Criminal Law Notebook

Reasonable and Probable Grounds

Revision as of 07:04, 23 July 2024 by Admin (talk | contribs) (Text replacement - "\{\{Fr\|([^\}\}]+)\}\}" to "Fr:$1")
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
This page was last substantively updated or reviewed August 2022. (Rev. # 95657)

General Principles

See also: Reasonable Suspicion

The legal standard of "reasonable and probable grounds" is employed in many aspects of law enforcement. It is the threshold that a peace officer must satisfy before certain powers can be employed including arrest and searches.

This level of proof is the calibrated to where "the state’s interest in detecting and preventing crime begins to prevail over the individual’s interest in being left alone."[1]

Objectively Reasonable

The reasonableness requires that the grounds be justifiable from an objective point of view. A reasonable person placed in the position of the officer must be able to find that the grounds exist.[2]

Between Suspicion and Balance of Probabilities

The standard of reasonable grounds to believe is greater than reasonable suspicion but less than on a balance of probabilities when the totality of the circumstances are considered.[3] It is also greater than "[m]ere suspicion, conjecture, hypothesis or ‘fishing expeditions’."[4]

Contrast with BARD and Prima Facie Standard

It does not equate with "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" or to a "prima facie case."[5] It is not "proof absolute."[6]

Reasonable grounds is a standard lower than a prima facie case and is less than a balance of probabilities.[7]

Contrast to Reasonable Suspicion

It is higher than "reasonable suspicion"[8], which is where "a constellation of objectively discernible facts which give the detaining officer reasonable cause to suspect that the detainee is criminally implicated in the activity under investigation"[9]

Identical Standards

In more recent times the standard has also been called "reasonable grounds to believe"[10] , "reasonable belief"[11], "reasonable probability", and to a lesser extent "probable cause."[12] However, neither of these names have lasted.[13]

Constitutional Baseline

The Charter requires that any statutory provisions enabling search and seizure must be based on "reasonable and probable grounds, established upon oath, to believe that an offence has been committed and that there is evidence to be found at the place of the search"[14] These requirements set out the "minimum standard, consistent with s. 8 of the Charter, for authorizing search and seizure."[15]

When Grounds May be Challenged

In most cases, the grounds underlying police authority can only be challenged by way of a Charter application. Absent the application, the sufficiency of grounds are presumed.[16]

Re-Stating the Standard

Appellate judges should avoid re-articulating the standard for reasonable grounds using new language as it risks obscuring not clarifying the law.[17]

Appellate Review

Whether the judge's factual findings amount to "reasonable and probable grounds" is a question of law and is reviewable on a standard of correctness.[18]

