Requirements for a Dangerous Offender Designation: Difference between revisions

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[[Fr:Exigences_pour_une_désignation_de_délinquant_dangereux]]
{{Currency2|January|2021}}
{{LevelZero}}{{HeaderLTODO}}
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==General Principles==
==General Principles==
<!-- -->
{{seealso|Consequences of a Dangerous Offender Designation}}
Under s. 753, the Court may make an order declaring an accused a "Dangerous Offender" requiring the accused to serve an indeterminate sentence as opposed to a determinate sentence to an index offence.
Part XXIV of the Code governs the procedures for designating a person as a "dangerous offender."<ref>
{{CanLIIR|Straub|jlwgk|2022 ONCA 47 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}{{atL|jlwgk|52}}
</ref>
 
Under s. 753, the Court may make an order declaring an accused a "dangerous offender" requiring the accused to serve an indeterminate sentence as opposed to a determinate sentence to an index offence.


There are two stages of analysis in a dangerous offender application. There is the "designation stage" followed by the "penalty stage".<ref>
There are two stages to the process of determining whether a person is a dangerous offender. First there is the "designation phase", governed by s. 753(1), which sets out the statutory preconditions to declare someone a dangerous offender. Second, there is the "penalty phase", governed by s. 753(4) and (4.1), which determines the sentencing options for the court.<ref>
R v Boutilier, [http://canlii.ca/t/grx23 2016 BCCA 235] (CanLII) at para 3<br>
{{ibid1|Straub}}{{atL|jlwgk|52}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Boutilier|hpg4c|2017 SCC 64 (CanLII)|[2017] 2 SCR 936}}{{perSCC|Côté J}}{{atsL|hpg4c|13| to 15}}<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Boutilier|grx23|2016 BCCA 235 (CanLII)|336 CCC (3d) 293}}{{perBCCA|Smith J}}{{atL|grx23|3}} appealed to SCC<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Purpose'''<br>
; Purpose
The purpose of the dangerous offender order is to protect the public. It was designed “to carefully define a very small group of offenders whose personal characteristics and particular circumstances militate strenuously in favour of preventative incarceration”<ref>R v Johnson [http://canlii.ca/t/51pl 2003 SCC 46] (CanLII) at para 19</ref>
The purpose of the dangerous offender order is to protect the public. It was designed “to carefully define a very small group of offenders whose personal characteristics and particular circumstances militate strenuously in favour of preventative incarceration”<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Johnson|51pl|2003 SCC 46 (CanLII)|[2003] 2 SCR 357}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci and Arbour JJ}}{{atL|51pl|19}}</ref>


'''Constitutionality'''<Br>
; Constitutionality
Section 753(1) that authorizes the declaration of a dangerous offender does not violate s. 7 of the Charter.<Ref>
Section 753(1) that authorizes the declaration of a dangerous offender does not violate s. 7 of the Charter.<ref>
Boutilier{{supra}}<br>
{{supra1|Boutilier}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Burden'''<br>
; Burden
The Crown has the burden to establish each statutory requirement of dangerousness on a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.<ref>
The Crown has the burden to establish each statutory requirement of dangerousness on a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.<ref>
Boutilier{{supra}} at para 3<Br>
{{supra1|Boutilier}}{{atL|grx23|3}}<Br>
R v Wormell, [http://canlii.ca/t/1l02b 2005 BCCA 328] (CanLII)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Wormell|1l02b|2005 BCCA 328 (CanLII)|198 CCC (3d) 252}}{{perBCCA|Southin JA}}<br>
R v Pike, [http://canlii.ca/t/2ck9w 2010 BCCA 401] (CanLII)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Pike|2ck9w|2010 BCCA 401 (CanLII)|260 CCC (3d) 68}}{{perBCCA|Levine JA}}<br>
</ref>
 
; Relationship with Sentencing Provisions
The dangerous offender proceeding are a form of sentencing proceeding and require the judge to apply the same objectives, pricnepsl and guidelines in Part XXIII.<REf>
Straub at para 59
</ref>
</ref>


{{Reflist|2}}
{{Reflist|2}}


==Requirements for a Dangerous Offender Order==
==Requirements for a Dangerous Offender Designation==


{{quotation|
{{Quote box
'''Application for finding that an offender is a dangerous offender'''<br>
|width = 35em
753. (1) On application made under this Part after an assessment report is filed under subsection 752.1(2), the court shall find the offender to be a dangerous offender if it is satisfied
|bgcolor = #c6dbf7
:(a) that the offence for which the offender has been convicted is a serious personal injury offence described in paragraph (a) of the definition of that expression in section 752 and the offender constitutes a threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons on the basis of evidence establishing
|align = right
|quote =
The court ''may'' declare an offender a “dangerous offender” where:
# the offender is convicted of a serious personal injury offender and constitutes an ongoing threat on the basis of:
## a “repetitive behavior” showing a failure of restraint and “likelihood” of causing injury or worse
## a “pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour” that shows “a substantial degree of indifference” to the “reasonably foreseeable consequences” of his behaviour; or
## in the “brutal nature” of the offence, the offender is not likely to be inhibited by the normal standards of behavioral constraints” or
# the offence is a serous personal injury offence and “has shown a failure to control his or her sexual impulses and a likelihood of causing injury”.
|source = s. 753
}}
 
Section 753(1) sets out the requirements before an offender can be designated a "dangerous offender".
 
{{quotation2|
; Application for finding that an offender is a dangerous offender
753 (1) On application made under this Part {{AnnSec|Part XXIV}} after an assessment report is filed under subsection 752.1(2) {{AnnSec7|752.1(2)}}, the court shall find the offender to be a dangerous offender if it is satisfied
:(a) that the offence for which the offender has been convicted is a serious personal injury offence described in paragraph (a) of the definition of that expression in section 752 {{AnnSec7|752}} and the offender constitutes a threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons on the basis of evidence establishing
::(i) a pattern of repetitive behaviour by the offender, of which the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, showing a failure to restrain his or her behaviour and a likelihood of causing death or injury to other persons, or inflicting severe psychological damage on other persons, through failure in the future to restrain his or her behaviour,
::(i) a pattern of repetitive behaviour by the offender, of which the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, showing a failure to restrain his or her behaviour and a likelihood of causing death or injury to other persons, or inflicting severe psychological damage on other persons, through failure in the future to restrain his or her behaviour,
::(ii) a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour by the offender, of which the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, showing a substantial degree of indifference on the part of the offender respecting the reasonably foreseeable consequences to other persons of his or her behaviour, or
::(ii) a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour by the offender, of which the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, showing a substantial degree of indifference on the part of the offender respecting the reasonably foreseeable consequences to other persons of his or her behaviour, or
::(iii) any behaviour by the offender, associated with the offence for which he or she has been convicted, that is of such a brutal nature as to compel the conclusion that the offender’s behaviour in the future is unlikely to be inhibited by normal standards of behavioural restraint; or
::(iii) any behaviour by the offender, associated with the offence for which he or she has been convicted, that is of such a brutal nature as to compel the conclusion that the offender’s behaviour in the future is unlikely to be inhibited by normal standards of behavioural restraint; or
:(b) that the offence for which the offender has been convicted is a serious personal injury offence described in paragraph (b) of the definition of that expression in section 752 and the offender, by his or her conduct in any sexual matter including that involved in the commission of the offence for which he or she has been convicted, has shown a failure to control his or her sexual impulses and a likelihood of causing injury, pain or other evil to other persons through failure in the future to control his or her sexual impulses.
:(b) that the offence for which the offender has been convicted is a serious personal injury offence described in paragraph (b) of the definition of that expression in section 752 {{AnnSec7|752}} and the offender, by his or her conduct in any sexual matter including that involved in the commission of the offence for which he or she has been convicted, has shown a failure to control his or her sexual impulses and a likelihood of causing injury, pain or other evil to other persons through failure in the future to control his or her sexual impulses.
{{removed|(1.1), (2), (3), (4), (4.1), (4.2) and (5)}}
(6) [Repealed, 2008, c. 6, s. 42]<br>
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 753;
{{LegHistory90s|1997, c. 17}}, s. 4;
{{LegHistory00s|2008, c. 6}}, s. 42.
|{{CCCSec2|753}}
|{{NoteUp|753|1}}
}}


