Sealing and Unsealing Judicial Authorizations: Difference between revisions
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==Unsealing== | ==Unsealing== | ||
* [[Unsealing Judicial Authorizations]] | |||
==Wiretaps== | ==Wiretaps== |
Revision as of 12:19, 8 August 2024
This page was last substantively updated or reviewed January 2020. (Rev. # 96044) |
General Principles
Once a judicial authorization is executed (be it a warrant, production order or otherwise), the authorization and the supporting documents (usually the Information to Obtain) must be made available to the public unless the warrant is placed under a sealing order.[1]
Under s. 487.3(1), an application to seal a warrant and ITO can be made prohibiting disclosure of any information related to the warrant on the basis that access to it would subvert the ends of justice or the information would be put to an improper purpose.
Once an order is made, it must be made public "unless an applicant seeking a sealing order can demonstrate that public access would subvert the ends of justice."[2]
Section 487.3 provides statutory authority for a judge or justice to issue a sealing order:
- Order denying access to information
487.3 (1) On application made at the time an application is made for a warrant under this or any other Act of Parliament, an order under any of sections 487.013 to 487.018 [provisions on production orders] or an authorization under section 529 [entry into residence to arrest] or 529.4 [executing a warrant to enter a residence of arrest], or at a later time, a justice, a judge of a superior court of criminal jurisdiction or a judge of the Court of Quebec may make an order prohibiting access to, and the disclosure of, any information relating to the warrant, order or authorization on the ground that
- (a) the ends of justice would be subverted by the disclosure for one of the reasons referred to in subsection (2) [sealing order in relation to warrants – grounds] or the information might be used for an improper purpose; and
- (b) the reason referred to in paragraph (a) [sealing order in relation to warrants – grounds to seal] outweighs in importance the access to the information.
[omitted (2), (3) and (4)]
1997, c. 23, s. 14, c. 39, s. 1; 2004, c. 3, s. 8; 2014, c. 31, s. 22.
[annotation(s) added]
Sealing orders are to be the exception to the rule of openness.[3]
It is the responsibility of the Attorney General to be the responding party to any application to unseal where privilege may be at issue.[4]
Confidential police investigations require "a high level of secrecy to be effective" at least until after the warrant is executed.[5] Once the search is complete the presumption moves to one of openness.[6]
- Burden of Proof
Where a court document is subject to a discretionary sealing, the burden is upon the party seeking to maintain the sealing order.[7] The exception to this burden include the mandatory sealings provisions under s. 187(1)(a)(ii) relating to wiretaps.[8]
- Duty to Unseal is On the Crown
The burden is on the Crown to unsealing judicial authorization materials. This duty is part of the Crown's Stinchcombe disclosure obligations.[9]
- Effect of Sealing Order
The predominant view suggests that sealing orders function as an order restricting access to the court file rather than as a confidentiality order.[10]
- Residual Authority to Control Access
Even where there is no sealing order granted, the court may also restrict and prohibit access to court-record materials where it would "subvert" the "ends of justice" or "might" be used for an "improper purpose."[11]
- ↑ Toronto Star Newspaper Ltd. v Ontario, 2005 SCC 41 (CanLII), [2005] 2 SCR 188, per Fish J
- ↑
Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v Ontario, ibid.
Attorney General of Nova Scotia v MacIntyre, 1982 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1982] 1 SCR 175, per Dickson J
- ↑
Application by the Winnipeg Free Press, 2006 MBQB 43 (CanLII), 70 WCB (2d) 54, per McKelvey J, at para 10
- ↑ Re Regina and Atout, 2013 ONSC 1312 (CanLII), OJ No 899, per Campbell J
- ↑
Globe & Mail v Alberta, 2011 ABQB 363 (CanLII), 520 AR 279, per Tilleman J, at para 10
- ↑
Globe & Mail v Alberta, ibid., at para 10
- ↑
R v Verrilli, 2019 NSSC 263 (CanLII), per Arnold J, at para 56
cf. National Post Co. v Ontario, 2003 CanLII 13 (ONSC), 176 CCC (3d) 432, per McKinnon J - ↑ Michaud v Quebec (Attorney General), 1996 CanLII 167 (SCC), [1996] 3 SCR 3, per Lamer CJ, at to 5 paras 3 to 5{{{3}}}
- ↑
R v Osei, 2007 CanLII 5681 (ON SC), 152 CRR (2d) 152, per Nordheimer J
- ↑
R v Moosemay, 2001 ABPC 156 (CanLII), 297 AR 34, per Fradsham J, at paras 19 to 31
Konstan v Berkovits, 2016 ONSC 7958 (CanLII), per Myers J, at paras 8 to 9
Konstan v Berkovits, 2016 ONSC 3957 (CanLII), per Myers J, at para 10 - ↑
AG (Nova Scotia) v MacIntyre, 1982 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1982] 1 SCR 175, per Dickson J, at p. 189 (SCR) ("Undoubtedly every court has a supervisory and protecting power over its own records. Access can be denied when the ends of justice would be subverted by disclosure or the judicial documents might be used for an improper purpose. The presumption, however, is in favour of public access and the burden of contrary proof lies upon the person who would deny the exercice of the right.")