  1. ↑ Hunter v Southam, 1984 CanLII 33 (SCC), [1984] 2 SCR 145, per Dickson J, at p. 167 (cited to SCR)
    R v Sanchez, 1994 CanLII 5271 (ONSC), 93 CCC (3d) 357 at 367 (Ont.Ct. Gen.Div.), per Hill J ("The appropriate standard of reasonable or credibly based probability envisions a practical, non-technical and common sense probability as to the existence of the facts and inferences asserted.")
    R v Ngo, 2011 ONSC 6676 (CanLII), OJ No 5023, per Hill J, at para 35
  2. ↑ Storrey, supra, at pp. 250-1
  3. ↑ Shinkewski, supra, at para 13 ("an arresting officer is not required to establish the commission of an indictable offence on a balance of probabilities ... or a prima facie case for conviction (R v Storrey) before making the arrest; but an arresting officer must act on something more than a “reasonable suspicion” or a hunch")
    R v Herta, 2018 ONCA 927 (CanLII), 143 OR (3d) 721, per Fairburn JA, at para 20 (RPG "falls short of a balance of probabilities") R v Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72 (CanLII), 305 CCC (3d) 421, per Watt JA, at para 81
  4. ↑ Sanchez, supra, at para 31
  5. ↑ Ngo, supra, at para 35
    R v Jacobson, 2006 CanLII 12292 (ON CA), 207 CCC (3d) 270, per Rosenberg JA
  6. ↑ Ngo, supra, at para 35
    R v Smith, 1998 ABCA 418 (CanLII), 126 CCC (3d) 62, per Conrad J, at p. 77
  7. ↑ see R v Debot, 1986 CanLII 113 (ON CA), 17 OAC 141, per Martin JA, affirmed 1989 CanLII 13 (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 1140, per Wilson J Storrey, supra, at pp. 250-1 - prima facie case not necessary Loewen, supra, at para 18
  8. ↑ Phung, supra, at para 11
  9. ↑ Phung, supra, at para 11
    R v Simpson, 1993 CanLII 3379 (ON CA), 12 OR (3d) 182, per Doherty JA, at p. 202
    R v Jacques, 1996 CanLII 174 (SCC), [1996] 3 SCR 312, per Gonthier J, at para 24
    Mann, supra, at para 27
  10. ↑ Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40 (CanLII), [2005] 2 SCR 100, per curiam, at para 114
    Baron v Canada, supra, at paras 42 to 44 - discussion of the difference between "reasonable grounds to believe" vs "reasonable and probable grounds"
    R v Loewen, 2011 SCC 21 (CanLII), [2011] 2 SCR 167, per McLachlin CJ, at para 5
  11. ↑ Debot (SCC), supra, at p. 213
  12. ↑ R v Law, 2002 BCCA 594 (CanLII), 171 CCC (3d) 219, per Huddart JA, at paras 3, 7
  13. ↑ e.g. R v Chehil, 2013 SCC 49 (CanLII), [2013] 3 SCR 220, per Karakatsanis J
  14. ↑ R v Morelli, 2010 SCC 8 (CanLII), [2010] 1 SCR 253, per Fish J, at para 39
    Hunter v Southam Inc, supra, at p. 168
    See also R v Vella, 1984 CanLII 3607 (ONSC), (1984) 14 CCC 513, per Henry J
    R v Harris, 1987 CanLII 181 (ON CA), 35 CCC (3d) 1, per Martin JA
  15. ↑ Hunter v Southam, supra, at p. 168
  16. ↑ See Charter Applications
  17. ↑ R v Santos, 2022 SKCA 50 (CanLII), per Kalmakoff JA, at para 28
    R v HA, 2018 ABCA 233 (CanLII), per Schutz JA (2:1)
  18. ↑ R v Dhillon, 2016 ONCA 308 (CanLII), 335 CCC (3d) 144, per Tulloch JA, at para 22
    R v Shepherd, 2009 SCC 35 (CanLII), [2009] 2 SCR 527, 309 DLR (4th) 139, per McLachlin CJ and Charron J, at paras 18, 20 ("[w]hile there can be no doubt that the existence of reasonable and probable grounds is grounded in the 'factual findings' of the trial judge, the issue of whether the facts as found by the trial judge amount at law to reasonable and probable grounds is a question of law")
    R v MacKenzie, 2013 SCC 50 (CanLII), [2013] 3 SCR 250, per Moldaver J, at para 54
    R v Feeney, 1997 CanLII 342 (SCC), [1997] 2 SCR 13, per Sopinka J, at paras 30, 33, 36
    R v Biccum, 2012 ABCA 80 (CanLII), 286 CCC (3d) 536, per Berger JA, at para 10
    R v Nicholson, 2011 ABCA 218 (CanLII), 510 AR 308, per curiam, at para 14
    R v Mehari, 2011 ABCA 67 (CanLII), 230 CRR (2d) 96, per curiam, at paras 13 to 14
    R v Loewen, 2010 ABCA 255 (CanLII), 260 CCC (3d) 296, per Slatter JA (2:1), at para 6, aff'd 2011 SCC 21 (CanLII), per McLachlin CJ
    R v Harding, 2010 ABCA 180 (CanLII), 256 CCC (3d) 284, per curiam, at paras 12 to 13
    R v Abdo, 2009 ABCA 340 (CanLII), 464 AR 147, per Costigan JA, at para 5
    R v Dill, 2009 ABCA 332 (CanLII), 464 AR 92, per Costigan JA, at para 4

Credibility-based Standard

Reasonable and probable grounds is the “the point where credibly-based probability replaces suspicion."[1] It is the reasonable belief that "an event not unlikely to occur for reasons that rise above mere suspicion."[2] "Reasonableness" concerns the legitimate expectations in the existence of certain facts. It can then be said that the belief in certain facts can be "reasonable" without being "probable."[3]

Credibility-based probability involves “a practical, non-technical, and common-sense assessment of the totality of the circumstances”.[4]