...<br>
There are two ways to establish the criteria. The difference depends on which type of serious personal injury (SPI) offence has been established by the index offence. The first is of a more general nature of unlawfulness while the second targets sexual behaviour.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 753; 1997, c. 17, s. 4; 2008, c. 6, s. 42.
|[http://www.canlii.ca/t/7vf2#sec753 CCC]
}}


There are two ways to establish a the criteria. The difference depends on which type of serious personal injury (SPI) offence has been established by the index offence. The first is of a more general nature of unlawfulness while the second targets sexual behaviour.
Section 753 does not preclude the sentencing judge from considering evidence relating to the prospects of future treatment when considering a dangerous offender designation.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Boutilier|hpg4c|2017 SCC 64 (CanLII)|[2017] 2 SCR 936}}{{perSCC|Cote J}}{{atsL|grx23|21| to 23}}
</ref>


'''Burden'''<br>
; Burden
The burden is upon the crown to establish the necessary elements under s. 753(1)(a)(i) and (ii) or 753(1)(b) of a DO designation beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused. The burden never switches to the accused.<ref> R v Carlton, [1981] 69 CCC 2d 1 (ABCA), [http://canlii.ca/t/fp6c0 1981 ABCA 220] (CanLII)</ref>
The burden is upon the crown to establish the necessary elements under s. 753(1)(a)(i) and (ii) or 753(1)(b) of a DO designation beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused. The burden never switches to the accused.<ref>  
{{CanLIIRP|Carlton|fp6c0|1981 ABCA 220 (CanLII)|[1981] 69 CCC (2d) 1 (ABCA)}}{{perABCA|McGillivray JA}} (6:1)</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}
===Dangerous Offender: General Violence===
===Dangerous Offender: General Violence===
<!--
<!--
'''Designation Based on Ongoing Risk of Violence (s. 753(1)(a))'''<br>
; Designation Based on Ongoing Risk of Violence (s. 753(1)(a))
Under the first branch of s. 753(1)(a) the Crown must prove that:
Under the first branch of s. 753(1)(a) the Crown must prove that:
# the index offence is a serious personal injury offence as found in s. 752(a), namely an indictable offence with a maximum penalty of 10 years or more<ref>see [[List of Hybrid Offences]] and [[List of Straight Indictable Offences]]</ref> that "use[d] or attempted use of violence against another person, or ...conduct endangering or likely to endanger the life or safety... or inflicting or likely to inflict severe psychological damage".<ref>
# the index offence is a serious personal injury offence as found in s. 752(a), namely an indictable offence with a maximum penalty of 10 years or more<ref>see [[List of Hybrid Offences]] and [[List of Straight Indictable Offences]]</ref> that "use[d] or attempted use of violence against another person, or ...conduct endangering or likely to endanger the life or safety... or inflicting or likely to inflict severe psychological damage."<ref>
See [[Serious Personal Injury Offences]]<bR></ref>
See [[Serious Personal Injury Offences]]<br></ref>
# the offender constitutes a "threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons";
# the offender constitutes a "threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons";
# the basis for the threat is either:
# the basis for the threat is either:
Line 62: Line 100:
An SPI offence under s. 752(a) requires either some form of violence or risk of harm (see Serious Personal Injury Offences below for details). This type of SPI offence engages s. 753(1)(a), which requires that the "offender [constitute] a threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons" by reason of a "repetitive", "persistent", or "brutal" behaviour.
An SPI offence under s. 752(a) requires either some form of violence or risk of harm (see Serious Personal Injury Offences below for details). This type of SPI offence engages s. 753(1)(a), which requires that the "offender [constitute] a threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons" by reason of a "repetitive", "persistent", or "brutal" behaviour.


The criteria requires:<ref>
The criteria require:<ref>
Boutilier at para 10<br>
{{supra1|Boutilier}}{{atL|grx23|10}}<br>
R v Pike at para 90<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Pike|2ck9w|2010 BCCA 401 (CanLII)|260 CCC (3d) 68}}{{perBCCA|Levine JA}}{{atL|2ck9w|90}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
# pattern "repetitive dangerous behaviour";
# pattern "repetitive dangerous behaviour";
Line 75: Line 113:
===Dangerous Offender: Sexual Violence===
===Dangerous Offender: Sexual Violence===


'''Designation Based on Ongoing Risk of Sexual Violence (s. 753(1)(b))'''<br>
; Designation Based on Ongoing Risk of Sexual Violence (s. 753(1)(b))
Under the second branch found in s. 753(1)(b), the Crown must prove that:
Under the second branch found in s. 753(1)(b), the Crown must prove that:
# the offence is a serious personal injury offence as found in s. 752(b), namely an offence under s. 271 ([[Sexual Assault (Offence)]]), 272 ([[Sexual Assault Causing Bodily Harm (Offence)]] and [[Sexual Assault with a Weapon (Offence)]]), or 273 ([[Aggravated Sexual Assault (Offence)]])
# the offence is a serious personal injury offence as found in s. 752(b), namely an offence under s. 271 ([[Sexual Assault (Offence)]]), 272 ([[Sexual Assault Causing Bodily Harm (Offence)]] and [[Sexual Assault with a Weapon (Offence)]]), or 273 ([[Aggravated Sexual Assault (Offence)]])
# the offender "has shown a failure to control his or her sexual impulses and a likelihood of causing injury, pain or other evil ... through failure in the future to control his or her sexual impulses."(s. 753(1)(b))
# the offender "has shown a failure to control his or her sexual impulses and a likelihood of causing injury, pain or other evil ... through failure in the future to control his or her sexual impulses."(s. 753(1)(b))
-->
 
An SPI offence under s. 752(b) requires the index offence be a type of sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm, or aggravated sexual assault. (see Serious Personal Injury Offences below for details). This type of SPI offence engages s. 753(1)(b), which requires that the offender "has shown a failure to control his or her sexual impulses and a likelihood of causing injury, pain or other evil to other persons through failure in the future to control his or her sexual impulses".
An SPI offence under s. 752(b) requires the index offence be a type of sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm, or aggravated sexual assault. (see Serious Personal Injury Offences below for details). This type of SPI offence engages s. 753(1)(b), which requires that the offender "has shown a failure to control his or her sexual impulses and a likelihood of causing injury, pain or other evil to other persons through failure in the future to control his or her sexual impulses".


Before considering whether the offender is a Dangerous Offender, the Court must consider whether the accused is an LTO.<Ref>see R v Johnson, [http://canlii.ca/t/51pl 2003 SCC 46] (CanLII), [2003] 2 SCR 357</ref>
Before considering whether the offender is a Dangerous Offender, the Court must consider whether the accused is an LTO.<ref>
see {{CanLIIRP|Johnson|51pl|2003 SCC 46 (CanLII)|[2003] 2 SCR 357}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci and Arbour JJ}}</ref>


It is only where an LTO is not an appropriate disposition, in light of sentencing principles of s. 718, that the court may consider a DO.
It is only where an LTO is not an appropriate disposition, in light of sentencing principles of s. 718, that the court may consider a DO.
The requirement of "any sexual manner" is not limited to the predicate offence and can include any prior past sexual acts that demonstrate present risks.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Currie|1fr27|1997 CanLII 347 (SCC)|[1997] 2 SCR 260}}{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}} (9:0){{atL|1fr27|2}}
</ref>
There is no need for the judge to focus on the objective seriousness of the predicate offence.<Ref>
{{ibid1|Currie}}{{atL|1fr27|17}}
</ref>
; Standard of Proof
The Court must be satisfied of the requirements beyond a reasonable doubt.<ref>
{{ibid1|Currie}}{{atL|1fr27|11}}
</ref>
; Standard of Review
The finding of dangerousness is a finding of fact. As long as it is reasonable it should not be "lightly overturned."<Ref>
{{ibid1|Currie}}{{atL|1fr27|17}}
</ref>


