Child Pornography Private Use Defence

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This page was last substantively updated or reviewed January 2021. (Rev. # 94053)

General Principles

See also: Definition of Child Pornography and Child Pornography Defences
Constitutional Exemption

There is a constitutional exemption for the class of materials that are for private use.[1] This consists of:[2]

  1. Self-created expressive material: i.e., any written material or visual representation created by the accused alone, and held by the accused alone, exclusively for his or her own personal use; or
  2. Private recording of lawful sexual activity: i.e. any visual recording created by or depicting the accused, provided it does not depict unlawful sexual activity and is held by the accused exclusively for private use.

The only persons who can possess CP under the private use exception is the “creator and the persons depicted therein.”[3]

The interpretation of “private use” is not a strict “bright line” and can include passing on materials for safe-keeping.[4]

Burden of Proof

When the accused raises an "air of reality" to the defence, the crown has the burden of disproving the applicability of the defence beyond a reasonable doubt.[5] This can be raised by evidence "that the parties intended the ... material for the private use of [the victim] as well as that of the [accused], sometimes called a mutuality of benefit. Also, the evidence must show that [the victim's] consent was obtained in circumstances precluding her exploitation or abuse."[6]

Applicable Charges

This defence may also apply to distribution as well as possession.[7]


  1. ↑ R v Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2 (CanLII), [2001] 1 SCR 45, per McLachlin CJ, at para 75
  2. ↑ Sharpe, ibid., at para 115
  3. ↑ Sharpe, ibid., at para 116
  4. ↑ R v Dabrowski, 2007 ONCA 619 (CanLII), 226 CCC (3d) 536, per MacPherson JA
  5. ↑ Sharpe, ibid., at para 116
    R v Cockell, 2013 ABCA 112 (CanLII), 299 CCC (3d) 221, per Bielby JA, at paras 33 to 36
  6. ↑ Cockell, ibid., at para 36
  7. ↑ R v Keough (No. 1), 2011 ABQB 48 (CanLII), 267 CCC (3d) 193, per Manderscheid J, at para 282

First Exception

The exception protects any visual or written materials created by the accused and held for personal use.[1] Despite the recognition that the private holding of these materials can fuel fantasies and promote distortions, the value of expression outweighs the dangers.[2]

Dual Purposes

Possession of materials for any other purpose other than private use will not be protected.[3] The materials should be kept in "strict privacy" by the person in possession.[4]

  1. ↑ R v Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2 (CanLII), [2001] 1 SCR 45, per McLachlin CJ, at para 115 ("The first category would protect written or visual expressions of thought, created through the efforts of a single individual, and held by that person for his or her eyes alone. The teenager’s confidential diary would fall within this category, as would any other written work or visual representation confined to a single person in its creation, possession and intended audience.")
  2. ↑ R v Fisher, 2022 SKCA 78 (CanLII), per Tholl JA, at para 40 (" While such material still engenders potential harm by promoting cognitive distortion and fueling fantasies, the Supreme Court determined that the expressive value outweighs the harm. In my view, the requirement that such material be self-created and remain completely private weighed heavily in the balancing that resulted in this exception.")
  3. ↑ Sharpe, supra, at paras 116, 118 and 128(8)
  4. ↑ Sharpe, supra, at para 116

Second Exception

The second exception protects “person’s possession of visual recordings created by or depicting that person, but only where these recordings do not depict unlawful sexual activity, are held only for private use, and were created with the consent of those persons depicted.”[1]

The test requires:[2]

  1. materials depict lawful sexual activity;
  2. the activity posed a "nominal risk" to the child;[3]
  3. the materials were made with the consent of the persons depicted (ie. all parties involved);
  4. consent was not obtained by any exploitation or abuse of the subject;
  5. the materials is in possession of the creator of the material or participant to the sexual activity; and
  6. was held for private use.
Unlawful Activities

The capturing of a sex act with a person who is not legally permitted to consent to the sex act will not fall within the private use defence.[4]

Nominal Risk

The defence is only applicable to "expressive conduct" that is of "nominal risk" to children.[5]

Cannot Involve Exploitation

"Lawful" requirement does not simply mean it is conduct that is not criminal but can include the absence of "exploitation" or "abuse."[6]

Imaginary Imagery

The fact that the depictions are "fictitious" or "imaginary" does not negate the "unlawful" nature of the activity.[7]

Self-fulfilment an self-actualization

The materials must have a "potential connection to self-fulfilment and self-actualization."[8] These purposes have bearing on adolescents in ways that include "sexual exploration and identity" and could "conceivably reinforce healthy sexual relationships."[9]


Mutual Benefit

There is some suggestion that there must also be a mutual benefit to all parties (ie. a requirement of "mutuality").[10]