The "key elements" of a credibility based probability:[5]

  1. "The Information to obtain the warrant must set out sworn evidence sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for believing that an offence has been committed, that the things to be searched for will afford evidence and that the things in question will be found at a specked place"
  2. "The Information to obtain as a whole must be considered and peace officers, who generally will prepare these documents without legal assistance, should not be held to the 'specificity and legal precision expected of pleadings at the trial stage.'"
  3. "The affiant's reasonable belief does not have to be based on personal knowledge, but the Information to obtain must, in the totality of circumstances, disclose a substantial basis for the existence of the affiant's belief"
  4. "Where the affiant relies on information obtained from a police informer, the reliability of the information must be apparent and is to be assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances." This will include:
    1. Acceptance of hearsay from an informant, but an informer tip by itself is not enough;
    2. Assessment of a tip is in the "totality of circumstances" considering factors including a) degree of detail, b) informer's source of knowledge, c) the indicia of informer's reliability in the past and corroboration from other sources.
    3. the results of the search cannot be used as evidence of reliability
  1. ↑ Hunter v Southam, supra
    R v Phung, 2013 ABCA 63 (CanLII), 542 AR 392, per curiam, at para 11 ("As for what “reasonable grounds” itself means, the standard was first described in Hunter v Southam, ... as “the point where credibly-based probability replaces suspicion”. It has since been characterized in terms of “reasonable probability”: ... . This is a standard higher than a reasonable suspicion but less than a prima facie case: .... Reasonable suspicion, by contrast, exists where there is “a constellation of objectively discernible facts which give the detaining officer reasonable cause to suspect that the detainee is criminally implicated in the activity under investigation”:...")
    R v Hosie, 1996 CanLII 450 (ON CA), [1996] OJ No 2175 (ONCA), per Rosenberg JA, at para 11
  2. ↑ R v Loewen, 2010 ABCA 255 (CanLII), [2011] 2 WWR 15, 260 CCC (3d) 296, per Slatter JA (2:1), at para 18
    Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40 (CanLII), [2005] 2 SCR 100, per curiam, at para 114
    R v Mann, 2004 SCC 52 (CanLII), [2004] 3 SCR 59, per Iacobucci J, at paras 34, 41
    R v Hall, 1995 CanLII 647 (ON CA), 22 OR (3d) 289, per Osborne JA, at p. 298
    Baron v Canada, 1993 CanLII 154 (SCC), [1993] 1 SCR 416, per Sopinka J
  3. ↑ Loewen, supra, at para 18
    n.b. which is also why certain cases use the term reasonable grounds rather than reasonable and probable grounds
  4. ↑ R v Ballendine, 2011 BCCA 221 (CanLII), 271 CCC (3d) 418, per Frankel JA, at para 53
  5. ↑ R v Morris, 1998 NSCA 229 (CanLII), 134 CCC (3d) 539, per Cromwell JA

Totality of Circumstances

The "totality of the circumstances" must be considered in the assessment of grounds.[1] The purpose of emphasizing the "totality of the circumstances" is to "avoid concentrating on individual pieces of evidence."[2] Accordingly, the considerations of the evidence cannot be "piecemeal."[3]

Totality requires that the officer consider "all incriminating and exonerating information", but may disregard unreliable evidence.[4]

The officer must consider context including timing involved, events leading formation of grounds, and the dynamics at play.[5] Reasonable grounds need not be based on first hand knowledge.[6]

The factors of consideration must be "flexible". Courts should not put one factor "to the status of an essential prerequisite" to establish grounds.[7]