{{Reflist|2}}
{{Reflist|2}}


===DO Shortcut===
===Dangerous Offender Shortcut===


{{Quotation|
{{quotation2|
753<br>...<br>
753<br>
'''Presumption'''<br>
{{removed|(1)}}
(1.1) If the court is satisfied that the offence for which the offender is convicted is a primary designated offence for which it would be appropriate to impose a sentence of imprisonment of two years or more and that the offender was convicted previously at least twice of a primary designated offence and was sentenced to at least two years of imprisonment for each of those convictions, the conditions in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), as the case may be, are presumed to have been met unless the contrary is proved on a balance of probabilities.
; Presumption
<br>...<br>
(1.1) If the court is satisfied that the offence for which the offender is convicted is a primary designated offence for which it would be appropriate to impose a sentence of imprisonment of two years or more and that the offender was convicted previously at least twice of a primary designated offence and was sentenced to at least two years of imprisonment for each of those convictions, the conditions in paragraph (1)(a) {{AnnSec7|753(1)(a)}} or (b) {{AnnSec7|753(1)(b)}}, as the case may be, are presumed to have been met unless the contrary is proved on a balance of probabilities.
'''Sentence of indeterminate detention'''<br>
<br>
(4.1) The court shall impose a sentence of detention in a penitentiary for an indeterminate period unless it is satisfied by the evidence adduced during the hearing of the application that there is a reasonable expectation that a lesser measure under paragraph (4)(b) or (c) will adequately protect the public against the commission by the offender of murder or a serious personal injury offence.
{{removed|(1.1), (2), (3) and (4)}}
<Br>...<br>
; Sentence of indeterminate detention
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 753; 1997, c. 17, s. 4; 2008, c. 6, s. 42.
(4.1) The court shall impose a sentence of detention in a penitentiary for an indeterminate period unless it is satisfied by the evidence adduced during the hearing of the application that there is a reasonable expectation that a lesser measure under paragraph (4)(b) {{AnnSec7|753(4)(b)}} or (c) {{AnnSec7|753(4)(c)}} will adequately protect the public against the commission by the offender of murder or a serious personal injury offence.
|[http://www.canlii.ca/t/7vf2#sec753 CCC]
<Br>
{{removed|(4.2) and (5)}}
(6) [Repealed, 2008, c. 6, s. 42]<br>
R.S., {{LegHistory80s|1985, c. C-46}}, s. 753;  
{{LegHistory90s|1997, c. 17}}, s. 4;  
{{LegHistory00s|2008, c. 6}}, s. 42.
{{Annotation}}
|{{CCCSec2|753}}
|{{NoteUp|753|1.1|4.1}}
}}
}}


Section 753(4.1) create a presumption for an indeterminate sentence unless there is a "reasonable expectation" that an LTO or determinate sentence "will adequately protect the public against the commission by the offender of murder or a serious personal injury offence".<ref>
Section 753(4.1) create a presumption for an indeterminate sentence unless there is a "reasonable expectation" that an LTO or determinate sentence "will adequately protect the public against the commission by the offender of murder or a serious personal injury offence."<ref>
Boutilier at para 11<br>
{{supra1|Boutilier}}{{atL|grx23|11}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


The judge has discretion to refuse to impose an indeterminate sentence where there is a "reasonable expectation" that a determinate sentence "would adequately protect the public, would seem to have potentially increased the number of offenders captured by the regime, it has not changed the nature or characteristics of the group of offenders targeted as dangerous".<ref>
The judge has the discretion to refuse to impose an indeterminate sentence where there is a "reasonable expectation" that a determinate sentence "would adequately protect the public, would seem to have potentially increased the number of offenders captured by the regime, it has not changed the nature or characteristics of the group of offenders targeted as dangerous."<ref>
Boutilier at para 27 <br>
{{supra1|Boutilier}}{{atL|grx23|27}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 113: Line 178:


===Intractable Condition===
===Intractable Condition===
The judge must consider intractability at the designation stage.<Ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Smithen-Davis|jbvd0|2020 ONCA 759 (CanLII)}}{{perONCA-H|Watt JA}}
</ref>


The Crown must prove that the offender's condition is substantially or pathologically intractable.<ref>R v PBA [http://canlii.ca/t/1jvv5 2005 BCCA 121] (CanLII)</ref>
The Crown must prove that the offender's condition is substantially or pathologically intractable.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Pedden|1jvv5|2005 BCCA 121 (CanLII)|194 CCC (3d) 476}}{{perBCCA|Newbury JA}}</ref>


In determining intractability, the courts have considered the following:<ref> R v Ominayak, [http://canlii.ca/t/1wvfx 2007 ABQB 442] (CanLII)</ref>
; Considerations
In determining intractability, the courts have considered the following:<ref>  
{{CanLIIRP|Ominayak|1wvfx|2007 ABQB 442 (CanLII)|75 WCB (2d) 217}}{{perABQB|Topolniski J}}</ref>
#deeply ingrained personality disorders that are resistant to change;
#deeply ingrained personality disorders that are resistant to change;
#a lack of available and appropriate treatment facilities;
#a lack of available and appropriate treatment facilities;
Line 124: Line 195:
#treatment that will be long and difficult because an offender has more than one disorder and a limited capacity to learn.
#treatment that will be long and difficult because an offender has more than one disorder and a limited capacity to learn.


The court must be satisfied that the treatment can be accomplished within a certain time-frame within an LTO order for one to be available.<ref>R v Higginbottom, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fc0j 2001 CanLII 3989] (ONCA)</ref>
The court must be satisfied that the treatment can be accomplished within a certain time-frame within an LTO order for one to be available.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Higginbottom|1fc0j|2001 CanLII 3989 (ON CA)|156 CCC (3d) 178}}{{perONCA|Charron JA}}</ref>


{{Reflist|2}}
{{Reflist|2}}


===Reasonable Possibility of Controlling Risk in the Community===
===Reasonable Possibility of Controlling Risk in the Community===
The judge must determine whether there is a "reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community, having regard to the whole of the evidence before it".<ref>Wormell at para 61<br>
The judge must determine whether there is a "reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community, having regard to the whole of the evidence before it."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Wormell|1l02b|2005 BCCA 328 (CanLII)|198 CCC (3d) 252}}{{perBCCA|Southin JA}}{{atL|1l02b|61}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


A "reasonable possibility" should not mean "absolute certainty".<ref>
A "reasonable possibility" should not mean "absolute certainty."<ref>
R v Little, [http://canlii.ca/t/1s8wc 2007 ONCA 548] (CanLII), 87 O.R. (3d) 683 at para 39, leave to appeal ref’d [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 39<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Little|1s8wc|2007 ONCA 548 (CanLII)|87 OR (3d) 683}}{{perONCA|Cronk JA}}{{atL|1s8wc|39}}, leave to appeal ref’d [2008] SCCA No 39<br>
</ref>
</ref>


"Reasonable possibility" requires not only that there is a "possibility" of future treatment. If there is a possibility, but it is "unlikely that such treatment or control can be effected within the parameters of the appropriate fixed sentence and supervisory conditions in the community", then an LTO is not appropriate.<ref>
"Reasonable possibility" requires not only that there is a "possibility" of future treatment. If there is a possibility, but it is "unlikely that such treatment or control can be effected within the parameters of the appropriate fixed sentence and supervisory conditions in the community", then an LTO is not appropriate.<ref>
R v B.A.P., [http://canlii.ca/t/1jvv5 2005 BCCA 121] (CanLII), 208 BCAC 303, leave to appeal ref’d [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 445 at para 30
{{CanLIIRP|BAP|1jvv5|2005 BCCA 121 (CanLII)|208 BCAC 303}}{{perBCCA|Newbury JA}} (2:1) leave to appeal ref’d [2005] SCCA No 445 {{atL|1jvv5|30}}
</ref>
</ref>


The finding of a remote possibility does not bar a dangerous offender order.<ref>
The finding of a remote possibility does not bar a dangerous offender order.<ref>
Dagenais, at para 91<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Dagenais|1g4bv|2003 ABCA 376 (CanLII)|181 CCC (3d) 332}}{{perABCA|Wittmann JA}}{{atL|1f4bv|91}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


