The granting of a discharge "is a discretionary order based on the weighing and assessing of many factors, including the principles of sentencing and the public interest."
The Criminal Codes describes the discharge as:
The discharge was enacted in 1972 to give the courts the power to "relieve against both the fact and stigma of a criminal conviction."
Section 730 states:
The discharge is not a conviction but rather the offence is discharged absolutely or conditionally with probation. In cannot be paired with a fine or jail. The end result is that there is no criminal record. No record may be disclosed to any person by a federal agency, except for the purpose of verifying fingerprints, without the consent of the Solicitor General after 1 year for a absolute discharge or 3 years for a conditional discharge.
- Absolute Discharge
Where an absolute discharge has been granted the record of the offence cannot be disclosed without the approval of the Minister of Public Safety.
- R v Hayden, 2002 NSCA 7 (CanLII), per Oland JA
R v Burke, 1996 CanLII 11083 (NL CA), per Gushue CJ
R v Montgrand, 2008 SKCA 50 (CanLII), per Wilkinson JA
- s. 6.1 of the Criminal Records Act
R v Montesano, 2019 ONCA 194, at paras 9to 11("Section 6.1(1)(a) of the CRA precludes the disclosure not only of the record, but also of the existence and fact of an absolute discharge beyond one year following its imposition, unless the prior approval of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness is obtained.")
An offence punishable by less than 14 years and without minimum sentence, the offender may apply to the court for a "conditional discharge" if it is in the "best interests of the accused" and "not contrary to the public interest".
Best Interests of Offender
It is wrong to assume it is always be in the best interest of the offender to have a discharge. This requirement has been interpreted as requiring that (1) specific deterrence is of "no concern" and (2) the accused is of good character.
Generally speaking the effect of the criminal record would be disproportionate to the offence, such as where the offender cannot pursue their chosen profession, education would be affected, etc. The reason for discharge cannot be mere speculation.
The first factor of a discharge presupposes that the offender is of good character and so is without a prior criminal record.
It is generally preferred or sometimes necessary that the court have evidence of the consequence of a criminal record to support a discharge application.
- Manson, The Law of Sentencing, at p. 211 cited in R v Donovan, 2013 NSPC 83 (CanLII), per Whalen J, at para 27
- R v Carroll, 1995 CanLII 1123 (BC CA), per Donald JA
- R v Abouabdellah, 1996 CanLII 6502 (QC CA), per curiam
- R v Roberts, 2004 SKCA 153 (CanLII), per curiam
- R v Elsharawy, 1997 CanLII 14708 (NL CA), (1997), 119 CCC (3d) 565 (N.L.C.A.), per Green JA, at para 3
- R v Relph, 1991 CanLII 1236 (BC CA),  BCJ No. 298 (BCCA), per Locke JA at 12
Not contrary to public interest
The concern of this inquiry is whether the consequences of the conviction (either real or potential) upon the particular individual outweighs the value of the stigma.
The factors to determine the "public interest" and the weight "will vary depending on the circumstances of the offence and of the offender".
The "public interest" includes "a consideration of the principle of general deterrence with attention being paid to the gravity of the offence, its incidence in the community, public attitudes towards it and public confidence in the effective enforcement of the criminal law."
The second factor considers:
- the gravity of the offence;
- the frequency/prevalence of the offence in the community
- the public attitudes to the offence
- amount of planning of the offence
- value of property (if property-related offence)
- whether there was personal gain from the offence
- the effect on the public confidence in the law
It is not necessary that the offence be trivial to not be contrary to the public interest.