  1. ↑ R v Debot, 1989 CanLII 13 (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 1140, per Wilson J, at para 53 (" I concur with Martin J.A.'s view that the 'totality of the circumstances' must meet the standard of reasonableness. Weakness in one area may, to some extent, be compensated by strengths in the other two.")
    R v Garofoli, 1990 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 1421, per Sopinka J ("The reliability of the tip is to be assessed by recourse to the 'totality of the circumstances'. ")
  2. ↑ R v Slippery, 2014 SKCA 23 (CanLII), 433 Sask R 183, per Whitmore JA, at paras 21 to 22
    R v Skinkewski, 2012 SKCA 63 (CanLII), 289 CCC (3d) 145, per Caldwell JA, at para 13 ("a reviewing court must view the evidence available to an arresting officer cumulatively, not in a piecemeal fashion")
    R v Savage, 2011 SKCA 65 (CanLII), 371 Sask R 283, per Smith JA
    R v Nguyen, 2010 ABCA 146 (CanLII), 477 AR 39, per curiam
  3. ↑ Skinkewski, supra, at para 13
  4. ↑ Shinkewski, supra, at para 13 ("an arresting officer must consider all incriminating and exonerating information which the circumstances reasonably permit, but may disregard information which the officer has reason to believe may be unreliable: R v Storrey;")
  5. ↑ Skinkewski, supra, at para 13
    Nguyen, supra, at para 18
  6. ↑ R v Yorke, 1992 CanLII 2521 (NSCA), 115 NSR (2d) 426 (CA), per Roscoe JA; aff'd 1993 CanLII 83 (SCC), [1993] 3 SCR 647, per La Forest J
  7. ↑ R v Parsley, 2016 NLCA 51 (CanLII), 341 CCC (3d) 263, per Hoegg JA, at para 16
    R v Burke, 2011 NBCA 51 (CanLII), 275 CCC (3d) 90, per Richard JA

A Context-Specific Standard

"Reasonable and probable grounds" will mean different things in different contexts.[1]

The standard will depend on the nature of the state interest and the individual's privacy interest being intruded upon. What is "reasonable" must be "flexible if it is to be realistic and meaningful."[2]

Whether the grounds exist is a "fact-specific determination in each case."[3] The ground must be "considered in their totality, not isolated out for independent evaluation."[4]

Fair Context

The officer must take into account both inculpatory as well as exculpatory evidence. The only evidence that is unreliable can be ignored.[5] The officer must make inquiry as the circumstances reasonably permit.[6]

Search Warrants

In the context of a warrant search, there must be “reasonable and probable grounds, established upon oath, to believe that an offence has been committed and that there is evidence to be found at the place of the search”.[7]

  1. ↑ R v Bernshaw, 1995 CanLII 150 (SCC), [1995] 1 SCR 254, per L'Heureux-Dube J, at pp. 304-6
  2. ↑ R v McKinlay Transport Ltd., 1990 CanLII 137 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 627, per Wilson J
  3. ↑ R v Ngo, 2011 ONSC 6676 (CanLII), OJ No 5023, per Hill J, at para 35
  4. ↑ Ngo, ibid., at para 35
    R v Campbell, 2010 ONCA 588 (CanLII), 261 CCC (3d) 1, per Juriansz JA, at para 57 ("Considered independently each of these grounds may not have justified the authorization. However, a justice of the peace could have found from their cumulative effect that there were reasonable grounds to issue the warrant.")
    R v Nguyen, 2007 ONCA 24 (CanLII), per curiam, at para 4 ("The cumulative effect of the information demonstrated the existence of reasonable and probable grounds to believe that a grow operation would be found inside the house")
  5. ↑ Chartier v Quebec (A.G.), 1979 CanLII 17, , [1979] 2 SCR 474
  6. ↑ Golub, supra, at para 21
  7. ↑ Hunter v Southam, 1984 CanLII 33 (SCC), [1984] 2 SCR 145, per Dickson J, at p. 167 (cited to SCR)
    R v Campbell, 2011 SCC 32 (CanLII), [2011] 2 SCR 549, per Charron J, at para 14

Reliability of Information

The officer weighing evidence to be relied upon when justifying a search or arrest must be satisfied that:[1]

  1. was the information ... compelling?
  2. if the information is based on a tip, was the source credible?
  3. was the information corroborated prior to the police action?
Source of Assertion

The swearing officer's belief "does not have to be based on personal knowledge, but the information to obtain must, in the totality of circumstances, disclose a substantial basis for the existence of the affiant's belief."[2]

  1. ↑ R v Debot, 1989 CanLII 13 (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 1140, per Lamer J, at p. 215
  2. ↑ R v Morris, 1998 NSCA 229 (CanLII), 134 CCC (3d) 539, per Cromwell JA
    R v Yorke, 1992 CanLII 2521 (NSCA), 77 CCC (3d) 529; affirmed 1993 CanLII 83 (SCC), [1993] 3 SCR 647, 84 CCC (3d) 286