It is not necessary that the sentencing judge find "absolute intractability" resulting in the offender never being treatable in his lifetime.<ref>
It is not necessary that the sentencing judge finds "absolute intractability" resulting in the offender never being treatable in his lifetime.<ref>
B.A.P. at para 26<br>
{{supra1|BAP}}{{atL|1jvv5|26}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


There is no need for the Crown to show uncontrollability of the offender.<ref>R v Kopas, [http://canlii.ca/t/fpl4t 2012 ONCA 16] (CanLII)</ref>
There is no need for the Crown to show uncontrollability of the offender.<ref>
{{CanLIIRx|Kopas|fpl4t|2012 ONCA 16 (CanLII)}}{{TheCourtONCA}}</ref>


A "reasonable possibility" of  controlling the risk must have an air of reality to it and cannot simply be a mere hope.<ref> R v P(DWA), [http://canlii.ca/t/1p6c1 2006 BCSC 1288] (CanLII)</ref>
A "reasonable possibility" of  controlling the risk must have an air of reality to it and cannot simply be a mere hope.<ref>  
{{CanLIIRP|DWAP|1p6c1|2006 BCSC 1288 (CanLII)|70 WCB (2d) 624}}{{perBCSC|D Smith J}}</ref>


The crown does not need to refute the possibility that there is a reasonable possibility that the risk to the community will eventually be controlled. <ref>R v Moosomin, [http://canlii.ca/t/220h3 2008 SKCA 169] (CanLII) at para 40</ref>
The crown does not need to refute the possibility that there is a reasonable possibility that the risk to the community will eventually be controlled. <ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Moosomin|220h3|2008 SKCA 169 (CanLII)|239 CCC (3d) 362}}{{TheCourtSKCA}}{{atL|220h3|40}}</ref>


In considering the risk to the community, the court may consider past failed attempts at rehabilitation.<ref> R v Otto, [http://canlii.ca/t/1nfh7 2006 SKCA 52] (CanLII) at para 22</ref>
In considering the risk to the community, the court may consider past failed attempts at rehabilitation.<ref>  
{{CanLIIRP|Otto|1nfh7|2006 SKCA 52 (CanLII)|70 WCB (2d) 4}}{{perSKCA|Gerwing JA}}{{atL|1nfh7|22}}</ref>


If the level of supervision is so great as to amount to custody the offender is not likely a candidate for a LTO.<ref> R. v.LG [http://canlii.ca/t/1s8wc 2007 ONCA 548] (CanLII) at para 62</ref>
If the level of supervision is so great as to amount to custody the offender is not likely a candidate for a LTO.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|LG|1s8wc|2007 ONCA 548 (CanLII)|225 CCC (3d) 20}}{{perONCA|Cronk JA}}{{atL|1s8wc|62}}</ref>


'''"Acceptable Level"'''<br>
; "Acceptable Level"
Should an offender be found to meet the definition of "dangerous offender" under s. 753(1), the sentencing judge must be satisfied that a long-term offender order would not be "sufficient to reduce this threat to an acceptable level"<ref>
Should an offender be found to meet the definition of "dangerous offender" under s. 753(1), the sentencing judge must be satisfied that a long-term offender order would not be "sufficient to reduce this threat to an acceptable level"<ref>
R v Johnson, [http://canlii.ca/t/51pl 2003 SCC 46] (CanLII) at para 29<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Johnson|51pl|2003 SCC 46 (CanLII)|[2003] 2 SCR 357}}{{perSCC|Iacobucci and Arbour JJ}}{{atL|51pl|29}}<br>
R v Wormell, [http://canlii.ca/t/1l02b 2005 BCCA 328] (CanLII)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Wormell|1l02b|2005 BCCA 328 (CanLII)|198 CCC (3d) 252}}{{perBCCA|Southin JA}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


This determination is not on a standard of balance of probabilities or beyond a reasonable doubt.<Ref>
This determination is not on a standard of balance of probabilities or beyond a reasonable doubt.<ref>
Wormell at paras 32 to 33
{{ibid1|Wormell}}{{atsL|1l02b|32| to 33}}
</ref>
</ref>


Determination of an "acceptable level" requires consideration of all factors that can reduce risk to public.<ref>
Determination of an "acceptable level" requires consideration of all factors that can reduce risk to public.<ref>
Allen, [http://canlii.ca/t/25ln0 2009 BCSC 1245] (CanLII) at para 245, upheld 2015 BCCA 229<br>
{{CanLIIRx|Allan|25ln0|2009 BCSC 1245 (CanLII)}}{{perBCSC|MacKenzie J}}{{atL|25ln0|245}}, upheld {{CanLII|gj42g|2015 BCCA 229 (CanLII)}}{{perBCCA|Savage JA}}<br>
G.L.<br>
{{supra1|GL}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Factors include "treatability". This factor does not require that the offender will be "cured" by the treatment or that rehabilitation "might be assured".<ref>
Factors include "treatability". This factor does not require that the offender will be "cured" by the treatment or that rehabilitation "might be assured."<ref>
G.L. at para 42<br>
{{supra1|GL}}{{atL|1s8wc|42}}<br>
Allen (BCSC) at para 245, upheld 2015 BCCA 229<br>
{{supra1|Allan (BCSC)}}{{atL|25ln0|245}}, upheld {{CanLII|gj42g|2015 BCCA 229 (CanLII)}}{{perBCCA|Savage JA}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
The factor requires proof that the "nature and severity" of the risk can be "sufficiently contained in a non-custodial setting in the community so as to protect the public".<Ref>
The factor requires proof that the "nature and severity" of the risk can be "sufficiently contained in a non-custodial setting in the community so as to protect the public."<ref>
Allen (BCSC) at para 245 <Br>
{{supra1|Allan}} (BCSC){{atL|25ln0|245}}<Br>
G.L. at para 42<br>
{{supra1|GL}}{{atL|1s8wc|42}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


There is no expectation that risk be "eradicated" but only must be contained or managed.<ref>
There is no expectation that risk be "eradicated" but only must be contained or managed.<ref>
Allen (BCSC) at para 245<br></ref>
{{supra1|Allen (BCSC)}}{{atL|25ln0|245}}<br></ref>


When relying upon community supervision, the availability of resources to implement the supervision "cannot be uncertain". Otherwise, it would be too "speculative", "preventing any reliable assurance that the unreasonable risks to public safety can be avoided".<ref>
When relying upon community supervision, the availability of resources to implement the supervision "cannot be uncertain". Otherwise, it would be too "speculative", "preventing any reliable assurance that the unreasonable risks to public safety can be avoided."<ref>
G.L. at para 59<br>
{{supra1|GL}}{{atL|1s8wc|59}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


'''Treatement'''<br>
; Treatment
It will be inappropriate to make an LTO order should the treatment conditions necessary to control the offender end up replicating jail terms.<ref>
It will be inappropriate to make an LTO order should the treatment conditions necessary to control the offender end up replicating jail terms.<ref>
G.L.
{{supra1|GL}}
</ref>
</ref>
{{Reflist|2}}
{{Reflist|2}}
Line 197: Line 275:
==="Pattern of Repetitive Behaviour"===
==="Pattern of Repetitive Behaviour"===
Section 753(a)(i) requires that the applicant prove:<ref>
Section 753(a)(i) requires that the applicant prove:<ref>
R v Neve, [http://canlii.ca/t/5s63 1999 ABCA 206] (CanLII) at para 107</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Neve|5s63|1999 ABCA 206 (CanLII)|137 CCC (3d) 97 }}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|5s63|107}}</ref>
# A pattern of repetitive behaviour;
# A pattern of repetitive behaviour;
# The predicate offence must form part of that pattern;
# The predicate offence must form part of that pattern;
Line 203: Line 281:
# That pattern must show a likelihood of death, injury or severe psychological damage to other persons through failure to restrain his or her behaviour in the future.
# That pattern must show a likelihood of death, injury or severe psychological damage to other persons through failure to restrain his or her behaviour in the future.


