Standard of Appellate Review: Difference between revisions
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==General Principles== | ==General Principles== | ||
All reviewable decisions made by a judge can be seen as answering one of three categories of questions:<ref> | All reviewable decisions made by a judge can be seen as answering one of three categories of questions:<ref> | ||
''Housen v Nikolaisen'', [http://canlii.ca/t/51tl 2002 SCC 33] (CanLII), [2002] 2 SCR 235{{perSCC|Iacobucci and Major JJ}}{{ | ''Housen v Nikolaisen'', [http://canlii.ca/t/51tl 2002 SCC 33] (CanLII), [2002] 2 SCR 235{{perSCC|Iacobucci and Major JJ}}{{AtsL|51tl|8|, 10 to 12}}, {{atsL-np|51tl|26|, 31, 39}}, {{atsL-np|51tl|72|}}, and {{atsL-np|51tl|101|}}</ref> | ||
# questions of law: what is the correct legal test to be applied | # questions of law: what is the correct legal test to be applied | ||
# questions of fact: what took place between the parties | # questions of fact: what took place between the parties | ||
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All questions of law are to be reviewed on a standard of "correctness".<ref> | All questions of law are to be reviewed on a standard of "correctness".<ref> | ||
{{supra1|Housen v Nikolaisen}}{{at|8}}<br> | {{supra1|Housen v Nikolaisen}}{{at|8}}<br> | ||
''R v Mooney'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1lbdb 2005 NLCA 49] (CanLII){{perNLCA|Rowe JA}}{{ | ''R v Mooney'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1lbdb 2005 NLCA 49] (CanLII){{perNLCA|Rowe JA}}{{atL|1lbdb|18}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
All questions of fact are reviewed on a standard of "palpable and overriding error". | All questions of fact are reviewed on a standard of "palpable and overriding error". | ||
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A question of law inquire into the "correct legal test" to be applied for a particular legal issue or the "the application of a legal standard" to facts.<ref> | A question of law inquire into the "correct legal test" to be applied for a particular legal issue or the "the application of a legal standard" to facts.<ref> | ||
''Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqs6 1998 CanLII 778] (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 982{{perSCC|Bastarache J}}{{at|37}}<br> | ''Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1fqs6 1998 CanLII 778] (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 982{{perSCC|Bastarache J}}{{at|37}}<br> | ||
''Saint-Jean v Mercier'', [http://canlii.ca/t/51vg 2002 SCC 15] (CanLII), [2002] 1 SCR 491{{perSCC|Gothier J}}{{ | ''Saint-Jean v Mercier'', [http://canlii.ca/t/51vg 2002 SCC 15] (CanLII), [2002] 1 SCR 491{{perSCC|Gothier J}}{{atL|51vg|33}}<br> | ||
''R v Araujo'', [http://canlii.ca/t/5231 2000 SCC 65] (CanLII), [2000] 2 SCR 992{{perSCC|LeBel J}}{{ | ''R v Araujo'', [http://canlii.ca/t/5231 2000 SCC 65] (CanLII), [2000] 2 SCR 992{{perSCC|LeBel J}}{{atL|5231|18}}<br> | ||
{{supra1|Shepherd}}<br> | {{supra1|Shepherd}}<br> | ||
''R v Brooks'', [http://canlii.ca/t/527q 2000 SCC 11] (CanLII){{perSCC|Bastarache J}}<br> | ''R v Brooks'', [http://canlii.ca/t/527q 2000 SCC 11] (CanLII){{perSCC|Bastarache J}}<br> | ||
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</ref> | </ref> | ||
However, where the facts are in dispute, it is most likely a question of mixed fact and law.<ref> | However, where the facts are in dispute, it is most likely a question of mixed fact and law.<ref> | ||
''R v Grouse'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1hx78 2004 NSCA 108] (CanLII){{perNSCA|Cromwell JA}}{{ | ''R v Grouse'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1hx78 2004 NSCA 108] (CanLII){{perNSCA|Cromwell JA}}{{atL|1hx78|44}}</ref> | ||
Where the question is neither purely a question of law or question of fact, then it is considered a question of "questions of mixed law and fact". | Where the question is neither purely a question of law or question of fact, then it is considered a question of "questions of mixed law and fact". | ||