R v Garofoli, 1990 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 1421, per Sopinka J ("The power to edit clearly exists and derives from the supervisory and protecting power which a court possesses over its own records")
Grounds to Sealing
Under s. 487.3(2), set out the basis of how the ends of justice would be subverted.
487.3
[omitted (1)]
- Reasons
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a) [sealing order in relation to warrants – grounds to seal], an order may be made under subsection (1) [sealing order in relation to warrants] on the ground that the ends of justice would be subverted by the disclosure
- (a) if disclosure of the information would
- (i) compromise the identity of a confidential informant,
- (ii) compromise the nature and extent of an ongoing investigation,
- (iii) endanger a person engaged in particular intelligence-gathering techniques and thereby prejudice future investigations in which similar techniques would be used, or
- (iv) prejudice the interests of an innocent person; and
- (b) for any other sufficient reason.
[omitted (3) and (4)]
1997, c. 23, s. 14, c. 39, s. 1; 2004, c. 3, s. 8; 2014, c. 31, s. 22.
[annotation(s) added]
There is a presumption in favour of access to information.[1]
- Dagenais/Mentuck Test
The Dagenais/Mentuck test applies to seal orders.[2] The test permits discretionary court orders prohibiting access to legal proceeding where:
- an order is necessary to prevent a "serious risk" to the "proper administration of justice" because "reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk"; and
- the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice
- Standard of Proof
The risks of keeping the record unsealed must be established to be a "risk the reality of which is well-grounded in the evidence."[3]
- Proper Administration of Justice
The risk to "administration of justice" will include "real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial."[4]
The preservation of a witness's evidence is not a justification for sealing as the witnesses are free to speak to whomever they want and thier prior statement is already preserved in their statement. [5]
It is not a general rule that the mere fact of publication that a witness cooperated with police is a reason to protect their identity. There would need to be evidence supporting a specific risk to the witness.[6]
- Other Options to Sealing
It is an error of law for the authorizing judge or justice to fail "to consider alternative measures short of a full-fledged non-access order."[7]
- "Ongoing investigation"
The risk posed to the investigation must be satisfied on a case-by-case basis and is not to be used as a class of prohibited records.[8] Generalized or abstract assertions of potential prejudice is insufficient.[9] However, generalized assertions are all that can be offered and that it may be that a "perceived risk may be more difficult to demonstrate in a concrete manner at that early stage."[10]
Denial of access cannot be granted on the basis that there is an "investigative advantage" to the police in having documents sealed.[11]
- "innocent person"
Section 487.3(2)(iv) permits a court to seal a record where disclosure could "prejudice the interests of an innocent person".