Repetition does not require that the offences be "remarkably similar".<ref>
Repetition does not require that the offences be "remarkably similar."<ref>
R v Dorfer, [http://canlii.ca/t/fxc4w 2013 BCCA 223] (CanLII) at para 40</ref>  
{{CanLIIRP|Dorfer|fxc4w|2013 BCCA 223 (CanLII)|337 BCAC 309}}{{perBCCA|Kirkpatrick JA}}{{atL|fxc4w|40}}</ref>  
Where the most recent offence does not involve sexual penetration while the other do, does not create a break in a pattern.<ref>
Where the most recent offence does not involve sexual penetration while the other do, does not create a break in a pattern.<ref>
R v Dorfer, at para 26
{{ibid1|Dorfer}}{{atL|fxc4w|26}}
</ref>
</ref>
{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


==="Pattern of Persistent Behaviour"===
==="Pattern of Persistent Behaviour"===
Section 753(a)(ii) requires that htere be a "pattern of persistent behaviour" that shows a substantial degree of indifference respecting the foreseeable consequences of the offender's behaviour.
Section 753(a)(ii) requires that there be a "pattern of persistent behaviour" that shows a substantial degree of indifference respecting the foreseeable consequences of the offender's behaviour.


Persistent can have the same meaning as "enduring" or "constantly repeated".<ref>
Persistent can have the same meaning as "enduring" or "constantly repeated."<ref>
R v Yanoshewski [http://canlii.ca/t/1mb30 1996 CanLII 4916] (SK CA), (1996), 104 CCC (3d) 512, 141 Sask. R. 132 (C.A.),  at p. 522 (C.C.C.) ("The judge made no error in finding that the behaviour of the appellant was persistent in view of the fact that the period of time during which he committed the offences of which he was convicted extended from 1964 to 1992 without any significant periods during that time when no offences were being committed.")</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Yanoshewski|1mb30|1996 CanLII 4916 (SK CA)|104 CCC (3d) 512, 141 Sask R 132 (CA)}}{{perSKCA|Sherstobitoff JA}}{{atp|522}} (CCC) ("The judge made no error in finding that the behaviour of the appellant was persistent in view of the fact that the period of time during which he committed the offences of which he was convicted extended from 1964 to 1992 without any significant periods during that time when no offences were being committed.")</ref>


To determine if there is a pattern of repetitive behaviour, the court should consider the nature of the similarity of the predicate office. This includes considering "similarities in terms of the kind of offences" and where the offences are not "similar in kind", but "in results" upon the victims (ie. degree of violence).<ref>
To determine if there is a pattern of repetitive behaviour, the court should consider the nature of the similarity of the predicate office. This includes considering "similarities in terms of the kind of offences" and where the offences are not "similar in kind", but "in results" upon the victims (ie. degree of violence).<ref>
R v Neve, [http://canlii.ca/t/5s63 1999 ABCA 206] (CanLII) at para 111</ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Neve|5s63|1999 ABCA 206 (CanLII)|137 CCC (3d) 97}}{{TheCourtABCA}}{{atL|5s63|111}}</ref>


Where the offender commits a variety of crimes with no patterns, they can still be a "pattern of persistent behaviour".  There "is no requirement that the past criminal actions all be of the same or similar form, order or arrangement; though if this has occurred, it may well suffice."<ref>
Where the offender commits a variety of crimes with no patterns, they can still be a "pattern of persistent behaviour".  There "is no requirement that the past criminal actions all be of the same or similar form, order or arrangement; though if this has occurred, it may well suffice."<ref>
Neve at para 111</ref>
{{ibid1|Neve}}{{atL|5s63|111}}</ref>


Two or more incidents can amount to a "pattern".<ref>
Two or more incidents can amount to a "pattern."<ref>
R v Langevin, (1984), 8 D.L.R. (4th) 485, 11 CCC (3d) 336 (Ont. C.A.)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Langevin|g1g8k|1984 CanLII 1914 (ON CA)| 8 DLR (4th) 485, 11 CCC (3d) 336}}{{perONCA|Lacourciere JA}}<br>
</ref> However, they should have "remarkable similarity".<Ref>
</ref>  
R v Neve at para 113<br>
However, they should have "remarkable similarity."<ref>
R v Langevin at p. 498<br>
{{supra1|Neve}}{{atL|5s63|113}}<br>
{{supra1|Langevin}}{{atp|498}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


A "pattern of persistent behaviour" is made out where there is all of the following:<ref>
A "pattern of persistent behaviour" is made out where there is all of the following:<ref>
R v Dow, [http://canlii.ca/t/54l7 1999 BCCA 177] (CanLII) at para 24, 134 CCC (3d) 323 at para 24<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Dow|54l7|1999 BCCA 177 (CanLII)|134 CCC (3d) 323}}{{perBCCA|Lambert JA}}{{atL|54l7|24}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>
# repetitive behaviour;
# repetitive behaviour;
# a failure in each case to restrain behaviour in each case;
# a failure in each case to restrain behaviour in each case;
# there have been injury to other persons arising from that failure.
# there has been an injury to other persons arising from that failure.
 


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}
Line 242: Line 320:


When considering the criteria of "substantial degree of indifference" ,the court may look at the offender's actions in the offence as well as other offences.<ref>
When considering the criteria of "substantial degree of indifference" ,the court may look at the offender's actions in the offence as well as other offences.<ref>
R v George, [http://canlii.ca/t/1dxx4 1998 CanLII 5691] (BC CA), (1998), 126 CCC (3d) 384, [1998] BCJ No. 1505 at 394-95
{{CanLIIRP|George|1dxx4|1998 CanLII 5691 (BCCA)|126 CCC (3d) 384, [1998] BCJ No 1505}}{{perBCCA|George JA}} at 394-95
</ref> The consideration should be upon whether "the offender has a conscious but uncaring awareness of causing harm to others and this has occurred over a period of long duration involving frequent acts and with significant consequences, this is sufficient to establish a substantial degree of indifference."<ref>
</ref>
R v G.N.B., [http://canlii.ca/t/ft6ps 2012 SKQB 397] (CanLII) at para 19</ref>
The consideration should be upon whether "the offender has a conscious but uncaring awareness of causing harm to others and this has occurred over a period of long duration involving frequent acts and with significant consequences, this is sufficient to establish a substantial degree of indifference."<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|GNB|ft6ps|2012 SKQB 397 (CanLII)|406 Sask R 241}}{{perSKQB|Acton J}}{{atL|ft6ps|19}}</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}


==="Brutal Nature"===
==="Brutal Nature"===
The actions do not need to amount "stark horror", but must amount to "conduct which is coarse, savage and cruel and which is capable of inflicting severe psychological damage".<ref>
The actions do not need to amount "stark horror", but must amount to "conduct which is coarse, savage and cruel and which is capable of inflicting severe psychological damage."<ref>
R v Langevin (1984), 8 D.L.R. (4th) 485, 11 CCC (3d) 336 (Ont. C.A.)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Langevin|g1g8k|1984 CanLII 1914 (ON CA)| 8 DLR (4th) 485, 11 CCC (3d) 336}}{{perONCA|Lacourciere JA}}<br>
R v Melanson, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fbq8 2001 CanLII 24054] (ON CA), (2001), 152 CCC (3d) 375 (Ont. C.A.)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Melanson|1fbq8|2001 CanLII 24054 (ON CA)|152 CCC (3d) 375}}{{perONCA|Carthy JA}}<br>
R v Dow, [http://canlii.ca/t/54l7 1999 BCCA 177] (CanLII)<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Dow|54l7|1999 BCCA 177 (CanLII)|134 CCC (3d) 323}}{{perBCCA|Lamert JA}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


It includes offences that are "excessive, extreme, senseless, mean, vicious, merciless, ruthless, sadistic, unfeeling and violent."<ref>
It includes offences that are "excessive, extreme, senseless, mean, vicious, merciless, ruthless, sadistic, unfeeling and violent."<ref>
R v Paxton, [http://canlii.ca/t/g2jtf 2013 ABQB 750] (CanLII) at para 311<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Paxton|g2jtf|2013 ABQB 750 (CanLII)|111 WCB (2d) 835}}{{perABQB|Martin J}}{{atL|g2jtf|311}}<br>
R v Campbell, [2004] OJ No 2151 (Ont Sup Ct J) at para 56 <br>
{{CanLIIRP|Campbell|1h4wt|2004 CanLII 19316 (ONSC)|[2004] OJ No 2151 (Ont Sup Ct J)}}{{perONSC|Hill J}}{{atL|1h4wt|56}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