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; Exercises of Discretion | ; Exercises of Discretion | ||
The appellate court owes deference to exercises of discretion. However, where the exercise is unreasonable, then no deference is required.<ref> | The appellate court owes deference to exercises of discretion. However, where the exercise is unreasonable, then no deference is required.<ref> | ||
''Haaretz.com v Goldhar'', 2018 SCC 28 | ''Haaretz.com v Goldhar'', {{CanLII|hsd2n|2018 SCC 28}}, [2018] 2 SCR 3{{perSCC|Côté J}}{{atL|hsd2n|49}}<Br> | ||
''R v Victoria'', 2018 ONCA 69 (CanLII), 359 CCC (3d) 179{{fix}}{{at|81}}<br> | ''R v Victoria'', 2018 ONCA 69 (CanLII), 359 CCC (3d) 179{{fix}}{{at|81}}<br> | ||
''R v Imola'', [http://canlii.ca/t/j184j 2019 ONCA 556] (CanLII){{ | ''R v Imola'', [http://canlii.ca/t/j184j 2019 ONCA 556] (CanLII){{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|j184j|17}} ("We are of the view that the trial judge erred in declining to hear the application. Trial judges have considerable discretion to manage the cases before them and an appellate court will not lightly interfere with that discretion. However, deference is not owed to unreasonable exercises of discretion")<Br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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==Questions of Fact== | ==Questions of Fact== | ||
Findings of fact are given deference on appeal.<ref> | Findings of fact are given deference on appeal.<ref> | ||
''R v D’Onofrio'', 2013 ONCA 145 | ''R v D’Onofrio'', {{CanLII|fwfwf|2013 ONCA 145}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|fwfwf|1}}<br> | ||
''R v Yi'', 2007 ONCA 185 | ''R v Yi'', {{CanLII|1qvpt|2007 ONCA 185}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|1qvpt|1}}<br> | ||
''R v JF'', 2016 ONCA 900 | ''R v JF'', {{CanLII|gvtp3|2016 ONCA 900}}{{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|gvtp3|7}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
The court of appeal should not substitute their own view of the evidence with the findings of facts of the trial judge.<ref> | The court of appeal should not substitute their own view of the evidence with the findings of facts of the trial judge.<ref> | ||
''R v Magagna'' (2003), 2003 CanLII 655 (ON CA), 173 C.C.C. (3d) 188 (Ont. C.A.){{ | ''R v Magagna'' (2003), [http://canlii.ca/t/1bz2d 2003 CanLII 655] (ON CA), 173 C.C.C. (3d) 188 (Ont. C.A.){{TheCourtONCA}}{{atL|1bz2d|12}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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The following have been found to be questions of fact and so reviewable on the palpable and overriding error: | The following have been found to be questions of fact and so reviewable on the palpable and overriding error: | ||
* findings of fact<ref> | * findings of fact<ref> | ||
''R v Biccum'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fqhdj 2012 ABCA 80] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}}{{ | ''R v Biccum'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fqhdj 2012 ABCA 80] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|fqhdj|10}}<br> | ||
''R v Fan'', [http://canlii.ca/t/gxrk4 2017 BCCA 99] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Dickson JA}}{{ | ''R v Fan'', [http://canlii.ca/t/gxrk4 2017 BCCA 99] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Dickson JA}}{{atL|gxrk4|47}}<Br> | ||
''R v Caron'', [http://canlii.ca/t/2fnq2 2011 BCCA 56] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Frankel JA}}{{ | ''R v Caron'', [http://canlii.ca/t/2fnq2 2011 BCCA 56] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Frankel JA}}{{atL|2fnq2|26}}<br> | ||
''R v Clark'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1jmfj 2005 SCC 2] (CanLII), [2005] 1 SCR 6{{perSCC|Fish J}}{{ | ''R v Clark'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1jmfj 2005 SCC 2] (CanLII), [2005] 1 SCR 6{{perSCC|Fish J}}{{atL|1jmfj|9}}<br> | ||
</ref>, including: | </ref>, including: | ||
