), 46 CCC (3d) 523 (Ont. C.A.){{perONCA|Cory JA}}<br> | ||
R v Varcoe, [http://canlii.ca/t/1qwxw 2007 ONCA 194] (CanLII) at para 33<br> | R v Varcoe, [http://canlii.ca/t/1qwxw 2007 ONCA 194] (CanLII){{perONCA|MacFarland JA}} at para 33<br> | ||
R v Arsenault, [http://canlii.ca/t/6hj9 1997 CanLII 1069] (ON CA), [1997] O.J. No. 3977 (C.A.) at para 9<br> | R v Arsenault, [http://canlii.ca/t/6hj9 1997 CanLII 1069] (ON CA), [1997] O.J. No. 3977 (C.A.){{TheCourtONCA}} at para 9<br> | ||
R v Clark, [http://canlii.ca/t/6jqw 1995 CanLII 1474] (ON CA), [1995] O.J. No. 4036 (C.A.) at para 7<br> | R v Clark, [http://canlii.ca/t/6jqw 1995 CanLII 1474] (ON CA), [1995] O.J. No. 4036 (C.A.){{TheCourtONCA}} at para 7<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Line 258: | Line 258: | ||
Evidence of the accused in possession of the weapon of the offence at a time outside of the offence time is admissible to prove that the accused had the necessary means to commit the offence. Without further details it cannot be put to establish that he had the weapon of the assault or that he be convicted for the offence.<Ref> | Evidence of the accused in possession of the weapon of the offence at a time outside of the offence time is admissible to prove that the accused had the necessary means to commit the offence. Without further details it cannot be put to establish that he had the weapon of the assault or that he be convicted for the offence.<Ref> | ||
R v Backhouse, [http://canlii.ca/t/1jvwn 2005 CanLII 4937] (ON CA), (2005) 194 CCC (3d) 1 (ONCA)<br> | R v Backhouse, [http://canlii.ca/t/1jvwn 2005 CanLII 4937] (ON CA), (2005) 194 CCC (3d) 1 (ONCA){{perONCA|Rosenberg JA}}<br> | ||
R v Kinkead, [http://canlii.ca/t/5xwn 2003 CanLII 52177] (ON CA) | R v Kinkead, [http://canlii.ca/t/5xwn 2003 CanLII 52177] (ON CA){{perONCA|Simmons JA}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Evidence of tools and gear in possession of the accused consistent with the offence is evidence of expertise.<ref> | Evidence of tools and gear in possession of the accused consistent with the offence is evidence of expertise.<ref> | ||
R v Davison, [http://canlii.ca/t/g15kj 1974 CanLII 787] (ON CA), (1974), 20 CCC (2d) 424 (ONCA)</ref> | R v Davison, [http://canlii.ca/t/g15kj 1974 CanLII 787] (ON CA), (1974), 20 CCC (2d) 424 (ONCA){{perONCA|Martin JA}}</ref> | ||
{{reflist|2}} | {{reflist|2}} | ||
==Opportunity== | ==Opportunity== | ||
Opportunity evidence is a form of circumstantial evidence.<ref> | Opportunity evidence is a form of circumstantial evidence.<ref> | ||
R v Doodnaught, [http://canlii.ca/t/h6m5m 2017 ONCA 781] (CanLII), para 67 ("Evidence of opportunity typifies the concomitant use of circumstantial evidence")<Br> | R v Doodnaught, [http://canlii.ca/t/h6m5m 2017 ONCA 781] (CanLII){{perONCA|Watt JA}}, para 67 ("Evidence of opportunity typifies the concomitant use of circumstantial evidence")<Br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Evidence that tends to show the presence of an accused at or near the location of the offence near in time to its commission is "relevant, material and ''prima facie'' admissible", even if it does nothing to suggest exclusive opportunity.<Ref> | Evidence that tends to show the presence of an accused at or near the location of the offence near in time to its commission is "relevant, material and ''prima facie'' admissible", even if it does nothing to suggest exclusive opportunity.<Ref> | ||
Line 275: | Line 275: | ||
Opportunity alone cannot be sufficient to make the case, even when in combination with motive.<Ref> | Opportunity alone cannot be sufficient to make the case, even when in combination with motive.<Ref> | ||
R v Yebes, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftlc 1987 CanLII 17], [1987] 2 SCR 168 ("evidence of motive alone would not be sufficient to base a conviction and coupling opportunity with motive in the absence of other evidence would not advance the case unless there were evidence of exclusive opportunity") | R v Yebes, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftlc 1987 CanLII 17], [1987] 2 SCR 168{{perSCC|McIntyre J}} ("evidence of motive alone would not be sufficient to base a conviction and coupling opportunity with motive in the absence of other evidence would not advance the case unless there were evidence of exclusive opportunity") | ||
Doodnaught at para 68<br> | Doodnaught at para 68<br> | ||
R v Ferianz, [1962] OWN 40 (CA){{NOCANLII}}, at p. 42<Br> | R v Ferianz, [1962] OWN 40 (CA){{NOCANLII}}, at p. 42<Br> | ||
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'''Last Person Present With Victim'''<br> | '''Last Person Present With Victim'''<br> | ||
Where the accused is the last person seen with the victim is circumstantial evidence of opportunity.<ref> | Where the accused is the last person seen with the victim is circumstantial evidence of opportunity.<ref> | ||