The defence does not cover the distribution of private use materials without consent.[11]

Child participants in lawful private use materials must be aged 14 to 17 years old.[12]


  1. ↑ Sharpe, supra, at para 128
  2. ↑ Sharpe, supra, at para 116
    Cockell, supra, at paras 36 to 39
    Barabash, supra
  3. ↑ see Barabash, supra (ABCA), at para 36
  4. ↑ Cockell, supra, at paras 10 to 14 - suggests that pictures of sex between accused and a 13-year-old female cannot be private use.
  5. ↑ R v Barabash, 2014 ABCA 126 (CanLII), 310 CCC (3d) 360, per curiam (2:1), at para 34, appealed at [2015] 2 SCR 522, 2015 SCC 29 (CanLII), per Karakatsanis J
  6. ↑ Barabash, supra (ABCA), at para 36
  7. ↑ R v Fisher, 2020 SKQB 197 (CanLII), at para 22
  8. ↑ Sharpe, supra, at para 120 ("Thus described, the proposed exception relates only to materials that pose a negligible risk of harm to children, while deeply implicating s. 2(b) values and the s. 7 liberty interest by virtue of their intensely private nature and potential connection to self-fulfilment and self-actualization. "
  9. ↑ Sharpe, supra, at para 109
  10. ↑ Cockell, supra, at paras 41 to 42
  11. ↑ R v Schultz, 2008 ABQB 679 (CanLII), 239 CCC (3d) 535, per Topolniski J, at paras 86 to 88
  12. ↑ R v Keough (No. 2), 2011 ABQB 312 (CanLII), 271 CCC (3d) 486, per Manderscheid J, at para 121

Third Party Possession

While not settled law, there is some authority to suggest that third-party (ie. persons not depicted in the materials) may also possess these materials (ie. "A records A for B").[1] By contrast an "owner" is someone who is a participant in the recording or is the creator of the recording.[2]

The expectation it that the "owner" must maintain control over the materials for the defence to apply to the third party. Factors to consider whether the owners maintain control include:[3]

  1. the recipient of the material,
  2. the purpose or reason for the transfer,
  3. what the third party recipient was told were the criteria for the transfer,
  4. the residual control of the ‘owners’ over the private use materials, and
  5. whether the private use materials were viewed by anyone other than its ‘owners’.

Third party possession of private use materials is illegal when it is: [4]

  1. without the consent of all persons recorded,
  2. obtained by fraud or deception,
  3. a result of coercion, threat, or extortion,
  4. results in the loss of control of the private use material,
  5. in exchange for any form of consideration, or
  6. otherwise exploitive or abusive.

Generally, the third party recipient will be an intimate partner of the "owner."[5]

There is some suggestion that the "owners" of the materials may withdraw their consent to remove the exception.[6]

All tranfers to third parties in exchange for payment is exploitive.[7]

  1. ↑ R v Keough (No. 1), 2011 ABQB 48 (CanLII), 267 CCC (3d) 193, per Manderscheid J, at paras 267 to 277
    R v Joseph, 2020 ONCA 733 (CanLII), per curiam, at para 163
    contra R v Bono, 2008 CanLII 51780 (ON SC), OJ No 3928, per DiTomaso J
    see also R v John, 2018 ONCA 702 (CanLII), 366 CCC (3d) 136, per Pardu JA, at para 37
  2. ↑ Keough (No. 1), supra, at para 284
  3. ↑ Keough (No. 1), supra, at para 288
    R v Dabrowski, 2007 ONCA 619 (CanLII), 226 CCC (3d) 536, per MacPherson JA, at para 30
  4. ↑ Keough (No. 1), supra, at paras 71, 293
  5. ↑ Keough (No. 1), supra, at para 294
  6. ↑ Keough (No. 1), supra, at paras 288 to 289 - discusses the implication of loss of "owner's" control and ability to seek its return or destruction
  7. ↑ Keough (No. 1), supra, at paras 291 to 292

Exploitation

See also: Sexual Exploitation (Offence)

The victim of exploitation need not be aware that they are being exploited. Exploitation of a victim will often produce a lack objectivity in the victim or ability to appreciate the nature of the exploitation.[1]

Establishing exploitation goes beyond a "moral taste test."[2]

Factors considered include:[3]

  • age difference;
  • circumstances of their meeting;
  • speed at which their relationship escalated;
  • active pursuit of sexual contact before face-to-face meeting
  • accused possessing images of other children;
  1. ↑ R v Cockell, 2013 ABCA 112 (CanLII), 299 CCC (3d) 221, per Bielby JA, at para 38
  2. ↑ Cockell, ibid., at para 39
  3. ↑ Cockell, ibid., at paras 43 to 46
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