Waiver of Charter Rights: Difference between revisions
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{LevelOne}}{{HeaderProcedure}} | {{LevelOne}}{{HeaderProcedure}} | ||
==General Principles== | ==General Principles== | ||
The waiver of any Charter right must be done clearly and unequivocally with full knowledge of the scope of the right and effect of the waiver.<Ref> | The waiver of any ''Charter'' right must be done clearly and unequivocally with full knowledge of the scope of the right and effect of the waiver.<Ref> | ||
''Korponay v Attorney General of Canada'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1lpbj 1982 CanLII 12] (SCC), [1982] 1 SCR 41{{perSCC|Lamer J}}{{atp|49}} ("the validity of such a waiver, and I should add that that is so of any waiver, is dependent upon it being clear and unequivocal that the person is waiving the procedural safeguard and is doing so with full knowledge of the rights the procedure was enacted to protect and of the effect the waiver will have on those rights in the process.")</ref> | ''Korponay v Attorney General of Canada'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1lpbj 1982 CanLII 12] (SCC), [1982] 1 SCR 41{{perSCC|Lamer J}}{{atp|49}} ("the validity of such a waiver, and I should add that that is so of any waiver, is dependent upon it being clear and unequivocal that the person is waiving the procedural safeguard and is doing so with full knowledge of the rights the procedure was enacted to protect and of the effect the waiver will have on those rights in the process.")</ref> | ||
| Line 14: | Line 14: | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
It is necessary for the Crown to prove waiver of an accused right under s. 8.<ref> | It is necessary for the Crown to prove waiver of an accused right under s. 8{{CCRF}}.<ref> | ||
See ''R v Neilson'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1pfnn 1988 CanLII 213], (1988), 43 CCC (3d) 548 (SKCA){{perSKCA|Bayda CJ}}</ref> | See ''R v Neilson'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1pfnn 1988 CanLII 213], (1988), 43 CCC (3d) 548 (SKCA){{perSKCA|Bayda CJ}}</ref> | ||
Revision as of 19:19, 17 July 2019
General Principles
The waiver of any Charter right must be done clearly and unequivocally with full knowledge of the scope of the right and effect of the waiver.[1]
This equally applies to any procedural right, which can be waived where the waiver is "waiver is informed, clear, and unequivocal".[2]
The person waiving the right must be "fully and properly informed" in order for the waiver to be valid.[3]
It is necessary for the Crown to prove waiver of an accused right under s. 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[4]
An express or implied invitation, such as at the attendance of police at the door of a residence or being invited into the house, results in the waiving of privacy.[5]
- ↑ Korponay v Attorney General of Canada, 1982 CanLII 12 (SCC), [1982] 1 SCR 41, per Lamer J, at p. 49 ("the validity of such a waiver, and I should add that that is so of any waiver, is dependent upon it being clear and unequivocal that the person is waiving the procedural safeguard and is doing so with full knowledge of the rights the procedure was enacted to protect and of the effect the waiver will have on those rights in the process.")
- ↑
R v Edwardsen, 2019 BCCA 259 (CanLII), per Harris JA, at para 9 ("an accused can waive procedural rights for their benefit, as long as the waiver is informed, clear, and unequivocal")
R v Tran, [1994] 2 SCR 951, 1994 CanLII 56 (SCC), per Lamer CJ, at pp. 996–97 (SCR)
- ↑
Edwardsen, supra, at para 9 ("A person waiving a procedural right must be fully and properly informed of their rights in order for the waiver to be valid")
R v Bartle, 1994 CanLII 64 (SCC), [1994] 3 SCR 173, at pp. 203–04 (SCR)
- ↑ See R v Neilson, 1988 CanLII 213, (1988), 43 CCC (3d) 548 (SKCA), per Bayda CJ
- ↑
See R v Evans, 1996 CanLII 248 (SCC), [1996] 1 SCR 8, per Sopinka J at 12-13 implied invitation
R v Roy, 2010 BCCA 448 (CanLII), per Lowry JA express invitation