R v Stevens (1984), 11 CCC (3d) 318, [http://canlii.ca/t/gbj53 1984 CanLII 3481] (ON CA) | R v Stevens (1984), 11 CCC (3d) 318, [http://canlii.ca/t/gbj53 1984 CanLII 3481] (ON CA){{perONCA|Martin JA}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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===Exclusive Opportunity=== | ===Exclusive Opportunity=== | ||
Evidence that establishes only a single person was present at the time of the offence and was otherwise capable of committing the offence, then it will be sufficient to prove the identity of the culprit and may prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.<Ref> | Evidence that establishes only a single person was present at the time of the offence and was otherwise capable of committing the offence, then it will be sufficient to prove the identity of the culprit and may prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.<Ref> | ||
R v Doodnaught, [http://canlii.ca/t/h6m5m 2017 ONCA 781] (CanLII) at para 70 ("Evidence of mere opportunity to commit an offence is one thing, evidence of exclusive opportunity to commit an offence quite another. Indeed, evidence of exclusive opportunity, on its own, may be sufficient to prove the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt")<Br> | R v Doodnaught, [http://canlii.ca/t/h6m5m 2017 ONCA 781] (CanLII){{perONCA|Watt JA}} at para 70 ("Evidence of mere opportunity to commit an offence is one thing, evidence of exclusive opportunity to commit an offence quite another. Indeed, evidence of exclusive opportunity, on its own, may be sufficient to prove the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt")<Br> | ||
R. v. Imrich, [http://canlii.ca/t/1tx3s 1977 CanLII 27] (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 622, affirming (1974), [http://canlii.ca/t/1vlmp 1974 CanLII 42] (ON CA), 21 CCC (2d) 99 (Ont. C.A.). | R. v. Imrich, [http://canlii.ca/t/1tx3s 1977 CanLII 27] (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 622{{perSCC|Ritchie J}}, affirming (1974), [http://canlii.ca/t/1vlmp 1974 CanLII 42] (ON CA), 21 CCC (2d) 99 (Ont. C.A.){{perONCA|Schroeder JA}}. | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
The issue is whether the opportunity is truly "exclusive" and not simply a likely among several potential persons. This will often address factors such as who had access to the location of the offence as well as the timing of events and each person's location during or near that time.{{NEEDCITE}} | The issue is whether the opportunity is truly "exclusive" and not simply a likely among several potential persons. This will often address factors such as who had access to the location of the offence as well as the timing of events and each person's location during or near that time.{{NEEDCITE}} | ||
Evidence of opportunity that is not exclusive is akin to evidence of motive. It cannot be used as a form of corroboration.<ref>R v Ferianz (1962), 37 C.R. 37 (Ont. C.A.) {{NOCANLII}}(“Evidence of opportunity, unless it is exclusive opportunity, is on a somewhat similar footing as evidence of motive. Mere opportunity is not accepted as corroboration where corroboration is required or desirable....”)</ref> However, where opportunity is coupled with some other form of inculpatory evidence, then it may be sufficient.<ref> | Evidence of opportunity that is not exclusive is akin to evidence of motive. It cannot be used as a form of corroboration.<ref>R v Ferianz (1962), 37 C.R. 37 (Ont. C.A.) {{NOCANLII}}(“Evidence of opportunity, unless it is exclusive opportunity, is on a somewhat similar footing as evidence of motive. Mere opportunity is not accepted as corroboration where corroboration is required or desirable....”)</ref> However, where opportunity is coupled with some other form of inculpatory evidence, then it may be sufficient.<ref> | ||
R v Yebes, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftlc 1987 CanLII 17], [1987] 2 SCR 168 | R v Yebes, [http://canlii.ca/t/1ftlc 1987 CanLII 17], [1987] 2 SCR 168{{perSCC|McIntyre J}} ("where evidence of opportunity is accompanied by other inculpatory evidence, something less than exclusive opportunity may suffice.")<br>See R v Johnson [http://canlii.ca/t/1hjwq 2004 NSCA 91] (CanLII){{perNSCA|Oland JA}}</ref> | ||
("where evidence of opportunity is accompanied by other inculpatory evidence, something less than exclusive opportunity may suffice.") | |||
{{reflist|2}} | {{reflist|2}} | ||
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==Victim's Tendency for Violence== | ==Victim's Tendency for Violence== | ||