** findings of fact relating to Charter breaches<ref> | ** findings of fact relating to Charter breaches<ref> | ||
''R v Schmidt'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fm8bm 2011 ABCA 216] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}}{{ | ''R v Schmidt'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fm8bm 2011 ABCA 216] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}}{{AtL|fm8bm|14}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
* Findings of credibility<ref> | * Findings of credibility<ref> | ||
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''R v Thomas'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1ttvl 1952 CanLII 7] (SCC), [1952] 2 SCR 344{{perSCC|Cartwright J}}<br> | ''R v Thomas'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1ttvl 1952 CanLII 7] (SCC), [1952] 2 SCR 344{{perSCC|Cartwright J}}<br> | ||
{{supra1|Clark}}{{at|9}}<br> | {{supra1|Clark}}{{at|9}}<br> | ||
''R v Morin'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1fs8t 1992 CanLII 40] (SCC), [1992] 3 SCR 286{{perSCC|Sopinka J}}{{atp|297}} ("a different theory of the facts and the inferences that could be drawn from those facts" are not a question of law)<br></ref> | ''R v Morin'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1fs8t 1992 CanLII 40] (SCC), [1992] 3 SCR 286{{perSCC|Sopinka J}}{{atp|297}} ("a different theory of the facts and the inferences that could be drawn from those facts" are not a question of law)<br> | ||
</ref> | |||
* whether an officer had an honest subjective belief in the existence of a ground<ref> | * whether an officer had an honest subjective belief in the existence of a ground<ref> | ||
{{{supra1|Biccum}}{{at|10}}</ref> | {{{supra1|Biccum}}{{at|10}}</ref> | ||
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A judge's assessment of evidence, such as whether a judge can rely on a document for the truth of its contents, is reviewed on a standard of palpable and overriding error that the finding of fact played an essential part in the reasoning.<ref> | A judge's assessment of evidence, such as whether a judge can rely on a document for the truth of its contents, is reviewed on a standard of palpable and overriding error that the finding of fact played an essential part in the reasoning.<ref> | ||
''R v Lohrer'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1jx8r 2004 SCC 80] (CanLII), [2004] 3 SCR 732{{perSCC|Binnie J}}{{ | ''R v Lohrer'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1jx8r 2004 SCC 80] (CanLII), [2004] 3 SCR 732{{perSCC|Binnie J}}{{atL|1jx8r|1}}<br> | ||
''R v Lee'', [http://canlii.ca/t/27scf 2010 ABCA 1] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} (2:1){{ | ''R v Lee'', [http://canlii.ca/t/27scf 2010 ABCA 1] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}} (2:1){{atL|27scf|8}}<br> | ||
''R v O'Neil'', [http://canlii.ca/t/frg82 2012 ABCA 162] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}}<br> | ''R v O'Neil'', [http://canlii.ca/t/frg82 2012 ABCA 162] (CanLII){{TheCourtABCA}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Reviewing inferences drawn from facts it is not sufficient that a different inference can be drawn from the facts.<ref> | Reviewing inferences drawn from facts it is not sufficient that a different inference can be drawn from the facts.<ref> | ||
''HL v Canada (Attorney General)'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1k864 2005 SCC 25] (CanLII), [2005] 1 SCR 401{{perSCC|Fish J}}{{ | ''HL v Canada (Attorney General)'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1k864 2005 SCC 25] (CanLII), [2005] 1 SCR 401{{perSCC|Fish J}}{{atL|1k864|74}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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{{seealso|Analyzing Testimony}} | {{seealso|Analyzing Testimony}} | ||
Matters of credibility are given considerable deference. <ref> | Matters of credibility are given considerable deference. <ref> | ||