R v D'Eon, 2011 NSSC 330 (CanLII), per LeBlanc J, at paras 18 to 25
R v Sellars, 2013 NSCA 129 (CanLII), per Beveridge JA, at para 27
- Manson, The Law of Sentencing, at p. 211
Sellars, supra, at para 37
R v Elsharawy,  N.J. No. 249, 1997 CanLII 14708 (NL CA), per Green JA, at para 3
See R v Fallofield (1973), 13 CCC (2d) 450 (BCCA), 1973 CanLII 1412 (BC CA), per curiam
R v Waters, 1990 CanLII 7561 (SK QB), (1990), 54 CCC (3d) 40 (Sask. QB), per Wedge JA
R v MacFarlane, 1976 ALTASCAD 6 (CanLII), (1976) 3 Alta LR (2d) 341, per curiam
R v Sanchez-Pino, 1973 CanLII 794 (ON CA), per Arnup JA, at para 19 ("must consider all of the circumstances of the accused, and the nature and circumstances of the offence, against the background of proper law enforcement in the community, and the general criteria")
Sellars, supra, at paras 34 and 38
Snachez-Pino, supra, at para 18
Cases for a variety of offences have been considered:
- possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose (s.88)
- break and enter
- possession of marijuana (4(1))
- theft under $5,000 
Factors such as the accused's immigration status are valid considerations but are not determinative.
It is not prohibited to grant a discharge where a prior discharge has already been granted.  Nor is it prohibited to grant a discharge where a prior record exists.  Nevertheless the granting of a discharge in these cases is exceptional.
It should not be order solely because of adverse immigration consequences where it would otherwise be inappropriate.
- R v Chalifoux, 1995 ABCA 444 (CanLII), per Fraser CJ - denied
R v Kadotchnikov, 2002 SKPC 112 (CanLII), per Whelan J - CD granted
- R v Lail, 2007 ABPC 117 (CanLII), per AJ Brown J - granted
- R v Pepper, 2005 ABPC 294 (CanLII), per AJ Brown J - granted
- R v Wisniewski, 2002 MBCA 93 (CanLII), per Steel JA
- R v Tan (1974), 22 CCC (2d) 184 (BCCA), 1974 CanLII 1608 (BC CA), per Branca JA
- eg: R c Lasania, 2010 QCCS 3446 (CanLII), per Cohen J
see R v Melo (1975), 26 CCC (2d) 510 (ONCA), 1975 CanLII 1299 (ON CA), per Arnup JA
cf. R v Abouabedellah (1996), 1996 CanLII 6502 (QC CA), 109 CCC (3d) 477 (Que. C.A.), per curiam
Absolute vs Conditional
An absolute discharge order discharges the offence without any additional requirements of probation. It is usually granted in the cases of lesser seriousness of offences or where the personal circumstances are exceptional.
Offences of violence
Without a prior record, a Court will grant a discharge for common assault.  However, it should only be given in extraordinary circumstances. Assault causing bodily harm can be available for discharges in only limited circumstances. 
R v Bartlett, 2008 CanLII 1535 (ON SC),  OJ No 193, per Hill J
R v Stevens, 2009 NSPC 46 (CanLII), per Ross J
R v Munro,  NSJ No. 693 (S.C.)(*no CanLII links)
R v Boyle (1990), 100 N.S.R. (2d) 39, 1990 CanLII 4078 (NS SC),  NSJ No. 371 (S.C.T.D.), per Kelly J
R v Rhynold, 1993 CanLII 3218 (NS CA),  NSJ No. 192 (C.A.), per Jones JA
R v Sumyk, 2010 ABQB 217 (CanLII), per Burrows J
R v Teclesenbet, 2009 ABCA 389 (CanLII), per McDonald JA - CD denied for domestic assault causing bodily harm
- R v MacFarlane (1976), 55 AR 222 (ABCA), 1976 ALTASCAD 6 (CanLII), per curiam
R v Sowden, 2011 ONCJ 244 (CanLII), per Hearn J
R v Batt, 2010 CanLII 18251 (NL PC),  N.J. No. 137 (P.C.), per Gorman J -- Joint Recommendation
R v Morgan,  N.J. No. 341 (S.C.)(*no CanLII links) -- Joint Recommendation
R v Gulpin, (1975), 36 CRNS 363 (ONCA)(*no CanLII links)
R v Wood, (1975), 24 CCC (2d) 79 (ONCA), 1975 CanLII 1410 (ON CA), per Jessup JA
R v Pynn, 2011 CanLII 6161 (NL PC), per Gorman J -- conditional sentence
R v Sullivan, 2011 CanLII 144 (NL PC),  N.J. No. 4 (P.C.), per Gorman J -- probation