The presence of brutality varies with the crime, "the way in which [it was] committed, the effect(s) on the victim and the offender's attitude and mental state."<Ref>
The presence of brutality varies with the crime, "the way in which [it was] committed, the effect(s) on the victim and the offender's attitude and mental state."<ref>
R v Campbell at para 55 <br>
{{ibid1|Campbell}}{{atL|1h4wt||55}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


The categories are not closed.<ref>
The categories are not closed.<ref>
R v Ominayak, [http://canlii.ca/t/1wvfx 2007 ABQB 442] (CanLII) at para 194<br>
{{CanLIIRP|Ominayak|1wvfx|2007 ABQB 442 (CanLII)|75 WCB (2d) 217}}{{perABQB|Topolniski J}}{{atL|1wvfx|194}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


It does not need to be raised to the point of "stark horror".<ref>
It does not need to be raised to the point of "stark horror."<ref>
Langevin at para 34<br>
{{supra1|Langevin}}{{atL|g1g8k|34}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


Line 279: Line 358:


The Court must be satisfied that the offender's past conduct gives rise to a likelihood of future injury.<ref>
The Court must be satisfied that the offender's past conduct gives rise to a likelihood of future injury.<ref>
R v Carleton [http://canlii.ca/t/fp6c0 1981 ABCA 220] (CanLII), (1981), 32 AR 181 at para 11
{{CanLIIRP|Carleton|fp6c0|1981 ABCA 220 (CanLII)|32 AR 181}}{{perABCA|McGillivary CJ}} (6:1) {{atL|fp6c0|11}}
</ref> There is no need to prove that the offender ''will'' reoffend.<ref>
</ref>
R v Currie, [http://canlii.ca/t/1fr27 1997 CanLII 347] (SCC), [1997] 2 SCR 260 at para 42<br>
There is no need to prove that the offender ''will'' reoffend.<ref>
{{CanLIIRP|Currie|1fr27|1997 CanLII 347 (SCC)|[1997] 2 SCR 260}}{{perSCC|Lamer CJ}}{{atL|1fr27|42}}<br>
</ref>
</ref>


This conclusion can be made by inference where it is "self-evident" from conduct that is "beyond the normal range of behaviour".<ref>
This conclusion can be made by inference where it is "self-evident" from conduct that is "beyond the normal range of behaviour."<ref>
R v Robinson, [http://canlii.ca/t/1pmf7 2006 CanLII 33189] (ON CA), (2006), 212 CCC (3d) 439 at para 55
{{CanLIIRP|Robinson|1pmf7|2006 CanLII 33189 (ON CA)|212 CCC (3d) 439}}{{TheCourt}}{{atL|1pmf|55}}
</ref>
</ref>


{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}
==See Also==
* [[Consequences of a Dangerous Offender Designation]]

Latest revision as of 07:05, 23 July 2024

This page was last substantively updated or reviewed January 2021. (Rev. # 95704)

General Principles

See also: Consequences of a Dangerous Offender Designation

Part XXIV of the Code governs the procedures for designating a person as a "dangerous offender."[1]

Under s. 753, the Court may make an order declaring an accused a "dangerous offender" requiring the accused to serve an indeterminate sentence as opposed to a determinate sentence to an index offence.

There are two stages to the process of determining whether a person is a dangerous offender. First there is the "designation phase", governed by s. 753(1), which sets out the statutory preconditions to declare someone a dangerous offender. Second, there is the "penalty phase", governed by s. 753(4) and (4.1), which determines the sentencing options for the court.[2]

Purpose

The purpose of the dangerous offender order is to protect the public. It was designed “to carefully define a very small group of offenders whose personal characteristics and particular circumstances militate strenuously in favour of preventative incarceration”[3]

Constitutionality

Section 753(1) that authorizes the declaration of a dangerous offender does not violate s. 7 of the Charter.[4]

Burden

The Crown has the burden to establish each statutory requirement of dangerousness on a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.[5]

Relationship with Sentencing Provisions

The dangerous offender proceeding are a form of sentencing proceeding and require the judge to apply the same objectives, pricnepsl and guidelines in Part XXIII.[6]

  1. R v Straub, 2022 ONCA 47 (CanLII), per Watt JA, at para 52
  2. Straub, ibid., at para 52
    R v Boutilier, 2017 SCC 64 (CanLII), [2017] 2 SCR 936, per Côté J, at paras 13 to 15
    R v Boutilier, 2016 BCCA 235 (CanLII), 336 CCC (3d) 293, per Smith J, at para 3 appealed to SCC
  3. R v Johnson, 2003 SCC 46 (CanLII), [2003] 2 SCR 357, per Iacobucci and Arbour JJ, at para 19
  4. Boutilier, supra
  5. Boutilier, supra, at para 3
    R v Wormell, 2005 BCCA 328 (CanLII), 198 CCC (3d) 252, per Southin JA
    R v Pike, 2010 BCCA 401 (CanLII), 260 CCC (3d) 68, per Levine JA
  6. Straub at para 59

Requirements for a Dangerous Offender Designation

The court may declare an offender a “dangerous offender” where:
  1. the offender is convicted of a serious personal injury offender and constitutes an ongoing threat on the basis of:
    1. a “repetitive behavior” showing a failure of restraint and “likelihood” of causing injury or worse
    2. a “pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour” that shows “a substantial degree of indifference” to the “reasonably foreseeable consequences” of his behaviour; or
    3. in the “brutal nature” of the offence, the offender is not likely to be inhibited by the normal standards of behavioral constraints” or
  2. the offence is a serous personal injury offence and “has shown a failure to control his or her sexual impulses and a likelihood of causing injury”.
s. 753

Section 753(1) sets out the requirements before an offender can be designated a "dangerous offender".

Application for finding that an offender is a dangerous offender

753 (1) On application made under this Part [Pt. XXIV – Dangerous Offenders and Long-Term Offenders (ss. 752 to 761)] after an assessment report is filed under subsection 752.1(2) [application for remand for assessment – reporting], the court shall find the offender to be a dangerous offender if it is satisfied

(a) that the offence for which the offender has been convicted is a serious personal injury offence described in paragraph (a) of the definition of that expression in section 752 [dangerous Offenders and Long-term Offenders – definitions] and the offender constitutes a threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons on the basis of evidence establishing
(i) a pattern of repetitive behaviour by the offender, of which the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, showing a failure to restrain his or her behaviour and a likelihood of causing death or injury to other persons, or inflicting severe psychological damage on other persons, through failure in the future to restrain his or her behaviour,
(ii) a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour by the offender, of which the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, showing a substantial degree of indifference on the part of the offender respecting the reasonably foreseeable consequences to other persons of his or her behaviour, or
(iii) any behaviour by the offender, associated with the offence for which he or she has been convicted, that is of such a brutal nature as to compel the conclusion that the offender’s behaviour in the future is unlikely to be inhibited by normal standards of behavioural restraint; or
(b) that the offence for which the offender has been convicted is a serious personal injury offence described in paragraph (b) of the definition of that expression in section 752 [dangerous Offenders and Long-term Offenders – definitions] and the offender, by his or her conduct in any sexual matter including that involved in the commission of the offence for which he or she has been convicted, has shown a failure to control his or her sexual impulses and a likelihood of causing injury, pain or other evil to other persons through failure in the future to control his or her sexual impulses.

[omitted (1.1), (2), (3), (4), (4.1), (4.2) and (5)]
(6) [Repealed, 2008, c. 6, s. 42]
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 753; 1997, c. 17, s. 4; 2008, c. 6, s. 42.

CCC (CanLII), (DOJ)


Note up: 753(1)

There are two ways to establish the criteria. The difference depends on which type of serious personal injury (SPI) offence has been established by the index offence. The first is of a more general nature of unlawfulness while the second targets sexual behaviour.