A history of threats by the victim to the accused to admissible for the purpose of establishing the reasonableness of the accused apprehension of harm and the accused's belief in no alternatives to the commission of the criminal acts.<ref> | A history of threats by the victim to the accused to admissible for the purpose of establishing the reasonableness of the accused apprehension of harm and the accused's belief in no alternatives to the commission of the criminal acts.<ref> | ||
R v Petel, [http://canlii.ca/t/1frw4 1994 CanLII 133] (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 3 | R v Petel, [http://canlii.ca/t/1frw4 1994 CanLII 133] (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 3{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Evidence of tendency is even admissible where self-defence is not an available defence.<ref> | Evidence of tendency is even admissible where self-defence is not an available defence.<ref> | ||
R v Sims, [http://canlii.ca/t/1dcg4 1994 CanLII 1298] (BC CA) | R v Sims, [http://canlii.ca/t/1dcg4 1994 CanLII 1298] (BC CA){{perBCCA|Wood JA}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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==Accused's Tendency for Violence== | ==Accused's Tendency for Violence== | ||
Details on the relationship between the victim and accused can provide "background and context that was essential to an accurate interpretation of the relevant events".<ref> | Details on the relationship between the victim and accused can provide "background and context that was essential to an accurate interpretation of the relevant events".<ref> | ||
R v MacDonald, [http://canlii.ca/t/1cf10 2002 CanLII 14251] (ON CA) at para 35<br> | R v MacDonald, [http://canlii.ca/t/1cf10 2002 CanLII 14251] (ON CA){{perONCA|Doherty JA}} at para 35<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Prior threats made by the accused to the victim is admissible to establish the accused committed the offence and the accused's state of mind.<ref> | Prior threats made by the accused to the victim is admissible to establish the accused committed the offence and the accused's state of mind.<ref> | ||
R v Fournier, [http://canlii.ca/t/5347 2000 BCCA 140] (CanLII) | R v Fournier, [http://canlii.ca/t/5347 2000 BCCA 140] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Hall JA}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible to establish motive or animus regardless of how similar it is the allegations.<ref> | Evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible to establish motive or animus regardless of how similar it is the allegations.<ref> | ||
R v Chapman, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mdh6 2006 CanLII 1178] (ON CA) at para 27<br> | R v Chapman, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mdh6 2006 CanLII 1178] (ON CA){{perONCA|Simmons JA}} at para 27<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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'''Demeanor'''<br> | '''Demeanor'''<br> | ||
Demeanour evidence may constitute circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge.<ref> | Demeanour evidence may constitute circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge.<ref> | ||
e.g., R v Goulart-Nelson, [http://canlii.ca/t/1hz5s 2004 CanLII 32077] (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 4010 (C.A.) at para 14<br> | e.g., R v Goulart-Nelson, [http://canlii.ca/t/1hz5s 2004 CanLII 32077] (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 4010 (C.A.){{TheCourtONCA}} at para 14<br> | ||
R v Morales, [http://canlii.ca/t/1nl9b 2006 CanLII 19930] (ON CA), (2006), 81 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.), at paras 12, 14<br> | R v Morales, [http://canlii.ca/t/1nl9b 2006 CanLII 19930] (ON CA), (2006), 81 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.){{perONCA|LaForme JA}}, at paras 12, 14<br> | ||
</ref> The judge should consider the nature and context of the observations, such as a person's natural display of nervousness common to interactions with police.<ref> | </ref> The judge should consider the nature and context of the observations, such as a person's natural display of nervousness common to interactions with police.<ref> | ||
R v De Rojas, [http://canlii.ca/t/ftcn0 2012 ONSC 3227] (CanLII) at para 88</ref> | R v De Rojas, [http://canlii.ca/t/ftcn0 2012 ONSC 3227] (CanLII){{perONSC|Hill J}} at para 88</ref> | ||
'''Drug Purchase Calls'''<br> | '''Drug Purchase Calls'''<br> | ||
In many cases, drug purchase calls were found admissible as circumstantial evidence, a purpose of which it is not for the truth of its contents.<ref> | In many cases, drug purchase calls were found admissible as circumstantial evidence, a purpose of which it is not for the truth of its contents.<ref> | ||
e.g. R v Cook, [http://canlii.ca/t/23gjx 1978 CanLII 399] (BC CA), (1978), 10 B.C.L.R. 84 at 86<br> | e.g. R v Cook, [http://canlii.ca/t/23gjx 1978 CanLII 399] (BC CA), (1978), 10 B.C.L.R. 84{{perBCCA|McIntyre JA}} at 86<br> | ||