''R v Gagnon'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1n54q 2006 SCC 17] (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 621{{perSCC|Bastarache and Abella JJ}}{{ | ''R v Gagnon'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1n54q 2006 SCC 17] (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 621{{perSCC|Bastarache and Abella JJ}}{{atL|1n54q|20}} (... “It is very difficult for a trial judge to articulate with precision the complex intermingling of impressions that emerge after watching and listening to witnesses and attempting to reconcile the various versions of events. That is why this court decided..., that in the absence of a palpable and overriding error by the trial judge, his or her perceptions should be respected.”) | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
The trial judge has a "significant advantage" of being able to see and hear the evidence.<ref> | The trial judge has a "significant advantage" of being able to see and hear the evidence.<ref> | ||
see ''R v W(R)'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1fsbj 1992 CanLII 56] (SCC), [1992] 2 SCR 122{{perSCC|McLachlin J}}{{atp|131}}<br> | see ''R v W(R)'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1fsbj 1992 CanLII 56] (SCC), [1992] 2 SCR 122{{perSCC|McLachlin J}}{{atp|131}}<br> | ||
{{supra1|Gagnon}}<br> | {{supra1|Gagnon}}<br> | ||
''R v Ceal'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fpn0l 2012 BCCA 19] (CanLII){{perBCCA|D Smith JA}}{{ | ''R v Ceal'', [http://canlii.ca/t/fpn0l 2012 BCCA 19] (CanLII){{perBCCA|D Smith JA}}{{AtL|fpn0l|24}}<br> | ||
''R v François'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1frqm 1994 CanLII 52] (SCC), [1994] 2 SCR 827{{perSCC|McLachlin J}}<br> | ''R v François'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1frqm 1994 CanLII 52] (SCC), [1994] 2 SCR 827{{perSCC|McLachlin J}}<br> | ||
''R v Horton'', [http://canlii.ca/t/23253 1999 BCCA 150] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Esson JA}}<br> | ''R v Horton'', [http://canlii.ca/t/23253 1999 BCCA 150] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Esson JA}}<br> | ||
''R v McLean'', [http://canlii.ca/t/2bd3r 2010 BCCA 341] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Ryan JA}}{{ | ''R v McLean'', [http://canlii.ca/t/2bd3r 2010 BCCA 341] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Ryan JA}}{{atL|2bd3r|51}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
It is assessed not just of “what was said, but how it was said.”<ref> | It is assessed not just of “what was said, but how it was said.”<ref> | ||
''R v Howe'' (2005), [http://canlii.ca/t/1jkc6 2005 CanLII 253] (ON CA), 192 CCC (3d) 480{{perONCA|Doherty JA}}{{ | ''R v Howe'' (2005), [http://canlii.ca/t/1jkc6 2005 CanLII 253] (ON CA), 192 CCC (3d) 480{{perONCA|Doherty JA}}{{atL|1jkc6|46}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Unless there is a "palpable and overriding error" in the findings of fact by the judge in assessing credibility, the findings should not be overturned.<ref> | Unless there is a "palpable and overriding error" in the findings of fact by the judge in assessing credibility, the findings should not be overturned.<ref> | ||
{{ibid1|Ceal}}{{ | {{ibid1|Ceal}}{{atL|fpn0l|25}}<br> | ||
''R v Jacobs'', [http://canlii.ca/t/ggfk7 2015 BCCA 83] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Neilson JA}}{{At|44}}<br> | ''R v Jacobs'', [http://canlii.ca/t/ggfk7 2015 BCCA 83] (CanLII){{perBCCA|Neilson JA}}{{At|44}}<br> | ||
{{supra1|Gagnon}}{{ | {{supra1|Gagnon}}{{atL|1n54q|20}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Sufficiency of reasons in determining credibility are also accorded deference.<ref> | Sufficiency of reasons in determining credibility are also accorded deference.<ref> | ||
see ''R v Dinardo'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1wtt2 2008 SCC 24] (CanLII), [2008] 1 SCR{{perSCC|Charron J}}{{ | see ''R v Dinardo'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1wtt2 2008 SCC 24] (CanLII), [2008] 1 SCR{{perSCC|Charron J}}{{atL|1wtt2|26}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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A question that is of mixed fact and law will be considered on a standard of "palpable and overriding error".<ref> | A question that is of mixed fact and law will be considered on a standard of "palpable and overriding error".<ref> | ||