Section 753 does not preclude the sentencing judge from considering evidence relating to the prospects of future treatment when considering a dangerous offender designation.[1]

Burden

The burden is upon the crown to establish the necessary elements under s. 753(1)(a)(i) and (ii) or 753(1)(b) of a DO designation beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused. The burden never switches to the accused.[2]

  1. R v Boutilier, 2017 SCC 64 (CanLII), [2017] 2 SCR 936, per Cote J, at paras 21 to 23
  2. R v Carlton, 1981 ABCA 220 (CanLII), [1981] 69 CCC (2d) 1 (ABCA), per McGillivray JA (6:1)

Dangerous Offender: General Violence

An SPI offence under s. 752(a) requires either some form of violence or risk of harm (see Serious Personal Injury Offences below for details). This type of SPI offence engages s. 753(1)(a), which requires that the "offender [constitute] a threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons" by reason of a "repetitive", "persistent", or "brutal" behaviour.

The criteria require:[1]

  1. pattern "repetitive dangerous behaviour";
  2. of which the predicate offence(s) form a part;
  3. that shows a failure to restrain the offender's behaviour in the past; and
  4. "in such a way as to provide a basis to predict the likelihood of the same behaviour occurring in the future".
  1. Boutilier, supra, at para 10
    R v Pike, 2010 BCCA 401 (CanLII), 260 CCC (3d) 68, per Levine JA, at para 90

Dangerous Offender: Sexual Violence

Designation Based on Ongoing Risk of Sexual Violence (s. 753(1)(b))

Under the second branch found in s. 753(1)(b), the Crown must prove that:

  1. the offence is a serious personal injury offence as found in s. 752(b), namely an offence under s. 271 (Sexual Assault (Offence)), 272 (Sexual Assault Causing Bodily Harm (Offence) and Sexual Assault with a Weapon (Offence)), or 273 (Aggravated Sexual Assault (Offence))
  2. the offender "has shown a failure to control his or her sexual impulses and a likelihood of causing injury, pain or other evil ... through failure in the future to control his or her sexual impulses."(s. 753(1)(b))

An SPI offence under s. 752(b) requires the index offence be a type of sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm, or aggravated sexual assault. (see Serious Personal Injury Offences below for details). This type of SPI offence engages s. 753(1)(b), which requires that the offender "has shown a failure to control his or her sexual impulses and a likelihood of causing injury, pain or other evil to other persons through failure in the future to control his or her sexual impulses".

Before considering whether the offender is a Dangerous Offender, the Court must consider whether the accused is an LTO.[1]

It is only where an LTO is not an appropriate disposition, in light of sentencing principles of s. 718, that the court may consider a DO.

The requirement of "any sexual manner" is not limited to the predicate offence and can include any prior past sexual acts that demonstrate present risks.[2]

There is no need for the judge to focus on the objective seriousness of the predicate offence.[3]

Standard of Proof

The Court must be satisfied of the requirements beyond a reasonable doubt.[4]

Standard of Review

The finding of dangerousness is a finding of fact. As long as it is reasonable it should not be "lightly overturned."[5]

  1. see R v Johnson, 2003 SCC 46 (CanLII), [2003] 2 SCR 357, per Iacobucci and Arbour JJ
  2. R v Currie, 1997 CanLII 347 (SCC), [1997] 2 SCR 260, per Lamer CJ (9:0), at para 2
  3. Currie, ibid., at para 17
  4. Currie, ibid., at para 11
  5. Currie, ibid., at para 17

Dangerous Offender Shortcut

753
[omitted (1)]

Presumption

(1.1) If the court is satisfied that the offence for which the offender is convicted is a primary designated offence for which it would be appropriate to impose a sentence of imprisonment of two years or more and that the offender was convicted previously at least twice of a primary designated offence and was sentenced to at least two years of imprisonment for each of those convictions, the conditions in paragraph (1)(a) [dangerous offender application – serious personal injury plus criteria of threats] or (b) [dangerous offender application – serious personal injury plus sexual impulses], as the case may be, are presumed to have been met unless the contrary is proved on a balance of probabilities.
[omitted (1.1), (2), (3) and (4)]

Sentence of indeterminate detention

(4.1) The court shall impose a sentence of detention in a penitentiary for an indeterminate period unless it is satisfied by the evidence adduced during the hearing of the application that there is a reasonable expectation that a lesser measure under paragraph (4)(b) [sentence for dangerous offender – long-term offender order] or (c) [sentence for dangerous offender – sentenced for index offence] will adequately protect the public against the commission by the offender of murder or a serious personal injury offence.
[omitted (4.2) and (5)]
(6) [Repealed, 2008, c. 6, s. 42]
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 753; 1997, c. 17, s. 4; 2008, c. 6, s. 42.
[annotation(s) added]

CCC (CanLII), (DOJ)


Note up: 753(1.1) and (4.1)

Section 753(4.1) create a presumption for an indeterminate sentence unless there is a "reasonable expectation" that an LTO or determinate sentence "will adequately protect the public against the commission by the offender of murder or a serious personal injury offence."[1]

The judge has the discretion to refuse to impose an indeterminate sentence where there is a "reasonable expectation" that a determinate sentence "would adequately protect the public, would seem to have potentially increased the number of offenders captured by the regime, it has not changed the nature or characteristics of the group of offenders targeted as dangerous."[2]

  1. Boutilier, supra, at para 11
  2. Boutilier, supra, at para 27

Intractable Condition

The judge must consider intractability at the designation stage.[1]

The Crown must prove that the offender's condition is substantially or pathologically intractable.[2]

Considerations

In determining intractability, the courts have considered the following:[3]

  1. deeply ingrained personality disorders that are resistant to change;
  2. a lack of available and appropriate treatment facilities;
  3. a poor outlook for improvement, even where facilities exist;
  4. an inability to estimate or predict a timeframe for improvement;
  5. some, but very little hope for treatment some time in the future; and
  6. treatment that will be long and difficult because an offender has more than one disorder and a limited capacity to learn.

The court must be satisfied that the treatment can be accomplished within a certain time-frame within an LTO order for one to be available.[4]

  1. R v Smithen-Davis, 2020 ONCA 759 (CanLII), per Watt JA
  2. R v Pedden, 2005 BCCA 121 (CanLII), 194 CCC (3d) 476, per Newbury JA
  3. R v Ominayak, 2007 ABQB 442 (CanLII), 75 WCB (2d) 217, per Topolniski J
  4. R v Higginbottom, 2001 CanLII 3989 (ON CA), 156 CCC (3d) 178, per Charron JA

Reasonable Possibility of Controlling Risk in the Community

The judge must determine whether there is a "reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community, having regard to the whole of the evidence before it."[1]

A "reasonable possibility" should not mean "absolute certainty."[2]

"Reasonable possibility" requires not only that there is a "possibility" of future treatment. If there is a possibility, but it is "unlikely that such treatment or control can be effected within the parameters of the appropriate fixed sentence and supervisory conditions in the community", then an LTO is not appropriate.[3]

The finding of a remote possibility does not bar a dangerous offender order.[4]

It is not necessary that the sentencing judge finds "absolute intractability" resulting in the offender never being treatable in his lifetime.[5]

There is no need for the Crown to show uncontrollability of the offender.[6]

A "reasonable possibility" of controlling the risk must have an air of reality to it and cannot simply be a mere hope.[7]

The crown does not need to refute the possibility that there is a reasonable possibility that the risk to the community will eventually be controlled. [8]

In considering the risk to the community, the court may consider past failed attempts at rehabilitation.[9]

If the level of supervision is so great as to amount to custody the offender is not likely a candidate for a LTO.[10]

"Acceptable Level"

Should an offender be found to meet the definition of "dangerous offender" under s. 753(1), the sentencing judge must be satisfied that a long-term offender order would not be "sufficient to reduce this threat to an acceptable level"[11]

This determination is not on a standard of balance of probabilities or beyond a reasonable doubt.[12]

Determination of an "acceptable level" requires consideration of all factors that can reduce risk to public.[13]

Factors include "treatability". This factor does not require that the offender will be "cured" by the treatment or that rehabilitation "might be assured."[14] The factor requires proof that the "nature and severity" of the risk can be "sufficiently contained in a non-custodial setting in the community so as to protect the public."[15]

There is no expectation that risk be "eradicated" but only must be contained or managed.[16]