R v Lees, [http://canlii.ca/t/23pv9 2009 BCCA 240] (CanLII) at para 21<br> | R v Lees, [http://canlii.ca/t/23pv9 2009 BCCA 240] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Newbury JA}} at para 21<br> | ||
R v Bjornson, [http://canlii.ca/t/27525 2009 BCSC 1780] (CanLII) at para 13<br> | R v Bjornson, [http://canlii.ca/t/27525 2009 BCSC 1780] (CanLII){{perBCSC|Bennett J}} at para 13<br> | ||
R v Graham, [http://canlii.ca/t/fw64n 2013 BCCA 75] (CanLII) at para 36 - however there is some inconsistency see para 38<br> | R v Graham, [http://canlii.ca/t/fw64n 2013 BCCA 75] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Neilson JA}} at para 36 - however there is some inconsistency see para 38<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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The defence challenge would more regularly be upon the possibility of accidental DNA transfer.<Ref> | The defence challenge would more regularly be upon the possibility of accidental DNA transfer.<Ref> | ||
e.g. R v Doan, [http://canlii.ca/t/fwkjh 2013 BCCA 123] (CanLII) - defence argues accidental transfer | e.g. R v Doan, [http://canlii.ca/t/fwkjh 2013 BCCA 123] (CanLII){{TheCourtBCCA}} - defence argues accidental transfer | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Revision as of 22:12, 29 December 2018
- < Evidence
General Principles
Circumstantial evidence refers to any evidence from which one or more inferences are to be drawn to establish material facts.[1]
While there is no burden to prove every piece of evidence on a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to convict on a circumstantial case, a judge must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the only rational inference that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence is one of guilt.[2]
Circumstantial evidence may be used to support the inference of innocence as well as guilt so long as the probative value outweighs prejudicial effect and it is not given undue weight.[3]
Examples of circumstantial evidence:
- motive (past hostility to victim)
- opportunity (including exclusive opportunity)
- means, capacity and skills
- post-offence conduct (flight, false alibi, destruction of evidence)
- knowledge and state of mind
- habit[4]
- disposition for violence by victim
Inference vs Speculation
Circumstantial evidence is based on reasoning and inference-drawing through probability.[5]
The judge must apply logic, common sense and experience to the evidence. They must consider the inherent probabilities and improbabilities, frequently eliminating the possibility of coincidence.[6]
The judge in his or her analysis must "separate inferences from speculation".[7]
Strength of Inferences to Establish a Fact
The rule of circumstantial evidence does not apply to each piece of evidence but rather only the totality of the evidence.[8]
A conclusion cannot be found without evidence, which is to say that it cannot be speculation.[9]
The strength of the inference made from circumstantial evidence depends on the relationship between the circumstantial evidence and the rest of the evidence.[10]
Proof by circumstantial evidence requires consideration of the evidence as a whole and not in part.[11]
The strength of the inference to be drawn from a single piece of circumstantial evidence depends on its context amongst all the other evidence.[12]
The whole of all the evidence may be more compelling than the sum of its parts.[13]
Juries
A judge does not need to give special instructions for circumstantial evidence.[14]
There is also no need to explain circustantial evidence in any sort of formulaic manner. It is sufficient just to use the language of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.[15]
Types of Evidence
Evidence of prior violence by the victim, including threats, can be relevant circumstantial evidence to establish the reasonableness of an apprehension of harm and could not otherwise protect themselves from harm.[16]
Drug paraphernalia found with drugs can be relevant to support the inference of knowledge of the nature of the drugs, participation in drug dealing, and specific plans of dealing.[17]
Fingerprint evidence can infer that the person who the fingerprint matches touched or held the object it was found on. It is other evidence that will determine the time and place that the object was touched or held.[18]
Standard of Appellate Review
The standard of review of any instructions on the drawing of inferences of knowledge in a circumstantial case is "whether the trier of fact, acting judicially, could reasonably be satisfied that the accused’s guilt was the only reasonable conclusion available on the totality of the evidence".