''Housen v Nikolaisen'', [http://canlii.ca/t/51tl 2002 SCC 33] (CanLII), [2002] 2 SCR 235{{perSCC|Iacobucci and Major JJ}}{{ | ''Housen v Nikolaisen'', [http://canlii.ca/t/51tl 2002 SCC 33] (CanLII), [2002] 2 SCR 235{{perSCC|Iacobucci and Major JJ}}{{atsL|51tl|8| to 37}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Where the judge has considered all evidence required by law and comes to the wrong conclusion. This will be an error of mixed fact and law.<ref> | Where the judge has considered all evidence required by law and comes to the wrong conclusion. This will be an error of mixed fact and law.<ref> | ||
''Hunter v Southam'', [1984] 2 SCR 145, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mgc1 1984 CanLII 33] (SCC){{perSCC|Dickson J}}{{ | ''Hunter v Southam'', [1984] 2 SCR 145, [http://canlii.ca/t/1mgc1 1984 CanLII 33] (SCC){{perSCC|Dickson J}}{{AtsL|1mgc1|41| to 45}}<Br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
However, where the issue may appear to be of mixed fact and law but relates to a failure to consider one or more factual findings, such error will normally be treated as a question of fact and not a mixed question.<ref> | However, where the issue may appear to be of mixed fact and law but relates to a failure to consider one or more factual findings, such error will normally be treated as a question of fact and not a mixed question.<ref> | ||
{{supra1|Southam}}{{ | {{supra1|Southam}}{{atL|1mgc1|39}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Where the question involves "the application of a legal standard to a set of facts", then it is a mixed question of fact and law.<ref> | Where the question involves "the application of a legal standard to a set of facts", then it is a mixed question of fact and law.<ref> | ||
{{supra1|Housen v Nikolaisen}}{{ | {{supra1|Housen v Nikolaisen}}{{atL|51tl|27}}<br> | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
The following have also been considered questions of "mixed fact and law": | The following have also been considered questions of "mixed fact and law": | ||
* A defence appeal of conviction to [[Guilty Plea|withdraw a guilty plea]]<ref> | * A defence appeal of conviction to [[Guilty Plea|withdraw a guilty plea]]<ref> | ||
''R v Miller'', [http://canlii.ca/t/flps0 2011 NBCA 52] (CanLII){{perNBCA|Richard JA}}{{ | ''R v Miller'', [http://canlii.ca/t/flps0 2011 NBCA 52] (CanLII){{perNBCA|Richard JA}}{{atL|flps0|6}}</ref> | ||
* [[Voluntariness]] of a statement<ref> | * [[Voluntariness]] of a statement<ref> | ||
''R v Petri'', [http://canlii.ca/t/5fc5 2003 MBCA 1] (CanLII){{perMBCA|Kroft JA}}{{ | ''R v Petri'', [http://canlii.ca/t/5fc5 2003 MBCA 1] (CanLII){{perMBCA|Kroft JA}}{{atL|5fc5|35}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Revision as of 20:21, 19 August 2019
General Principles
All reviewable decisions made by a judge can be seen as answering one of three categories of questions:[1]
- questions of law: what is the correct legal test to be applied
- questions of fact: what took place between the parties
- questions of mixed law and fact: whether the facts satisfy the correct legal tests[2]
All questions of law are to be reviewed on a standard of "correctness".[3] All questions of fact are reviewed on a standard of "palpable and overriding error".
All findings of facts are questions of fact.[4]
A question of law inquire into the "correct legal test" to be applied for a particular legal issue or the "the application of a legal standard" to facts.[5] This also includes the interpretation of a legal standard[6] and the application of a standard to settled facts.[7] However, where the facts are in dispute, it is most likely a question of mixed fact and law.[8]
Where the question is neither purely a question of law or question of fact, then it is considered a question of "questions of mixed law and fact".