Subjective Factors

An officer must have a subjective belief that there are sufficient grounds.[1]

Experience, Training and Knowledge of Officer

The officer may use his training and experience in determining objective reasonableness.[2] For example, what may appear to be innocent objects to the general public may have a very different meaning to an officer experienced in drug operations[3] This objective standard while "standing in the shoes of the police officer" has been interpreted as taking into account the officer's experience and training.[4]

The subjective component does not require that the police officer specifically testifies to having a subjective belief. It can be inferred based on the surrounding circumstances.[5]

Assessment of reasonableness requires that the judge places themselves "in the position of the officer" and assess "the circumstances through the lens of someone who has the same experience, training, knowledge and skills as the officer."[6]

Operating on Agency

The searching or arresting officer may rely upon the assumption that the officer directing them has the requisite grounds.[7]

Mistaken Belief vs Reality

In assessing the reasonableness, the judge must "measure the facts as the police officer honestly understood them to be."[8]

The subjective grounds must be based on a bona fides belief to a relevant fact. It is not necessary that the fact actually be true.[9]

  1. ↑ R v Shinkewski, 2012 SKCA 63 (CanLII), 289 CCC (3d) 145, per Caldwell JA, at para 13 ("an arresting officer must subjectively hold reasonable grounds to arrest and those grounds must be justifiable from an objective point of view - in other words, a reasonable person placed in the position of the arresting officer must be able to conclude there were indeed reasonable grounds for the arrest")
  2. ↑ R v Biccum, 2012 ABCA 80 (CanLII), 286 CCC (3d) 536, per curiam, at para 21
    R v Lawes, 2007 ONCA 10 (CanLII), 72 WCB (2d) 487, per curiam, at para 4
    R v MacKenzie, 2011 SKCA 64 (CanLII), 86 CR (6th) 78, per Caldwell JA (3:0), at para 27, reserved (January 22, 2013) [2011] SCCA No 359
    R v Wilson, 2012 BCCA 517 (CanLII), 99 CR (6th) 76, per MacKenzie JA, at paras 18 to 44
    R v Smith, 1998 ABCA 418 (CanLII), 126 CCC (3d) 62, per Conrad JA, at para 30
    R v Sinclair, 2005 MBCA 41 (CanLII), 64 WCB (2d) 563, per Freedman JA, at para 14
    R v Messina, 2013 BCCA 499 (CanLII), 346 BCAC 179, per Stromberg-Stein JA - officer's experience with dial-a-dope R v Navales, 2011 ABQB 404 (CanLII), 520 AR 110, per Hughes J
    R v Acosta, 2014 BCCA 218 (CanLII), 356 BCAC 168, per Saunders JA
  3. ↑ R v Rajaratnam, 2006 ABCA 333 (CanLII), 214 CCC (3d) 547, per curiam, at para 25
    R v Kluczny, 2005 ABQB 350 (CanLII), 385 AR 182, per Moen J, at para 51
  4. ↑ R v Juan, 2007 BCCA 351 (CanLII), 222 CCC (3d) 289, per Thackray JA, at paras 27 to 28
  5. ↑ R v RMJT, 2014 MBCA 36 (CanLII), 311 CCC (3d) 185, per Cameron JA, at paras 56 to 58
    R v Jacob (J.A.), 2013 MBCA 29 (CanLII), 296 CCC (3d) 1, per Beard JA, at para 35
  6. ↑ Galye, supra, at para 38 ("The assessment of whether objective grounds existed involves placing a reasonable person in the position of the officer and having that person assess the circumstances through the lens of someone who has the same experience, training, knowledge and skills as the officer. If that reasonable person would reach the same conclusion as the police officer, then the grounds for arrest will be considered to be objectively reasonable")
  7. ↑ R v Chervinski, 2013 ABQB 29 (CanLII), per Hall J, at paras 21 to 22
    R v Debot, 1989 CanLII 13 (SCC), 52 CCC (3d) 193, per Wilson J, at para 50
  8. ↑ R v Slippery, 2014 SKCA 23 (CanLII), 433 Sask R 183, per Whitmore JA, at para 32
  9. ↑ Eccles v Bourque, 1974 CanLII 191 (SCC), [1975] 2 SCR 739

Objective Factors

The subjective belief must be reasonable.[1]