[19]
- ↑
see R v Atlee, 2010 ONCJ 72 (CanLII), per Thibideau J, at para 14
see also Watt's Manual of Criminal Evidence ss. 9.01
R v Campbell, 2001 CanLII 7064 (ON CA), per Weiler JA, at paras 10 and 11
R v Cinous, 2002 SCC 29 (CanLII), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 3, per McLachlin CJ and Bastarache J at para 89 (Circumstantial evidence is "evidence that tends to prove a factual matter by proving other events or circumstances from which the occurrence of the matter at issue can be reasonably inferred")
- ↑
R v Griffin, 2009 SCC 28 (CanLII), per Charron J at para 33
R v Ngo, 2009 BCCA 301 (CanLII), per Rowles JA at para 53
- ↑ R v SCB, 1997 CanLII 6319 (ON CA), (1997), 104 O.A.C. 81 (CA), per Doherty and Rosenberg JJA at para 33 to 36
- ↑ R v Pilon, 2009 ONCA 248 (CanLII), (2009) 243 CCC (3d) 109 (ONCA), per Doherty JA
- ↑ R v Arp 1998 CanLII 769, [1998] 3 SCR 339, per Cory J at p. 375
- ↑
FH v McDougall, 2008 SCC 53 (CanLII), [2008] 3 SCR 41, per Rothstein J, at paras 33-40, 47-8
R v Yousif, 2011 ABCA 12 (CanLII), per Slatter JA, at para 5
- ↑ R v Allen, 2015 BCCA 299 (CanLII), per Donald JA, at para 27
- ↑
R v John, [1970] 5 CCC 63, aff'd at 1970 CanLII 199 (SCC), [1971] SCR 781, per Ritchie J
- ↑ R v Torrie, 1967 CanLII 285 (ON CA), [1967] 3 CCC 303 (ONCA), per Evans JA
- ↑
See R v White, 1996 CanLII 3013 (ON CA), (1996), 108 CCC (3d) 1 (Ont.C.A.), per curiam
R v Uhrig, 2012 ONCA 470 (CanLII), per curiam - ↑
R v Stewart, 1976 CanLII 202 (SCC), [1977] 2 SCR 748, per Pigeon J
R v Turlon, (1989) 49 CCC (3d) 186 (Ont. C.A.), 1989 CanLII 7206 (ON CA), per Zuber JA
- ↑
R v Leitch, [2010] O.J. No. 6240 (C.J.), aff’d 2012 ONCA 85 (CanLII), per curiam
R v Sykes, 2014 NSCA 57 (CanLII), per Farrar JA, at para 43
- ↑
R v Nolet, 2010 SCC 24 (CanLII), per Binnie J, at para 48
R v Luc, [2007] O.J. No. 4210 (C.J.)(*no CanLII links) at para 36-37
Sykes, supra at para 43
- ↑ Griffin, supra at para 33 ("We have long departed from any legal requirement for a “special instruction” on circumstantial evidence, even where the issue is one of identification...")
R v Robert, 2000 CanLII 5129 (ON CA), per Sharpe JA at para 15
- ↑
R v Tombran, 2000 CanLII 2688 (ON CA), (2000), 142 CCC (3d) 380, per Sharpe JA at 392
R v Fleet, 1997 CanLII 867 (ON CA), (1997), 36 O.R. (3d) 542, 120 CCC (3d) 457 (C.A.), per curiam
- ↑ R v Petel, 1994 CanLII 133 (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 3, per Lamer CJ
- ↑ R v Froese (1988) 44 CCC (3d) 1 (MBCA), 1988 CanLII 7088 (MB CA), per Huband JA
- ↑
R v Mars, 2006 CanLII 3460 (ON CA), (2006), 205 CCC (3d) 376, per Doherty JA, at paras 19 to 24
R v Pakula, 2017 ABPC 33 (CanLII), per Semenuk J
- ↑
R v Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33 (CanLII), per Cromwell J, at para 55
Inference on an Ultimate Issue Establishing Guilt
It is usually put forward to establish a fact that can be used to suggest facts that, if established, would resolve a matter at issue.
In order for a judge to convict on only circumstantial evidence, the "circumstances must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence"[1]
The modern rule of circumstantial evidence requires that before a conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be entered the trier-of-fact must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilt of the accused is the only reasonable inference from the proven facts.[2]
The reverse of the principle is also true, where "there is exculpatory evidence. One piece of exculpatory evidence might not be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt but the cumulative effect of a number of pieces of exculpatory evidence may well do so."[3]
Inferences consistent with innocence do not need to arise from proven facts.[4] To require proven facts wrongly places the burden upon the accused to prove what happened rather than simply raise a doubt.[5]
Cumulative Effect of the Evidence
The Court must look at the cumulative effect of the evidence and not in piecemeal.[6]
Some evidence may be explicable without guilt, and it may relate to a necessary chain of proof. However, it must be viewed in the context of all the other evidence.[7]
Inference of Guilt is The Only Reasonable One
The judge must make inquiry into whether an inference of guilt is the only reasonable inference available on the facts, which requires consideration whether there are alternative inferences capable of raising a reasonable doubt.[8]
Inference
An inference is a deduction made from the evidence.[9]
Example: Presence in Vehicle
Evidence putting the accused in a vehicle in which it is established that someone from the vehicle committed an offence is not enough to establish guilt where there is evidence suggesting other persons in the vehicle could be responsible.[10]
Example: Fingerprints
The mere finding of fingerprints on a household item moved during a break and enter can be sufficient to establish guilt.[11]
Inference in Absence of Evidence