- Exercises of Discretion
The appellate court owes deference to exercises of discretion. However, where the exercise is unreasonable, then no deference is required.[9]
- ↑ Housen v Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 (CanLII), [2002] 2 SCR 235, per Iacobucci and Major JJ, at paras 8, 10 to 12, 26, 31, 39, 72, and 101
- ↑ see also Saint-Jean v Mercier, 2002 SCC 15 (CanLII), [2002] 1 SCR 491, per Gothier J
- ↑
Housen v Nikolaisen, supra, at para 8
R v Mooney, 2005 NLCA 49 (CanLII), per Rowe JA, at para 18
- ↑ R v Shepherd, 2009 SCC 35 (CanLII), per McLachlin CJ and Charron J
- ↑
Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 778 (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 982, per Bastarache J, at para 37
Saint-Jean v Mercier, 2002 SCC 15 (CanLII), [2002] 1 SCR 491, per Gothier J, at para 33
R v Araujo, 2000 SCC 65 (CanLII), [2000] 2 SCR 992, per LeBel J, at para 18
Shepherd, supra
R v Brooks, 2000 SCC 11 (CanLII), per Bastarache J
- ↑ R v Ewanchuk, 1999 CanLII 711 (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 330, per Major J, at para 21
- ↑ R v Mara, 1997 CanLII 363 (SCC), [1997] 2 SCR 630, per Sopinka J, at paras 18-19
- ↑ R v Grouse, 2004 NSCA 108 (CanLII), per Cromwell JA, at para 44
- ↑
Haaretz.com v Goldhar, 2018 SCC 28, [2018] 2 SCR 3, per Côté J, at para 49
R v Victoria, 2018 ONCA 69 (CanLII), 359 CCC (3d) 179(complete citation pending), at para 81
R v Imola, 2019 ONCA 556 (CanLII), per curiam, at para 17 ("We are of the view that the trial judge erred in declining to hear the application. Trial judges have considerable discretion to manage the cases before them and an appellate court will not lightly interfere with that discretion. However, deference is not owed to unreasonable exercises of discretion")
Questions of Law
Questions of Fact
Findings of fact are given deference on appeal.[1] The court of appeal should not substitute their own view of the evidence with the findings of facts of the trial judge.[2]
Where a palpable and overriding error has been found, the judge may intervene with its view of the evidence as well as draw inferences based on that evidence.[3]
The following have been found to be questions of fact and so reviewable on the palpable and overriding error:
- findings of fact[4], including:
- findings of fact relating to Charter breaches[5]
- Findings of credibility[6]
- whether an inference can be drawn from established facts[7]
- whether an officer had an honest subjective belief in the existence of a ground[8]
- assessing the weight given to an item of evidence or evidence as a whole in determining whether it meets the standard of proof[9]
A judge's assessment of evidence, such as whether a judge can rely on a document for the truth of its contents, is reviewed on a standard of palpable and overriding error that the finding of fact played an essential part in the reasoning.[10]
Reviewing inferences drawn from facts it is not sufficient that a different inference can be drawn from the facts.[11]
- ↑
R v D’Onofrio, 2013 ONCA 145, per curiam, at para 1
R v Yi, 2007 ONCA 185, per curiam, at para 1
R v JF, 2016 ONCA 900, per curiam, at para 7
- ↑ R v Magagna (2003), 2003 CanLII 655 (ON CA), 173 C.C.C. (3d) 188 (Ont. C.A.), per curiam, at para 12
- ↑ L(H) v Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 25 (CanLII), per Fish J
- ↑
R v Biccum, 2012 ABCA 80 (CanLII), per curiam, at para 10
R v Fan, 2017 BCCA 99 (CanLII), per Dickson JA, at para 47
R v Caron, 2011 BCCA 56 (CanLII), per Frankel JA, at para 26
R v Clark, 2005 SCC 2 (CanLII), [2005] 1 SCR 6, per Fish J, at para 9
- ↑
R v Schmidt, 2011 ABCA 216 (CanLII), per curiam, at para 14
- ↑ R v Brooks, 2000 SCC 11 (CanLII), per Bastarache J