"Innocent persons" include third parties whose premises have been searched and nothing was found.[12]This does not mean that where something is seized from the premises that they can no longer be innocent persons.[13]
Prejudice to innocent persons is "entitled to significant weight."[14]
The interests of "innocent persons" includes preventing an "innocent person subject to intense media scrutiny that may irreparably tarnish that person’s reputation."[15] Where the allegations found in the ITO may be "extremely harmful to [the] reputations" of innocent persons, including the suspect, then the public interest will be against releasing information identifying them.[16]
An "innocent person" does not include the accused as "reporting of ...evidence is a price" that they must pay for "insuring the public accountability of those involved in the administration of justice" once the accused has "surrendered to the judicial process."[17]
It is unsettled whether notice is required to be given to innocent third-parties with cases going both ways.[18]
- Right to a Fair Trial
Releasing information regarding an ongoing investigation can be "highly prejudicial to a person's right to a fair trial."[19]
The release of certain types of "incriminating evidence" against the accused may result in such prejudice as to be unfair to be released to the public.[20] Such evidence would have the effect of "place irreversible ideas in the minds of potential jurors that would prevent them from being impartial at trial, or that would make it impossible for them to distinguish between evidence heard during the trial and information acquired outside of the courtroom."[21]
There is some suggestion that protecting of trial rights are better protected by a publication ban rather than a sealing order.[22]
- Commercial Interests
A "real and substantial risk" to commercial interests of a company in revealing the allegations in the ITO may create a public interest in confidentiality.[23]
- "any other sufficient reasons"
"Other sufficient reasons" within the meaning of s. 487.3 include "serious threat to trial fairness."[24]
- Procedure
The applicant must be specific on the grounds of sealing, there must be "particularized grounds". Generalized assertions are not enough.[25]
- Ruling
The Judge must give reasons for any decision to issue the sealing of a public record.[26]
- ↑ Phillips v Vancouver Sun, 2004 BCCA 14 (CanLII), 182 CCC (3d) 483, per Prowse JA
- ↑
Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, 1994 CanLII 39 (SCC), [1994] 3 SCR 835, per Lamer CJ
R v Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76 (CanLII), [2001] 3 SCR 442, per Iacobucci J - ↑ Mentuk, supra at 34 ("he first branch of the test contains several important elements that can be collapsed in the concept of ‘necessity’, but that are worth pausing to enumerate. One required element is that the risk in question be a serious one, or as Lamer C.J. put it at p.878 in Dagenais, a ‘real and substantial’ risk. That is, it must be a risk the reality of which is well-grounded in the evidence. It must also be a risk that poses a serious threat to the proper administration of justice. ")
- ↑
Globe & Mail v Alberta, 2011 ABQB 363 (CanLII), 520 AR 279, per Tilleman J, at para 8
- ↑
R v CBC, 2018 ONSC 5167 (CanLII), per Goldstein J, at para 36
- ↑
CBC, ibid., at para 36 (". I also do not accept that as a general rule mere publication of the fact of cooperation with the police will prejudice future cooperation. It might. People might be willing to cooperate with the police only where they do not believe that the fact of cooperation is unknown. Such an assertion would require specific evidence — such as in the case of a person fearing physical harm in a gang-related case. ")
- ↑
R v CBC, 2008 ONCA 397 (CanLII), 231 CCC (3d) 394, per Juriansz JA, at paras 18, 26
- ↑
R v Vice Media Canada Inc, 2016 ONSC 1961 (CanLII), 352 CRR (2d) 60, per MacDonnell J, at para 64 - appealed to 2017 ONCA 231 (CanLII) and 2018 SCC 53 (CanLII)
- ↑
Vice Media Canada, ibid., at para 66
Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v Ontario, 2005 SCC 41 (CanLII), [2005] 2 SCR 188, per Fish J, at para 23 ("the ground must not just be asserted in the abstract; it must be supported by particularized grounds related to the investigation that is said to be imperilled")
- ↑ Application by the Winnipeg Free Press, 2006 MBQB 43 (CanLII), 200 Man R (2d) 196, 70 WCB (2d) 54, at para 71 ("... the R.C.M.P. is seeking to limit public access to information on the basis that resultant publicity through the media would harm the nature and extent of an ongoing investigation and subvert the ends of justice. The R.C.M.P. is put in an unenviable position of endeavouring to support an application by reliance upon, in some respects, generalized assertions. However, to do otherwise or to give specifics could well result in jeopardizing the very information that is sought to be protected by the R.C.M.P. from coming into the public domain. ...However, “ … the perceived risk may be more difficult to demonstrate in a concrete manner at that early stage.”")
- ↑
Toronto Star, supra ("...access to court documents cannot be denied solely for the purpose of giving law enforcement officers an investigative advantage...")