The court may consider "other plausible theor[ies]" and "other reasonable possibilities" which are inconsistent with guilt. These possibilities "must be based on logic and experience applied to the evidence or the absence of evidence".[12]
This means that the Crown may need to negative "reasonable possibilities", however, this does not extend to require the Crown to "negative every possible conjecture".[13]
It must be kept in mind however that as a rule the "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence".[14]
Jury Instructions
There is no longer any legal requirement for "special instructions" on circumstantial evidence even when relating to the essential element of identity.[15]
- ↑
R v Yebes, 1987 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1987] 2 SCR 168, per McIntyre J
R v Griffin; R. v. Harris, 2009 SCC 28 (CanLII), [2009] S.C.J. No. 28, per Charron J, at para. 33 (The "essential component of an instruction on circumstantial evidence is to instill in the jury that in order to convict, they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the only rational inference that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence is that the accused is guilty.") - ↑
R v Cooper, [1978] 1 SCR 860, 1977 CanLII 11 (SCC), per Ritchie J
Mezzo v The Queen, 1986 CanLII 16, [1986] 1 SCR 802, per McIntyre J at para 12 - ↑
R v Moose, 2015 ABCA 71 (CanLII), per curiam, at para 12
- ↑
R. v. Khela, 2009 SCC 4 (CanLII), [2009] 1 S.C.R. 104, per Fish J, at para. 58
see also R. v. Defaveri, 2014 BCCA 370 (CanLII), 361 B.C.A.C. 301, per Lowry JA, at para. 10
R. v. Bui, 2014 ONCA 614 (CanLII), 14 C.R. (7th) 149, per Simmons JA, at para. 28
- ↑
R. v. Villaroman, [2016] 1 SCR 1000, 2016 SCC 33 (CanLII), per Cromwell J, at para 35
- ↑
Trevor, supra
R v Smith, 2016 ONCA 25 (CanLII), per Watt JA at paras 81 to 82
- ↑
Smith, ibid. at para 81
- ↑
R v Garciacruz, 2015 ONCA 27 (CanLII), per Rouleau JA
R v Griffin, [2009] 2 SCR 42, 2009 SCC 28 (CanLII), per Charron J, at para 33 ("The essential component of an instruction on circumstantial evidence is to instill in the jury that in order to convict, they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the only rational inference that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence is that the accused is guilty. Imparting the necessary message to the jury may be achieved in different ways")
- ↑
R v Shields, 2014 NSPC 21 (CanLII), per Derrick J at para 105
R v Latif, [2004] OJ No. 5891 (SCJ)(*no CanLII links) at para 4
- ↑ R v Bouzied, 2013 ONCA 276 (CanLII), per curiam
- ↑ e.g. R v Miller, 2016 BCCA 263 (CanLII), per Lowry JA
- ↑
Villaroman, supra at para 37
- ↑
Villaroman, supra at para 37 to 38
- ↑ R v Piec, 2007 MBCA 138 (CanLII), per Steel JA
- ↑
Griffin, supra at para 33
Hodges Rule
Common Law Hodges' Rule
The Hodge's rule test states that guilt can only be found where the judge is "satisfied that the facts were such as to be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion than that the prisoner was the guilty person".[1]
The original common law requirement of proof for a finding of guilt in circumstantial case is based on the rule in hodge’s case.[2]
Hodge's rule does not apply to determine the mens rea (including the accused's intention) for an offence.[3]
Hodge's rule should not be applied to test the accused's explanation for his acts.[4]
The Hodge's rule is not the "inexorable rule of law in Canada". It is only one manner of phrasing the essential test of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.[5]
Canadian Adoption
The Rule from Hodges was adopted in Canada and characterized as a test that requires that "conclusions alternative to the guilt of the accused must be rational conclusions based on inferences drawn from proven facts".[6]
The US and UK Rejection
It should be noted that both the US and the UK have long since abandoned the test from Hodges rule.[7]
- ↑
Hodge's Case
- ↑
considered in R v Linn 1994 CanLII 4643 (SK CA), (1994), 116 Sask.R. 203, [1994] 4 W.W.R. 305, per Vancise JA at paras 13-15
R v Munro, 2001 SKQB 138 (CanLII), per Baynton J at paras 13-14
R v Trevor, 2006 BCCA 91 (CanLII), per Low JA at para 12
c.f. R v Cooper, [1978] 1 SCR 860, 1977 CanLII 11 (SCC), per Ritchie J, at p. 881
- ↑
R v Mitchell, 1964 CanLII 42 (SCC), [1964] SCR 471, per Spence J
Cooper, supra at p. 881 ("It is enough if it is made plain to the members of the jury that before basing a verdict of guilty on circumstantial evidence they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilt of the accused is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the proven facts.')
- ↑ Robert, supra
- ↑
R v Robert, 2000 CanLII 5129 (ON CA), per Sharpe JA, at para 15
- ↑
see R v McIver, 1965 CanLII 26 (ON CA), [1965] 2 O.R. 475 (C.A.), per Porter CJ, at p. 479, aff’d 1966 CanLII 6 (SCC), [1966] S.C.R. 254, per Cartwright J
- ↑
see R v Robinson, 2017 BCCA 6 (CanLII), per Newbury JA, para 24
US: Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954)
UK: McGreevy v. D.P.P. [1973] 1 All E.R. 503 (H.L.)
