Possession of Stolen Property (Offence): Difference between revisions

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Merely getting into a stolen vehicle that was known to be stolen is not enough to establish possession or control.<Ref>

~~''R v~~ Terrence~~'', [http://canlii.ca/t/~~1vqzk 1980 CanLII 74] (ON CA){{perONCA|MacKinnon CJ}}("With deference, in my view, the mere getting into a stolen vehicle knowing it to be stolen, without more, would not be sufficient to establish the measure of control which I conclude is necessary to satisfy the requirement of the subsection.")

{{CanLIIR|Terrence|1vqzk|1980 CanLII 74 (ON CA)}}{{perONCA|MacKinnon CJ}}("With deference, in my view, the mere getting into a stolen vehicle knowing it to be stolen, without more, would not be sufficient to establish the measure of control which I conclude is necessary to satisfy the requirement of the subsection.")

</ref>

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Insofar as s. 359 requires admission of irrelevant or purely character evidence, it violates s. 7 of the Charter and should be "read down" to exclude irrelevant evidence.

<ref>

~~''R v~~ Hewitt~~'', [http://canlii.ca/t/~~g9vsb 1986 CanLII 4716] (MB CA){{perMBCA|Huband JA}} ("The admission of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence by virtue of s. 317(1) is surely contrary to the principles of fundamental justice. ")<Br>

{{CanLIIR|Hewitt|g9vsb|1986 CanLII 4716 (MB CA)}}{{perMBCA|Huband JA}} ("The admission of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence by virtue of s. 317(1) is surely contrary to the principles of fundamental justice. ")<Br>

~~''R v~~ Guyett~~'', [http://canlii.ca/t/~~g9nxc 1989 CanLII 7202] (ON CA){{perONCA|Brooke JA}}("It is sufficient to say that I agree with the judgment of the majority in Hewitt that s. 317 goes much farther than the general rules of admissibility and that under it, evidence of bad character can be introduced even if it shows nothing more. To this extent, the section violates the principles of fundamental justice and the guarantee in s. 7 of the Charter. In my opinion, this section cannot be read down.")

{{CanLIIR|Guyett|g9nxc|1989 CanLII 7202 (ON CA)}}{{perONCA|Brooke JA}}("It is sufficient to say that I agree with the judgment of the majority in Hewitt that s. 317 goes much farther than the general rules of admissibility and that under it, evidence of bad character can be introduced even if it shows nothing more. To this extent, the section violates the principles of fundamental justice and the guarantee in s. 7 of the Charter. In my opinion, this section cannot be read down.")

</ref>

@@ Line 262: / Line 262: @@
 Merely getting into a stolen vehicle that was known to be stolen is not enough to establish possession or control.<Ref>
-''R v Terrence'', [http://canlii.ca/t/1vqzk 1980 CanLII 74] (ON CA){{perONCA|MacKinnon CJ}}("With deference, in my view, the mere getting into a stolen vehicle knowing it to be stolen, without more, would not be sufficient to establish the measure of control which I conclude is necessary to satisfy the requirement of the subsection.")
+{{CanLIIR|Terrence|1vqzk|1980 CanLII 74 (ON CA)}}{{perONCA|MacKinnon CJ}}("With deference, in my view, the mere getting into a stolen vehicle knowing it to be stolen, without more, would not be sufficient to establish the measure of control which I conclude is necessary to satisfy the requirement of the subsection.")
 </ref>
@@ Line 362: / Line 362: @@
 Insofar as s. 359 requires admission of irrelevant or purely character evidence, it violates s. 7 of the Charter and should be "read down" to exclude irrelevant evidence.
 <ref>
-''R v Hewitt'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g9vsb 1986 CanLII 4716] (MB CA){{perMBCA|Huband JA}} ("The admission of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence by virtue of s. 317(1) is surely contrary to the principles of fundamental justice. ")<Br>
+{{CanLIIR|Hewitt|g9vsb|1986 CanLII 4716 (MB CA)}}{{perMBCA|Huband JA}} ("The admission of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence by virtue of s. 317(1) is surely contrary to the principles of fundamental justice. ")<Br>
-''R v Guyett'', [http://canlii.ca/t/g9nxc 1989 CanLII 7202] (ON CA){{perONCA|Brooke JA}}("It is sufficient to say that I agree with the judgment of the majority in Hewitt that s. 317 goes much farther than the general rules of admissibility and that under it, evidence of bad character can be introduced even if it shows nothing more. To this extent, the section violates the principles of fundamental justice and the guarantee in s. 7 of the Charter. In my opinion, this section cannot be read down.")
+{{CanLIIR|Guyett|g9nxc|1989 CanLII 7202 (ON CA)}}{{perONCA|Brooke JA}}("It is sufficient to say that I agree with the judgment of the majority in Hewitt that s. 317 goes much farther than the general rules of admissibility and that under it, evidence of bad character can be introduced even if it shows nothing more. To this extent, the section violates the principles of fundamental justice and the guarantee in s. 7 of the Charter. In my opinion, this section cannot be read down.")
 </ref>