No Ex Post Facto Analysis

Evaluation of grounds is based on what facts the officer was aware of at the time. It not relevant whether the facts, circumstances or inferences made were in fact true. It is only whether it was reasonable for the officer to believe that the officer's believed facts, circumstances and inferences were reasonable.[2]

Any evidence that comes to light after the formation of the grounds is not relevant.[3]

  1. ↑ R v Shinkewski, 2012 SKCA 63 (CanLII), 289 CCC (3d) 145, per Caldwell JA, at para 13 ("an arresting officer must subjectively hold reasonable grounds to arrest and those grounds must be justifiable from an objective point of view - in other words, a reasonable person placed in the position of the arresting officer must be able to conclude there were indeed reasonable grounds for the arrest")
  2. ↑ R v Jacob (J.A.), 2013 MBCA 29 (CanLII), 296 CCC (3d) 1, per Beard JA, at para 35
    R v Slippery, 2014 SKCA 23 (CanLII), 433 Sask R 183, per Whitmore JA
  3. ↑ Slippery, ibid. - context of observing "post demand conduct" in an impaired driving investigation

Inferences

See also: Inferences

The Justice of the Peace may draw "reasonable inferences" from the information found in the ITO.[1]

"[R]easonable inference from the facts" can form the basis of reasonable and probable grounds.[2]

An officer may search for anything "relevant or rationally connected to the incident under investigation, the parties and their culpability, that gives rise to the authorized warrant.[3]

The standard remains the same for offences within the Code.[4]

The officer may rely upon the observed reactions of the suspect (including body movement, posture, etc) to the presence of police.[5]

Reliance odour alone can be problematic as the sense of smell can be "highly subjective."[6]

Judicial Notice

The justice of the peace may take "judicial notice of concrete local circumstances in assessing the adequacy of the officer’s statement."[7]

  1. ↑ See R v Durling, 2006 NSCA 124 (CanLII), 214 CCC (3d) 49, per MacDonald CJ, at paras 20, 27 to 28
    R v Schiers, 1973 CanLII 1488 (ONSC), [2003] NSJ No 453 (CA), at para 15
    R v Jackson, at p. 131
    Re Lubell and The Queen, 1973 CanLII 1488 (ON SC), 11 CCC (2d) 188, per Zuber J, at p. 190
    R v Sanchez, 1994 CanLII 5271 (ON SC), 93 CCC (3d) 357, per Hill J, at pp. 365, 370
    R v Church of Scientology (No. 6), at pp. 514-5
  2. ↑ R v Jacobson, 2006 CanLII 12292 (ON CA), [2006] OJ No 1527, per Rosenberg JA, at para 22
  3. ↑ R v Cunsolo, 2008 CanLII 48640 (ON SC), 180 CRR 174, per Hill J, at para 135
  4. ↑ R v Jacob (J.A.), at para 36
  5. ↑ R v Plummer, 2011 ONCA 350 (CanLII), 272 CCC (3d) 172, per MacPherson JA, at para 23 - referring to grounds of arrest
    R v Dene, 2010 ONCA 796 (CanLII), OJ No 5012, per curiam, at para 4
  6. ↑ R v Polashek, 1999 CanLII 3714 (ON CA), 134 CCC (3d) 187, per Rosenberg JA
    R v Barclay, 2018 ONCA 114 (CanLII), 44 CR (7th) 134, per Hoy ACJ, at para 36
  7. ↑ R v Lacelle, 2013 ONCA 390 (CanLII), 284 CRR (2d) 184, per curiam, at para 6

Compared to Suspicion

See also: Reasonable Suspicion

Reasonable suspicion requires a "reasonable possibility" of certainty while reasonable and probable grounds requires a "reasonable probability" of certainty.[1]

Where the police cannot obtain evidence without violating the Charter-based only on suspicion, conjecture, hypothesis or a "fishing expedition."[2]

The belief that the accused "may" have used a cell phone is a form of speculation and is insufficient to rely upon for an ITO targeting the phone.[3]