Motive
Motive is a form of ulterior intent that permits the inferential proof of other essential elements of the offence. Evidence of a motive to commit the offence is circumstantial evidence supporting a conviction.[1] Conversely, evidence of a lack of motive is circumstantial evidence supporting an acquittal. Evidence of a lack of motive is not the same as lack of evidence of a motive.[2]
Evidence that the accused and victim had a good relationship is not evidence of a lack of motive, but a lack of evidence of a motive.[3]
Evidence of motive goes to prove intent as well as the act.[4]
Evidence of insolvency or debt can be admitted to establish motive for an offence of theft, fraud or arson.[5]
Evidence of the accused previously threatening the victim is admissible to establish an animus and motive to harm the victim, an intent to kill, as well as narrative. It is not bad character evidence.[6]
In a murder case, evidence of a prior abuse that establishes an animus or motive to kill is admissible against the accused.[7]
- ↑ R v Griffin, 2009 SCC 28 (CanLII), per Charron J -- statement of deceased suggests a motive for murder
- ↑ R v Lewis, 1979 CanLII 19 (SCC), [1979] 2 SCR 821, per Dickson J
- ↑ R v Ilina, 2003 MBCA 20 (CanLII), per Scott CJ
- ↑
R v Cloutier, 1939 CanLII 26 (SCC), [1940] SCR 131, per Rinfret J
R c Bari, 2006 NBCA 119 (CanLII), per Deschênes JA - ↑ R v Portillo, 2003 CanLII 5709 (ON CA), per Doherty JA - accused's possession of victim's property establish motive of theft for murder charge
- ↑
R v Cooper, 2004 BCCA 540 (CanLII), per Thackray JA at paras 34, 35
- ↑
R v Chapman, 2006 CanLII 1178 (ON CA), (2006), 204 CCC (3d) 449 (Ont CA), per Simmons JA at para 27
R v Cudjoe, 2009 ONCA 543 (CanLII), per Watt JA at para 64
R v Van Osselaer, 2002 BCCA 464 (CanLII), (2002), 167 CCC (3d) 225 (BC CA), per Hall JA at para 23, leave to appeal refused, [2002] SCCA No 444 (SCC)
R v Batte, 2000 CanLII 5750 (ON CA), (2000), 145 CCC (3d) 449 (Ont CA), per Rosenberg JA at paras 97 and 102
State of Mind
Evidence of an utterance by the deceased victim goes to the state of mind of the victim.[1]
A complainant's post-even demeanour or emotional state is admissible and may be used to support the credibility of the complainant's evidence of a sexual assault.[2]
- ↑ Bari c. R., 2006 NBCA 119 (CanLII), per Deschênes JA
- ↑
R v Woollam, 2012 ONSC 2188 (CanLII), per Durno J at para 48
see Murphy and Butt v The Queen, 1976 CanLII 198 (SCC), [1977) 2 SCR 603, per Spence J at p. 617
R v Boss, 1988 CanLII 190 (ON CA), (1988), 46 CCC (3d) 523 (Ont. C.A.), per Cory JA
R v Varcoe, 2007 ONCA 194 (CanLII), per MacFarland JA at para 33
R v Arsenault, 1997 CanLII 1069 (ON CA), [1997] O.J. No. 3977 (C.A.), per curiam at para 9
R v Clark, 1995 CanLII 1474 (ON CA), [1995] O.J. No. 4036 (C.A.), per curiam at para 7
Means, Capacity and Expertise
Evidence of the accused in possession of the weapon of the offence at a time outside of the offence time is admissible to prove that the accused had the necessary means to commit the offence. Without further details it cannot be put to establish that he had the weapon of the assault or that he be convicted for the offence.[1]
Evidence of tools and gear in possession of the accused consistent with the offence is evidence of expertise.[2]
- ↑
R v Backhouse, 2005 CanLII 4937 (ON CA), (2005) 194 CCC (3d) 1 (ONCA), per Rosenberg JA
R v Kinkead, 2003 CanLII 52177 (ON CA), per Simmons JA - ↑ R v Davison, 1974 CanLII 787 (ON CA), (1974), 20 CCC (2d) 424 (ONCA), per Martin JA
Opportunity
Opportunity evidence is a form of circumstantial evidence.[1] Evidence that tends to show the presence of an accused at or near the location of the offence near in time to its commission is "relevant, material and prima facie admissible", even if it does nothing to suggest exclusive opportunity.[2]
Opportunity alone cannot be sufficient to make the case, even when in combination with motive.[3]
The accused is always permitted to counter evidence of opportunity with evidence of personal capacity, evidence of equivalent or superior capacity.[4]
Last Person Present With Victim
Where the accused is the last person seen with the victim is circumstantial evidence of opportunity.[5]
- ↑
R v Doodnaught, 2017 ONCA 781 (CanLII), per Watt JA, para 67 ("Evidence of opportunity typifies the concomitant use of circumstantial evidence")
- ↑
Doodnaught, ibid. at para 67
- ↑
R v Yebes, 1987 CanLII 17, [1987] 2 SCR 168, per McIntyre J ("evidence of motive alone would not be sufficient to base a conviction and coupling opportunity with motive in the absence of other evidence would not advance the case unless there were evidence of exclusive opportunity")
Doodnaught at para 68
R v Ferianz, [1962] OWN 40 (CA)(*no CanLII links) , at p. 42
- ↑
Doodnaught, supra at para 68
- ↑
R v Stevens (1984), 11 CCC (3d) 318, 1984 CanLII 3481 (ON CA), per Martin JA
Exclusive Opportunity
Evidence that establishes only a single person was present at the time of the offence and was otherwise capable of committing the offence, then it will be sufficient to prove the identity of the culprit and may prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.[1] The issue is whether the opportunity is truly "exclusive" and not simply a likely among several potential persons. This will often address factors such as who had access to the location of the offence as well as the timing of events and each person's location during or near that time.