- ↑
R v Thomas, 1952 CanLII 7 (SCC), [1952] 2 SCR 344, per Cartwright J
Clark, supra, at para 9
R v Morin, 1992 CanLII 40 (SCC), [1992] 3 SCR 286, per Sopinka J, at p. 297 ("a different theory of the facts and the inferences that could be drawn from those facts" are not a question of law)
- ↑ {Biccum, supra, at para 10
- ↑
R v Powell, 2010 ONCA 105 (CanLII), per Juransz JA, at para 40
R v AA, 2015 ONCA 558 (CanLII), per Watt JA, at para 65
- ↑
R v Lohrer, 2004 SCC 80 (CanLII), [2004] 3 SCR 732, per Binnie J, at para 1
R v Lee, 2010 ABCA 1 (CanLII), per curiam (2:1), at para 8
R v O'Neil, 2012 ABCA 162 (CanLII), per curiam
- ↑
HL v Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 25 (CanLII), [2005] 1 SCR 401, per Fish J, at para 74
Reviewing Findings of Credibility
Matters of credibility are given considerable deference. [1] The trial judge has a "significant advantage" of being able to see and hear the evidence.[2] It is assessed not just of “what was said, but how it was said.”[3]
Unless there is a "palpable and overriding error" in the findings of fact by the judge in assessing credibility, the findings should not be overturned.[4]
Sufficiency of reasons in determining credibility are also accorded deference.[5]
- ↑ R v Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17 (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 621, per Bastarache and Abella JJ, at para 20 (... “It is very difficult for a trial judge to articulate with precision the complex intermingling of impressions that emerge after watching and listening to witnesses and attempting to reconcile the various versions of events. That is why this court decided..., that in the absence of a palpable and overriding error by the trial judge, his or her perceptions should be respected.”)
- ↑
see R v W(R), 1992 CanLII 56 (SCC), [1992] 2 SCR 122, per McLachlin J, at p. 131
Gagnon, supra
R v Ceal, 2012 BCCA 19 (CanLII), per D Smith JA, at para 24
R v François, 1994 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1994] 2 SCR 827, per McLachlin J
R v Horton, 1999 BCCA 150 (CanLII), per Esson JA
R v McLean, 2010 BCCA 341 (CanLII), per Ryan JA, at para 51 - ↑ R v Howe (2005), 2005 CanLII 253 (ON CA), 192 CCC (3d) 480, per Doherty JA, at para 46
- ↑
Ceal, ibid., at para 25
R v Jacobs, 2015 BCCA 83 (CanLII), per Neilson JA, at para 44
Gagnon, supra, at para 20
- ↑ see R v Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24 (CanLII), [2008] 1 SCR, per Charron J, at para 26
Question of Mixed Fact and Law
A question that is of mixed fact and law will be considered on a standard of "palpable and overriding error".[1]
Where the judge has considered all evidence required by law and comes to the wrong conclusion. This will be an error of mixed fact and law.[2]
However, where the issue may appear to be of mixed fact and law but relates to a failure to consider one or more factual findings, such error will normally be treated as a question of fact and not a mixed question.[3]
Where the question involves "the application of a legal standard to a set of facts", then it is a mixed question of fact and law.[4]
The following have also been considered questions of "mixed fact and law":
- A defence appeal of conviction to withdraw a guilty plea[5]
- Voluntariness of a statement[6]
- ↑
Housen v Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 (CanLII), [2002] 2 SCR 235, per Iacobucci and Major JJ, at paras 8 to 37
- ↑
Hunter v Southam, [1984] 2 SCR 145, 1984 CanLII 33 (SCC), per Dickson J, at paras 41 to 45
- ↑ Southam, supra, at para 39
- ↑
Housen v Nikolaisen, supra, at para 27
- ↑ R v Miller, 2011 NBCA 52 (CanLII), per Richard JA, at para 6
- ↑ R v Petri, 2003 MBCA 1 (CanLII), per Kroft JA, at para 35