- ↑
Globe & Mail v Alberta, supra, at para 16
MacIntyre, supra - ↑
Globe & Mail, supra, at para 16
Phillips v Vancouver Sun, supra
- ↑ Phillips v Vancouver Sun, supra, at para 66
- ↑
Globe & Mail v Alberta, 2011 ABQB 363 (CanLII), 520 AR 279, per Tilleman J, at para 15
- ↑
Globe & Mail v Alberta, ibid., at para 18
- ↑
R v DM, 1993 CanLII 5661 (NS CA), per Kelly JA
- ↑
Vice Media Canada Inc, supra, at para 73
R v CBC, 2013 ONSC 6983 (CanLII), per Nordheimer J, at para 11
R v Esseghaier, 2013 ONSC 5779 (CanLII), per Durno J, at para 160
- ↑
Globe & Mail v Alberta, ibid., at para 21
Flahiff v Cour Du Québec, 1998 CanLII 13149 (QC CA), [1998] RJQ 327, 157 DLR (4th) 485, per Rothman JA, at pp. 19 to 20
- ↑
Flahiff, ibid., at p. 91
CBC, supra, at paras 29 to 32
- ↑
CBC, supra, at para 32
- ↑
CBC, supra, at paras 43 to 46
- ↑
Globe & Mail v Alberta, supra, at para 18
Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 41 (CanLII), [2002] 2 SCR 522, per Iacobucci J
- ↑ Flahiff v Cour Du Québec, 1998 CanLII 13149 (QC CA), 123 CCC (3d) 79, per Rothman JA
- ↑
Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v Canada, 2005 CanLII 47737 (ON SC), 204 CCC (3d) 397, per Nordheimer J, at paras 36 to 42
- ↑
CBC, supra, at para 55
Sealing Procedure
487.3
[omitted (1) and (2)]
- Procedure
(3) Where an order is made under subsection (1) [sealing order in relation to warrants], all documents relating to the application shall, subject to any terms and conditions that the justice or judge considers desirable in the circumstances, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, any term or condition concerning the duration of the prohibition, partial disclosure of a document, deletion of any information or the occurrence of a condition, be placed in a packet and sealed by the justice or judge immediately on determination of the application, and that packet shall be kept in the custody of the court in a place to which the public has no access or in any other place that the justice or judge may authorize and shall not be dealt with except in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the order or as varied under subsection (4). [omitted (4)]
1997, c. 23, s. 14, c. 39, s. 1; 2004, c. 3, s. 8; 2014, c. 31, s. 22.
[annotation(s) added]
Unsealing
Wiretaps
Sealing of Authorization
- Manner in which application to be kept secret
187 (1) All documents relating to an application made pursuant to any provision of this Part [Pt. VI – Invasion of Privacy (ss. 183 to 196.1)] are confidential and, subject to subsection (1.1) [manner in which application to be kept secret – exception], shall be placed in a packet and sealed by the judge to whom the application is made immediately on determination of the application, and that packet shall be kept in the custody of the court in a place to which the public has no access or in such other place as the judge may authorize and shall not be dealt with except in accordance with subsections (1.2) to (1.5) [manner in which application to be kept secret – opening for further applications].
- Exception
(1.1) An authorization given under this Part [Pt. VI – Invasion of Privacy (ss. 183 to 196.1)] need not be placed in the packet except if, under subsection 184.3(8) [one-party consent wiretap by telewarrant – where telecomm. produces writing], the original authorization is in the hands of the judge, in which case that judge must place it in the packet and the copy remains with the applicant.
[omitted (1.2), (1.3), (1.4), (1.5), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8)]
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 187; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 24; 1993, c. 40, s. 7; 2005, c. 10, s. 24; 2014, c. 31, s. 10; 2022, c. 17, s. 8.
[annotation(s) added]
Unsealing of Authorization
Defence counsel may apply to the court under s. 187(1.4) to unseal to authorization. The section states:
187
[omitted (1) and (1.1)]
- Opening for further applications
(1.2) The sealed packet may be opened and its contents removed for the purpose of dealing with an application for a further authorization or with an application for renewal of an authorization.
- Opening on order of judge
(1.3) A provincial court judge, a judge of a superior court of criminal jurisdiction or a judge as defined in section 552 [definitions - judges] may order that the sealed packet be opened and its contents removed for the purpose of copying and examining the documents contained in the packet.
- Opening on order of trial judge
(1.4) A judge or provincial court judge before whom a trial is to be held and who has jurisdiction in the province in which an authorization was given may order that the sealed packet be opened and its contents removed for the purpose of copying and examining the documents contained in the packet if
- (a) any matter relevant to the authorization or any evidence obtained pursuant to the authorization is in issue in the trial; and
- (b) the accused applies for such an order for the purpose of consulting the documents to prepare for trial.
- Order for destruction of documents
(1.5) Where a sealed packet is opened, its contents shall not be destroyed except pursuant to an order of a judge of the same court as the judge who gave the authorization.