Evidence of opportunity that is not exclusive is akin to evidence of motive. It cannot be used as a form of corroboration.[2] However, where opportunity is coupled with some other form of inculpatory evidence, then it may be sufficient.[3]
- ↑
R v Doodnaught, 2017 ONCA 781 (CanLII), per Watt JA at para 70 ("Evidence of mere opportunity to commit an offence is one thing, evidence of exclusive opportunity to commit an offence quite another. Indeed, evidence of exclusive opportunity, on its own, may be sufficient to prove the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt")
R. v. Imrich, 1977 CanLII 27 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 622, per Ritchie J, affirming (1974), 1974 CanLII 42 (ON CA), 21 CCC (2d) 99 (Ont. C.A.), per Schroeder JA. - ↑ R v Ferianz (1962), 37 C.R. 37 (Ont. C.A.) (*no CanLII links) (“Evidence of opportunity, unless it is exclusive opportunity, is on a somewhat similar footing as evidence of motive. Mere opportunity is not accepted as corroboration where corroboration is required or desirable....”)
- ↑
R v Yebes, 1987 CanLII 17, [1987] 2 SCR 168, per McIntyre J ("where evidence of opportunity is accompanied by other inculpatory evidence, something less than exclusive opportunity may suffice.")
See R v Johnson 2004 NSCA 91 (CanLII), per Oland JA
Victim's Tendency for Violence
A history of threats by the victim to the accused to admissible for the purpose of establishing the reasonableness of the accused apprehension of harm and the accused's belief in no alternatives to the commission of the criminal acts.[1]
Evidence of tendency is even admissible where self-defence is not an available defence.[2]
- ↑ R v Petel, 1994 CanLII 133 (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 3, per Lamer CJ
- ↑ R v Sims, 1994 CanLII 1298 (BC CA), per Wood JA
Accused's Tendency for Violence
Details on the relationship between the victim and accused can provide "background and context that was essential to an accurate interpretation of the relevant events".[1]
Prior threats made by the accused to the victim is admissible to establish the accused committed the offence and the accused's state of mind.[2]
Evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible to establish motive or animus regardless of how similar it is the allegations.[3]
- ↑
R v MacDonald, 2002 CanLII 14251 (ON CA), per Doherty JA at para 35
- ↑ R v Fournier, 2000 BCCA 140 (CanLII), per Hall JA
- ↑
R v Chapman, 2006 CanLII 1178 (ON CA), per Simmons JA at para 27
Form of Evidence
Demeanor
Demeanour evidence may constitute circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge.[1] The judge should consider the nature and context of the observations, such as a person's natural display of nervousness common to interactions with police.[2]
Drug Purchase Calls
In many cases, drug purchase calls were found admissible as circumstantial evidence, a purpose of which it is not for the truth of its contents.[3]
DNA
Expert testimony of DNA evidence found upon an object will typically be considered accurate.
The defence challenge would more regularly be upon the possibility of accidental DNA transfer.[4]
See also Established Fields of Expert Evidence#DNA_Analysis, Continuity
- ↑
e.g., R v Goulart-Nelson, 2004 CanLII 32077 (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 4010 (C.A.), per curiam at para 14
R v Morales, 2006 CanLII 19930 (ON CA), (2006), 81 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.), per LaForme JA, at paras 12, 14
- ↑ R v De Rojas, 2012 ONSC 3227 (CanLII), per Hill J at para 88
- ↑
e.g. R v Cook, 1978 CanLII 399 (BC CA), (1978), 10 B.C.L.R. 84, per McIntyre JA at 86
R v Lees, 2009 BCCA 240 (CanLII), per Newbury JA at para 21
R v Bjornson, 2009 BCSC 1780 (CanLII), per Bennett J at para 13
R v Graham, 2013 BCCA 75 (CanLII), per Neilson JA at para 36 - however there is some inconsistency see para 38
- ↑ e.g. R v Doan, 2013 BCCA 123 (CanLII), per curiam - defence argues accidental transfer