  1. ↑ R v Buchanan, 2020 ONCA 245 (CanLII), per Fairburn JA, at para 23 ("Reasonable grounds to suspect is a lower standard than reasonable grounds to believe. The first engages a reasonable possibility, while the latter engages a reasonable probability")
    R v Chehil, 2013 SCC 49 (CanLII), [2013] 3 SCR 220, per Karakatsanis J, at para 27
  2. ↑ R v Kokesch, 1990 CanLII 55 (SCC), [1990] 3 SCR 3, per Sopinka J ("Where the police have nothing but suspicion and no legal way to obtain other evidence, it follows that they must leave the suspect alone, not charge ahead and obtain evidence illegally and unconstitutionally.")
    R v Sanchez, 1994 CanLII 5271 (ON SC), 93 CCC (3d) 357, per Hill J
    R v Mahmood, 2008 CanLII 51774 (ON SC), 236 CCC (3d) 3, per Quigley J
  3. ↑ Mahmood, ibid.

In Arrest

In Search Warrants

See also: Judicial Authorization Standard of Review

| An affiant must have formed reasonable grounds before applying for a search warrant such as that found under s. 487.

The "reasonable grounds" standard has two components the "subjective" and "objective". In the context of a warrant the affiant swearing the ITO "must have a subjective belief that ... the search requested will yield evidence respecting the commission of an offence" and that an "objective assessment of the grounds justifies issuance of the warrant."[1]

While the objective component is the same as that addressed in grounds of arrest, the application in the contxt of a warrant is more "exacting."[2]

  1. ↑ R v Parsley, 2015 NLCA 51 (CanLII), per Welsh JA, at para 10
  2. ↑ Parsley, ibid.

Special Rules

Child Pornography

It is not necessary that an eye-witness claiming to have seen child pornography describe the contents of the image in order for the officer to form reasonable grounds.[1]

  1. ↑ R v Butters, 2014 ONCJ 228 (CanLII) (working hyperlinks pending), per Pacioccco J, at paras 15 to 16

Confidential Informers

See also: Confidential Informers

Where the basis of the warrant relies on a confidential informer, the requirement from R v Debot must be considered.[1] Generally, the requirement will increase "the level of verification required" where "credibility cannot be assessed", "fewer details are provided", and "the risk of innocent coincidence is greater". [2]

On review of a search warrant the issue is whether the evidence might reasonably be believed, not whether there is some guarantee that the infromer was telling the truth about criminal activity.[3]

  1. ↑ R v Hosie, 1996 CanLII 450 (ON CA), [1996] OJ No 2175 (ONCA), per Rosenberg JA, at para 12
    See R v Debot, 1989 CanLII 13 (SCC), 52 CCC (3d) 193, per Wilson J, at p. 215 (SCC)
  2. ↑ Debot, ibid., at p. 218
  3. ↑ R v Caissey, 2007 ABCA 380 (CanLII), 299 DLR (4th) 432, per Martin JA, at para 23, aff’d 2008 SCC 65 (CanLII), [2008] 3 SCR 451, per McLachlin CJ

Drunk Driving

Drug Trafficking and Possession

Where an unknown person makes a "furtive visit" that is short enough to suggest drug trafficking is going on, along with informant details that drugs are being sold out of the house, is enough to form grounds that the resident is in possession of drugs.[1]

Police cannot arrest a resident who answers the door of a marijuana grow operation without further grounds connecting the accused to the illegal activity. Please could have detained but not arrested.[2]

Evidence of a person leaving a property, by itself, "would not be sufficient to connect that person with the crime… Believed was being committed on the property”.[3] It follows that police cannot simply arrest everyone coming out of a residence believes to be a grow operation.[4]

In certain contexts, seeing an accused holding a cigarette with the palm facing the front of the cigarette can be used as evidence for reasonable grounds to believe he is smoking marijuana.[5]

  1. ↑ R v Charlton, 1992 CanLII 367 (BC CA), 16 WCB (2d) 423, per Cumming JA
  2. ↑ R v Orr, 2010 BCCA 513 (CanLII), 297 BCAC 54, per Low JA
  3. ↑ R v Doak, 2008 BCSC 1359 (CanLII), per Joyce J
  4. ↑ R v Settle, 2010 BCCA 426 (CanLII), 261 CCC (3d) 45, per Smith and Bennett JJA
  5. ↑ R v Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2014 ONCA 627 (CanLII), 316 CCC (3d) 87, per Strathy JA

See Also

Retrieved from "https://criminalnotebook.ca/index.php?title=Reasonable_and_Probable_Grounds&oldid=95657"