Interception of Private Communications

From Criminal Law Notebook


This page was last substantively updated or reviewed January 2023. (Rev. # 94937)

General Principles

Wiretaps are governed by Part VI of the Criminal Code (Invasion of Privacy (ss. 183 to 196.1)).

There are five categories of interception/wiretap:

Eligible Applicants, Offences and Level of Court

Authorizations for a third-party intercept under s. 185 and 186 can only be authorized by a judge of a superior court.

Type of Intercept Section Applicant Court Offences
Third-Party Intercept Authorizations 185 and 186
Designated Agent Superior s. 183 offences
(been committed only)
One-Party Consent (OPC) Intercept authorization 184.2 peace officer, public officer, Designated Agent Provincial or Superior Any
("has been or will be committed")
One-Party Consent Intercepts to Prevent Bodily Harm 184.1 NA NA Any
Third-Party Intercept to Prevent Serious Harm 184.4 NA NA s. 183 offences
(been committed only)
Emergency Intercepts 188 a designated peace officer Superior s. 183 offences
(been committed only)
Video Surveillance 487.01 Designated Agent Superior s. 183 offences
(been committed only)
Tracking Warrants 492.1(1) and 492.1(2) peace officer or public officer JP, Provincial or Superior Any
Warrantless

The One-Party Consent Wiretap to Prevent Bodily Harm (s. 184.1) and Third-Party Wiretap to Prevent Serious Harm (s. 184.4) do not require judicial authorization.

Section 8 of the Charter

An interception of a private communication under a Part VI authorization is a search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter.[1]

Offence

A wilful interception of "a private communication" without authorization is an indictable offence under s. 184 with a maximum penalty of 5 years. This offence does not include situations where one of the parties consents (s.184(2)).

Disclosure of Packet

The right to full answer and defence permits the accused to examine an edited version of the materials available to the authorizing judge to support the wiretap authorization.[2]

Vetting

The Crown and police have a positive obligation not to disseminate irrelevant private communications revealed within a wiretap.[3]

  1. R v Grant, 1999 CanLII 3694 (ON CA), 132 CCC (3d) 531, per Charron J, at p. 539 [CCC]
  2. R v Garofoli, 1990 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 1421, per Sopinka J, at pp. 1433, 1452 [SCR]
  3. R v Guess, 2000 BCCA 547 (CanLII), 148 CCC (3d) 321, per Hall J

History

The modern legislation protecting against the interception of private communications arose from the 1969 Ouimet report which resulted in the Protection of Privacy Act.[1]

Constitutionality

It was found that the interception regime in Part VI of the Code is constitutional.[2]

  1. R. Ouimet, Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, Towards Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1969) cited in detail at R v Nguyen, 2001 ABPC 52 (CanLII), 294 AR 201, per Stevenson ACJ, at para 17
    R v Lyons, 1984 CanLII 30 (SCC), [1984] 2 SCR 633, 15 CCC (3d) 417, per Estey J, at p. 453 (CCC) - comments on the origin of the wiretap provisions
  2. R v Finlay Grelette (1985) 23CCCC (3d) 38 at paras 63 to 64

Purpose

Modern electronic surveillance has been singled out as a particularly powerful form of privacy intrusion. But unregulated, it would destroy any sort of privacy and would threaten society.[1]

Part VI of the Code regulates the "power of the state to record communications that their originator expects will not be intercepted."[2] It avoids the "danger inherent in allowing the state, in its unfettered discretion, to record and transmit our words."[3]

These provisions aim to "strike a balance between the protection of privacy and the availability of effective law enforcement techniques". [4]

Electronic surveillance has the potential to "annihilate" any expectation of privacy in our communications. Society should not expose us to permanent electronic surveillance.[5]

Surveillance is one of the "the greatest leveler[s] of human privacy ever known".[6]

This provision has nothing to do with protecting persons from the risk that the recipient of the communication will divulge anything.[7]