- Order of judge
(2) An order under subsection (1.2) [manner in which application to be kept secret – opening for further applications], (1.3) [opening on order of judge to copy and examine packet], (1.4) [opening on order of trial judge to copy and examine packet for trial] or (1.5) [order for destruction of documents] made with respect to documents relating to an application made pursuant to section 185 [procedure to apply for a 186 wiretap] or subsection 186(6) [authorization of wiretap – renewal] or 196(2) [suspension while extension application pending] may only be made after the Attorney General or the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness by whom or on whose authority the application for the authorization to which the order relates was made has been given an opportunity to be heard.
- Order of judge
(3) An order under subsection (1.2) [manner in which application to be kept secret – opening for further applications], (1.3) [opening on order of judge to copy and examine packet], (1.4) [opening on order of trial judge to copy and examine packet for trial] or (1.5) [order for destruction of documents] made with respect to documents relating to an application made under subsection 184.2(2) may only be made after the Attorney General has been given an opportunity to be heard.
- Editing of copies
(4) Where a prosecution has been commenced and an accused applies for an order for the copying and examination of documents pursuant to subsection (1.3) [opening on order of judge to copy and examine packet] or (1.4) [opening on order of trial judge to copy and examine packet for trial], the judge shall not, notwithstanding those subsections, provide any copy of any document to the accused until the prosecutor has deleted any part of the copy of the document that the prosecutor believes would be prejudicial to the public interest, including any part that the prosecutor believes could
- (a) compromise the identity of any confidential informant;
- (b) compromise the nature and extent of ongoing investigations;
- (c) endanger persons engaged in particular intelligence-gathering techniques and thereby prejudice future investigations in which similar techniques would be used; or
- (d) prejudice the interests of innocent persons.
- Accused to be provided with copies
(5) After the prosecutor has deleted the parts of the copy of the document to be given to the accused under subsection (4) [editing of copies to remove certain information before disclosure], the accused shall be provided with an edited copy of the document.
- Original documents to be returned
(6) After the accused has received an edited copy of a document, the prosecutor shall keep a copy of the original document, and an edited copy of the document and the original document shall be returned to the packet and the packet resealed.
- Deleted parts
(7) An accused to whom an edited copy of a document has been provided pursuant to subsection (5) [order for destruction of documents] may request that the judge before whom the trial is to be held order that any part of the document deleted by the prosecutor be made available to the accused, and the judge shall order that a copy of any part that, in the opinion of the judge, is required in order for the accused to make full answer and defence and for which the provision of a judicial summary would not be sufficient, be made available to the accused.
- Documents to be kept secret — related warrant or order
(8) The rules provided for in this section apply to all documents relating to a request for a related warrant or order referred to in subsection 184.2(5) [one-party consent wiretap – other concurrent authorizations], 186(8) [authorization of wiretap – other concurrent authorizations] or 188(6) [emergency wiretaps – related warrant or order] with any necessary modifications.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 187; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 24; 1993, c. 40, s. 7; 2005, c. 10, s. 24; 2014, c. 31, s. 10; 2022, c. 17, s. 8.
[annotation(s) added]
Non-Disclosure Order for Production Orders
A non-disclosure order is an order available to prohibit a named person or organization from disclosing the existence of a preservation demand, preservation order, or production order.
- Order prohibiting disclosure
487.0191 (1) On ex parte application made by a peace officer or public officer, a justice or judge may make an order prohibiting a person from disclosing the existence or some or all of the contents of a preservation demand made under section 487.012 [preservation demand] or a preservation or production order made under any of sections 487.013 to 487.018 [provisions on production orders] during the period set out in the order.
- Conditions for making order
(2) Before making the order, the justice or judge must be satisfied by information on oath in Form 5.009 [forms] that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the disclosure during that period would jeopardize the conduct of the investigation of the offence to which the preservation demand or the preservation or production order relates.
- Form
(3) The order is to be in Form 5.0091 [forms].
- Application to revoke or vary order
(4) A peace officer or a public officer or a person, financial institution or entity that is subject to an order made under subsection (1) [order prohibiting disclosure of preservation or production orders] may apply in writing to the justice or judge who made the order — or to a judge in the judicial district where the order was made — to revoke or vary the order.
2014, c. 31, s. 20.
[annotation(s) added]
- peace officer and public officer
Section 2 defines "peace officer."[1] Section 487.011 defines "public officer."[2]
- judge and justice
Section 2 defines "justice."[3] Section 487.011 defines "judge."[4]