When relying upon community supervision, the availability of resources to implement the supervision "cannot be uncertain". Otherwise, it would be too "speculative", "preventing any reliable assurance that the unreasonable risks to public safety can be avoided."[17]

Treatment

It will be inappropriate to make an LTO order should the treatment conditions necessary to control the offender end up replicating jail terms.[18]

  1. R v Wormell, 2005 BCCA 328 (CanLII), 198 CCC (3d) 252, per Southin JA, at para 61
  2. R v Little, 2007 ONCA 548 (CanLII), 87 OR (3d) 683, per Cronk JA, at para 39, leave to appeal ref’d [2008] SCCA No 39
  3. R v BAP, 2005 BCCA 121 (CanLII), 208 BCAC 303, per Newbury JA (2:1) leave to appeal ref’d [2005] SCCA No 445 , at para 30
  4. R v Dagenais, 2003 ABCA 376 (CanLII), 181 CCC (3d) 332, per Wittmann JA, at para 91
  5. BAP, supra, at para 26
  6. R v Kopas, 2012 ONCA 16 (CanLII), per curiam
  7. R v DWAP, 2006 BCSC 1288 (CanLII), 70 WCB (2d) 624, per D Smith J
  8. R v Moosomin, 2008 SKCA 169 (CanLII), 239 CCC (3d) 362, per curiam, at para 40
  9. R v Otto, 2006 SKCA 52 (CanLII), 70 WCB (2d) 4, per Gerwing JA, at para 22
  10. R v LG, 2007 ONCA 548 (CanLII), 225 CCC (3d) 20, per Cronk JA, at para 62
  11. R v Johnson, 2003 SCC 46 (CanLII), [2003] 2 SCR 357, per Iacobucci and Arbour JJ, at para 29
    R v Wormell, 2005 BCCA 328 (CanLII), 198 CCC (3d) 252, per Southin JA
  12. Wormell, ibid., at paras 32 to 33
  13. R v Allan, 2009 BCSC 1245 (CanLII), per MacKenzie J, at para 245, upheld 2015 BCCA 229 (CanLII), per Savage JA
    GL, supra
  14. GL, supra, at para 42
    Allan (BCSC), supra, at para 245, upheld 2015 BCCA 229 (CanLII), per Savage JA
  15. Allan, supra (BCSC), at para 245
    GL, supra, at para 42
  16. Allen (BCSC), supra, at para 245
  17. GL, supra, at para 59
  18. GL, supra

"Pattern of Repetitive Behaviour"

Section 753(a)(i) requires that the applicant prove:[1]

  1. A pattern of repetitive behaviour;
  2. The predicate offence must form part of that pattern;
  3. That pattern must show a failure by the offender to restrain his or her behaviour in the past; and
  4. That pattern must show a likelihood of death, injury or severe psychological damage to other persons through failure to restrain his or her behaviour in the future.

Repetition does not require that the offences be "remarkably similar."[2] Where the most recent offence does not involve sexual penetration while the other do, does not create a break in a pattern.[3]

  1. R v Neve, 1999 ABCA 206 (CanLII), 137 CCC (3d) 97, per curiam, at para 107
  2. R v Dorfer, 2013 BCCA 223 (CanLII), 337 BCAC 309, per Kirkpatrick JA, at para 40
  3. Dorfer, ibid., at para 26

"Pattern of Persistent Behaviour"

Section 753(a)(ii) requires that there be a "pattern of persistent behaviour" that shows a substantial degree of indifference respecting the foreseeable consequences of the offender's behaviour.

Persistent can have the same meaning as "enduring" or "constantly repeated."[1]

To determine if there is a pattern of repetitive behaviour, the court should consider the nature of the similarity of the predicate office. This includes considering "similarities in terms of the kind of offences" and where the offences are not "similar in kind", but "in results" upon the victims (ie. degree of violence).[2]

Where the offender commits a variety of crimes with no patterns, they can still be a "pattern of persistent behaviour". There "is no requirement that the past criminal actions all be of the same or similar form, order or arrangement; though if this has occurred, it may well suffice."[3]

Two or more incidents can amount to a "pattern."[4] However, they should have "remarkable similarity."[5]

A "pattern of persistent behaviour" is made out where there is all of the following:[6]

  1. repetitive behaviour;
  2. a failure in each case to restrain behaviour in each case;
  3. there has been an injury to other persons arising from that failure.
  1. R v Yanoshewski, 1996 CanLII 4916 (SK CA), 104 CCC (3d) 512, 141 Sask R 132 (CA), per Sherstobitoff JA, at p. 522 (CCC) ("The judge made no error in finding that the behaviour of the appellant was persistent in view of the fact that the period of time during which he committed the offences of which he was convicted extended from 1964 to 1992 without any significant periods during that time when no offences were being committed.")
  2. R v Neve, 1999 ABCA 206 (CanLII), 137 CCC (3d) 97, per curiam, at para 111
  3. Neve, ibid., at para 111
  4. R v Langevin, 1984 CanLII 1914 (ON CA), 8 DLR (4th) 485, 11 CCC (3d) 336, per Lacourciere JA
  5. Neve, supra, at para 113
    Langevin, supra, at p. 498
  6. R v Dow, 1999 BCCA 177 (CanLII), 134 CCC (3d) 323, per Lambert JA, at para 24

"Substantial Degree of Indifference"

When considering the criteria of "substantial degree of indifference" ,the court may look at the offender's actions in the offence as well as other offences.[1] The consideration should be upon whether "the offender has a conscious but uncaring awareness of causing harm to others and this has occurred over a period of long duration involving frequent acts and with significant consequences, this is sufficient to establish a substantial degree of indifference."[2]

  1. R v George, 1998 CanLII 5691 (BCCA), 126 CCC (3d) 384, [1998] BCJ No 1505, per George JA at 394-95
  2. R v GNB, 2012 SKQB 397 (CanLII), 406 Sask R 241, per Acton J, at para 19

"Brutal Nature"

The actions do not need to amount "stark horror", but must amount to "conduct which is coarse, savage and cruel and which is capable of inflicting severe psychological damage."[1]

It includes offences that are "excessive, extreme, senseless, mean, vicious, merciless, ruthless, sadistic, unfeeling and violent."[2]

The presence of brutality varies with the crime, "the way in which [it was] committed, the effect(s) on the victim and the offender's attitude and mental state."[3]

The categories are not closed.[4]

It does not need to be raised to the point of "stark horror."[5]

  1. R v Langevin, 1984 CanLII 1914 (ON CA), 8 DLR (4th) 485, 11 CCC (3d) 336, per Lacourciere JA
    R v Melanson, 2001 CanLII 24054 (ON CA), 152 CCC (3d) 375, per Carthy JA
    R v Dow, 1999 BCCA 177 (CanLII), 134 CCC (3d) 323, per Lamert JA
  2. R v Paxton, 2013 ABQB 750 (CanLII), 111 WCB (2d) 835, per Martin J, at para 311
    R v Campbell, 2004 CanLII 19316 (ONSC), [2004] OJ No 2151 (Ont Sup Ct J), per Hill J, at para 56
  3. Campbell, ibid., at para
  4. R v Ominayak, 2007 ABQB 442 (CanLII), 75 WCB (2d) 217, per Topolniski J, at para 194
  5. Langevin, supra, at para 34

"Normal Standards of Behavioural Restraint"

Section 53(1)(a)(iii) requires that the offender be "unlikely to be inhibited by normal standards of behavioural restraint".

The Court must be satisfied that the offender's past conduct gives rise to a likelihood of future injury.[1] There is no need to prove that the offender will reoffend.[2]

This conclusion can be made by inference where it is "self-evident" from conduct that is "beyond the normal range of behaviour."[3]

  1. R v Carleton, 1981 ABCA 220 (CanLII), 32 AR 181, per McGillivary CJ (6:1) , at para 11
  2. R v Currie, 1997 CanLII 347 (SCC), [1997] 2 SCR 260, per Lamer CJ, at para 42
  3. R v Robinson, 2006 CanLII 33189 (ON CA), 212 CCC (3d) 439, per curiam, at para 55

See Also