  1. R v Duarte, 1990 CanLII 150 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 30, per LaForest J - Judge referring to electronic surveillance as "superbly" equipped to fight crime, but left unregulated would mean "privacy no longer had any meaning"
    R v Wong, 1990 CanLII 56 (SCC), [1990] 3 SCR 36, per LaForest J - Judge suggests that electronic surveillance would "annihilate privacy"
    R v Wise, 1992 CanLII 125 (SCC), [1992] 1 SCR 527, per LaForest J (dissenting) suggesting that surviellance was a "danger to individual autonomy and the organization of a free society”)
  2. R v Duarte, 1990 CanLII 150 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 30, per La Forest J R v Jones, 2017 SCC 60 (CanLII), [2017] 2 SCR 696, per Cote J, at para 60
  3. Duarte, supra
  4. R v Nguyen, 2001 ABPC 52 (CanLII), 294 AR 201, per Stevenson ACJ, at para 17
    Regina v Welsh and Iannuzzi (No. 6), 1977 CanLII 1215 (ON CA), 32 CCC (2d) 363, per Zuber JA (5:0), at p. 369
  5. Duarte, supra, at p. 11 (CCC)
    see also United States v White, 201 US 745 (1971), at p. 756 ("electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known")
  6. United States v White, 201 U.S. 745 (1971), at p. 756
  7. Duarte, supra ("has nothing to do with protecting individuals from the threat that their interlocutors will divulge communications that are meant to be private")

Misc Wiretap Terms

Definitions

183 In this Part [Pt. VI – Invasion of Privacy (ss. 183 to 196.1)],
"authorization" means an authorization to intercept a private communication given under subsection 184.‍2(3) [one-party consent wiretap – judge must be satisfied], section 186 [authorization of wiretap] or subsection 188(2) [emergency wiretaps – granting authorization]; (autorisation) ...
"police officer" means any officer, constable or other person employed for the preservation and maintenance of the public peace; (policier)
...
"public switched telephone network" means a telecommunication facility the primary purpose of which is to provide a land line-based telephone service to the public for compensation; (réseau téléphonique public commuté)
"radio-based telephone communication" means any radiocommunication within the meaning of the Radiocommunication Act that is made over apparatus that is used primarily for connection to a public switched telephone network; (communication radiotéléphonique)
"sell" includes offer for sale, expose for sale, have in possession for sale or distribute or advertise for sale; (vendre)
"solicitor" means, in the Province of Quebec, an advocate or a notary and, in any other province, a barrister or solicitor. (avocat)
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 183; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), ss. 7, 23, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), s. 213, c. 1 (4th Supp.), s. 13, c. 29 (4th Supp.), s. 17, c. 42 (4th Supp.), s. 1; 1991, c. 28, s. 12; 1992, c. 27, s. 90; 1993, c. 7, s. 5, c. 25, s. 94, c. 40, s. 1, c. 46, s. 4; 1995, c. 39, s. 140; 1996, c. 19, s. 66; 1997, c. 18, s. 7, c. 23, s. 3; 1998, c. 34, s. 8; 1999, c. 2, s. 47, c. 5, s. 4; 2000, c. 24, s. 43; 2001, c. 32, s. 4, c. 41, ss. 5, 31, 133; 2002, c. 22, s. 409; 2004, c. 15, s. 108; 2005, c. 32, s. 10, c. 43, s. 1; 2008, c. 6, s. 15; 2009, c. 2, s. 442, c. 22, s. 4, c. 28, s. 3; 2010, c. 3, s. 1, c. 14, s. 2; 2012, c. 1, s. 24; 2013, c. 8, s. 2, c. 9, s. 14, c. 13, s. 7; 2014, c. 17, s. 2, c. 25, s. 11, c. 31, s. 7, c. 32, s. 59; 2015, c. 20, s. 19; 2017, c. 7, s. 56; 2018, c. 12, s. 114, c. 16, s. 210, c. 26, s. 23, c. 29, s. 15; 2019, c. 13, s. 150; 2019, c. 16, s. 122; 2019, c. 25, s. 63.1; 2020, c. 1, s. 36; 2022, c. 17, s. 5; 2023, c. 14, s. 2.

CCC (CanLII), (DOJ)


Note up: 183


Defined terms: "private communication" (s. 183)

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